In this paper some proposals for the representation of illocutionary force, in as much as it is expressed gramatically, are examined, without taking into consideration how these representations are integrated into other levels of representation. There are certain inadequacies in the solutions proposed in the current literature, which often deals with the problems posed by Austin by considering only one of the various devices, mood, or grouping them into main types or moods, without considering either the possible differences between types of acts and types of sentences in different languages, or their possible variations within the same language. Instead, the adequate description of the grammatical illocutionary force device, or candidates for such a role, that is for the role of giving an utterance its literal force, leads to a discussion of some of the best known positions and stipulations about the levels of representation of speech acts: the question as to whether speech acts are produced in a linguistically conventional way can be tackled after finding a more linguistically adequate description of the sentences uttered to perform speech acts, and in particular, of the features which can function as illocutionary force device. The representation of the literal force of an utterance, unifying a series of generalizations regarding form and function, permits a more precise evaluation of certain widespread theoretical positions about the integration of the linguistic level of representation (which according to the conventionality theory gives the utterance literal force) with other levels of representation. Instead, the adequate description of the grammatical illocutionary force device, or candidates for such a role, that is for the role of giving an utterance its literal force, can make it possible to discuss some of the best known positions and stipulations about the levels of representation of speech acts. The question as to whether speech acts are produced in a linguistically conventional way can be tackled after finding a more linguistically adequate description of the sentences uttered to perform speech acts, and in particular, of the features which can function as illocutionary force devices. The number and the importance of the phenomena of variation between languages and within a given language make it necessary to reconsider the relation between the different grammatical features, including mood, which can function as illocutionary force devices in a langue-parole framework.

On Moods and Types in Italian: Some Observations and Proposal

FAVA, Elisabetta
1984

Abstract

In this paper some proposals for the representation of illocutionary force, in as much as it is expressed gramatically, are examined, without taking into consideration how these representations are integrated into other levels of representation. There are certain inadequacies in the solutions proposed in the current literature, which often deals with the problems posed by Austin by considering only one of the various devices, mood, or grouping them into main types or moods, without considering either the possible differences between types of acts and types of sentences in different languages, or their possible variations within the same language. Instead, the adequate description of the grammatical illocutionary force device, or candidates for such a role, that is for the role of giving an utterance its literal force, leads to a discussion of some of the best known positions and stipulations about the levels of representation of speech acts: the question as to whether speech acts are produced in a linguistically conventional way can be tackled after finding a more linguistically adequate description of the sentences uttered to perform speech acts, and in particular, of the features which can function as illocutionary force device. The representation of the literal force of an utterance, unifying a series of generalizations regarding form and function, permits a more precise evaluation of certain widespread theoretical positions about the integration of the linguistic level of representation (which according to the conventionality theory gives the utterance literal force) with other levels of representation. Instead, the adequate description of the grammatical illocutionary force device, or candidates for such a role, that is for the role of giving an utterance its literal force, can make it possible to discuss some of the best known positions and stipulations about the levels of representation of speech acts. The question as to whether speech acts are produced in a linguistically conventional way can be tackled after finding a more linguistically adequate description of the sentences uttered to perform speech acts, and in particular, of the features which can function as illocutionary force devices. The number and the importance of the phenomena of variation between languages and within a given language make it necessary to reconsider the relation between the different grammatical features, including mood, which can function as illocutionary force devices in a langue-parole framework.
1984
moods; types; speech acts
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11392/463749
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