The recent enactment of the Italian “Codice della Crisi d’Impresa e dell’Insolvenza” (Business Crisis and Insolvency Code) has renewed attention on the role and the adequacy of organizational structures designed to prevent business crisis. In this context, the present study originates from a critical provocation: it questions whether these so called “adequate organizational structures” constitute a substantive innovation or, conversely, merely formalize pre-existing practices that had already demonstrated operational effectiveness in the past. Building on this consideration, the research aims to assess whether the principles and needs that have led to today’s regulation of “adequate organizational structures”, as tool for crisis prevention, can also be identified in much earlier historical contexts. The research carried out is particularly extensive and complex because it encompasses the emblematic case of the Monte di Pietà of Ferrara, which experienced two major insolvency episodes between the late 16th and early 17th centuries. The extended time horizon of the phenomenon under consideration requests an important methodological choice: in order to maintain a sufficiently analytical depth of the case examined and the findings that can be derived therefrom, it was considered appropriate to divide the study into two contributions, each published as a separate article. More precisely, the present contribution focuses on the 1598 crisis, while the second, to be published subsequently, will address the 1646 crisis. The case study follows a longitudinal approach based on in-depth analysis of archival sources and adopts a diachronic perspective. The examination of primary and secondary archival sources made it possible to: identify the specific causal mechanisms behind the crisis occurred in 1598; reconstruct the organizational structure of the institution at that time; assess the adequacy of these structures by comparing them with the pathological dysfunctions that ultimately led to failure. Ultimately, the findings of this first part of the research suggest that organizational structures, even in a non-structured way, can be found in distant historical periods. Furthermore, the findings reveal that the organizational structures put in place immediately after the first crisis was inadequate to the specific needs and peculiarities of the institutions in that historical context. This outcome can be attributed to two interrelated shortcomings: an underdeveloped learning process and the absence of a crisis culture mature enough to guide the design and reconfiguration of governance mechanisms oriented towards the prevention of pathological states. Moreover, the inefficiencies identified did not have a neutral effect on the governance of the institution; rather, they functioned as a contributing cause of crisis, facilitating the resurgence and proliferation of pathological dysfunctions. The persistence of these structural weaknesses will be further highlighted by the 1646 crisis, the causes of which, together with the actions undertaken to address it, will constitute the focus of the second contribution. This subsequent contribution will trace the learning process gradually internalized by the Monte di Pietà and document the successive refinement of its organizational, administrative, and accounting structures, which ultimately proved adequate to preventing the onset of pathological conditions.
Radici antiche della modernità: “adeguati” assetti e prevenzione della crisi. Il Monte di Pietà di Ferrara dopo il fallimento del 1598
Cestari G.
;Georgiev M. G.;Madonna S.
2026
Abstract
The recent enactment of the Italian “Codice della Crisi d’Impresa e dell’Insolvenza” (Business Crisis and Insolvency Code) has renewed attention on the role and the adequacy of organizational structures designed to prevent business crisis. In this context, the present study originates from a critical provocation: it questions whether these so called “adequate organizational structures” constitute a substantive innovation or, conversely, merely formalize pre-existing practices that had already demonstrated operational effectiveness in the past. Building on this consideration, the research aims to assess whether the principles and needs that have led to today’s regulation of “adequate organizational structures”, as tool for crisis prevention, can also be identified in much earlier historical contexts. The research carried out is particularly extensive and complex because it encompasses the emblematic case of the Monte di Pietà of Ferrara, which experienced two major insolvency episodes between the late 16th and early 17th centuries. The extended time horizon of the phenomenon under consideration requests an important methodological choice: in order to maintain a sufficiently analytical depth of the case examined and the findings that can be derived therefrom, it was considered appropriate to divide the study into two contributions, each published as a separate article. More precisely, the present contribution focuses on the 1598 crisis, while the second, to be published subsequently, will address the 1646 crisis. The case study follows a longitudinal approach based on in-depth analysis of archival sources and adopts a diachronic perspective. The examination of primary and secondary archival sources made it possible to: identify the specific causal mechanisms behind the crisis occurred in 1598; reconstruct the organizational structure of the institution at that time; assess the adequacy of these structures by comparing them with the pathological dysfunctions that ultimately led to failure. Ultimately, the findings of this first part of the research suggest that organizational structures, even in a non-structured way, can be found in distant historical periods. Furthermore, the findings reveal that the organizational structures put in place immediately after the first crisis was inadequate to the specific needs and peculiarities of the institutions in that historical context. This outcome can be attributed to two interrelated shortcomings: an underdeveloped learning process and the absence of a crisis culture mature enough to guide the design and reconfiguration of governance mechanisms oriented towards the prevention of pathological states. Moreover, the inefficiencies identified did not have a neutral effect on the governance of the institution; rather, they functioned as a contributing cause of crisis, facilitating the resurgence and proliferation of pathological dysfunctions. The persistence of these structural weaknesses will be further highlighted by the 1646 crisis, the causes of which, together with the actions undertaken to address it, will constitute the focus of the second contribution. This subsequent contribution will trace the learning process gradually internalized by the Monte di Pietà and document the successive refinement of its organizational, administrative, and accounting structures, which ultimately proved adequate to preventing the onset of pathological conditions.I documenti in SFERA sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
