Abstract This text aims to address the appropriation of transcendental thought within Martin Heidegger's philosophy. To this end, the aim is the confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) that Heidegger establishes with German idealism, more specifically with Kant and Hegel. This confrontation has the main objective of making clearer the originality of Heidegger's background position (Grundstellung), which will prove to be a transcendentalist position in opposition to the immanentist position of German idealism. And the secondary objective is to demonstrate the irreducibility of the two background positions. This thesis is divided into two chapters in which the respective confrontations with Kant and then with Hegel are established. The first chapter aims at an appropriative confrontation with Kant based on texts from the intermediate period of Heidegger’s production, more specifically with Kant and the problem of metaphysics (1929), The metaphysical foundations of logic (1928) and the later text What is a thing? On Kant’s doctrine of transcendental principles (1935/36). Based on the Heideggerian interpretation of Kant with the deepening of the phenomenon of transcendence, we seek to clarify the development of Heidegger's transcendentalist background position. This investigation aims to clarify three facets of the phenomenon of transcendence: a) temporality as ek-static-horizontal temporality; b) a positive determination of finiteness; c) the primacy of the possible over the effective. We also seek to explain how the deepening of the thought of transcendence, in these intermediate texts, will prove to be a reason for the turn (Kehre) in Heideggerian thought. The second chapter aims at an oppositional confrontation with German idealism. Firstly, we seek to develop how the interpretation of Kant's philosophy, within German idealism, develops in a totally different way from Heidegger's. This interpretation will trigger an immanentization of the transcendental, developing in the immanentist background position of German idealism, which in terms of the history of being has its greatest exponent in Hegel. From this, a confrontation between the two basic positions is established, a confrontation that Heidegger saw as necessary for future philosophy, namely, the confrontation between the guiding question (Leitfrage) and the fundamental question (Grundfrage). Here we will also focus on the texts from the intermediate period in which Heidegger establishes his interpretation of the Phenomenology of Spirit, which are: Hegel and the problem of metaphysics (1930), Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (1930/31) and the later text The concept of experience in Hegel (1942//43). This confrontation will occur between the same facets listed above but in opposite way, namely: a) with Hegelian circular temporality; b) with infinity; c) with the primacy of effective (Wirklichkeit) over possibility. Such a confrontation between the modalities of the possible and the actual in terms of temporality will appear as a confrontation between memory (Erinnerung) and forgetfulness (Vergessenheit). In the conclusion, we intend to establish a difference between the Hegelian and Heideggerian understanding of presence (Anwesenheit) from the later conference Time and Being (1962). As a guiding thread throughout the text lies the debate on the topology of being, understood as a place of the transcendental.
Resumo Este texto tem como objetivo abordar a apropriação do pensamento transcendental no interior da filosofia de Martin Heidegger. Para tal, visa-se a confrontação (Auseinandersetzung) que Heidegger estabelece com o idealismo alemão, mais especificamente com Kant e Hegel. Esta confrontação tem como objetivo maior tornar mais clara a originalidade da posição-de-fundo (Grundstellung) heideggeriana que se mostrará como uma posição transcendentalista em contraposição a posição imanentista do idealismo alemão. E o menor objetivo de demostrar a irredutibilidade das duas posições-de-fundo. A tese é dividida em dois capítulos em que são estabelecidas as respectivas confrontações com Kant e depois com Hegel. No primeiro capítulo se visa uma confrontação apropriativa com Kant a partir dos textos do período intermediário da produção de Heidegger, mais especificamente com Kant e o problema da metafísica (1929), Fundamentos iniciais metafísicos da lógica a partir de Leibniz (1928) e o texto mais tardio O que é uma coisa? A doutrina kantiana dos princípios transcendentais (1935/36). A partir da interpretação heideggeriana de Kant com o aprofundamento no fenômeno da transcendência buscamos clarificar o desenvolvimento da posição-de-fundo transcendentalista de Heidegger. Esta investigação visa clarificar três facetas do fenômeno da transcendência: a) a temporalidade enquanto temporalidade ek-statico-horizontal; b) uma determinação positiva da finitude; c) a primazia do possível perante o efetivo. Também buscamos explicitar como o aprofundamento no pensamento da transcendência, nestes textos intermediários, irá se mostrar como um motivo da virada (Kehre) no pensamento heideggeriano. No segundo capítulo visa-se uma confrontação opositiva com o idealismo alemão. Primeiramente busca-se desenvolver como a interpretação da filosofia de Kant, no interior do idealismo alemão, se desenvolve de maneira totalmente distinta da heideggeriana. Interpretação essa que desencadeará numa imanentização do transcendental desenvolvendo-se na posição-de-fundo imanentista do idealismo alemão, que em termos de história do ser tem seu maior expoente em Hegel. A partir disto, estabelece-se uma confrontação das duas posições-de-fundo, confrontação essa que Heidegger via como necessária para a filosofia futura, a saber, a confrontação entre a pergunta-diretriz (Leitfrage) e a pergunta-fundamental (Grundfrage). Aqui também focaremos nos textos do período intermediário em que Heidegger estabelece sua interpretação da Fenomenologia do Espírito, são eles: Hegel e o problema da metafísica (1930), A Fenomenologia do Espírito de Hegel (1930/31) e o texto tardio O conceito de experiência em Hegel (1942//43). Esta confrontação irá ocorrer entre as mesmas facetas enumeradas anteriormente mas em seu oposto, a saber: a) com a temporalidade circular hegeliana; b) com a infinitude; c) com a primazia da realidade-efetiva (Wirklichkeit) sobre a possibilidade. Tal confrontação entre as modalidades do possível e do efetivo em sede de temporalidade se mostrarão como uma confrontação entre lembrança (Erinnerung) e esquecimento (Vergessenheit). Em sede de conclusão pretende-se estabelecer uma diferença entre a compreensão de presença (Anwesenheit) hegeliana e heideggeriana a partir da conferência tardia Tempo e ser (1962). Como fio condutor de todo o texto reside o debate sobre a topologia do ser, entendido enquanto lugar do transcendental.
ECOS DO TRANSCENDENTAL: A CONFRONTAÇÃO ENTRE HEIDEGGER E O IDEALISMO ALEMÃO
EHRENFRIED NOGUEIRA, THIAGO
2024
Abstract
Abstract This text aims to address the appropriation of transcendental thought within Martin Heidegger's philosophy. To this end, the aim is the confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) that Heidegger establishes with German idealism, more specifically with Kant and Hegel. This confrontation has the main objective of making clearer the originality of Heidegger's background position (Grundstellung), which will prove to be a transcendentalist position in opposition to the immanentist position of German idealism. And the secondary objective is to demonstrate the irreducibility of the two background positions. This thesis is divided into two chapters in which the respective confrontations with Kant and then with Hegel are established. The first chapter aims at an appropriative confrontation with Kant based on texts from the intermediate period of Heidegger’s production, more specifically with Kant and the problem of metaphysics (1929), The metaphysical foundations of logic (1928) and the later text What is a thing? On Kant’s doctrine of transcendental principles (1935/36). Based on the Heideggerian interpretation of Kant with the deepening of the phenomenon of transcendence, we seek to clarify the development of Heidegger's transcendentalist background position. This investigation aims to clarify three facets of the phenomenon of transcendence: a) temporality as ek-static-horizontal temporality; b) a positive determination of finiteness; c) the primacy of the possible over the effective. We also seek to explain how the deepening of the thought of transcendence, in these intermediate texts, will prove to be a reason for the turn (Kehre) in Heideggerian thought. The second chapter aims at an oppositional confrontation with German idealism. Firstly, we seek to develop how the interpretation of Kant's philosophy, within German idealism, develops in a totally different way from Heidegger's. This interpretation will trigger an immanentization of the transcendental, developing in the immanentist background position of German idealism, which in terms of the history of being has its greatest exponent in Hegel. From this, a confrontation between the two basic positions is established, a confrontation that Heidegger saw as necessary for future philosophy, namely, the confrontation between the guiding question (Leitfrage) and the fundamental question (Grundfrage). Here we will also focus on the texts from the intermediate period in which Heidegger establishes his interpretation of the Phenomenology of Spirit, which are: Hegel and the problem of metaphysics (1930), Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (1930/31) and the later text The concept of experience in Hegel (1942//43). This confrontation will occur between the same facets listed above but in opposite way, namely: a) with Hegelian circular temporality; b) with infinity; c) with the primacy of effective (Wirklichkeit) over possibility. Such a confrontation between the modalities of the possible and the actual in terms of temporality will appear as a confrontation between memory (Erinnerung) and forgetfulness (Vergessenheit). In the conclusion, we intend to establish a difference between the Hegelian and Heideggerian understanding of presence (Anwesenheit) from the later conference Time and Being (1962). As a guiding thread throughout the text lies the debate on the topology of being, understood as a place of the transcendental.I documenti in SFERA sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
