In this paper, my aim is to show how Kant’s account of personhood fundamentally differs from those defended by the early readers of his philosophy at the end of the eighteenth century. I will argue that this difference is due to the coexistence of two different ways of considering the characteristics upon which the definition of “human being” (Mensch) rests, at the apogee of the Enlightenment and the dawn of idealism in Germany.
Personhood according to Kant (and Schiller): Personality, Being a Human Being, and Revolution
Falduto A
2023
Abstract
In this paper, my aim is to show how Kant’s account of personhood fundamentally differs from those defended by the early readers of his philosophy at the end of the eighteenth century. I will argue that this difference is due to the coexistence of two different ways of considering the characteristics upon which the definition of “human being” (Mensch) rests, at the apogee of the Enlightenment and the dawn of idealism in Germany.File in questo prodotto:
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2023 Falduto Kantian Subject.pdf
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