The present contribution proposes a comparison between the “classic” philosophical anthropology of the XX century and Karl Löwith’s thought re-read as an attempt of rising the Menschenfrage to the status of Sache des Denkens. The paper pursues this aim through a dialog with Joachim Fischer’s 2008 book, Philosophische Anthropologie. Eine Denkrichtung des 20. Jahrhunderts, where it is vividly proposed the issue of the historical and theoretical meaning of the philosophical anthropology. The paper articulates in two parts. The first one thrashes out the peculiar status of the philosophical anthropology in the XX century. In agreement with Fischer’s hypothesis, the paper claims that the philosophical anthropology exhibits the features of a thinking approach (Denkansatz); nonetheless, the paper disagrees about the assessment of the so-called sociological-turn (Soziologisierung), in which it is found out a compliance to positivistic stances, i.e. the ultimate victory of the gehlenian stance over the schelerian one. Starting from this critical presupposition, the second part makes a comparison with Löwith’s comsocentric anthropology. More specifically, the paper focuses on Löwith’s recovery of a concept of world (Welt) not reducible to any concept of human world (Menschenwelt). This stance is intended to be a feasible alternative to uphold the truly philosophical character of the Menschenfrage.
Traendo spunto dal libro-manifesto del 2008 di Joachim Fischer, in cui viene riproposta la questione del significato storico e teorico dell’antropologia filosofica, questo lavoro sviluppa un confronto fra l’antropologia filosofica “classica” del XX secolo e il pensiero di Karl Löwith riletto complessivamente in chiave antropologica. La prima parte del lavoro discute la peculiare situazione dell’antropologia filosofica nel XX secolo. D’accordo con Fischer, ne viene rivendicato il carattere di approccio di pensiero; ci si distacca dalla sua posizione, invece, quanto alla valutazione della cosiddetta "svolta sociologizzante", nella quale si ravvisa uno smarrimento della sua ispirazione filosofica. A partire da questo presupposto critico, la seconda parte innesta il confronto con l’antropologia cosmocentrica löwithiana, la cui ripresa del concetto di mondo (nella sua irriducibilità a qualsiasi mondo umano) viene indicata come un tentativo a tutt'oggi praticabile allo scopo di tutelare il carattere autenticamente filosofico della Menschenfrage.
Tra mondo e mondo umano: antropologia filosofica, oggi. Karl Löwith e la Philosophische Anthropologie
Cera A
2013
Abstract
The present contribution proposes a comparison between the “classic” philosophical anthropology of the XX century and Karl Löwith’s thought re-read as an attempt of rising the Menschenfrage to the status of Sache des Denkens. The paper pursues this aim through a dialog with Joachim Fischer’s 2008 book, Philosophische Anthropologie. Eine Denkrichtung des 20. Jahrhunderts, where it is vividly proposed the issue of the historical and theoretical meaning of the philosophical anthropology. The paper articulates in two parts. The first one thrashes out the peculiar status of the philosophical anthropology in the XX century. In agreement with Fischer’s hypothesis, the paper claims that the philosophical anthropology exhibits the features of a thinking approach (Denkansatz); nonetheless, the paper disagrees about the assessment of the so-called sociological-turn (Soziologisierung), in which it is found out a compliance to positivistic stances, i.e. the ultimate victory of the gehlenian stance over the schelerian one. Starting from this critical presupposition, the second part makes a comparison with Löwith’s comsocentric anthropology. More specifically, the paper focuses on Löwith’s recovery of a concept of world (Welt) not reducible to any concept of human world (Menschenwelt). This stance is intended to be a feasible alternative to uphold the truly philosophical character of the Menschenfrage.I documenti in SFERA sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
