In the aftermath of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, conflicts between the Court of Justice and Constitutional or Supreme Courts of the Member States have become increasingly frequent and serious. This trend has involved also the Italian Constitutional Court, which has taken a stance of "re-centralisation" towards European Union Law, overcoming axioms of the model of relations between domestic and EU Law (the so-called "Granital Model") and laying the foundations for a new era of the "cammino comunitario" (the "269 temperate model"). As a root cause for this phenomenon, Legal Scholars have put forward the current momentum of EU law after the Treaty of Lisbon: the expansion of European competences in matters deeply linked to State sovereignty and the strengthening of the Union's system of protection of fundamental rights, due to the attribution by Article 6(1) TEU to the Charter of Nice of the same legal value of the Treaties. These grounds are the premise, the general context. Another is claimed to be, in the present work, the real reason for the conflict between the Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice: the preliminary reference of the Italian ordinary judge. It is the (ab)use of the preliminary references procedure by Italian judges that is mainly responsible for the tensions arisen between the two Courts, a circumstance that has led “il giudice delle leggi” to review the relations between itself, the Court of Luxembourg and the ordinary judges. An ordinary judge who, in the “spaces” opened up by the encounter between the potential of the preliminary ruling mechanism and the broad discretion recognised to it by the “Granital model” (not to mention the Consulta's isolation derived from the refraining to use the preliminary ruling procedure), has found fertile ground for its own activism. Chapter I offers a reconstruction of the role of Article 267 TFEU in the EU judicial system. On the one hand, the focus is on the fundamentals of the preliminary ruling procedure, such as the admissibility (subjective and objective) of the reference, as well as the obligation imposed on the last instance courts; on the other hand, the interrelation between Article 267 TFEU and the Constitutional justice systems present in some Member States, including Italy, will not be ignored. Chapter II proposes an analysis of some references received by Italian courts since the Treaty of Lisbon that are particularly illustrative of the ordinary courts’ not marginal, but central, contribution to the conflict between courts. The Kamberaj case, which sums up the will towards a "comunitarizzazione" of the ECHR, and other references testifying to the tendency of Italian ordinary courts to invoke the Charter outside its scope. The potential conflict between EU secondary law and the constitutional principle of access to the public administration through competition (Art. 97, para. 4 Const.) and the related constitutional case law in the saga of fixed-term contracts in public schools (from Scattolon, through Mascolo and Rossato to YT and others). The Taricco case and the alarming risk of the activation of counter-limits. The “war between Supreme Judges” that can be witnessed in the Randstadt and Hoffman-La Roche cases. Finally, in Chapter III, the "cammino comunitario" of the Constitutional Court from the decentralization to the recent "re-centralisation" is analysed, thus, from the model of relations between legal systems in Granital to the recent "inversion" – not mandatory for the judge and not preclusive of the "European path" – of the dual preliminarity in Judgment No. 269 of 2017. The re-shaping by the Italian Constitutional Court of its role and of that of the ordinary judge toward EU Law could not be analyzed if not in the light of the reason of the conflict, topic of this Ph.D Thesis.

Dopo l’entrata in vigore del Trattato di Lisbona sempre più frequenti e gravi risultano i conflitti tra la Corte di giustizia e i giudici costituzionali o supremi degli Stati membri. Una tendenza che non ha lasciato intatta neppure la posizione della Corte costituzionale italiana, la quale ha attuato un cammino di “riaccentramento” rispetto al diritto dell'Unione europea, superando assiomi del modello di rapporti tra diritto interno e sovranazionale che sino ad oggi aveva guidato la propria giurisprudenza “comunitaria”. A giustificazione di tale fenomeno, la dottrina maggioritaria ha addotto l’attuale fisionomia del diritto sovranazionale a seguito del trattato di riforma. Tali motivi rappresentano, semmai, la premessa. È l’(ab)uso del rinvio pregiudiziale da parte dei giudici italiani il principale responsabile delle tensioni intercorse che tra le Corti. Un giudice ordinario che, negli “spazi” aperti dall’incontro tra le potenzialità proprie del meccanismo del rinvio pregiudiziale e l’ampia discrezionalità ad esso riconosciuta dal “modello Granital” (al quale va associata il colpevole isolamento della Consulta dal dialogo pregiudiziale), ha trovato il terreno fertile per il proprio attivismo. Nel Capitolo I viene offerta una ricostruzione del ruolo dell’art. 267 TFUE nel sistema di tutela giurisdizionale dei trattati. Da una parte oggetto di attenzione sono i fondamenti della procedura pregiudiziale, quali la ricevibilità (soggettiva e oggettiva) del rinvio nonché l’obbligo che ai sensi del co. 3 grava sui giudici di ultima istanza; dall’altra parte non si mancherà di approfondire l’interrelazione tra il dialogo fra i giudici nazionali e la Corte di giustizia e i sistemi di giustizia costituzionali presenti in alcuni degli Stati membri, fra i quali l’Italia. Nel Capitolo II viene proposta l’analisi di alcuni rinvii pregiudiziali pervenuti dagli organi giurisdizionali italiani dal Trattato di Lisbona ad oggi particolarmente esemplificativi del contributo non marginale, ma centrale, del giudice ordinario al conflitto fra Corti. Il caso Kamberaj, il quale somma le spinte verso una “comunitarizzazione” della CEDU presenti in una parte della giurisprudenza italiana, e altri rinvii che testimoniano la tendenza dei giudici ordinari di invocare la Carta fuori dal suo ambito di applicazione. Il potenziale contrasto tra il diritto derivato e il principio costituzionale dell’accesso alla pubblica amministrazione mediante concorso (art. 97, co. 4 Cost.) e la relativa giurisprudenza costituzionale nella saga dei contratti a termine della scuola pubblica (da Scattolon, passando per Mascolo e Rossato fino a YT e a.). Il caso Taricco, con il rischio più che concreto dell’attivazione del sindacato della Consulta sui controlimiti. La “guerra tra giudici supremi” alla quale è possibile assistere nei rinvii pregiudiziali Randstadt e Hoffman-La Roche. Nel Capitolo III, infine, viene preso in analisi il “cammino comunitario” del Giudice costituzionale dalla diffusione al recente “riaccentramento”, dunque, dal modello di relazioni tra ordinamenti cristallizzato dalla pronuncia Granital sino alla recente «inversione» – facoltativa per il giudice e non preclusiva del “percorso europeo” – della doppia pregiudiziale.

La ragione del conflitto. Il rinvio pregiudiziale tra giudici ordinari e Corte costituzionale

BARBIERI, Samuele
2023

Abstract

In the aftermath of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, conflicts between the Court of Justice and Constitutional or Supreme Courts of the Member States have become increasingly frequent and serious. This trend has involved also the Italian Constitutional Court, which has taken a stance of "re-centralisation" towards European Union Law, overcoming axioms of the model of relations between domestic and EU Law (the so-called "Granital Model") and laying the foundations for a new era of the "cammino comunitario" (the "269 temperate model"). As a root cause for this phenomenon, Legal Scholars have put forward the current momentum of EU law after the Treaty of Lisbon: the expansion of European competences in matters deeply linked to State sovereignty and the strengthening of the Union's system of protection of fundamental rights, due to the attribution by Article 6(1) TEU to the Charter of Nice of the same legal value of the Treaties. These grounds are the premise, the general context. Another is claimed to be, in the present work, the real reason for the conflict between the Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice: the preliminary reference of the Italian ordinary judge. It is the (ab)use of the preliminary references procedure by Italian judges that is mainly responsible for the tensions arisen between the two Courts, a circumstance that has led “il giudice delle leggi” to review the relations between itself, the Court of Luxembourg and the ordinary judges. An ordinary judge who, in the “spaces” opened up by the encounter between the potential of the preliminary ruling mechanism and the broad discretion recognised to it by the “Granital model” (not to mention the Consulta's isolation derived from the refraining to use the preliminary ruling procedure), has found fertile ground for its own activism. Chapter I offers a reconstruction of the role of Article 267 TFEU in the EU judicial system. On the one hand, the focus is on the fundamentals of the preliminary ruling procedure, such as the admissibility (subjective and objective) of the reference, as well as the obligation imposed on the last instance courts; on the other hand, the interrelation between Article 267 TFEU and the Constitutional justice systems present in some Member States, including Italy, will not be ignored. Chapter II proposes an analysis of some references received by Italian courts since the Treaty of Lisbon that are particularly illustrative of the ordinary courts’ not marginal, but central, contribution to the conflict between courts. The Kamberaj case, which sums up the will towards a "comunitarizzazione" of the ECHR, and other references testifying to the tendency of Italian ordinary courts to invoke the Charter outside its scope. The potential conflict between EU secondary law and the constitutional principle of access to the public administration through competition (Art. 97, para. 4 Const.) and the related constitutional case law in the saga of fixed-term contracts in public schools (from Scattolon, through Mascolo and Rossato to YT and others). The Taricco case and the alarming risk of the activation of counter-limits. The “war between Supreme Judges” that can be witnessed in the Randstadt and Hoffman-La Roche cases. Finally, in Chapter III, the "cammino comunitario" of the Constitutional Court from the decentralization to the recent "re-centralisation" is analysed, thus, from the model of relations between legal systems in Granital to the recent "inversion" – not mandatory for the judge and not preclusive of the "European path" – of the dual preliminarity in Judgment No. 269 of 2017. The re-shaping by the Italian Constitutional Court of its role and of that of the ordinary judge toward EU Law could not be analyzed if not in the light of the reason of the conflict, topic of this Ph.D Thesis.
FIORAVANTI, Cristiana
GREGGI, Marco
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11392/2502850
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