This thesis highlights the reasons why the current structure of the European Economic and Monetary Union has not been able to cope effectively with the effects of the global financial and economic crisis that broke out in the USA in 2008. In particular, since the introduction of the euro as single currency, there have been significant trade imbalances in the balance of payments of the EU Member States. However, until the outbreak of the crisis, these imbalances were concealed by the substantial break-even of Target 2 balances. Nevertheless, once the crisis broke out, a so-called sudden stop caused the collapse of the most important credit institutions of the peripheral States, which showed a clear over-exposure to credit. The rescue of these banks by public finances turned the private sector debt crisis into the so-called sovereign debt crisis. The procedure for macroeconomic imbalances, provided for by EU Regulations 1174/2011 and 1176/2011, was therefore established with the aim of monitoring also the imbalances relating to the private sector in Member States. However, certain thresholds of the indicators used for the scoreboard of this procedure show a clear underlying asymmetry. In this respect, the indicator on the current account balance is particularly significant. While the threshold for surpluses is set at 6%, the threshold for deficits is set at 4% proving that, compared to the former, the latter are considered more dangerous for the macroeconomic stability of a State. It follows, however, that, by considering debts and credits symmetrically, the procedure ends up attributing the greatest efforts at macroeconomic correction to the debtor Member States. This asymmetry therefore seems to contrast to the principle of equality among the Member States of the Union, as enshrined in Article 4 of the TEU and provided for in Article 11 of our Constitutional Charter. Moreover, the executives of PIGS Member States in adopting the most important national reforms post-2011 seem to have mainly complied with the recommendations of the procedure. This correlation therefore has two different implications, both of which are relevant from a constitutionalist point of view: on the one hand, the relationship between the political community and constitutional bodies has been affected, with repercussions on the functionality of political representation understood as a relationship and not merely as a position; on the other hand, there has been a surreptitious extension of the competences of the Union institutions, beyond the limits outlined by the principle of attribution pursuant to Article 5 TEU. With reference to this principle, it can therefore be seen that MIP recommendations relate to areas which would fall within the exclusive competence of the individual Member States, such as public administration, research and development, social security, taxation, health and social policy, and even go so far as to provide judgment on constitutional reforms. On the other hand, MIP recommendations do not seem to have significantly conditioned the political-legislative bodies of the surplus states, Germany above all, in developing their national policies. In this regard, there is the clear failure of the German governments to implement the repeated recommendations calling for greater public investment and a general increase in wages, in order to rebalance the relative national trade balance. This situation can probably be ascribed to the different political weight of the French-German axis compared to the much weaker one of the peripheral states. It therefore seems possible to conclude that the enforcement of the Procedure is intrinsically political, as the coercive degree of the recommendations, which are legally on the same level, seems to be linked to the credit or debt exposure of the various Member States.

La presente tesi pone in evidenza le ragioni per cui l’attuale assetto dell’Unione economica e monetaria europea non è stato in grado di fronteggiare efficacemente gli effetti della crisi economico finanziaria globale, scoppiata negli USA nel 2008. Tali squilibri sono stati infatti occultati, fino al momento dell’esplosione della crisi, dal sostanziale pareggio dei saldi Target 2. Tuttavia, quando questa dispiegò i suoi effetti, si registrò il c.d. sudden stop, ovvero un significativo deflusso di risorse dagli Stati GIPSI agli Stati core tale da determinare il crollo dei più importanti istituti creditizi dei secondi, a causa di una loro chiara sovraesposizione creditizia. Il salvataggio di tali banche, da parte delle finanze pubbliche statali, tramutò quindi la crisi dei debiti del settore privato nella c.d. crisi dei debiti sovrani. La procedura per squilibri macroeconomici, prevista dai Regolamenti UE 1174/2011 e 1176/2011, fu quindi istituita con la finalità di monitorare anche gli squilibri degli Stati membri afferenti al settore privato. Tuttavia, talune soglie degli indicatori di cui lo scoreboard di tale procedura si compone manifestano un’evidente asimmetria di fondo. Emblematico, a tale riguardo, è l’indicatore sul saldo delle partite correnti. Mentre infatti la soglia per i surplus è fissata al 6%, quella per i deficit è al 4%, a riprova del fatto che, rispetto ai primi, i secondi sono ritenuti più pericolosi per la stabilità macroeconomica di uno Stato. Ne deriva, tuttavia, che la procedura, non considerando in maniera simmetrica debiti e crediti, finisce con l’imputare agli Stati membri debitori i maggiori sforzi di correzione macroeconomica. Tale asimmetria pare quindi porsi in contrasto con il principio di parità tra Stati membri dell’Unione come sancito dall’art. 4 TUE e previsto dallo stesso art. 11 della nostra Costituzione. Inoltre, gli esecutivi degli Stati membri GIPSI nell’adottare le più rilevanti riforme nazionali post 2011 sembrano essersi sostanzialmente conformati alle raccomandazioni nell’ambito della procedura. Tale correlazione ha quindi due diverse implicazioni, entrambe rilevanti dal punto di vista costituzionalistico: per un verso, è stato infatti inciso il rapporto tra comunità politica e organi costituzionali, con riflessi sulla funzionalità della rappresentanza politica intesa quale rapporto e non come mera posizione; per l’altro, si è assistito ad un ampliamento surrettizio delle competenze delle istituzioni dell’Unione, al di fuori del perimetro tracciato dal principio di attribuzione ex art. 5 TUE. Proprio in riferimento a tale principio, si può quindi osservare come le raccomandazioni MIP vertano su settori che sarebbero riservati alla competenza esclusiva dei singoli Stati membri quali: pubblica amministrazione, ricerca e sviluppo, previdenza, fisco, sanità, politiche sociali, fino a spingersi addirittura a sviluppare un giudizio con riguardo alle riforme costituzionali. Diversamente, invece, le raccomandazioni MIP non sembrano aver significativamente condizionato gli organi politico-legislativi degli Stati in surplus, Germania su tutti, quanto a progettazione delle politiche nazionali. Emblematica, a tal riguardo, la mancata implementazione, da parte dei Governi tedeschi, delle ripetute raccomandazioni sollecitanti maggiori investimenti pubblici e un generale aumento dei salari, ai fini di un riequilibrio della relativa bilancia commerciale nazionale, in costante ed eccessivo surplus. Tale situazione è verosimilmente attribuibile al diverso peso politico dell’asse franco tedesco rispetto a quello, ben più debole, degli Stati periferici. Pare quindi potersi concludere per un’intrinseca politicità nell’enforcement della Procedura, il cui grado di coercitività delle raccomandazioni, benché giuridicamente queste siano sul medesimo piano, sembra legarsi all’esposizione creditoria o debitoria dei diversi Stati membri.

La tecnocrazia in luogo della politica: la procedura per squilibri macroeconomici e le riforme negli Stati membri dell'Unione europea.

CABAZZI, Riccardo
2020

Abstract

This thesis highlights the reasons why the current structure of the European Economic and Monetary Union has not been able to cope effectively with the effects of the global financial and economic crisis that broke out in the USA in 2008. In particular, since the introduction of the euro as single currency, there have been significant trade imbalances in the balance of payments of the EU Member States. However, until the outbreak of the crisis, these imbalances were concealed by the substantial break-even of Target 2 balances. Nevertheless, once the crisis broke out, a so-called sudden stop caused the collapse of the most important credit institutions of the peripheral States, which showed a clear over-exposure to credit. The rescue of these banks by public finances turned the private sector debt crisis into the so-called sovereign debt crisis. The procedure for macroeconomic imbalances, provided for by EU Regulations 1174/2011 and 1176/2011, was therefore established with the aim of monitoring also the imbalances relating to the private sector in Member States. However, certain thresholds of the indicators used for the scoreboard of this procedure show a clear underlying asymmetry. In this respect, the indicator on the current account balance is particularly significant. While the threshold for surpluses is set at 6%, the threshold for deficits is set at 4% proving that, compared to the former, the latter are considered more dangerous for the macroeconomic stability of a State. It follows, however, that, by considering debts and credits symmetrically, the procedure ends up attributing the greatest efforts at macroeconomic correction to the debtor Member States. This asymmetry therefore seems to contrast to the principle of equality among the Member States of the Union, as enshrined in Article 4 of the TEU and provided for in Article 11 of our Constitutional Charter. Moreover, the executives of PIGS Member States in adopting the most important national reforms post-2011 seem to have mainly complied with the recommendations of the procedure. This correlation therefore has two different implications, both of which are relevant from a constitutionalist point of view: on the one hand, the relationship between the political community and constitutional bodies has been affected, with repercussions on the functionality of political representation understood as a relationship and not merely as a position; on the other hand, there has been a surreptitious extension of the competences of the Union institutions, beyond the limits outlined by the principle of attribution pursuant to Article 5 TEU. With reference to this principle, it can therefore be seen that MIP recommendations relate to areas which would fall within the exclusive competence of the individual Member States, such as public administration, research and development, social security, taxation, health and social policy, and even go so far as to provide judgment on constitutional reforms. On the other hand, MIP recommendations do not seem to have significantly conditioned the political-legislative bodies of the surplus states, Germany above all, in developing their national policies. In this regard, there is the clear failure of the German governments to implement the repeated recommendations calling for greater public investment and a general increase in wages, in order to rebalance the relative national trade balance. This situation can probably be ascribed to the different political weight of the French-German axis compared to the much weaker one of the peripheral states. It therefore seems possible to conclude that the enforcement of the Procedure is intrinsically political, as the coercive degree of the recommendations, which are legally on the same level, seems to be linked to the credit or debt exposure of the various Member States.
GUAZZAROTTI, Andrea
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11392/2488151
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