The aim of my paper is to shed some light on the term ‘moralisches Gef ìhl’ (moral feeling) in Kant’s ethics. In particular, I want to offer some reason for accepting a meaning of ‘moralisches Gefìhl’ which does not completely correspond to the concept of ‘Achtung’ (respect). In order to find a second, independent meaning, we will have to consider two different senses of the word ‘Gefìhl’ and the corresponding more general concepts they denote.
The Two Meanings of moralisches Gefühl in Kant's Doctrine of Virtue
FALDUTO A
2013
Abstract
The aim of my paper is to shed some light on the term ‘moralisches Gef ìhl’ (moral feeling) in Kant’s ethics. In particular, I want to offer some reason for accepting a meaning of ‘moralisches Gefìhl’ which does not completely correspond to the concept of ‘Achtung’ (respect). In order to find a second, independent meaning, we will have to consider two different senses of the word ‘Gefìhl’ and the corresponding more general concepts they denote.File in questo prodotto:
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