L’autonomia finanziaria delle regioni tra antico e nuovo art. 119 – Progressi e regressi del c.d. ‘federalismo fiscale’

This PhD dissertation regards the so called “Fiscal Federalism” and examines the evolution of regional financial independence under the Italian constitutional system, beginning from the original article n. 119 of the Italian Constitution to the recent attempts at executing the new article n. 119, that was introduced in 2001. To begin with, the research aims to identify the correct meaning of “Fiscal Federalism,” which is a topic of debate where Italian public finance is concerned. Then, by a critical approach, this dissertation measures the real rise and fall of the “Fiscal Federalism” in Italy throughout the years, examining the connected normative framework, analyzing the decisions taken by the Constitutional Court and studying the most relevant doctrinal contributions on this matter. The development of the research follows the evolutions of the legal framework. The first chapter introduces the notions of “Federalism” and “Fiscal federalism.” The second chapter analyzes the financial independence of the regions during the implementation of the original article n. 119 of the Constitution. The third chapter regards the new article n. 119, introduced in October 2001, and signed by the legislative body as the beginning of Fiscal Federalism in Italy. The fourth chapter is dedicated to examining the legislative process aimed at implementing the new article n. 119, which began almost ten years after the introduction of the new constitutional framework. Furthermore, this chapter examines the modification of the article n. 119 made by constitutional law n. 1/2012, concerning balanced budgets, which is in direct opposition of the original objectives set forth in the reform made in 2001. The last chapter deals with some final considerations on this matter, taking into account the reports published by two groups of experts that were nominated in 2013 by the President of Republic and the Prime Minister in order to produce specific proposals concerning institutional reforms. Unfortunately, it is difficult to give a definitive evaluation of the matter as the reform has yet to be put into effect and, consequently, future economic and institutional results could be very different. Overall, this PhD dissertation radically calls into question the real innovative effects of “Fiscal Federalism” reform and shows the relevant difference between the political messages concerning it and the real financial independence of the regions and, thus, highlighting a contradiction between the abstract model of “Fiscal Federalism” and the choices concretely adopted by the Parliament and the Government.