Compressed sensing has been proposed to both yield low-cost compression and low-cost encryption. This can be very useful in the design of sensor nodes with a limited resource budget whose acquisition must be kept as private as possible. We here analyze the susceptibility of compressed sensing stages that are optimized to maximize compression performance by rakeness-based design to ciphertext-only and known-plaintext attacks. A tradeoff between compression and security is highlighted. Notwithstanding such a tradeoff, rakeness-based compressed sensing exhibits a noteworthy robustness to classical attacks.
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|Titolo:||Low-Cost Security of IoT Sensor Nodes with Rakeness-Based Compressed Sensing: Statistical and Known-Plaintext Attacks|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2018|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||03.1 Articolo su rivista|