De Finetti suggested that scoring rules - namely, loss functions by which a forecaster is virtually charged depending on the degree of inaccuracy of his predictions - could be employed also to provide a compelling argument for probabilism. However, De Finetti' s choice of a specifi c scoring rule for this purpose (Brier' s quadratic rule) appears somewhat arbitrary, and the general pragmatic flavour of the argument - which makes it a variant of the well-known "Dutch Book Theorem" has been deemed unsuitable for an epistemic justification of probabilism. In this paper we suggest how Brier' s rule may be justified on epistemic grounds by means of a strategy that is diff erent from the one usually adopted for this purpose, taking advantage of a recent characterization result concerning distance functions between real-valued vectors.
Epistemic accuracy and subjective probability.
D'AGOSTINO, Marcello;
2010
Abstract
De Finetti suggested that scoring rules - namely, loss functions by which a forecaster is virtually charged depending on the degree of inaccuracy of his predictions - could be employed also to provide a compelling argument for probabilism. However, De Finetti' s choice of a specifi c scoring rule for this purpose (Brier' s quadratic rule) appears somewhat arbitrary, and the general pragmatic flavour of the argument - which makes it a variant of the well-known "Dutch Book Theorem" has been deemed unsuitable for an epistemic justification of probabilism. In this paper we suggest how Brier' s rule may be justified on epistemic grounds by means of a strategy that is diff erent from the one usually adopted for this purpose, taking advantage of a recent characterization result concerning distance functions between real-valued vectors.I documenti in SFERA sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
