We investigate how market competition affects the incentive to adopt a non-profit-maximizing behaviour. The analysis is developed in a strategic delegation framework in which owners delegate output decisions to managers interested in firm’s relative performance. We study how the optimal delegation scheme is affected by market concentration and the elasticity of market demand. We prove that the distortion from a profit-maximizing rule decreases as market becomes less concentrated, while it increases as demand becomes more elastic. Finally, we discuss the impact of market competitiveness on the welfare-enhancing ability of delegation contracts.

COMPETITION AND THE STRATEGIC CHOICE OF MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES: THE RELATIVE PERFORMANCE CASE

COLOMBO, Caterina
2011

Abstract

We investigate how market competition affects the incentive to adopt a non-profit-maximizing behaviour. The analysis is developed in a strategic delegation framework in which owners delegate output decisions to managers interested in firm’s relative performance. We study how the optimal delegation scheme is affected by market concentration and the elasticity of market demand. We prove that the distortion from a profit-maximizing rule decreases as market becomes less concentrated, while it increases as demand becomes more elastic. Finally, we discuss the impact of market competitiveness on the welfare-enhancing ability of delegation contracts.
2011
A., Chirco; M., Scrimitore; Colombo, Caterina
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11392/1444910
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