We study the dynamic implementation of the first-best solution for King Solomon's Dilemma, under the assumption that boundedly rational players find their way to equilibrium using monotonic evolutionary dynamics. We find that all the mechanisms proposed by the literature fail to implement the first best dynamically and provide an alternative solution.
Splitting the Baby in Two: Solving Solomon’s Dilemma with Boundednly Rational Agents
PONTI, Giovanni
2000
Abstract
We study the dynamic implementation of the first-best solution for King Solomon's Dilemma, under the assumption that boundedly rational players find their way to equilibrium using monotonic evolutionary dynamics. We find that all the mechanisms proposed by the literature fail to implement the first best dynamically and provide an alternative solution.File in questo prodotto:
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