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Mohammad Attar Abkenar

ABSTRACT

This study has examined two epochs of reform and resistance to the government in Afghanistan's modern history. It provides a comprehensive analysis of the internal and external factors that terminated the government's efforts in consolidating the central authority and modernizing the country in failure which consequently resulted in the long lasting civil war and anti-western tendencies in Afghanistan. The first selected regime is the monarchy of King *Amanullah Khan* (1919-1929) and the second one is the communist regime of *the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (the PDPA)*, under the Soviet hegemony (1978-1989).

This study has provided a conceptual model, which hypothesizes the functions of different social, political, and religious factors in the process of consolidating the central power and conducting the reform programme. In this regard, the Afghan governments' inappropriate social, political, and economic policies, which provoked several reactions from tribal and religious forces, are identified as the internal factors. Furthermore, the colonial competitions between Russians and the British, *the Great Game*, and the tension between the Soviet Union and the West, *the Cold War*, are indicated as external elements.

The study demonstrates how King *Amanullah* initially was able to attain legitimacy from religious elites, and attract the public support to attain Afghanistan's complete independence from Britain and successfully implement initial stage of his reform programme while *the PDPA* in consequence of its military coup from the beginning was involved in the legitimacy crisis.

According to comparative analysis of two selected regimes, this study has concluded several significant findings regarding the factors that were supposed to be under the Afghan government's special consideration and also the characters of the several resistances that occurred throughout the two regimes.

Keywords: Afghanistan, modern history, government, reform, resistance, King *Amanullah*, *the PDPA*.

RIASSUNTO

Questo studio ha esaminato, nella storia moderna dell'Afghanistan, due epoche di riforma e resistenza al governo, di fornire un'analisi completa dei fattori interni ed esterni, che si è conclusa con gli sforzi di quest'ultimo di consolidare il proprio potere centrale e modernizzare il paese. Come causa del fallimento è scaturita una guerra civile che si è protratta per un lungo periodo di tempo con tendenze anti-occidentali. Il primo regime selezionato è stata la monarchia di re *Amanullah Khan* (1919-1929) e il secondo è stato *il regime comunista del Partito popolare democratico dell'Afghanistan (il PDPA)*, sotto l'egemonia Sovietica (1978-1989).

Questo studio ha fornito un modello concettuale che ipotizza le funzioni dei diversi fattori sociali, politici e religiosi nel processo di consolidamento del potere centrale e nella realizzazione del programma di riforme. A questo proposito i governi Afghani, inappropriati sotto il punto di vista sociale, politico ed economico, hanno causato numerose reazioni da parte delle forze tribali e religiose. Questi fattori sono identificati come “fattori interni”. Inoltre, la competizione coloniale tra Russi e Inglesi, chiamata come *il Grande gioco* e la tensione tra l'Unione Sovietica e l'Occidente, definita come *la Guerra fredda*, sono elencati come “elementi esterni”.

Lo studio dimostra come il re *Amanullah* è stato inizialmente in grado di raggiungere la legittimità delle élite religiose e di attrarre il sostegno del pubblico per accedere alla completa indipendenza dell'Afghanistan dalla Gran Bretagna, impostando con successo la fase iniziale di attuazione del suo programma di riforme; contrariamente *il PDPA* ha avuto sin dall'inizio, come risultato del suo Colpo di Stato militare, una crisi di legittimità.

Secondo l'analisi comparativa dei due regimi selezionati, questo studio ha trovato diverse importanti e significative conclusioni: una su i fattori principali essenziali ma non considerati dal governo Afgano, l'altra su i caratteri delle diverse resistenze che si sono svolte durante i due regimi.

Parole chiave: Afghanistan, storia moderna, il governo, la riforma, la resistenza, il re *Amanullah*, *il PDPA*.

DEDICATION

To my beloved country,
IRAN

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE OF APPROVAL	<i>i</i>
DECLARATION	<i>iii</i>
ABSTRACT	<i>iv</i>
RIASSUNTO	<i>v</i>
DEDICATION	<i>vi</i>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	<i>vii</i>
TABLE OF CONTENTS	<i>ix</i>
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES	<i>xii</i>
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	<i>xiii</i>
LIST OF GLOSSARY OF TERMS	<i>xiv</i>
1. INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY	<i>1</i>
1.1. Background and Context to the Study	<i>2</i>
1.2. Aims of the Study	<i>7</i>
1.3. Significance of the Study	<i>8</i>
1.4. Research Methodology	<i>9</i>
1.5. Case Selection	<i>11</i>
1.5.1. Case One: the Monarchy of King Amanullah Khan: 1919-1929	<i>11</i>
1.5.2. Case Two: People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, under the Soviet Hegemony: 1978-1989	<i>11</i>
1.6. Structure of Thesis	<i>12</i>
2. LITERATURE REVIEW	<i>14</i>
2.1. Introduction	<i>15</i>
2.2. Literature Review	<i>15</i>
3. CASE STUDY 1-THE MONARCHY OF KING AMANULLAH KHAN: 1919-1929	<i>20</i>
3.1. Introduction	<i>21</i>
3.2. Assumption of Power	<i>24</i>
3.3. The Young Afghans	<i>25</i>
3.4. Siraj-ul-Akhbar and Mahmud Tarzi	<i>27</i>
3.5. Achievement of Independence	<i>30</i>
3.6. Pan-Islamism	<i>33</i>
3.7. Reform Programmes and Resistances	<i>37</i>
3.8. The First Stage of Reform	<i>41</i>

3.8.1. Drafting of the Constitution -----	41
3.8.2. The State Structure -----	44
3.8.3. Culture and Educational Reforms -----	47
3.8.4. Changes in Family Life -----	53
3.8.5. Other Reforms -----	55
3.9. Backlash against the Reforms -----	55
3.9.1. The Background of Mangal Rebellion -----	55
3.9.2. The Mangal Rebellion -----	57
3.10. Impact of the Grand Tour -----	61
3.11. Secularization -----	65
3.12. Bache Saqaw's Uprising -----	70
3.13. The Connection between Uprisings and Reforms -----	74
3.14. Internal Factors of the Collapse of King Amanullah Khan's Government -----	83
3.15. The Function of External Factors -----	92
3.16. Analytic Summary -----	96
4. CASE STUDY 2-THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN, UNDER THE SOVIET HEGEMONY: 1978-1989 -----	100
4.1. Introduction -----	101
4.2. The Saur Coup in 1978 -----	105
4.2.1. Threatening Factors to the Soviet's Interests in Afghanistan -----	105
4.2.2. Pre-Saur -----	107
4.2.3. The Coup d'État -----	110
4.3. The Khalq Rule -----	113
4.3.1. Foreign Reaction -----	114
4.3.2. New Reforms -----	116
4.3.3. The Public Backlash -----	126
4.3.3.1. Waygal, Jadran and Nuristan Uprising -----	128
4.3.3.2. Darya Suf Valley Uprising -----	128
4.3.3.3. Herat uprising -----	130
4.3.3.4. Chandawal Uprising -----	130
4.4. The Split -----	131
4.4.1. Conflict within the Khalq Faction -----	134
4.4.2. The Soviet Invasion -----	136
4.4.3. Social and Economic Crisis -----	141
4.4.3.1. Severe Military Pressure and Reforms -----	143
4.5. Increasing of the Internal Tensions within the Party -----	147
4.5.1. National Reconciliation -----	148
4.5.2. The Social and Economic Conditions -----	160
4.6. Resistance to the Afghan Puppet Government and the Soviet Occupation -----	162
4.7. Analytic Summary -----	169
5. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS -----	172

5.1. Introduction	173
5.2. Comparative Analysis of Cases	173
5.3. Analysing Government Functions	176
5.3.1. Monarchical regime	177
5.3.2. Democratic Regime	192
5.4. Findings	202
5.4.1. Delineating Characteristics of Functional Afghan Government	202
5.4.1.1. Foreign Support	202
5.4.1.2. National Identity	207
5.4.1.3. Legitimate Government	208
5.4.1.4. Indigenous Government	209
5.4.1.5. Totalitarian Authority	210
5.4.1.6. Handling Dissidents	212
5.4.1.7. Decentralized Government	213
5.4.1.8. The importance of Local Control and Administration	215
5.4.2. Delineating Characteristics of Resistance to the Government	217
5.4.2.1. Irregular Forces, Rebels	217
5.4.2.2. Local Population and Ethnic Groups	218
5.4.2.3. Importance of Islam	220
5.4.2.4. Xenophobic Resistance	221
6. CONCLUSION	223
6.1. A Summary of the Findings	224
6.2. Recommendations	228
6.3. Avenues of Future Research	229
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY	231
8. APPENDICES	241
8.1. The Constitution of Afghanistan April 9, 1923	241
8.2. The Constitution of Afghanistan 1978	249

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

<i>Figure 1-1: Structure of Chapter One</i>	1
<i>Figure 1-2: Conceptual Model for State Making and Reform Making in Afghanistan’s</i>	10
<i>Figure 1-3: Interplay of Thesis Components</i>	13
<i>Figure 2-1: Structure of Chapter Two</i>	14
<i>Figure 3-1: Structure of Chapter Three</i>	20
<i>Figure 3-2: Conceptual Model for the Roots of the Failure of King Amanullah</i>	23
<i>Figure 3-3: Afghanistan’s Tribal Structure and Relationship to the State</i>	45
<i>Figure 4-1: Structure of Chapter Four</i>	100
<i>Figure 4-2: Conceptual Model for the Roots of the Failure of the PDPA</i>	103
<i>Figure 4-3: The PDPA’s Structure</i>	104
<i>Figure 4-4: Nominal People’s Democratic of Afghanistan Party Structure 1980</i>	114
<i>Figure 4-5: Symbol” of East-West Confrontation</i>	159
<i>Figure 5-1: Structure of Chapter Five</i>	172
<i>Figure 5-2: Major Soviet Institutions Making Afghan Policy</i>	199
<i>Figure 6-1: Structure of Chapter Six</i>	223
<i>Table 5-1: Comparative Analysis of two cases</i>	175

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations	Full Description
AGSA	Department for Safeguarding the Interests of Afghanistan
AID	United States Agency for International Development
ANA	Afghan National Army
CIA	Intelligence agency United States of America
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
DRA	The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
GRU	Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye
ISI	Pakistan's military intelligence
KGB	Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti, (Committee for State Security)
KHAD	KhADamat-e Aetla'at-e Dawlati, (translates directly to English as: "State Intelligence Agency")
MSS	Ministry of State Security
NGO	Nongovernmental
PDPA	The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
SAF	The Soviet Armed Forces
UN	The United Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

LIST OF GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Alaqadari	Sub-district
Amir	King
Bazar	Eastern Market
Burqa	Outer garment for women worn over daily clothing to cover their bodies.
Chador	Muslim women's dress
Fatwa	Religious decree (advice, not legally binding)
Ghilzai	The second largest Pashtun tribal confederacy
Jawanan-i-Afghan	The young Afghan
Jihad	Islamic holy war
Khalq	People
Khalqi	Member of the Khalq faction of the PDPA
Khan	A title given to leaders or important people, landowners and landlords
Lashkar	Tribal militia formed during war
Loya Jirga	Grand assembly
Malik	Tribal headman
Mashrooteh Khahan	constitutionalists
Mujahidin	Fighter in the holy war, plural form. (Mujahid, in singular)
Mullah	Religious figure
Parcham	Flag
Parchami	Member of the Parcham faction of the PDPA
Pashtunwali	Pashtun code of conduct

Qadis	Judges
Qalang	Taxes
Qawm	A solidarity group (ethnic, professional or other)
Sardar	Commander
Saur	Forth month of the year according to Afghan solar calendar.
Sharia	Islamic Law
Shuras	Councils
Taghrir	exposition
Tazir	Minor crime
Ulema	Religious scholar
Woluswali	District Local

1. INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY




Figure 1-1: Structure of Chapter One

1.1. Background and Context to the Study

In the recent century, Afghanistan was one of the most undeveloped, unstable and insecure countries of the world, although several Afghan reformist regimes endeavoured to improve Afghanistan's condition. Since 1880, Afghanistan has seen many processes of modernisation such as instituting administrative, political, and social structures, which were implemented by several Afghan reformist regimes. Besides, owing to some internal factors such as public resistance and external factors such as *the Great Game* and *the Cold War* the reformist regimes failed to achieve their desired results.

Afghanistan's modern history has witnessed permanent tension among the liberal and progressive forces and the conservative and regressive ones. Definitely, ethnic and tribal struggles, frontier wars, desiring to preserve traditions and resistance to reforms and finally dysfunctional government could be regarded as the main character of Afghanistan.

The first Afghan reformist regime was Amir *Abdur Rahman Khan* (r. 1880-1901), who was given titles such as "*Iron Amir*" or "*internal imperialism*" due to his brutal operation to manage the tribal and ethnic communities and subdue them. He conducted some policies to develop the government structure, receiving financial aids from the British and increasing internal taxation. The king's cabinet members, governors, and Supreme council were selected from non-royal people. He codified laws, systemized the economic structures, and established his government based on new administration. His policies were based on centralizing control and decentralizing authority to control the power of tribal and feudal leaders and to exert a strong influence on the religious scholars. The king's policies against tribal community resulted in uprising the tribal community against his government. For instance, Hazara tribe arose against his government and consequently in 1882 faced with the king's successful reaction. However, it is noteworthy that *Abdur Rahman Khan's* policies in the villages and areas far from the capital to control the power of local solidarity groups were not so successful.

Abdur Rahman Khan's son, *Habibullah Khan* (r.1901-1919), whose assumption of power was peaceful, was a secular and the reformist King and conducted some policies to modernize Afghanistan. It is noteworthy that he wanted to take advantage of western science and technology to develop Afghanistan. In 1904, he established the *Habibia* School and also a military school. *Siraj-ul-Akhbar*, which during King Amanullah became an organization for independence and modernization, was published during his reign. It is

particularly significant that he endeavoured to alleviate the harsh rules of his father and establish a series of more moderate legislation, which resulted in the popular support for his regime. Nonetheless, his regime still was not able to gain the consent of all the tribes; hence, the tribal opposition was an obstacle to the process of his reforms. During *Habibullah Khan's* reign, the people who were exiled by his father were allowed to return to the country. They brought modernizing ideas and implemented significant role in highlighting the significant of independence and launching the reform policies during the *Amani* era. Although there were acute anti-British feelings in the Afghan Society, *Habibullah Khan* was strikingly attracted to British scientific and technical progresses especially in India, and he believed that Westernization would result in the modernization of the country.

From 1919 to 1929, which is the first case study of this dissertation, King *Amanullah Khan*, the third son of *Habibullah Khan*, was the sovereign of Afghanistan. He conducted the country to gain independence and cut British hands from Afghanistan, as well as he implemented dramatic political and social reform and also as the first Afghan ruler conducted some policies to modernize the country based on Western designs.

As a matter of fact, Afghanistan, subsequent to the attainment its independence and achievement the right to manage its own foreign affairs in 1919 commenced a decade of modernization. Accordingly, the country's first constitution was established in 1923 (See Appendix A). Furthermore, King *Amanullah Khan* adjusted a substantial number of *Abdul Rahman Khan's* inward looking development policies by seriously improving the communication substructure and relying on national resources. His reforms threatened the interests of his internal and external opponents and in consequence, the reform process was faced with several challenges. Following the king's famous trip to Europe and launching the policies to modernize Afghanistan based on Ataturk's modernizing, he implemented hastily and also radically his reform projects. It is worth pointing out that his fundamental change in the social and cultural field angered traditional and religious elements in the Afghan society, and consequently it emerged popular uprisings led by religious and traditional leaders against his government, which resulted in cessation of the king's reforms and ultimately collapse of his regime.

Although the king's advisers suggested him to implement the reforms more prudently in the rural and tribal areas, his inattention to this advice and making harsh and hasty reforms,

which were grave threat for conservative religious and tribal interests, resulted in failure of reforms. It is worth pointing out that none of the subsequent reformist governments paid attention to reform experience of the *Amani* era; as a consequence, they repeated the same mistakes as *Amanullah*'s.

During the reign of King *Nadir Shah* (r.1929-1933), the turbulence was subsided and the development process resumed prudently. He had been the Secretary of War in *Amanullah*'s government and played a major role in the Afghan war against Great Britain in 1919, which eventually led to the complete independence of the country in 1922. Shortly thereafter, he fell into disgrace and went into exile in France. As descendants of a branch line of King *Amanullah*, *Nadir Shah* and three of his brothers (including *Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan*, *Sardar Mohammed Aziz Khan* and *Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan*) revolted in 1929 and overthrew the short-reigning of Amir *Habibullah Kalakani*. In fact, *Kalakani* with the British support and in collaboration with *Ulema* and tribal leaders had forced King *Amanullah* to abdicate and establish non-Pashtun domination. *Mohammed Nadir Shah* appointed himself the king of Afghanistan and immediately initiated hasty programs for economic and social modernization of the country, which as during the *Amani* era resulted in conflict with the conservative *Ulema*. It goes without saying that he did not consider at all the experience of *Amanullah* to deal prosperously with the religious forces.

After the assassination of *Nadir Shah* in 1933, his son *Zahir Shah* became his successor and led the regency until 1953. The dynasty that was established by father and son called *Musahiban* Dynasty, based on their branch of the family of *Mohammedzai*¹ that was a sub-clan of the *Barakzai*. In 1964, the Loya Jirga (Grand Council) in the introduction of a constitutional monarchy proposed a new constitution. During this time, *Zahir Shah* proposed to implement further reforms; women were given the right to vote and were allowed to attend schools, as well as the medieval infrastructure of the country, was modified and the country was opened to the outside world. It is noteworthy that for many Afghans this era symbolized the last positive memory and reform experience throughout the recent decades.

¹ Also known as *Mohammadzai* or *Mohamedsai*.

On July 17, 1973, *Zahir Shah* was overthrown while he was in Italy by a military coup that was conducted by his cousin and long-time Prime Minister *Mohammed Daoud Khan* and abdicated on 24 August 1973.

Daoud Khan called the country the Republic of Afghanistan, introduced himself as president and supported the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (*the PDPA*). In addition, in 1976, he with the National Revolutionary Party, which was his own party redirected their policies and ideologically and politically became away from the leaders of *the PDPA*, *Nur Muhammad Taraki*, *Babrak Karmal* and *Hafizullah Amin*.

Daoud Khan implemented some reforms such as the suppression of Islamic radicalization and the emancipation of women, which ultimately forced Islamists to immigrate to Pakistan. Islamists made some attempts to perform uprising, however, none of them was successful and the government utilized them as a pretext for intensifying pressure on them.

In 1977, *Daoud Khan* convened the *Loya Jirga* with the intention of convincing the assembly to recognize the influence of Constitution in Afghanistan and turn the state into a one-party state. It does not seem unreasonable to consider that this led to the ban of *the PDPA*. On April 19, 1978, at the funeral of assassinated *Akbar Khyber*, a Pashtun ideologue emerged an uprising against *Daoud Khan's* government. Thousands of people responded to the summons of *Taraki*, *Amin*, and *Karmal* to demonstrate against the government. *The PDPA's* leaders seized the power in a military coup on April 27, thus the Afghan army that was influenced by *the PDPA* openly turned against *Daoud* and finally overthrew his regime.

It is particularly significant that throughout 1933-1978 a substantial number of the country's establishments and also its financial substructure were constructed. Further, the government founded the national bank, the first trained army, Kabul College and the state airline, not counting streets, airfields, telephones, institutes, production of energy. Thus, the country took several significant steps toward the development throughout the mentioned years. It is worth pointing out that numerous of the social reforms introduced, however, anti-religious reforms such as unveiling of women in 1959, did not face with the similar response as in the 1920s. Additionally, since then Prime Minister *Daoud* to some extent took advantage of the mechanism of the government to put them into effect and did not run them forcibly. It is likely that apart from the coup in July 1973, some public commotions, or local rebellions, Afghanistan generally experienced a nonviolent epoch of

approximately 50 years from the interruptions of 1929 up to the Communist coup in 1978. Nonetheless, some tensions occurred between the traditionalists and the modernists leaders. By virtue of incompatibility of political and cultural progress with Afghan traditionalists' ambitions, the country entered in a challenge with the *Saur* coup, the Soviet invasion, and public opposition.

The PDPA was able to take power in the country's political scene and formed the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (the *DRA*) (1978-1992), which is the second case study of this dissertation. *The PDPA* was established in 1965 and its members principally arrived from the urban petty-bourgeois intellectual milieu and possessed of *Marxist* theory at best vague ideas. In May 1967, the party split by virtue of some grounds such as disagreements concerning the nature of a future revolution and the issue of alliance.

After 27 April 1978, *the PDPA's* leadership took over the management of public affairs. The party's Secretary General *Mohammad Taraki* became Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, Babrak Karmal was Prime Minister, and his deputy foreign minister was *Hafizullah Amin*. They immediately initiated reform measures such as land reforms, regulation of marriage and divorce matters, literacy programs and annihilating feudal and semi-feudal structures. It is remarkable that they were performed such reforms without consideration of social conditions of the country. For instance, there were literacy courses in which girls and women had to participate along with men, which was not applicable in the religious society of Afghanistan.

Even with the land reforms, the government underwent serious blunders. In fact, neither the farmers nor the government were politically and materially prepared for it. Further, the tribal structures and the role of the clergy were simply disregarded; most of the landowners were likewise tribal and religious leaders whose interests were under threat by the land division.

In addition, all government responsibilities were given to party members, regardless of their qualifications and experiences. Thus, many professionals lost their position in the government structure and consequently emigrated. It goes without saying that contrary to the principles of the party programme no attempts implemented to reach a broad national-democratic alliance.

All mentioned issues and the de facto division of *the PDPA* led to a strengthening of the government's opponents. In late 1979, the position of the government was so desperate that Soviet military aid appeared inevitable. Since March 1979, Kabul government several times requested the Soviet Union for military aid and army deployment.

There is a school of thoughts that the Soviet military intervention was a huge political mistake of the Soviet leadership and documented the inability of the Kabul government to seek a political solution to the internal disagreements. It is quite clear that the Soviet provided opportunity for *the PDPA*'s government to compensate for preceding mistakes, fulfil a moderate reform policy, and defuse the controversy. The Soviet assured *the PDPA* that all supports could be provided for a period of six months. After this time, the Afghan government was supposed to be able to defend itself, and subsequently disposition of Soviet forces would have been unnecessary.

The geostrategic importance of Afghanistan on the southern flank of the Soviet Union prompted the Politburo of the CPSU to send units to Kabul. In other words, with the Soviet intervention in the intra-Afghan conflict it gained an international character. Most Western countries, especially the United States and its regional allies, initially in a secret manner and later openly supported opponents of *Karmal* while the Soviet forces were assisting *Karmal* to handle his opponents. Thus, one could draw the conclusion that Afghanistan became the scene of international battlefield.

1.2. Aims of the Study

The primary aim of this study is to clarify why several attempts, implemented in Afghanistan's modern history, to modernize Afghanistan and also develop the influence of the central government on the rural and tribal areas faced with public resistance.

One clarification is the permanent role of religious, tribal, and local groups in resisting to modernist government's attempts at the local level. This study demonstrates that previous Afghan modernist regimes have challenged with this particular issue and also it examines their adopted policies to expand their control and authority over the rural and tribal areas.

This study scrutinizes the backgrounds and functions of Afghanistan's tribal and rural systems and religious groups in restraining government's modernizing efforts spanning two Afghan modernist regimes. Besides, the disturbing role of superpowers especially Russia and Britain in this regard are verified. Main research questions this study purposes

to respond are how did each modernist regime endeavour to implement its reform programme, modernize the country and handle the tribal, rural and religious group that have permanently resisted to central governments' policies? This study hypothesizes that resistances of traditional forces such as tribal and religious groups to the central government could be regarded as the primary factors, and rivalries and interventions of the superpowers such as Russia and Britain could be regarded as the secondary factors in disrupting the modernizing process and failure of the reformist regimes throughout Afghanistan's modern history.

Despite the fact that the preceding studies have correspondingly sought to demonstrate the permanent resistance of traditional and religious classes of Afghan society to the central rule, none has taken a methodology to delineate characteristics of resistance to the modernist government. Likewise, none of them scrutinized characteristics of functional Afghan government that were supposed to consider by the authorities throughout Afghanistan's modern history. For instance, Senzil K. Nawid (Nawid, Amanullah and the Afghan Ulama: Reaction to reforms, 1919- 29 1987), Roshan Noorzai (Noorzai 1987), and M. Waseem Raja (Raja 2011) sought to describe the role of public resistance in disrupting Afghan regimes' reform projects, regardless of scrutinizing the inefficiency in Afghan governments in identifying the characteristics and backgrounds of the resistances in order to conduct them prosperously.

It is worth pointing out that this dissertation embarks on this historical analysis with the intention of drawing lessons of resistance to the Afghan governments' modernizing efforts to the ongoing reform processes in Afghanistan.

1.3. Significance of the Study

This study provides momentous historical experiments for the current Afghan government and international reform determination, for how to best handle the largely rural, tribal, and religious community and also conducting them devoid of provoking further internal challenge and chaos.

Recently implemented policies in Afghanistan have hunted to develop the central government's control beyond Kabul and improve the country's social, cultural and political conditions. Although the international community has assisted the Afghan government in centralizing its control and regionalize its authority by founding the new

administration, owing to internal disunity, challenge, and terrorism operations these measures have resulted in failure. Accordingly, there is not a shadow of doubt that the current reform efforts have not realized the desired results; consequently, the central government has been ineffective to decentralize its authority in the tribal and rural areas.

There is a school of thoughts that the substructures of the international community's strategy have been inappropriate, as well as it could not be effectively functional in the process of reform and strengthening the Afghan government's control in all over the country. (Bradsher 1999, 130, Misdaq 2006, 100). Likewise, there are those who maintain that internal challenge and disunity in Afghanistan could be regarded as a significant point in this regard (Tanner 2009, 117).

Re-experiencing these historical blunders would lead Afghanistan to involve in further civil war, and also would debilitate the government in handling resurgent forces. In addition, consolidating the government's control and reforming the country regarding political, social, and cultural aspects are likewise essential for the campaign against resistance groups and ameliorating Afghanistan's condition. This is because such government would be capable of handling prosperously resistance groups and conduct consequential political, social and cultural reforms, which would realize national reconciliation and develop the country.

This study, therefore, selected two types of regime in Afghanistan modern history that totalitarian regime of King *Amanullah Khan* (r.1919-1929) and democratic regime of *the PDPA* (1978-1992), with the purpose of analysing the obstacle to consolidate Afghan government's control in the rural and tribal areas and also scrutinizing the factors of resistances to the governments' reform projects.

1.4. Research Methodology

The central methodology to examine aims this of study is a methodical case study of two Afghan regimes. The study hunts for providing methodological visions and detailed analyse by scrutinizing the historical context of two selected cases. The conceptual model for state-making and reform-making (See Figure 1-2) hypothesizes the functions of different political, social and religious factors on state-making and reform-making.




Figure 1-2: Conceptual Model for State Making and Reform Making in Afghanistan's Modern History

(+): Positive effect, (-): Negative effect

The model puts forward the constructive and destructive effects that different internal and external factors had on the process of state-making and reform-making in Afghanistan's modern history. As the figure shows, external powers are hypothesized as having the positive effect on the state-making, but nevertheless their roles regarding reform-making are hypothesized negative. Additionally, a legitimate and indigenous authority is assumed to be functional, particularly if it is independent and has widespread control in the local and tribal areas.

Furthermore, identification and scrutiny of solidarity groups and their destructive role in consolidating the power of central government and also in conducting its modernization plans are provided. It is worth pointing out that the conceptual model offers a means, through which the study can subjectively analyse the functions of two types of regimes, including a totalitarian and a democratic regime, in handling solidarity groups and irregular forces that steadfastly resisted the governments' modernizing policies.

Ultimately, the study offers a comparative analysis of two studied regimes with the intention of evaluating each regime's prosperity in consolidating its rule and also in conducting consequential reforms.

1.5. Case Selection

As above mentioned the two selected cases for study are the semi-totalitarian regime of King *Amanullah Khan* (r.1919-1929), the years of the communist regime of *the PDPA* under the Soviet hegemony (1978-1989).

These two cases are selected first and foremost for their difference in regime type, spanning a monarchist and a democratic rule. Consequently, determining these cases offers a prospect of comparing the efforts of two different types of Afghan regimes in consolidating their powers and their prosperity in implementing consequential reforms and development of Afghanistan.

An additional noteworthy aspect regarding case selection was the independence. *Amanullah's* regime was the first independent Afghan regime while *the PDPA* was a puppet regime and completely dependent on the Soviet Union.

1.5.1. Case One: the Monarchy of King Amanullah Khan: 1919-1929

Despite the fact that there are many interpretations of King *Amanullah Khan's* initial success regarding establishing a semi-consolidated central rule to manage several resistance factors and also conducting some successful reforms, there has been no scrutiny concerning this momentous historical experience to take advantage of them for the ongoing reform attempts and eventual resistance to them. Taking into consideration *Amanullah's* prosperity in attracting the support of tribal and religious elements at least in his first stage of reforms might make obtainable traces about how to manage the incompetence of the Afghan government to implement consequential reforms and handle tribal and religious elements.

1.5.2. Case Two: People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, under the Soviet Hegemony: 1978-1989

A large number of essays have striven to scrutinize Soviet hegemony in Afghanistan, but, nonetheless, a limited number of them have inspected the hindrances of the state-making after the *Saur* coup and the role of different factors in the failure of *the PDPA's* reform

attempts. There is not a shadow of doubt that scrutinizing *the PDPA's* political blunders will provide a consequential historical experience for the ongoing reform efforts in Afghanistan.

There is not a shadow of doubt that the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan provided the conditions for the final clash between the USA and the USSR, which as a matter of course led to fall of USSR. One of the remarkable effects of the Soviet-Afghan war was the failure of spreading *Marxist-Leninist* ideas and accordingly the termination of any anti-Islam ideologies. It goes without saying that the communist government of *the PDPA* was incapable of controlling the rural and tribal areas and making a consequential agreement with the solidarity groups. It is likely that the fundamental mismatch and contrast between the apparatuses of *the PDPA's* government and ethnic and tribal structure of Afghan society was the main obstacle in the process of state-making in the era. Besides, public resistances and oppositions to external domination and also to the government's interference in their local affairs and private life hindered *the PDPA* from the course of the reform-making and modernizing the country.

1.6. Structure of Thesis

The rest of this thesis is organized into five chapters and each chapter is divided into several sections and sub-sections. Chapter two provides a prefatory literature review and presents the importance of internal and external factors in state-making and reform-making spanning two selected epochs.

Chapter three discusses how King *Amanullah* was able to gather various elements in Afghanistan, consolidated his power and consequentially attained Afghanistan's independence from the Great Britain. Furthermore, this chapter scrutinizes how the king was prosperous in his first stage of reforms and which obstacles hindered him from decentralizing his authority and also following his reform programme in the subsequent stages.

Chapter four scrutinizes the process of the *Saur* coup and *the PDPA's* adopted solution to implement political, Social and educational reforms. The Soviet Union role in *the PDPA's* policies and the public reaction to them is meticulously depicted. Besides, internal dispute in *the PDPA*, effects of Soviet invasion and resistance to their occupation, and ultimately

failure of *Najibullah*'s national reconciliation policy are the other matters that are regarded by this chapter.

Having presented and discussed two cases of reform and resistance to the government in Afghanistan modern history, chapter five presents and analyses separately each case and also it provides a comparative analysis of the cases. Furthermore, according to the analysis of one monarchical and one democratic government's function and internal and external resistance to their policies, this chapter offers exhibition of findings.

Finally, conclusion with a number of implications, recommendations, and scope for further research are presented in chapter six.




Figure 1-3: Interplay of Thesis Components

2. LITERATURE REVIEW




Figure 2-1: Structure of Chapter Two

2.1. Introduction

This chapter arranges based on the aims of the study and the conceptual model for state-making and reform-making in Afghanistan's modern history presented in chapter one. It goes without saying that there is a substantial number of a literature regarding process of state-making and the governments' reform projects throughout Afghanistan's modern history. Accordingly, a main intention of this chapter is to categorize them through incorporating them and provide those sources that follow the most relevance to the aims of the study and its conceptual model in order to offer an effective, meticulous, and characteristic literature review. Further, the chapter accomplishes a scrutiny of importance of internal and external factors in the process of conducting the government's reform projects in Afghanistan's modern history, in order to offer an overall primer for the further presentation of different factors presented in the chapter five.

2.2. Literature Review

A substantial number of literatures are in Persian (*Farsi*) and Pashto authored by important Afghan authors such as *Ghobar*, *Mojaddedi*, *Farhang*, *Keshtmand*. These authors provide an overall stance and provide plenty of perception in the political changes in Afghanistan's history until the twentieth century. It should also be stated that the bulk of this research is based on such primary sources because their authors were direct observer of many measures, thus their books are the most reliable in this regard. *Mir Gholam Mohammad Ghobar* who was a politician, historian, and journalist in Afghanistan's modern history wrote many books in regard to Afghanistan's history such as *Afghanestan Dar Masire Tarikh* (Afghanistan in the Course of History Vol 1-2). He scrutinized *Amanullah's* unprosperous policies and investigated British elements role in this regard. *Fazl Ghani Mojaddedi* was Afghan historian graduated from Cairo University in 1983. He is the author of more than 75 articles, books. One of them is "*Afghanistan during the kingdom of Amanullah Khan*", which is one of the important sources of this study. *Mir Mohammad Sediq Farhang* was another Afghan scholar that was the advisor of the Prime Minister during *Babrak Karmal*, wrote *Afghanistan Dar Panj Gharne Akhir* (Afghanistan in the past five centuries). *Sultan Ali Keshtmand* was an Afghan politician that was prime minister of *the PDPA* during 1980s. His book *Yaddashthaye Siasi va Roydadhaye Tarikhi: Khaterat-e Shakhsi ba Borhaee az Tarikhe Siasi Moaser-e Afghanistan*, (Political Notes and Historical Events Vol 1) is one of the main sources of scrutinising political

development in Afghanistan during *PDPA*'s rule. It goes without saying that there are a substantial number of primary sources scrutinized by this study that it is problematic to mention the name of all of them in this part.

Furthermore, this study took advantage of a substantial number of the books written by Western scholars. *Tytler, Gregorian, Roy, Poullada, Dupree, Olesen* are the authors that their books are included in the most important sources of this study. *William Kerr Fraser-Tytler* was a British soldier and diplomat in Afghanistan from 1935 to 1941. His book "*Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia*" is a significant source of this research.

There are those who maintain that King *Amanullah* was incapable of attaining public support to manage the local solidarity groups. *Vartan Gregorian* in his book "*The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*" addresses tribalism, nationalism, Islam, and modernization during contemporary history of Afghanistan and strategies of the superpowers in Afghanistan during *the Cold War*. He believed that *Amanullah*'s failure of reform-making was due to his incapability in getting support from urban class to handle tribal-feudal-religious-traditionalist coalition (Gregorian 1969, 269). *Gregorian* surveying the opinions of different researchers, who have scrutinized the roots of the independence war, is of the opinion that there are different judgements in this regard (Gregorian 1969, 228). "*Afghanistan*" is the title of a book written by *Louis Dupree* who spent several years in Afghanistan. He gathered detailed information regarding Afghanistan political development from 1962 to 1978.

Olivier Roy, the well-known French scholar of Islam believes that announcing the policy of modernize Afghan society by the king disturbed his relations with influential Muslim clerics. It is remarkable that this point was the termination of the *Pan-Islamism* alliance, which had been established in tribes, society, and reformist government. The main reason for this dispute was disagreement regarding the relationship between Islam and the westernization. *Roy* highlighted that according to standpoint of fundamentalist clergies, defence of Islam was defined as guiding the society toward Islam and *Shariah* while based on King *Amanullah*'s standpoint defence of Islam was the political issue of anti-imperialism, and the society could lead to modernity by tendency towards the West (Roy 1992, 100-101).

There is a school of thoughts that have blamed King *Amanullah* for inefficiency in considering the traditional basis of the Afghan government. “*Reform and rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929; Amanullah’s Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society*” written by *Leon Poullada* in 1973 is a remarkable source regarding the first case of this research. The author examined the dramatic conflict between a traditional society, whose rules was established based on religious and tribal codes, and a modernist group, whose thoughts was influenced by the Turkish modernist leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. He disregarded the significant role of Islam as an ideological tool directed by religious forces to launch traditional tribal uprising against government’s reform programme. He believed that King’s incapability to consider traditional basis of his government resulted in uprising against his policies.

There are those who highlighted the functional role of the Islam regarding political development in Afghanistan. “*Islam and politics in Afghanistan*” written by *Asta Olesen* is a comprehensive study regarding the role of Islam in the political development, from the realization of the modern Afghan state in the nineteenth century to the present day. He emphasized the cultural incoherence of traditional Islamic structure of the Afghan society with the king’s thoughts, the rule of prohibition of traditional clothing in cities that was enforced by the government and also Queen *Soraya*’s non-Islamic clothing. According to *Olesen* gender mores that established upon Islamic values effectuated one of the most crucial subjects for those who provided a number of requirements to the monarch, and also became persistent obstacle to the subsequent modernization processes (Olesen 1999, 117).

Senzil Nawid, in her PhD thesis titled “*Religious Response to Social Change in Afghanistan, 1919-1929: King Aman-Allah and the Afghan Ulama*”, scrutinizes the significant role of Islam during the *Amani* era considering the connection between British spies and Afghan tribes. He believes that in Afghanistan’s modern history Islam developed along with anti-imperial campaign. Accordingly, it had a consolidated position and well-established militants when King *Amanullah* conducted his reforms regarding Afghanistan’s tribal system. He likewise mentioned that influential religious families such as *Mojaddedi* always were not in the contrast with the king’s policies and they likewise supported the government in peaceful times.

Nazif Shahrani reviewed the considerable point of insurgencies during the *Amani* era. He believes that *Nawid*’s stance presents a statement of facts that were already identified

regarding the social and political aspects of Afghan tribes (Shahrani 2005, 665). As an illustration, he remarks *Nawid's* stance regarding anti-imperial activities provided an opportunity for religious class. Furthermore, a substantial connection among common-law principles, *Pashtunwali*, and the *Shariah* might contribute in the process of resistance to *Amanullah's* reforms. This is because the tribal system regarded government's new constitution as a potential menace to their tribal principles. Accordingly, as *Shahrani* stated from *Nawid's* research tribal society regarded Islam as beneficial instrumental to expand and increase its demands (Shahrani 2005, 673).

It is worth pointing out that apart from the indicated sources some others such as *Rhea Talley Stewart* 1973, *Heathcote* 1980, *Fred Halliday* 1978, *Alexander Lyakhovsky* 1995, *Robert Johnson* 2012 are meticulously scrutinized by this study as well.

It is remarkable that there is a school of thoughts regarding the historical ties between the king's regime and *the PDPA* are highlighted by some interpretations. *Iranica* traces the historical origin of *the PDPA* to the nationalistic and anti-colonial (Young Afghans) movement of 1920, which led by *Amanullah Khan* (Iranica 2010). *Britannica* mentions that in 1921 "[King *Amanullah*] concluded a treaty of friendship with the new Bolshevik regime in the Soviet Union. Afghanistan, therefore, became one of the first states to recognize the Soviet government, and a "special relationship" evolved between the two governments that lasted until December 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan" (Weinbaum 2010).

Both regimes' reform policies were faced with many resistances from the traditional and religious forces. A substantial number of scholars scrutinized the challenge among modernity and tradition during Afghanistan's modern history. *Muhammad Iqbal* believed that "the religious order of is organically related to the social order which it has created. The rejection of the one will eventually involve the rejection of the other" (Sharma 2008, 110).

Indeed, the mentioned sources are a limited number of a long list of sources that is offered in the bibliography. In order to provide the literature several archives, libraries and media centre were visited library of *New York University* (Afghanistan Digital Library), the *National Library of Afghanistan* (Kabul), *the National Library and Archives of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (NLAI), *Interlibrary Services of University of Ferrara*, centres such as

“Dickinson Bologna Centre” which is a Centre for Global Study and Engagement and *University Library of Bologna* and *National Central Library of Rome*.

3. CASE STUDY 1-THE MONARCHY OF KING AMANULLAH KHAN: 1919-1929




Figure 3-1: Structure of Chapter Three

3.1. Introduction

The previous chapter addressed the overview of the study. This chapter painstakingly examines King *Amanullah*'s reforms, their scopes, and objectives and also pinpoints roots of their failure in the views of different scholars and researchers. The method applied in this chapter is descriptive and analytical, which is directed using historical texts and also macro models of reform programme.

Afghanistan undergoing more than two decades of despotic and tyrannical rule of Amir *Abdur Rahman Khan*, eighteen-year rule of Amir *Habibullah Khan*,¹ and suffering from the British colonialism for decades, eventually in 1919 saw a period of enlightenment and freedom devoid of any tyranny and colonialism. Amir *Amanullah Khan* came to the throne in 1919 and plunged into a new strategy, which was based on the independence and a decent relationship with the neighbouring countries and western world. Regarding domestic issues, he concentrated upon social equanimity, national identity, and egalitarianism. Additionally, his domestic policies were vigorously in contrast with the interests of the feudal lords, nobles, and clergies.

The previous regimes under the banner of the British colonialism and achieving financial and political supports from colonialists autocratically governed. Nonetheless, King *Amanullah* was decisive to release Afghanistan from the British colonialism. He leaned upon the Afghan people, terminated the British hegemony, and ceased the British from directing and controlling Afghanistan's domestic and foreign policies. Freedom and autonomy need indisputably essential rearrangement and changes regarding the political, social, and economic matters. Accordingly, the king conducted these significant principles. He sought to shrink the influence of the nobles, feudal lords and Mullahs, and with the intention of establishing social equanimity, embarked on some strategies to adjust the situation of lower social class and intellectuals. From another point of view, he hunted to release state apparatus and administration from influence of irrational and senseless traditional principles (See Figure 3-3). The king summoned the collaboration and contribution of all Afghans in the process of the reform and modernization. The People impressively responded his demand and collaborated with him in the course of pulling out the British from Afghanistan and attaining the independence. Additionally, when the reform programme involved in the Afghans' social and cultural norms and the king

¹ For further information see: Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 3rd Ed, 1980), pp.450-462.

endeavoured to eliminate the influenced superstition in the Afghan society, the people resisted to him, and unfortunately, the resistance became an armed insurgency, which eventually resulted in the failure of the reform attempts and collapse of the government. Failure of the reforms proposes the question that which factors could be regarded as the main reason for failure of the reforms? Moreover, how could be regarded the function of the international elements in encouraging the grass root people and solidarity groups against the central government. Finally, why the king was not able to centralize his control, and decentralize his authority and have successful control in the local and tribal areas? There are those who provided so many theories and examinations based on these questions in this regard. This study examines all of them with the intention of offering scrupulous responses for the mentioned questions;

- What could be regarded as the essential causes of the failure of *Amanullah's* government's policies?
- What was the role of *the Great Game* in the state-making and reform-making?
- What was the role of domestic elements in this regard?

The British plots and subversive role of the British spies, characteristic inconsistency of the modern state with traditions, treason and sabotage of feudal lords, tribal heads, Islamic scholars and officials, could be regarded as the roots of the failure of the king's reform programme and resistance to his government. There is no doubt that a successful and effective reform programme is supposed to implement in an organized scheme; however, in the king's reform programme lack of such scheme is obvious. From the other point of view, the British colonialism, sought to annihilate the principles that assist the country to release from colonialism and foreign hegemony. In this regard, the colonialists taking advantage of the political and cultural reactionary aspects were able to miscarry of the king's reform programme.

This chapter offers a conceptual model for the roots of the failure of *Amanullah's* policies and his inefficiency to consolidate his power.




Figure 3-2: Conceptual Model for the Roots of the Failure of King Amanullah

The chapter takes advantage of a methodical overview of *Amanullah's* government based on primary and secondary sources. The chapter determines all methodological theories by providing the suitable historical background in every event. In addition, the chapter scrutinizes the state's function in handling dissidents, irregular forces, and rebels. Finally, after these examinations, it provides an inclusive analytic summary regarding the first case study.

The chapter at the outset examines *Amanullah's* assumption of power and attainment of independence for the country. The elements that played consequential role in the process of intellectual development of the king and his reformist comrades are presented. Afterwards, the chapter provides the stances of reformists and their objectives, scopes of reforms and resistance to them. Besides, the chapter emphasises on the elements that bothered the king to centralize his control and decentralized his authority.

Subsequent to the king's unsuccessful reform programme and downfall his government, the country faced with a huge crisis. *Habibullah Kalakani* who was a leader of religious forces getting support from the British elements provided a huge resistance to the king's policies and collapsed his government. The British utilized *Kalakani* as the predominant religious factor to stimulate all the Afghan solidarity groups against the king's policies. *Kalakani* provided his remarkable declarations for the Afghan people, in which addressing to the grass roots of the people declared that he saw cruelty, atheism and irreligious beliefs of the government, thus he arose to declare *Jihad* to protect the religion of Prophet Muhammad and release the Afghan people from cruelty and offence. He added that he

would never exploit the public treasury for constructing schools and would grant this to his militaries and to Mullahs (Ataee 2004, 270).

Nevertheless, some intellectual people comprehended the significance and principles of the king's government, comparing it with *Kalakani's* strategies and his religious and traditional system of the governance. Consequently, several researchers directed their studies in the manner of scrutinizing the factors of the failure of King's reform programme and his inability to control the local and tribal areas and practically handle the different resistance groups.

Ghobar regarded the British intervention and government's inefficiency as the motives of uprising and consequently the failure of reform attempts. He assumed that the British elements by providing propaganda in contradiction of the king and Queen *Soraya* excited the public. From the other point of view, misgovernment, and lack of powerful authority, officials' plots resulted in the failure of the reforms. He likewise criticized the king by virtue of his selfish and arrogant behaviour, radical policies, and hasty reforms following his dramatic trip to Europe and neighbouring countries (Ghobar 1981, 7).

Ataee approves *Ghobar's* idea taking into account the mentioned factors as the grounds of the failing in the reform programme. Furthermore, he assumes that, the king's immoderate confidence in his mother and following her idea in conducting his policies was a remarkable blunder of him. He charges *Barakzai* to bother the king in conducting successfully his policies (Ataee 2004, 249).

Indeed, the majority of researchers are approved *Ghobar's* point of view that the British conspiracy, the king's radical westernization and secularization, disregarding traditional rules, Islamic instructions and social beliefs, antagonism of religious scholars could be regarded as principal roots of the failing in his policies and toppling his government (Ghobar 1981, 7).

3.2. Assumption of Power

King *Amanullah's* rise to power was a struggle between two different ideological groups, which were reformists leading by *Amanullah Kahn* and orthodoxies leading by *Sardar Nasrullah Khan*. Both parties were opposite to Amir *Habibullah Khan's* pro-British policy throughout the first World War and they were of the opinion that the country was supposed to continue *Angolo Afghan* war to attain independence. Additionally, each party had

different comprehension regarding religious matters. The reformists were motivated to develop the country and implement modernization efforts in the social and political aspects, nevertheless the orthodoxies were completely opposite to any kind of modernization, and supported traditional rules and Islamic values institutions as the best manner of the guiding the country. Each party sought to bring its own leader to power and direct the country based on its on ideologies.

The *Ulema* and the *Ghalzais* declared their support of *Nasrullah Kan*, who advocated their interests and traditional and religious beliefs, and intellectuals and reformists supported *Amanullah Khan*. Finally, he defeated *Nasrullah Khan's* limited army in *Jalalabad* and took the control of the country. Subsequently the British recognized *Amanullah Khan* as the Sovereign of Afghanistan (Johnson 2012, 177).

Amanullah's assumption of power could be regarded as the outset of a new era of dramatic modification in Afghanistan regarding foreign and domestic policies. The king in a decade of his rule made an effort to achieve and preserve Afghanistan's independence. He sought to make improvement and adjust his new relations with other countries. Furthermore, he altered domestic politics with his social, political, and economic reform programme. His efforts faced with backlash from the local solidarity groups, which caused a crisis between these groups and the central government and bothered the government to have a decentralized authority in all over the country.

3.3. The Young Afghans

To have a meticulous outlook regarding *Amanullah's* social reform and the nationalist-reformists phenomenon in Afghanistan modern history, is indispensable the scrutiny of the development of the nationalist and modernist movements of the modern history of Islamic countries.

The phenomenon of the modern nation-state and independence initially sparked in the Western world and afterwards it was generalized to the other nations. Additionally, pro-independence doctrine developed in the Middle East and as a reaction to Western hegemony and its cultural and political influence. The primary intention of the first of Islamist modernist movement was to review of Islamic principles to adapt them to the modernization ideology and preserve Islam from any disappointing damages (Ghazal 1997). Accordingly, nationalist-reformist movement in the Middle Eastern countries like

Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan initiated to examine prudently the Western methods and procedures of political and social reforms to make adaptable reforms in the Islamic society and its administrative system.

Emerging nationalism in Afghanistan was simultaneous with social and political alteration. In the beginning of twentieth century, Afghan intellectuals established the secret national movement known as constitutionalists' movement, which requested restrictions on the control of the king, attainment of national independence, improvement of domestic economy and scientific progress. Constitutionalists' movement by virtue of unfolding their secret plot against Amir *Habibullah Khan* was suppressed by the government, whereas in fact it did not collapse. It is worth pointing out that after the first decade of the twentieth century, constitutionalists' movement became united with *Jawanan-i Afghan* movement (Young Afghan movement).

This nationalist group was chiefly composed of intellectuals, scholars, and journalists. It likewise attracted several important political leaders comprising of high-ranking officials and the royal family. The originator of the Young Afghan movement was *Mahmud Tarzi*¹, the most important ideologist of Afghanistan's modern history. He assumed that Afghanistan had all the conditions to fulfil nationalism; however, the remarkable issue in this regard is lack of the knowledge to demonstrate obviously that Afghanistan, as other countries, could be independent regardless any protection from the British or any other superpowers.

Amir *Habibullah Khan* granted safe-conduct to all the intellectuals and scholars who were exiled by the previous regimes. This policy resulted in bringing back knowledgeable individuals to Afghanistan. These individuals under the leadership of *Tarzi* implemented a fundamental function in directing the country towards independence and fulfilling nationalism. In fact, *Tarzi* affected many intellectuals comprising the two sons of Amir *Habibullah Khan*; *Enayatulla* and *Amanullah*. It is worth pointing out that when he became the Minister of Education in Kabul requested some modern education and also in 1914 *Habibia* School experienced some educational reforms (Tarzi 1913).

¹ For further information about Tarzi's life see: <http://www.Mahmudtarzi.com> (accessed, July 11, 2012). & May Schinasi, *Afghanistan at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century: Nationalism and Journalism in Afghanistan-A Study of Siraj al-Akhbar: 1911-1918*, (Naples: Istituto Universitario Orientale Seminario de Studi Asiatici, 1974). Rawan Farhadi, *Maqalat-e Mahmud Tarzi dar Seraj al-Akhbar*, [Mahmud Tarzi's articles in Seraj al-Akhbar], (Kabul: Baihaqi publishers, 1977), p.13.

However, the Young Afghan movement managed to remove *Amir Habibullah Kahn* from the political scene and thus by putting an end to an totalitarian regime provided the conditions for raising a constitutional one, which would emphasis on civil rights, liberties and administrative system (See Figure 3-3). In other words, in 1919, the young Afghan movement directed by King *Amanullah* struggled against the British colonialism and implemented a series of reforms throughout the *Amani* era, which were faced with local solidarity groups and finally were doomed to failure.

As reported by Dr. Misdaq, the Young Afghan movement was a model of the Young Turk movement and the doctrine of *Sayed Jamaludin Al-Afghani*¹ with pan-Islamic programmes. The Young Afghan believed that to defence of Islam Afghanistan was supposed to be adapted to modern ways or views like Turkey and Iran; thereby Afghanistan could provide a strong fortified defensive system for defence of Islam (Misdaq 2006, 98).

3.4. Siraj-ul-Akhbar and Mahmud Tarzi

Siraj-ul-Akhbar (Lamp of the News of Afghanistan) was first Afghan newspaper published in Kabul, which was an organization for Afghan intellectuals such as *Tarzi* to spread their modernist ideas regarding political, educational, social issues. From the other point of view, it was regarded the best approach by Afghan intellectuals to spread out their constitutional outlook and highlight the necessity of implementing the fundamental changes and modifications in the administrative system.

Mahmud Tarzi during his present in Turkey sought to discover the roots of the backwardness of Afghanistan and the factors that played as barrier in this regard. He strongly believed lack of attention to educational issues in Afghanistan was supposed to be one of the most consequential factors of Afghan backwardness. These conditions provided a context for superpowers to dominate Afghanistan and direct it based on their own interests and desires, which with no shadow of doubt was in the conflict with the Afghan people beliefs and desires.

Indeed, these issues determined *Tarzi* to launch some policies to increase the level of knowledge of the people with the intention of developing the revolutionary concept in the country. He believed that in the first step religious educations were supposed to be

¹ Also known as Sayed Jamal ad-Din Asadabadi.

replaced with advanced progressive educations. It is worth pointing out that based on religious education the king had divine authority and nobody had the right of criticizing him. From another point of view, religious leaders are strongly supposed to be respected owing to the fact that through them people could be convinced. Accordingly, religious leaders guide people based on their own idea and provided for people no opportunity to consider different issue and as a result, there was no possibility of making any progress in the country (Sakhawarz 1997, 25).

Tarzi wrote several articles in *Siraj al Akhbar* and criticized the British policies in Afghanistan, and addressing the British authorities declared that the period of their mastery in Afghanistan was over. Amir *Habibullah Khan* never prevented him from criticizing them and also encouraged him to continue his anti-British activities. *Tarzi* went a step further and constantly criticized European imperialism and their policies in Afghanistan. He likewise blamed religious leaders for promoting outdated beliefs in the Afghan society providing the context of backwardness of the country (L. Dupree 1980, 439).

It is remarkable that apart from *Tarzi's* articles several intellectuals published their anti-colonial article in the *Siraj al Akhbar*, which gradually became an important organization of anti-colonial movement. Thus, intellectuals, taking advantage of the important factor of national identity, promoted the revolutionary concept among local solidarity groups. They endeavoured to provide the conditions to arise against the British among all local solidarity groups especially those whose interests depended on the British.

Mahmud Tarzi knew attainment of independence without a strong coalition among all the solidarity groups would not be practical. He likewise believed the country required to be united with all the countries, which were suffering from the colonial powers. Based on this idea he decided to convey the messages of pan-Islamism to Turkey and anti-colonial movement of Muslims in India. Further, he conducted some policies establish good relationships with tribal chiefs and religious leaders with the intention of getting their approval and support in this regard. Furthermore, he assumed that international support was likewise very consequential and would bring a definite victory for Afghans. In this respect, he published many articles supporting Islamic or non-Islamic countries, which

were under colonial pressure of Russia and Britain.¹

In addition to the actions of *Tarzi* and his comrades, which played a significant function in stirring up the Afghan people, the role of international events should not be disregarded. Indeed, some international events such as the Iranian Constitutional Movement, convention between Great Britain and Russia in 1907, pan-Islamism in India after the trauma of the Balkan in May 1913, had considerable consequences regarding the Afghan nationalism movement. These events could be regarded as a remarkable lesson learned and convenient models for inexperienced Afghans and prevent them from repeating their political mistakes. Furthermore, *Tarzi* and the other intellectuals translated several books such as *International Law* from Turkish to inform Afghan people regarding their country's international right and *The History of the Russo-Japanese war* to demonstrate that Asian countries attained their rights from imperialism and colonialism.

Moreover, Afghan intellectuals emphasized the emancipation of women. They believed that the government to hold women in high respect as men should launch some policies. Based on their idea the women were supposed to involve in all public affairs and they could have the same rights as men. Further, they wanted the government to allow the women to learn foreign languages and later they were able to inaugurate a school for women in this regard.

It is worth pointing out that Afghan intellectual class believed that the country is backward and undeveloped as a result of the consecutive errors throughout Afghanistan's history. Accordingly, the mentioned errors were supposed as lesson learned in the process of the modification of different aspects of the Afghan society.

They likewise repeated *Tarzi's* idea regarding the necessity of establishing convenient educational institutions to increase the level of the knowledge of the Afghan people. They argued that taking special consideration in this regard was very consequential to cut the roots of development in the country. *Tarzi* likewise argued that in consequence of lack of knowledge in the country the Afghan people were not aware of their fundamental rights in the internal and international arena. The intellectuals were strongly against religious and traditional educations and argued that in consequence of lack of qualified educators and

¹ For further information see: *Siraj al-Akhbar*, 2nd year, no 2, Mizan, 8th, 1292/ September 30, 1913.

recourses in such educations, they were not adequate to improve public knowledge. *Tarzi* emphasized that development in the progressive countries was not just in consequence of their military capacity, it was on account of their scientific progress as well (Sakhawarz 1997, 34).

Tarzi's opinions resulted in appearing a huge encouragement in the court regarding the necessity of conducting social, cultural, and political modifications in the country. At that time, prince Amanullah was one of the important adherents of *Tarzi* and promoted *Tarzi's* opinions in the ruling system. Furthermore, *Tarzi's* special attention to Afghan lower class led to obtaining a very popular position in the society (A. M. Ghani 1980, 92). Thereby, he was able to make a consequential connection between local solidarity groups and the central government. In other words, *Tarzi's* popularity among tribal and local groups later assisted the central government to implement successfully some part of its policies. *Tarzi* was able to make a semi-unity in the country and handle the opposition groups and associated them with the central government.

Amanullah Khan enjoyed particular popularity by the beginning of 1919 as a result of *Tarzi's* arrangement (Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan, 1914-1929; faith, hope, and the British Empire 1973, 24). Indeed, he became a political figure that attracted the attention of all Afghan nationalist-reformists.

3.5. Achievement of Independence

One of the most important political successes achieved by King *Amanullah* was attainment of Afghanistan independence in the first year of his rule. *Ghani* criticized him by virtue of some of his policies in this regard, and argued that he disregarded several Afghan local solidarity groups and in his policies did not consider their interests; moreover, he blamed the king for his senseless manners and strange policies regarding the public (A. A. Ghani 1989, 733).

Indeed, some of the Afghan solidarity groups were pro-British and some others were anti-British. For instance, *Shir Ahmad Khan* and *Ali Ahmad Khan's* solidarity groups were oriented to the British and were against government's anti-British policies. They comprehended that the termination of the British influence in the country would threaten their interest in the country. The king by virtue of having adequate support never endeavoured to make any alliance with these opposition groups throughout the third

Anglo Afghan war. Although he was the winner of the war, these groups later played an important role to bother him in making his policies.

It is noteworthy that the king's assumption of power was along with some significant international events after the first *World War*, which persuaded him to consider the foreign policy as the first and foremost issue. In addition, the especial international situation and social and political instability among the British territory encouraged him to take advantage of these conditions as an opportunity to attain independence of his country. It could be argued that the termination of the British influence and intervention in Afghanistan's affairs for the first time in its history was yield of the third *Anglo-Afghan War*¹ in 1919.

Vartan Gregorian surveying the opinions of different researchers, who have scrutinized the roots of the independence war, believes that there are different judgements in this regard (Gregorian 1969, 228). For instance, some of them those who supported the British in this war did not consider Afghanistan as the winner and argued that the British due to expediently relinquished the war.

Indeed, King *Amanullah* conducted some policies to obtain further support from the local solidarity groups. He promised to provide full freedom and respect all beliefs. He likewise ensured them obtaining the independence of the country and argued that the influence of the British was a threat to Afghan people's rights and he was going to regain their rights (Popalzai, Summary: a glance at history of independence, Third Anglo-Afghan War with Britain, 1919 1989, 19). Thus, the king on 24 February announced independence of Afghanistan and personal freedom in the country.²

On 28 February 1919, the king addressing the Afghan people promised them to provide for them complete freedom and ensure them to be immune from any aggression and oppression. He added that the people were supposed to be obedient to the law and the government would consider the principle of consultation in conducting the affairs and running the country (Ghobar 1981, 752). Furthermore, on 3 March he emphasized that the right of Afghanistan like other independent countries were supposed to be respected

¹ For further information see: Gregory Fremont-Barnes, *The Anglo-Afghan Wars 1839-1919*, (Oxford, United Kingdom: Osprey Publishing, 2009), pp.76-90.

² For further information see: Mir Gholam Mohammad Ghobar, *Afghanistan dar masire tarikh*, [Afghanistan in the Course of History], vol. 2, p.753.

(Ghobar 1981, 753). Indeed, this action indicated declaration of war against the British and also meant that he was sure from the support of tribal and local groups.

On 3 March, *Amanullah* wrote a letter to British India and declared Afghanistan independence.¹ *Hafiz Saifullah Khan*, the British representative in Kabul informed the British India that the king declared that he would allow neither the British nor any other country to intervene in Afghanistan's affairs.² Furthermore, he implemented a series of political measures, sent political missions to other country, and established some commercial treatment with the other countries in order to demonstrate his country's independence.

It could be argued that due to having adequate backing from local solidarity groups he was determined to enter a war with the British. He knew that the one most important factor that could support him in the battle with the British was the tribal and ethnic forces. In other words, in consequence of lack of strong military forces³ in the country the king was forced to be sure of having support from these groups. Furthermore, he made an attempt to have *Ulema's* support as well. He was aware of their spiritual power, which could provide for him the popular support in this regard. Accordingly, he slowly equipped the Afghan military forces and sent them to East and South side (Ghobar 1981, 753).

On 3 May 1919, the king's forces through *Khyber* attacked *Peshawar* (Adamec, Afghanistan, 1900-1923; a diplomatic history 1967, 104-105), which was the starting point of the war. In this region, the functional position of the *Pashtun* tribe and their supporting role were very important for his troops. *Fraser Tytler* provided meticulous examination of the situation in the *Pashtun*⁴ tribal belt throughout the war. He argued in consequence of supporting role of the *Pashtun* the British could not manage the battle and the *Pashtun* dominance in the region bothered the British to have the upper hand throughout the battlefield, thus the British control of the border got poor within a few days (W.K 1967, 191). The mentioned situation provided encouragement among the Afghan forces, which motivated them to invade the British India's borders. Furthermore, seizing *Peshawar* was

¹ For further information see: Ludwig W., Adamec, Zahma Ali Mohammad (Trans.) *The History of political relations in Afghanistan from Amir Abdul Rahman till independence*, (Kabul : Education Printing Press, 1970/1349), p.145.

² For further information see: Ibid, p.146.

³ For further information see: Ibid, p.60.

⁴ For further information about Pashtun see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pashtun_people

the most important victories for Afghans, which was only obtained by Afghan tribal forces in the border and brought serious impact on the British Army (Heathcote 1980, 177).

Indeed, the Afghan forces with the collaboration of tribal forces in several regions, *Jalalabad, Paktia, Waziristan, Tel, Pivar* defeated the British forces. Such successive failures forced the British to relinquish and call for a permanent ceasefire.

The British authorities comprehended that the domination of the Afghan tribes especially the *Pashtun* tribal belt would never provide possibility to their forces to make any progress. They knew that the present of the tribal forces in the battle in favour of the king would be very disappointing for them. They, therefore, regarded ceasefire as the only and the best option for them in this regard. It should also be stated that the liberation movements in the British India territory indirectly assisted *Amanullah* to be the winner of the battle. In consequence of these movements, the British authorities involved in the internal problems and spent a substantial part of their forces to handle them. Accordingly, they knew that the continuation of the war would cost a substantial sum for them and making peace with the king was more reasonable.

3.6. Pan-Islamism

As it was mentioned earlier King *Amanullah* at the beginning of his reign followed pan-Islamism policies. As a result, he managed his foreign policy based on this policy and thus regarded a priority for Islamic countries. For insistence, in the first year of his reign he made an attempt to establish the relationship with the neighbouring country, Bukhara. *Amanullah* wrote a letter to Amir *Alam Khan*, Amir of Bukhara, and highlighted the necessity of making unity between Bukhara and Afghanistan and also in the Muslim world. It should also be stated that he added that Bukhara's independence would be recognized by Afghanistan in its agreement with Russia.

The king managed his domestic policy on the foundation of pan-Islamism policies and as a result he made an attempt to unify different Muslim groups in the country. He was against the racial and ethnic prejudice and comprehended that such disunity could absolutely create problem for his government. He declared that *Hindu, Hazara, Shiite, Sunni, Popalzai* and *Ahmadzai* were equal and same nations.

Amanullah perceived that that his government was required to receive legitimacy from religious elites. Accordingly, with the purpose of attainment legitimacy from religious

elites founded his governments based on pan-Islamism policies. Besides, he sought to attract religious elites' trust and consider their idea in launching his policies at least in the beginning of his reign.

The common view among the king religious elites, and *Mashrooteh Khahan* (constitutionalists) was their anti-British and also anti-colonialism, which resulted in making a substantial alliance among them and definitely assisted *Amanullah* in conducting his policies peacefully. It goes without saying that considering pan-Islamism and respecting religious elites likewise brought for *Amanullah* popularity among Afghan tribal solidarity groups.

It is worth pointing out that pan-Islamism policies provided international reputation for the king and he found many sympathizers throughout the Muslim world in consequence of his anti-colonialism ideas, as well as he became known as Islamic leaders. For instance, Egyptians believed that a democratic and nationalist sovereign like King *Amanullah* could be a key to be released from colonialism for the Egyptians and other eastern nations. In other words, *Amanullah* became a great model an oriental King in the twentieth century and countries that were under colonial domination requested him to assist them to cut the hand of colonialism from their country (Mojaddedi 1977, 330). Furthermore, following the collapse of the *Ottoman* caliphate King *Amanullah* became the last hope of the Muslim world and the only salvation of Islam (Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan 2005, 32). There is not a shadow of doubt that the underlying cause that his regime, at least in the early years of his reign, appeared to be more successful comparing other Afghan regimes was his political astuteness in treatment the different critical factors in Afghan society.

Subsequent to attainment the independence of Afghanistan, Indian Muslims argued that they were likewise supposed to release themselves from domination of infidels (the British). Accordingly, as they did not have adequate ability to withdraw the British from their country, the only option for them was immigrations moving toward Afghanistan. As a result, the Indian religious leaders issued *fatwa*, which ordered the Indian Muslims to immigrate to Afghanistan. Consequently, a large number of Indian Muslims moved to Afghanistan and the Afghan king accepted them warmly. As a result, the British authorities felt a grave threat from Afghanistan and deduced that if the situation continued like this their situation would be so critical in the region.

Afghanistan did not have adequate financial support for Indian immigrants, the British authorities, therefore, did not cease the Indian Muslims to immigrate to Afghanistan. They believed that the presence of Indian immigrants in Afghanistan could be a considerable trouble for *Amanullah's* government. Their prediction was accurate and the king soon after ordered to cease the immigration to Afghanistan (Olesen 1999, 114). The number of Indian immigrants in Afghanistan reached eighteen thousand and the Afghan government was not able to support all of these immigrants. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that this event demonstrates *Amanullah's* political inexperience and the British authorities' efforts to weaken the position of the Afghan king.

As a result of *Amanullah's* pan-Islamism policies, in addition to the Indian Muslims, the *Hindus* supported his anti-colonialism policies and believed that the king's policies could assist them to release their country from the British hegemony. On the other hand, he sought to respect their Hindu sentiments and regarded their ideology in his policies.¹ It could be argued that he formed a multilateral coalition against the British in his neighbouring country in the early years of his reign, which determined the British authorities to remove the Afghan king from the political scene as soon as possible.

Amanullah's independence campaign presented him as the anti-imperialist figure in the Muslim world. In the early years of his reign, he conducted the militant pan-Islamic policies and as a result, on the one hand he supported the caliphate against threat of the British and the Bolsheviks, on the other hand, he encouraged Amir of *Bukhara* and *Turkestan Basmachis*² to stand against the Bolsheviks. Eventually, in September 1920, the Bolsheviks seized *Bukhara* and *Khiva* and requested to use Kabul as their campaign against the British, which was absolutely rejected by the king. He believed that giving such opportunity to the Bolsheviks could bring a serious threat for Afghanistan's independence and increasing the British hostility.

Amanullah's policies were affected by *the Great Game*, which forced him to direct his foreign policy based on this event. He comprehended that neither the British nor the Russia were trustable, but nevertheless in order to implement his policies he was forced to handle

¹ For further information see: Asta Olesen, Khalilullah Zamr (Trans), *Islam and politics in Afghanistan*, p.114.

² For further information see: <http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/73/-basmachi-turkistan-national-liberation-movement-1916-1930s-.html> (accessed, December 11, 2012).

one of them and Russia was obviously better option comparing it with the British. It should be highlighted that *Amanullah* did not have sufficient financial sources and in consequence of immigration of Indian Muslims to Afghanistan, he was more in trouble. From another point of view, he recognized a grave threat from the British territory and comprehended that without getting support from tribal solidarity groups could not handle the British forces. However, these forces were not reliable for the king and they were under the command of the tribal chiefs, followed their tribal interests, and always could not be available. Accordingly, *Amanullah* regarded Russia as the only option that could provide military support for Afghanistan against the British. Although On November 28, 1921 he concluded a treaty with the Bolsheviks for the first time, the Bolsheviks respected none of their obligations. The king's estimate was indisputably true in this regard and he said that there was not a shadow of doubt that the Bolsheviks were not reliable (Stewart, *Fire in Afghanistan* 2005, 32). Additionally, he argued that Afghanistan was a free and independent country and had its own right to have relationships with its neighbouring countries like Russia, Bukhara. Although third *Angolo Afghan* war could be considered as the underlying cause that the British hated the king, the British authority also recognized that his measures provoked the Indian Muslims to arise against the British colonialism and encouraged them to abdicate from British rule.

Amanullah took advantage from Pan-Islamist movement to centralize the central government control, decentralize his authority, and also provide the suitable backgrounds for his modernization efforts. He adopted this policy based on *Mahmud Tarzi's* advises. *Tarzi* believed that the only solution to unify the Muslim world was Pan-Islamist movement, which likewise could bring popular support for the king to implement successfully his modernizations policies. *Tarzi* believed that *Amanullah's* reform programme could be difficult and critical to the Afghan society to understand. It, therefore, was essential to provide a suitable background for the reform programme. Furthermore, *Tarzi's* invited all Muslims in the Middle East from Egypt to Turkey, Iran to arise against the imperialist oppression, which caused a unified movement against colonialism. *Nawid Senzil* argued that Islam was a consequential ideological factor for the anti-colonialism activities element to unify the Afghan people in opposition to the British hegemony in the country throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Nawid, *The State, the Clergy, and British Imperial Policy in Afghanistan during the 19th and Early 20th Centuries* 1997, 581-82).

Mahmud Tarzi's advices were remarkable in the king's state-making and reform-making processes. The king sought to make a unity within the court and among the noble class in order to consolidate the central government and centralize his control. *Tazi's* patriotic ideas were very consequential to guide the king in this regard. It should also be stated that *Amanullah's* constitutional movement was one of his principal objectives, based on which the constitutionalists were required to remove all internal barriers to fulfilling the rule of law in the country (Ghobar 1981, 726).

3.7. Reform Programmes and Resistances

The reform programme initially accomplished in the court and the royal family, with the purpose of attracting the trust of the local solidarity groups and getting religious elites endorsement of the reforms. *Pamir* argued that the king comprehended that his reform programme was supposed to be fundamental to attain the public trust. Consequently, he conducted some popular measures, which could provide a suitable background for his critical reforms. For instance, he dismissed the women and girls who were forced to work as labour in his father's and grandfather's court. Furthermore, he conducted some policies to prevent any kind of buying and selling humans, and in fact, he prohibited slavery. From another point of view, luxury and lavishness were strongly forbidden and urged the courtiers to adhere to this new procedure. The king argued that all the people were equal and nobody had superiority to the other people (Pamir 2002, 107).

It could be argued that *Amanullah* by launching such policies could attract the trust of the tribal and rural groups within Afghan society; on the other hand, he made many opponents within the court and among the government officials, who used to have a luxury life and wanted to have their former privileges.

Before King *Amanullah*, his father and grandfather implemented some measures to modernize the Afghan state and society. The efforts of his grandfather, Amir *Abdul Rahman Khan*, led to make modern Afghan state; however, his policies were based on feudalism and autocracy, which disappointingly disregarded tribal cultural values of the Afghan society. Although, *Amanullah's* father, Amir *Habibullah Khan*, initially appeared to be very encouraged to consider and develop the public Affairs and conducted some political and cultural innovations in this regard. For instance, he founded some educational institutions like *Habibia School* and endeavoured to modernize the society in this regard. Additionally, in consequence of his oppressive policies and political inexperience, at the

end of his rule the reform process was aborted. Such backgrounds resulted the king faced with many critical problems throughout the process of state-making and reform-making. In other words, Amanullah's predecessors provided a huge cleavage between state and society and he was aware of the reality that the people hated the Afghan authority. All the mentioned activities, conducted by the king, were with the intention of providing a popular trust for the Afghan authority. It should also be stated that regarding the foreign policy the country was dependent on London and was not self-governing. Accordingly, when the king came to power was supposed to make a revolution regarding internal and external policies and in fact, the constitutionalists like *Tarzi* were supposed to provide a programme, which could change everything immediately.

Totalitarian and monarchist authorities in Afghanistan and inter-tribal rivalry between Pashtunism could be regarded as two remarkable characters of this country throughout its history. Results of the mentioned characters were growing discrimination, injustice, and subjection for the Afghan people. On the other hand, in consequence of being under hegemony of the British, Afghans were allowed to establish no political relationship with the other nations. It is likely that internal despotism of rulers, inter-tribal rivalry and lack of communication with the outside caused backwardness and development in all aspects for the Afghan people.

Indeed, making modifications and changes in the political and social structure of the country appeared to be the first required step in developing and modernizing the country. The king believed that first and foremost the governance structure was supposed to be changed to rid the country of its dramatic conditions. He requested from his political advisers to provide the best reform programme in this regard. Thus, he followed the idea of constitutionalists to establish a new form of political structure. In addition, the member of Afghan young movement, who implemented a significant function in attainment the independence of the country, provided a reform programme to make fundamental changes in administration system of the country and creation a constitutional government. Based on this type of the government the king was not an absolute power and the people had right in decision-making for the country.

Indeed, *Amanullah* established a constitutional monarchy system in Afghanistan, based on which he was not absolute and constitution had an outstanding function in his rule. It should be remarked that this type of the government system assisted the king to retain the

derived legitimacy and gain the approval of the religious elites regarding his governing system. It is noteworthy that the constitutional movement in Afghanistan conducted no political party in the country; however, their measures caused the spirit of free criticism and judgment for the first time in Afghanistan's history.

The main objectives of the reforms throughout the *Amani* era¹ were taking into a special consideration the issue of national identity and making consequential changes and modification of different factors in the country. In this regard, the factor, which appeared to be so critical, was the king's orientation to establish an independent state and his avoidance of tribalism. However, it was some signs of his anti-tribal activities, which later forced him to settle high price for this policy.

Amanullah's principal objective of preparing a new constitutional code was establishment of a central administration system. It goes without saying that fulfilling a centralized control and decentralized authority primarily required a central administration system, based on which the central government could be consolidated and dispersed its dominance in all over the country. Accordingly, he sought to spread out central administration system in national, provincial, rural, and tribal levels, which could be critical to the Afghan society that was established based on traditional administration. Furthermore, in consequence of the central government financial problems the new constitutional codes with the intention of increasing the government's revenue modified tax collection system and the earnings of Ulema and landowners, which put his government at stake of losing religious elites support.

It could be argued that there were some obvious signs of the king's initial blunders and consequently the dissatisfaction of the traditional and religious elements in the Afghan society, whose functions were very consequential in establishment of the first independent Afghan state and putting an end to the British hegemony in the country.

By launching the first stage of *Amanullah's* reforms, some critical factors created obstacles in this regard. First of all it should be mentioned the destructive role of the British spies, whose mission was providing the conditions in Afghanistan to bring back the British influence on the country. In other words, they sought to persuade the local solidarity groups, not only to support the government but also they tended to exaggerate the king's

¹ The reign of King Amanullah.

blunders. It should also be stated that *Mullahs* discovered that the central government interfered in the religious rules and endeavoured to modify and change the majority of them, and also they had no influence in this regard. It is noteworthy that the role of the British elements to provoke *Mullahs* should not be disregarded. Besides, the tribal chiefs were another opposite factor to the Afghan state. Although they receive further rights during *Amanullah's* rule comparing the previous Afghan regimes, they could not collaborate with the king in decentralizing the state authority and increasing the control of *Amanullah's* government in the tribal and rural area.

It is remarkable that reviewing the analyses of the different researchers regarding the reforms and resistances throughout the *Amanullah's* reign demonstrates that they have just argued that the king's reform programme caused resistances in all over the country especially in the tribal and rural areas. It is likely that in consequence of their lack of attention to the processes of the *Amanullah's* reform programme and the function of the different factors in this regard, their analyses, especially regarding the third phase of reforms, are not so consequential to demonstrate exactly the king's political blunder and the role of the local solidarity in this regard.

As was mentioned earlier, King *Amanullah* with the intention of removing the roots of the backwardness of the society and providing development and progress conducted a series of cultural, social, and political changes in the country. Additionally, he implemented his reform programme in three stages, and every stage tribal, rural and local forces offered resistance to the government. First stage accomplished from 1919 to 1923, during which the government implemented a series of administrative, legislative, and judicial reform programme and it brought about fundamental development in the government apparatus. Although the nature of the reforms appeared to be so crucial for the Afghan society, this stage was the most successful stage of reforms and comparing the subsequent stages, the resistance were not so serious for the government.

From 1924 to 1928, Afghanistan saw the second stage of the king's reform programme. *Mangal* rebellion that occurred during the first stage of reforms caused the reformists implemented the reforms slightly more prudently. This stage implemented a limited number of the reforms comparing the previous stage. The last stage of the reforms exactly initiated after *Amanullah's* dramatic trip the European countries.

From July 1928, until January 1929 a series of radical and hasty reforms were implemented in the Afghan society, which were completely against the people's values, religious elites' beliefs and local solidarity groups' interests. The king was faced with *Shinwar*¹ rebellion and *Habibullah Kalakani's*² attacks, and consequently, *Amanullah's* government and his reforms were doomed to failure.

3.8. The First Stage of Reform

From 1919 to 1923, Afghanistan experienced the first stage of the reforms, which could be regarded as the most consequential part of the king's modernization efforts. In other words, in this stage the tribal and religious factors' dissatisfaction did not grow as it could put the government in trouble the reform-making process. National unity, the state apparatus, the emancipation of women, culture and education development were the issues that were regarded by King *Amanullah*.

3.8.1. Drafting of the Constitution

At the outset of the reform-making, the government regarded strengthening national unity and providing equality for all Afghan people before the law. The ruling system of Afghanistan hitherto had been based on absolute authorities, who had been the owner of the people's life and property. King *Amanullah* was decisive to abrogate this procedure and with the intention of attracting the trust of the tribal solidarity groups and the public trust proclaimed that all the people regardless their ethnic, language and religion were equal, and nobody had priority to the others. He initiated to execute this reform in the court and the royal family and ordered the court members and their families should not have any priority in using the possibilities of the country than the other people.

The relationship in the Afghan society was based on the tribal-patriarchal rules and the people were unfamiliar with the law and its advantage in their life. It should also be stated that the relationship between the state and the people was never characterized the principles of justice or social equality. The authorities introduced themselves as the representative of God (Farhang 1995, 425) and they introduced their rules as the rule of the God and thereby imposed them on the people. Resistance to the authorities and their approved rules recognized as resistance to God and the divine laws (Majmoeye maghalate

¹ For further information about Shinwar see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shinwar_District

² For further information about Habibullah Kalakani see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habibull%C4%81h_Kalak%C4%81ni

seminare ayandeh Afghanistan va ghanoon asasi, [Proceedings of the seminar on the future of Afghanistan and the constitution] 2003, 19).

Indeed, King *Amanullah* sought to strengthen the rule of law in the society and revoke dominate tribal-patriarchal rules. He believed that governors and people were equal in front of the law and based on the national unity wanted to provide the principles of freedom and democracy and equality in the society. In order to fulfil this programme, he ordered the Afghan intellectuals to codify the constitution as the first time, which could be regarded as a legislative evolution in Afghanistan's history.

The heads of the tribal solidarity groups was so concern regarding recognizing their interests in the new constitution. Thus, a substantial number of them attended in the *Loya Jirga*,¹ which occurred in *Jalalabad* in 1922, to approve the primary constitution. Additionally, *Afghan state constitution* including 73 articles was signed by military officers, religious elites, and tribal chiefs in *Paghman Loya Jirga* in 1923 (See Appendix A). This new constitution defined state power based on legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, which happened for the first time in Afghanistan's history.

The approved constitution had some prominent and progressive principles. The principle of the rule of law obligated the king to rule based on law (Afghanistan's Constitution 1922, Article 4) and determined certain rules and regulations for officers and government officials (Afghanistan's Constitution 1922, Article 5). It should also be stated that this principle the council of ministers had responsibility regarding their collective and individual decisions (Afghanistan's Constitution 1922, Articles 6 and 33). The principle added that the violation of the law would be prosecuted by the Supreme Court (Afghanistan's Constitution 1922, Article 33).

Furthermore, human rights and freedom were strongly esteemed by the authority and also detention and punishment people without being sentenced by the court became absolutely forbidden (Afghanistan's Constitution 1922, Article 10). The government prohibited torture (Afghanistan's Constitution 1922, Article 24), forced labour (Afghanistan's Constitution 1922, Articles 22 and 23), slavery (Afghanistan's Constitution 1922, Article 10), and respected personal property (Afghanistan's Constitution 1922, 17), the right to have education (Afghanistan's Constitution 1922, 14) and freedom of the press.

¹ For further information see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loya_jirga

All the local and tribal ethnic groups in Afghanistan, regardless of their religious, ethnic and class were regarded the citizens of the country (Afghanistan's Constitution 1922, Article 8). Ethnic religious minorities were offered the freedom to execute their religious rites (Afghanistan's Constitution 1922, Article 2) and became free to instruct their religious beliefs (Afghanistan's Constitution 1922, Article 15). Furthermore, all citizens were offered the equal value before the law without taking into account race, religion, and language (Afghanistan's Constitution 1922, Article 16).

Approval of the constitution in the *Loya Jirga* was a significant step in abrogating the rule of personal interests in the Afghan society. At this point, the king decided to adopt various statutes to fulfil the general principles of the new Constitution. Besides, around fifty statutes were ratified and each had its own significant function various sectors of the Afghan social life (Ghobar 1981, 1250, Farhang 1995, 454).

One of the most remarkable matters regarding the new constitution is that the Afghan people were offered the same rights as the western liberal laws. Providing the equal rights for all Afghan people realized national identity in the country. In other words, this constitution could be regarded as a revolution in the Afghan society owing to the fact that for the first the civil rights were respected in the country; as well as the government duties and restrictions, and the cabinet responsibility were determined accurately. It should also be stated that the authority of the king became limited and was subjected to the law, based on which this was the termination of the dictatorial role in Afghanistan (Afghanistan's Constitution 1922, Article 7, Olesen 1999, 124).

It is noteworthy that the new constitution was not in favour of all the people. In other words, based on the new constitution the people those who their interests were in peril became opposite to the new system of law. The king was against any kind of bias system and demonstrated his opposition to favouritism towards some families and influential people. It should also be stated that he interrupted incomes of some dynasties like *Mohammadzai*¹ and some Khans and influential religious scholars. It is particularly significant that he imprisoned some member of the royal family to demonstrate to the people that everybody is equal in front of law, as well as the royal family, like the other people, could be punished according to law. From one point of view, such policies were consequential and led to fulfil the spirit of the law in the society, from another point of

¹ For further information see: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammadzai>

view, they strictly scratched the dignity of the influential people within local solidarity groups and also disappointed some part of the religious scholars.

3.8.2. The State Structure


The Afghan state was relationship was based on the Association based on kinship, tribal, regional, or ethnic solidarity (See Figure 3-3).

Conducting the policy of centralizing the control and decentralizing the authority required regulated the state structure. Accordingly, King *Amanullah* endeavoured to adjust state affairs in order to release from tribal and ethnic system that dominated the government (See Figure 3-3). He re-established the structure of the state based on legislative, judicial and executive and founded a modern administrative state with the collaboration of some Turkish and Indian experts.

Indeed, the new system had its own characteristics and qualities, and in fact, except for the judiciary sector, there was no fundamental difference in comparison with the foundations of the preceding systems. Additionally, in the legislative sector, the king adjusted the old house of lords which called “*Dar al Shora*”, and formed “*Shora e Khas*” (the special council), which later called “*Shora e Dowlat*” (the council). The council was comprised of elected members and those who were appointed by the king. It had a duty to examine the legal projects, and also dispatched them to the king through the council of ministers for endorsement and authentication. It is remarkable that, the council regarded the government budget, and also its international conventions and treaties (Ghobar 1981, 1248-49).

Figure 3-3 depicts Afghanistan’s tribal structure and relationship to the state. King *Amanullah* sought to fill the gap between state and tribal. Due to several tribal revolts against the government “two types of intermediaries were employed at the tribal level, a *Malik* and *khan*. *Maliks* are tribal leaders politically appointed by the state while *khans* are socially recognized by the tribe to speak with the state on their behalf, although not recognized (within the tribe) as a chieftain *per se*. The key political and socio-cultural finding is that the central government had structural institutions to conduct relations and relay policy between the state and the local level, but it left local government to the tribe. The individual Afghan, therefore, never developed any sense of political relationship or loyalty toward the state. Instead, individual solidarity was owed to the *qawm* or tribe, a relationship perpetuated from antiquity. Moreover, traditional group loyalty was paid to

the *watan* (tribal, ancestral or cultural homeland), and not the state, which never figured prominently in local socio-political affairs” (Mullins 2011, 21).



Entire structure based on relationships.
Association based on *qawm*: kinship, tribal, regional or Ethnic solidarity

Figure 3-3: Afghanistan’s Tribal Structure and Relationship to the State (Mullins 2011, 21)

Previous to King *Amanullah*, the judiciary system was apparently independent, whereas in fact it was practically regarded a part of the servant of the king. Although the judges were under subjugation of the king, they had wide discretion. In the new constitutional law, judicial independence was still held in high regard, but nevertheless the wide discretion of

the judges became narrow. *Tazir*¹ was previously as a sharp instrument in the hands of the judge, whereas in fact the king compiled two volume books, which called “*Tamasok al Ghozat Amanieh*” and changed *Tazir* into *Taghrir*. Thus, “*Tamasok al Ghozat Amanieh*” became an independent law and codified criminal codes (Ghobar 1981, 1248-49).

Thus, a fundamental transformation was implemented in the judicial system following a long period of inefficiency. In 1922, the ministry of justice was established and all matters related to the judiciary were supervised by the new system. Besides, in order to improve the conditions and increase the efficiency of the judiciary, two other changes accomplished in the system:

- Specialization of courts: For the first time in Afghanistan, the field of jurisdiction according to general topics was limited. Different types of claims, based on their nature were divided into several categories and for each category, a special branch was considered. In this regard, four kind of court were established in the country and each of them had different branches: criminal court, military court, rights court, bail court. Shrinking sphere of competence provided the background of increasing scientific expertise and practical skills for judges (Popalzai, *Edalat dar Afghanistan: az awayele doran islami ta doreh jomhoriyat*, [Justice in Afghanistan: the early Islamic era to era Republicanism] 1990, 677).
- Multiple stages of investigation: Systematic scheme of multiple stages of investigation was another fundamental change, based on which the justice process and the investigation into different claims were set in three stages. According to this scheme, the triple courts of primary courts, lawsuit courts and supreme court were formed. It is noteworthy that the three stages of investigation were not performed in all claims (Popalzai, *Edalat dar Afghanistan: az awayele doran islami ta doreh jomhoriyat*, [Justice in Afghanistan: the early Islamic era to era Republicanism] 1990, 677).

Furthermore, executive or ministerial committee picked up some persons for the charge of the chancellery, the ministry of the interior, the foreign ministry, and the ministry of war. In addition, the chancellery had just a superficial aspect and in fact, the king was the chief of ministers (Farhang 1995, 542-43, Ghobar 1981, 1249-50).

¹ For further information see: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tazir>

3.8.3. Culture and Educational Reforms

According to the Afghan scholar, Peykar Pamir, owing to the fraud and cruelty, lack of reformative and educational programmes, aggravating superstitions, oppressive policies of the previous Kings, underdevelopment and social obstacles King *Amanullah* and his new founded government were supposed to handle many problems. *Amanullah* was desirous of reforming society and removing the roots of social backwardness. Additionally, his charity nature and good intentions did not allow him to sit on the throne of power in the royal castle regardless of all of the backwardness of the Afghan society. Accordingly, he knew it is inevitable making some efforts in the social affairs in parallel with economic measures and plans.¹ Naturally, his social reforms would interfere in the customs, habits, personal interests and the deep traditions of the society (Pamir 2002, 113).

Indeed, the most important part of the king's reform was regarding educational cultural structures of the country. Notwithstanding having expert and technical human resources in various fields, this field was one of the fundamental principles of development of the country, and education was the first phase of progress of human resources planning. Besides, it could be said that the basis of social and economic trends of any country is related to expert and professional human sources. Consequently, educational system with training expert human resources provided the necessary background to accept government's modernisation and innovation efforts as well as smoothed the path of development.

In addition, King *Amanullah* determined to enlarge the public education system by founding new schools and training of expert human resources. Accordingly, he arranged the infrastructure of a modern and civil society. He approved article sixty-eighth of the constitution obliged having primary school education, moreover, he regarded many facilities for higher education (Afghanistan's Constitution 1922, Article 68). It is noteworthy that the budget of the ministry of education after the ministry of finance and ministry of war were placed on third grade (Ghobar 1981, 1245). Further, the king for expansion of public education took advantage of two factors of force and encouragement. Based on this purpose, he distributed some leaflets in public places and ordered all government employees to send their children to school in order to be a model for others.

¹ These plans were based on the ideas of constitutionalism and his commitment towards human values of his movement.

As well as it was emphasized that in case of disobedience, the offenders would be punished.

The king employed Egyptian and Turkish teachers for organizing and strengthening the system of training and education. In 1922, a French delegation of archaeologists directed by *Alfred Foucher*, professor at Sorbonne University, arrived in Afghanistan. They had the mission to organize a new system for higher education in Afghanistan. Three high schools were established in Kabul, which had the same function as “*Habibiah School*”, moreover, several foreign languages were taught and utilized by teachers for teaching. The first school was “*Amanieh*”, which was founded in 1922 and after the French schools, was very popular. In “*Amanieh*”, all courses were taught in French and five French teachers that one of them was female and twelve Afghan teachers were teaching, later in 1923, the German teachers taught at “*Amanieh*”. In the next years were built some other schools like “*Nejat*”, a German language school, “*Ghazi*”, an English language school, “*Esmat*”, a School for Girls, which was under the supervision of Queen *Soraya* (Tanin 2005, 42). Furthermore, technical-professional schools in the fields of art, music, weaving, painting, telegraph, carpentry, glass, agriculture, building construction, accounting, police, architecture, women’s health, women’s proper management home were established in Kabul. Similar schools were established in the other provinces of Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif (Ghobar 1981, 1245).

It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that it might be said, the most stable of *Amanullah*’s reforms was in the field of education. From 1924 to 1928, more than three hundred twenty-two primary schools in each province were established, and four thousand eight hundred thirty-two students finished primary school. In addition, one hundred fifty-one male and female students were sent to France, Germany, Russia, and Turkey for higher education with the costs of the ministry of education (Anousheh 2002, 120). It is worth pointing out that the king organized some educational projects for nomad tribes (Dopri 2000, 151).

The main goals of educational reforms during his reign could be pointed as follows:

- Development of young intellectuals in the country.
- Training the technical staff in different fields of science and technology, in order to adapt new programmes.
- Training efficient and skilled labour (Fayyaz 2010, 101).

An educational policy, which was conducted in order to modernize Afghanistan and was likewise an infrastructure development in various fields, was the necessity of learning the new science. In addition, the reformers desired that along with the development of the modern style schools, modern science would be taught as well. Intellectuals believed one of the main reasons for Afghanistan's backwardness was forgetting education and knowledge.

In 1918, the number of Indian educated in *Punjab* was more than all Afghans. Several generations of Afghans were deprived of education and competent teachers. Additionally, in Afghan society, where traditions and superstitions dominated, the people, like other Muslims population, did not have the right of taking advantage of their human and natural resources.

Young Afghans argued that the domination of Europe had not involved only in the military issues, however in the industrial, economic and cultural issues they had interfered as well. In this regard, there were two prominent ideas at that time in Afghanistan. One of them believed that renovation was compatible with Islam, and the other one, which was followed by clergies and bigoted traditionalists, was opposite of any modernity and rejected new knowledge as a product of the infidels.

Indeed, for teaching new technologies and sciences, which the western world was the leader of them, some attempts were made. For instance, some schools for teaching foreign languages were established and students initiated learning foreign languages. As was mentioned in the previous pages, even in "*Amanieh School*" and "*Ghazi school*", the courses were taught in French and English languages (Tanin 2005, 42).

In the struggle between traditionalists and modernists, initially modernists overcame, even some of the students were sent to abroad for studying with the costs of the ministry of education. Nonetheless, ultimately traditionalists overcame the struggle, and reformists faced with the deadlock.

One of the obvious characteristics of this epoch was spreading the idea of freedom, liberalism, and modernity. In this era, owing to coming foreign experts and scholars in Afghanistan and establishing cultural contact with the outside world people got familiar with the manners of life in developing countries. Further, by virtue of *Amanullah's* support and attention to young writers and reformists that attempted for the development and

progress of Afghanistan was removed the previous harsh and oppressive political and social system and the reformists provided the background for creating an open and developed social system.

Freedom of the press and the freedom of writing supplied by King *Amanullah* provided suitable conditions for connection of intellectual circles and people through publishing papers. In the previous epochs, liberalism and intellectualism were regarded incompatible with the purposes of the sovereignty and intellectuals and oppositions were severely punished. In the open society, nationalist intellectuals that had been arrested by the previous regime were released from prison. Among them, *Abdul Rahman Lodin* known as “*Kebrit*” and *Abd al Hadi Davoudi* known as “*Parishan*” had a significant role in the establishment and development of the press and cultural promotions and liberalism. They issued political and social topic in the form of both poetry and prose, and contributed to the growth of the awareness of the society and the development of modern ideas (Habibi 1984, 181-187).

Mahmud Tarzi provided numerous articles regarding legal, political, social, and cultural issues, and discussed topics such as Islamic alliance, necessity and benefits of independence, necessity of learning science and technology and backwardness of Muslims. He was regarded as a “*leading innovator*” and “*Father of Journalism*” on the scenes of political issues, literature and publication (Davoudi, *Zamine va pishinehe eslah talabi dar Afghanistan*, [Background and History of the Reform Movement of Afghanistan] 2000, 162, Habibi 1984, 151-152).

In addition to Kabul, in the other cities like Herat, Kandahar, Herat, Jalalabad, and Mazar Sharif, the number of publications considerably increased. Magazines such as “*Ershad Nasvanin*” in Kabul (1922), “*Ettehad Mashreghi*” in Jalalabad (1922), “*Ettehad Islam*” in Herat (1921), “*Bidar*” in Mazar Sharif (1923) and approximately 23 publications with government’s spending were conducted. Likewise, there were some nongovernmental (NGO) magazines such as, “*Anis*”, “*Norooz*”, “*Afghan*” and “*Payandeh*” that were conducted with personal cost (Ghobar 1981, 1246-47, Anousheh 2002, 121).

In the *Amani* era, in both terms of language titivation and diversity in literary genres and the press became more widespread and this increased the impact of the press on human growth. It should also be stated that personal publication resulted in increasing journalists in Kabul, and the press provided further information to the people in the fields of

economic and social life (Naderi 2007). In fact, expanding the press in this period was based on a social, economic and political necessity. *Amanullah's* government was interested in modernizing the country in all fields, and this issue required the responsible press for explaining to the people the necessity of foundations such issues. Particularly, the governmental press permanently retained their influence and freedom from this period and never returned under control or censorship of the subsequent dictatorship regimes (Naderi 2007). In addition to the spread of reformist publications, many books were translated from other languages into Persian that were introduced the infrastructure of the development and progress in the country, people awareness and learning new sciences.

Another attempt that was made based on the modernist approach was freedom of doing religious practices. Previously, religious minorities had not had this possibility and some of their rituals were held secretly. In order to illustrate the importance of this action and determine the point of deprivation and limitation of doing religious practices, it is necessary to consider the past of Afghanistan. The majority of the Afghan people were Muslim and in terms of religious attitudes they were initially divided into two sects, *Sunni* and *Shia*.¹ The majority of the Afghan population were *Sunni* and the majority of the *Sunni* followers were *Sunni Hanafi*,² as well as *Hazara* people³ were majority followers of the *Shia* in Afghanistan (Sajjadi 2001, 91).

Shiite communities in Afghanistan had always been under pressure and deprived of human rights, however, Pashtuns were always ruler and political leader. Furthermore, throughout history, the *Sunnite* people had always occupied the authority position, and thus *Sunni* always had been regarded superior to *Shia*, and *Shiite* always had been regarded as second-class citizens and even lower. Furthermore, *Sunnis'* fanatic behaviour and their challenging with *Shiite* underlined the social solidarity, thus it resulted in social deprivation and religious limitation for *Shiite*. Afghan autocrats, whose rule was based on force and compulsion, always had been utilized religious conflict of Afghan people to preserve their sovereignty. Although they had no devotion to religion, they supported *Hanafi*, who were the majority and always were in rivalry with *Shiite* in order to satisfy the *Sunnite*.

¹ For further information about Sunni and Shia see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shi'a%E2%80%93Sunni_relations.

² For further information about Sunni Hanafi see: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanafi>

³ For further information about Hazara see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hazara_people

It is worth pointing out that the role of the British colonialists in fomenting religious disagreement should not be disregarded (Sajjadi 2001, 94-95). The Afghan rulers were loyal to British colonialism and always endeavoured to impose religion of the majority on the minority. Amir *Abdul Rahman Khan* conducted a specific policy for removing *Shia* and *Ja'fari jurisprudence*¹ and replacing it with the *Hanafi jurisprudence*. He declared *Shia* as an illegal religion and received from *Sunnite* clergies the sentence of excommunication and heretic of the *Shia*. *Sunnite* clergies associated with the royal court and encouraged *Sunni* to struggle against *Shiites*. Thus, Amir *Abdul Rahman* announced that who would participate in this holy struggle against *Hazara Shia*, would obtain their assets as prize and their women and children as servant and slave. As well as performing publicly the rituals of the *Shia* was forbidden and the religious right of *Ja'fari jurisprudence* were not recognized by the government (Davoudi, *Majmoeye maghalat seminar-e Afghanistan va ayandeh nezam-e siasi*, [Proceedings of the seminar on Afghanistan and the future of the political system] 2002, 355). Amir *Abdul al Rahman Khan* sent *Sunnite* religious scholars to *Shiite* populated area to train people according to the *Hanafi jurisprudence* and promote the *Hanafi* teachings. He forced *Shiite* to perform their legal claims according to the *Hanafi* jurisprudence (Sajjadi 2001, 71). Additionally, *Sunnite* religious scholars issued a fatwa² that introduced *Shia* illegal and excommunicated them. Subsequently Amir *Abdur Rahman* banned the *Shiite* rituals. These conditions resulted the Afghan society became unsuccessful in having collective life. Besides, governmental announcement and religious fatwa put *Sunnite* common people in serious conflict with the *Shiite*.

Amanullah after assumption of power, in order to modify Afghanistan's internal policies gave a special consideration to the national unity and attempted to remove the religious fanaticism. He granted to all citizens of Afghanistan religious and intellectual freedom regardless ethnic and racial affiliations. Furthermore, he emphasized on social equality and fraternity and regarded equal right for all citizens. In his constitution, he stated in eight articles that all people of Afghanistan without religious supremacy were regarded the Afghan citizens. He mentioned in the ninth article of new the constitution that the Afghan citizens were free to commit their religious affairs and their personal rights and freedoms would be respected by the government (Ghobar 1981, 1274). Subsequently, *Shiite*

¹ For further information about *Ja'fari jurisprudence* see:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ja%27fari_jurisprudence

² Authoritative religious decree of Islamic law. For further information about Fatwa see:

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatw%C4%81>

religious ceremonies and their religious places practically were esteemed as well as *Hazara* slaves, who were heritage of Amir *Abdur Rahman*, were released from slavery (Ghobar 1981, 1274).

The king, in order to confirm his sincerity and seriousness in the manner of social unity, was present personally on *Day of Ashura*¹ in *Shiite* ritual in *Chandawa* (Kabuli 2009).² In order to prevent discriminative and divisive intervention of British colonialism, he ordered to mention Islam as the official religion of Afghanistan and avoided mentioning the name of any sect of Islam. Nonetheless, in the second *Loya Jirga* meeting, King *Amanullah* by intense pressure from some *Sunnite* scholars acquiesced in approval and recognition of the *Hanafi* sect in the new constitution. Even he demonstrated his willingness to recognize *Shia*, which proposed by *Faiz Mohammad Katib Hazara*,³ but nevertheless *Sunnite* scholars' hard opposition deterred him to recognize *Shia* (Davoudi 2000, 181-182).

3.8.4. Changes in Family Life

As it was mentioned previously King *Amanullah* initiated a series of educational and social reforms, including new statutes called *Nizamnama*.⁴ *Loya Jirga* in 1921, and *Loya Jirga Paghman* in July 1924, enacted some articles, for women's social freedom (Olesen 1999, 138-140), as follows:

- The child marriage was prevented which was a violation of human rights particularly affected all aspects of the girls' rights. Accordingly, *Nikah*⁵ in childhood was forbidden unless reaching the age of maturity. Thirteen-year-old defined as the minimum age of maturity for male and female.
- The act of polygamy became limited and it was an obligatory permission from the court for a man that wanted to marry more than one wife at one time; therefore having four wives was limited to one woman.

¹ For further information about Day of Ashura see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Day_of_Ashura

² Chandawal is one of the oldest districts of Kabul that were inhabited for a long time by the Shia community. During *Amir Abd al Rahman Khan*, the people of this region like most Afghans felt a heavy shadow of repression. However, with the opening up of political and religious freedom of the country, during reign of *Amir Amanullah Khan*- were able to establish their important religious centers there; http://database-aryana-encyclopaedia.blogspot.it/2009/06/blog-post_85.html (accessed, October 18, 2012).

³ For further information about Faiz Mohammad Katib Hazara see: http://no.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faiz_Mohammad_Katib_Hazara

⁴ Regulations or statutes of an organization; constitution.

⁵ The legal contract between a bride and groom as part of an Islamic marriage; the contract of Islamic marriage; Islamic marriage in general.

Amanullah paid a particular attention to the role of women in social development. He initiated the process of rescuing women by recognizing them as citizens with equal rights. He established some schools for girls and conducted an association for the protection of women's rights. As it was mentioned earlier, he sent a number of girls in Turkey to learn higher education in the fields of medicine and nursing.

The king concerning bride price and the high cost of a wedding ceremony adopted some rules to reduce the cost of the wedding for the groom's family, moreover, he determined the legal age for marriage. Nonetheless, in the second *Loya Jirga* that was established in 1924, were made some modifications in the programme of reforms by virtue of pressure and opposition of landowners, khans, and fanatical priests. They issued a resolution according to which the marriage of minors was permitted, women's education was limited to the home, and a man was allowed to marry four women (Hoseinzadeh 2008). Although there was freedom of religion or belief, a new article was added to the constitution, which forced *Hindus* and *Jews* to settle ransom by virtue of being infidel. Additionally, when *Sunni* clergies suggested supporting of *Hanafi* sect the king declared his opposition. He believed that such issue could destroy national unity and would be a grave menace to the *Shia* community but, nonetheless, the protest clergies prevailed and could convince him in this regard. It is likely that these modifications were the result of opposition to the spirit of the new constitution, the king's policies, and his advisor, *Mahmud Tarzi*.

Despite all the troubles that his reform programme confronted, a special chapter for women's rights was regarded in the government's reform programme. In 1920, queen *Soraya* and some of the open-minded women took charge of the administration of the *Maktab Masturat*¹ (Masturat School). In 1921, the queen along with her mother founded the first magazine for women that called *Ershad-I-Niswan* (Guidance for Women). Then *Maktab Tadbir Manzel* (school of management house) in which German and Turkish women taught, was founded (Hoseinzadeh 2008). In a part of a royal proclamation that was signed by queen *Soraya*, was stated that the purpose of establishing these schools was liberation of women from economical dependent on their husbands and to contribute to the family economy (Kazem 2005, 144). In the summer of 1928, queen *Soraya* established an association for the protection of women's rights (*Anjoman-i Hemayat-i Neswan*) and

¹ The first primary school for girls, Masturat School, was founded in 1921 in Kabul, under the patronage of queen Soraya.

twelve of knowing women in Kabul took its management. Thus, for the first time women like men were involved in the country's management and bureaucratic system.

3.8.5. Other Reforms

King *Amanullah* made some reforms in the economic and financial fields. He initiated land reforms for the first time in Afghanistan's history and gave governmental land to people. He likewise paid a preferable attention to the export; thus, from 1920 to 1925 Afghanistan's exports increased from 50 million Francs to one billion Francs. The king did not like importation and he always encouraged people to use domestic production in order to prevent from importing (Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan 2005, 213). This policy was by virtue of his anti-imperialism ideas and he was concerned that importation could threaten Afghanistan's independence.

King *Amanullah* in the first step in the progress of reform was successful and all his colleagues and reformist comrades were concurred with him. In addition, he modified the tax system and thereby released the majority of the people such as farmers, livestock, and artisan from heavy taxes. Monetary tax was considered for lands, and all people could settle direct tax. They linked to financial offices of the government without interfering of chieftains and Khans.

3.9. Backlash against the Reforms

As it was mentioned earlier, following the first stage of the successful implementation of reforms, the first armed rebellion against *Amanullah*'s government occurred in the south of Afghanistan. This section briefly discusses backgrounds and causes of the realization the reactions, as well as it remarks the process of public backlash and the government function to handle them.

3.9.1. The Background of Mangal Rebellion

The Khost rebellion arose from Afghan tribal community and religious leaders. It was motivated by many causes, such as increasing tax and changing in penal codes and family law. After third Afghan war, Britain cut the financial aid to Afghanistan. Furthermore, third Afghan war imposed too high costs on the Afghan government. Accordingly, the government had no choice except increasing taxes and in the new constitution changed the tax law, thus it levied taxes on the landowners, traders.

These taxes increased the government revenue and assisted to implement reforms. In addition, the government abolished some non-mandatory taxes, and in Kandahar it forgave some belated taxes (Summary of events in Afghanistan, from 1st June 1920 to 1st July 1922 1922). *Amanullah* largely reduced military spending and instead imposed taxes to support educational affairs, which resulted in dissatisfaction of military commanders. They were opposite to government policies owing to losing their former incomes they, therefore, were ready for insurrection.

Furthermore, a head tax or capitation tax was levied, which was a fixed amount and imposed on every male citizen (Summary of events in Afghanistan, from 1st July 1922 to 22nd May 1923 1923, 2023). Landowners that must settle the largest share of taxes were very discontent of increasing taxes, moreover, in Kandahar there was a general dissatisfaction with increasing taxes. It is worth pointing out that in July 1924 in *Loya Jirga Paghman* Kandahar's delegates refused to increase taxes and declared their opposition in this regard (Kateb 1923, 236).

The tax increase led to the corruption in the government, which means the new system of collecting tax despite inspiring from the western taxation system and eliminating any possibility of bribery and corruption, resulted in further corruption among the government officials. According to Ghobar, King *Amanullah* arranged an inspection team to inspect the taxation (Ghobar 1981, 691).

It should be remarked that reform measures in Afghanistan had no rapid results, especially for the peasants, who could not tolerate the problems that arose from government's reform programme. Additionally, in order to compensate these problems the government initiated to make land reforms for the peasants. Based on this policy, the government sold the state land to the peasants at a low cost (Poullada 1973, 135). Nevertheless, instead of the peasants, just the large landowners took advantage of the land reforms (Ghobar 1981, 791).

As a matter of fact, King *Amanullah* with his social reforms intervened in the most personal aspects of the people's life such as marriage, funeral, and banning to wear some costumes. Thus, the people felt more aggrieved at the reforms, as well as the government forced the Afghans to perform obligatory military service and make individual identity card for all Afghans. In fact, the government weakened the military authority of the Afghan tribes by obligatory military service; and controlled child marriage and polygamy

by making individual identity card, which led to a deep sense of resentment of reforms among the people.

Habibullah Khan and Nasrullah Khan had granted an allowance to tribal leaders and religious scholars in order to attract their support. Nonetheless, King *Amanullah* refused to grant any allowance to them because he wanted to spend this money on implementation his policies. Tribal leaders and religious scholars became very furious with him and opposite to his policies. In consequence, the Afghan society slowly became ready for a popular uprising.

3.9.2. The Mangal Rebellion

The *Khost* rebellion or the *Mangal* rebellion lasted fourteen months. It is known as *Mullah-i-Lang rebellion* as well. Besides the casualties and financial losses, *Amanullah's* efforts of the nation building and national unity, faced with obstacles and significantly slowed the process of implementation of reforms.

This rebellion initiated in March 1924, in the *Mangal* district, in Paktia province,¹ and led by *Mullah Abdullah*, known as *Mullah-i-Lang* and his son in law *Mullah Abdul Rashid*. The background of this rebellion since long time earlier had been arranged in Paktia, however, it initiated under the pretext of the trial of one of the Mangal tribe people. This person had claimed that in childhood with a girl had been engaged and his opponents of this person, complained to Amir *Uddin Khan*, the supreme ruler and judge. The judge after obtaining the consent of the girl, according to the new constitutional code in which minor marriage (child marriage) was banned, rejected the claim of the man. *Mullah Abdullah* that was supposed to solve the dispute argued that the judge disobeyed Sharia² decree (Hazara 1999, 13-14). *Mullah Abdullah* in cooperation with *Mullah Abdul Rashid* convinced tribes that in this regard instead of penal code Quran should be considered; hereby he invited them to uprising against the government.

Rhea Talley Stewart, the author of the famous book "Fire in Afghanistan" wrote about rebel leader, *Mullah Abdullah* wore green cassock that was in the colour of the cassock of prophet. He became a significant character among the Afghan masses. The people talk about him as if he inspired from heaven (Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan 1914-1929: The First Opening to the West Undone by Tribal Ferocity Years before the Taliban 2000, 259-260).

¹ Paktia is one of the Province of Afghanistan that is located in the South East of Afghanistan.

² Islamic code of law based on the Koran; holy laws of the Islam which cover aspects of day-to-day life

Thus, a number of the Mullahs in Paktia were stimulated and rebelled against the government. In opposition to the statute and codes that were proposed by King *Amanullah*, they argued that he was away from the Quran and *Shariah*, and he enacted the new legislation based on his interests and predilections (Tanin 2005, 45).

The rebellion continued for more than one year; gradually other tribes joined it, thus it spread to *Logar*¹ province. Both Mullahs with the support of the people of Mangal and Jodran² requested the king to moderate some of the penal codes, which according to their idea were against *Shariah*.³ The king wanted to negotiate with those who had approved the law, nonetheless, the Mullahs did not accept his reasons and revolted in Paktia in the name of preserving Islam and *Shariah*. Farmers of Paktia, who were upset of the government officials' method and particularly supreme ruler, came to support them. Besides, a number of mercenaries joined the uprising (Ghobar 1981, 807).

The king sought to solve the problem by sending influence and intellectual scholars to the opposite group. These scholars met with rebellious Mullahs in *Bidak Logar*, however, *Mullah-i-Lang* had no willingness about discussing the problems. They had a hostile attitude towards the king and their explicit demand was his resignation, as well as they announced that they already selected the new Amir. Nonetheless, according to the mentioned meeting the government concluded that a compromise was not possible and turbulence could just cease with collapsing the rebel forces. Besides, the board of scholars realized that *Mullah-i-Lang*'s requests were political issues and they were not related to religious issues. The king's religious counsellors advised him to establish *Loya Jirga* to investigate the religious complaint. However, *Loya Jirga* generally accepted his proposals and they just made a few modifications regarding penal codes (Poullada 1973, 122).

Loya Jirga modified some part of the reform agenda and sent a board headed by *Shams al-Mashayekh*, *Hazrat-e Noor al-Mashayekh*, minister of Justice and chief justice, *Sardar Mohammad Osman Khan* and some other people to negotiate with insurgents. The purpose of negotiation was adjusting all articles of the constitution with *Shariah* and removing any article, which was in contradiction with Islam. Nonetheless, there was no result in the negotiation with insurgents. Professor Fazl Ghani Mojaddedi quoted from daughter of

¹ Logar is one of the Province of Afghanistan that is located in the East of Afghanistan. The centre of this province Pul-i-Alam.

² It is one of the Afghan tribal communities.

³ (Islam) code of law based on the Koran; holy laws of the Islam which cover aspects of day-to-day life.

Sardar Mohammad Osman Khan (Hazrat-e Sebghatallah Mojaddedi's mother) that some private negotiations between *Hazrat-e Noor al-Mashayekh* and *Mullah Abdullah* were conducted. Although *Hazrat-e Noor al-Mashayekh* initially accepted a substantial number of his ideas, but nevertheless he ultimately refused *Mullah Abdullah's* suggestion (Mojaddedi 1977, 239).

During occurring unrest and conflict in Paktia, many casualties happened to the government forces and insurgents. Most of the battles were in benefit of the insurgents. According to Ghobar, in one of these battles, when war minister *Mohammad Wali Khan*, in *Gardez*¹ was beleaguered by insurgents, 700 people were sent as assistance force named “*Askar Jan Fada*” from Kabul toward *Gardez*. Nonetheless, the insurgents ambushed the assistance force in *Bidak Logar* and killed all of them (Ghobar 1981, 808). *Ali Ahmad Khan* the governor of *Nangarhar* province came to aid the war minister. If *Ali Mohammad Khan* with militias of *Khogyani* and *Momand* districts had not arrived on time, there was not a shadow of doubt that the war minister would have failed and the insurgents seriously would have threatened the capital. In addition, the governor *Ali Mohammad Khan* arrived on time and besieged *Gardez* broke through the rebel siege and ultimately forced the insurgents to retreat and escape.

During the turbulence intensity, the military camp of *Khost province*² was under siege, as well as the insurgents attacked the national treasury that was on the way of *Ghazni*³ to *Gardez*. They occupied *Tanghi Agha Jan* city by a sudden attack and the capital was directly under threat. Additionally, after a while, the insurgents besieged *Ghazni* city, *Ahmadzai* and *Khayal* tribes cut connection between Kabul and Paktia, even the insurgents could arrive up to *Sheikh Abad* and *wardak* Provinces, and in *Sheikh Abad* they took the government treasury as booty.

At this time, *Abd al-Karim* from Indian British entered the scene to make some intercessions in the civil war. This news rapidly was spread throughout the country and as a result of a foreign intervention the people despite their inconvenience of the country's administration maintained their neutrality in the *Paktia* war. Indeed, when they realized the *Paktia* rebellion and involving British spies, in addition to having religious neutrality, they

¹ Gardez is a city in southern Afghanistan in Paktia province.

² Khost is a city in eastern Afghanistan. It is the capital of Khost Province that is adjacent to Afghanistan's border with Pakistan.

³ Ghazni is a city in east central Afghanistan. Its historical name is Ghaznin.

retained their political neutrality. Thus, all people rose to support the government and were united against foreign intrusion (Ghobar 1981, 808). It is noteworthy that the young Afghan movement had a significant role in creating the spirit of independence and xenophobia among Afghan people.

After preparing and supporting the people from the north, the east, Kandahar, Kabul, and Hazara the government forces on the battlefields were out of defensive state and initiated attacking. Additionally, General *Mohammad Omar Khan*¹ penetrated in *Ghazni* that was under siege by the uprisings and defeated insurgents of Paktia, he, therefore, terminated Kabul threat. Furthermore, *Mohammad Amin Khan* defended fort of *Logar* and defeated a group of insurgents in Paktia. Furthermore, Ghulam Nabi Khan Charkhi defeated the insurgents in *Tangi Agho Jan Logar*, and *Sardar Shah Wali Khan* initiated to negotiate with the insurgents in *Logar*.

Indeed, removing insurgents from *Kowtal-e Tireh*, defeating rebels in *Zurmat District*² and Mangal, and smiting the last force of rebellion in Paktia effectuated the termination of the Paktia war. Officers and the government officials arrived in Paktia and controlled the re-established the connection between Kabul and Paktia.

Abd al-Karim Khan fled to India and the government forces arrested the elements of uprising. In addition, the government conducted a military operation, which resulted in execution of rebel leaders such as *Mullah Abdullah*, *Mullah Abdul Rashid*, twenty-five other leaders of the rebellion, and other Mullahs, who motivated the people against the central government (Ghobar 1981, 809-811).

As it was stated previously, this rebellion lasted more than one year and during this time, the intensity of dealing with insurgents had different stages. It is noteworthy that the final defeat of rebels and the arrest of leaders of *Mangal* rebellion was not the termination of the internal conflict. Owing to the casualties and financial losses that arose from the war, the southern opponents and local solidarity groups continued their resistance to the government. Additionally, fear of the government and the idea of revenge as a matter of principles of Pashtunism had a remarkable function in this regard. For concluding this problem, tribal Jirga appeared to be the best option. Although in the tribal Jirga there were some disagreements, which even appeared to be able to promote restarting the conflict,

¹ He is known as *Sur Jrnil*, as well.

² Also spelled as *Zormat*, is a district in Paktia Province in the East of Afghanistan.

with arrival of *Ghazi Mir Zaman Khan Kanri*, who was a tribal leader, and subsequently establishing a tribal Jirga, the conflict almost terminated.

King *Amanullah* on 25 May 1925, in the court before the implementation of the execution of the rebel leaders, which issued by the military court in a speech addressing the rebel leaders outlined the reasons for the execution. The King mentioned that the rebels had accused him of heresy and being against the Koran. He added that he requested them to discuss about the problems, but nevertheless they did not want to negotiate and instead sought to support *Abdul Karim*, who according to the King's idea, was an adventurous and terrorist person.¹

3.10. Impact of the Grand Tour

On 10 December 1927, he left Afghanistan for Asian, European, and African countries, and started the so-called Grand Tour. According to Rhea Talley Stewart, King *Amanullah* in his farewell in the palace of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressing to the staff and students and education officers in Afghanistan expressed the reasons for his trip.² Then, in order to represent the different class of the people of Afghanistan accompanied him four different classes of society, including one soldier, one student of school, one government official and one citizen of Kabul. (Stewart, *Fire in Afghanistan 1914-1929: The First Opening to the West Undone by Tribal Ferocity Years before the Taliban 2000*, 51-52).

On December 15, 1927 King *Amanullah* through Kandahar along with thirty-one people as a board, entered British India. In India, he participated in the Friday prayers and preached a sermon based on Hindu Muslim unity. This statement brought the Indian public sentiment into passion for their freedom. Then, he departed to Egypt, where he was welcomed in Port Said. Queen *Soraya* and *Noor al Saraj* - the king's sister - appeared with non-Islamic dresses. Some photos were taken photo of them, which published in newspapers in Europe and demonstrated the queen and the king's sister with non-Islamic dress. These photos arrive soon in Afghanistan and were distributed among the tribe. It should be mentioned that the British elements in order to destroy the king's position in Afghanistan and stimulate the people against him distributed these photos in the country.

¹ For further information about the king's speech see: Mohammad Akram Andishmand, *Amozesh va parvareh modern dar Afghanistan*, [Modern Education in Afghanistan], (Kabul: Maiwand Publication, 1389/2010), P.30.

² For further information about King's speech see: Rhea Talley Stewart, *Fire in Afghanistan 1914-1929: The First Opening to the West Undone by Tribal Ferocity Years before the Taliban*, pp.51-52.

Italy was the first European country that invited King *Amanullah*. In Italy, he was welcomed by Mussolini and two magnificent banquets were arranged in his honour as well as he visited Rome, Milan and some other cities and met with the pope. *Amanullah* was the first King that was accepted by the pope.

The king quoted, “Italians demonstrated me a desirable kindness; especially their attentive and aware the king and the royal family of Italy expressed their friendship very much. What I did in Italy are as follows: [...] Italian government admitted a number of our children. They accepted twenty-five people for teaching and I am sure this is the most useful support and love” (Popalzai, *Safarhaye shah Amanullah dar davazdah keshvar -e Asia va oropa 1306-1307*, [King *Amanullah*’s Visits of 12 Asian and European Countries in 1927] 1985, 100-101).

The king after visiting Italy travelled to France and Belgium, Switzerland, Britain, Germany, Poland and Soviet Union. George V the king of Great Britain said it would never address *Amanullah* as “His Majesty”, however when he met with *Amanullah*, greeted promptly and addressed as “His Majesty” (Popalzai, *Summary: a glance at history of independence, Third Anglo-Afghan War with Britain, 1919 1989*, 55). It goes without saying that this deed confirmed the significant position of the king and recognizing Afghanistan’s independence by Great Britain. Further, the British endeavoured to prevent him from travelling to Moscow (Popalzai, *Summary: a glance at history of independence, Third Anglo-Afghan War with Britain, 1919 1989*, 55). *The Great Game* between Great Britain and Russia caused each of two colonialism countries endeavoured to attract the king’s accordance with their own policies and interests in Afghanistan.

In Turkey, *General Mustafa Ataturk* arranged a magnificent banquet for King *Amanullah*. It is worth pointing out that programmes of *General Mustafa Ataturk* for progress and prosperity of his country had a dramatic effect on the mind of *Amanullah*. He wished he could walk in the footsteps of *Mustafa Ataturk*. It is worth pointing out that the Turkish society and Afghan society in terms of the conditions and characteristics were quite different from each other, thus it was not easy to develop the Afghan society with the same manners and reform programmes, which were implemented by *Ataturk*.

On 20 June 1928, King *Amanullah* returned to Afghanistan. In Kandahar, he addressing the Afghan people declared that he went to Europe to find the manner of progress and improvement for the country. He added that he would sacrifice everything for the

progressive and improvement of the country. He hoped that the development and progress of the country would initiate from Kandahar. He added in Europe that women worked like men had equal rights, and attended in all social, political, economic, and commercial aspects. (Popalzai, Summary: a glance at history of independence, Third Anglo-Afghan War with Britain, 1919 1989, 56-57). Nevertheless, the Mullahs in Kandahar believed that the king became infidel and he would make them infidel as well.

Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, regarding the king's long trip to Europe, and its consequences believed that, the king long trip attracted a preferable attention to him, provided for him a higher credibility and prestige, and increased the importance of Afghanistan in the world. Nonetheless, he criticized *Amanullah* for his trip and believed that the situation in Afghanistan was not stable and in this regard, his trip was a critical act. He left his country to travel during the change process, which was a very blameful action. *Nehru* also indicates that he sought to change the old manner of life and *Mustafa Kemal* never implemented such critical measure (Nehru 2007, 1665-66).

It is worth pointing out that conspiracy and adverse publicity against King *Amanullah* during his trip to Europe were severe. Especially the British were particularly interested and involved in running propaganda. In addition, they wanted to revenge for their defeat in third Afghan war. According to *Jawaharlal Nehru*, in the absence of the king all persons and reactionary elements, who were disagreed with his policies, undermined his position. Various plots and conspiracies were raised and many rumours spread against him. Furthermore, so much money was spent for propaganda against the king. Mullahs were given large sums of money and they introduced *Amanullah* as infidels and enemy of religion in all over the country. Inappropriate pictures of Queen *Soraya* in European evening dress were printed thousands of copies and were distributed in villages and remote areas in order to demonstrate people her non-Islamic clothing. The basic question is this who organized this widespread and expensive propaganda? Afghans had no money, as well as they did not know how to perform these measures. There is a strong likelihood that the British secret police organization was beyond all these measures. Furthermore, it was apparent that Britain was interested in weakening the king position in Afghanistan. Thus, during *Amanullah's* European trip the British sought to undermine his influence and foundations of his power by intense propaganda. He returned to the country and immediately reinitiated his reform programme based on new ideas and encouragements that he received in the meeting with *Kemal Pasha* in Ankara, (Nehru 2007, 1665-66).

As it was mentioned previously queen *Soraya*'s non-Islamic photographs were distributed among the tribes. It is worth pointing out that printing such picture required technical skills, which demonstrated that Britain was involved in preparing and distributing the photos. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that this is an important evidence to demonstrate the British involvement in the conspiracy against the king. (Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan 1914-1929: The First Opening to the West Undone by Tribal Ferocity Years before the Taliban 2000, 84). It is likely that the Britain's purpose of these measures was destruction of the reputation of position of the king and the queen and their popularity among the people.

According to Asta Olesen business representative of Afghanistan in *Quetta*, in opposition to King *Amanullah*, bought all newspapers, which contained the unveiled photographs of the Queen and sent them to Kabul, in order to provoke the public sentiments against the King, which was another indication regarding the British conspiracy. (Olesen 1999, 84). Rhea Talley Stewart believed the British published the news regarding the king's programmes in France, Britain, Germany, Italy, and Russia and distributed rumours in their newspaper about him. On 19 October 1929, in *Daily Mail* the fanatics revolted against the Queen, killed Islamic elites, and jailed the king's brother. However, there is no dispute that all the mentioned measures could be regarded as conspiracy against *Amanullah*. (Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan 1914-1929: The First Opening to the West Undone by Tribal Ferocity Years before the Taliban 2000, 226).

Mir Mohammad Sediq Farhang believed that "the most remarkable issue was the disapproval of *Mojaddidi* family, especially *Hazrat-e-Fazl Omar*, who in *Dera Ismail Khan* - adjacent to the Afghanistan border with Pakistan - penetrated the Afghan nomads and promoted propaganda against King *Amanullah*. According to the report of Indian officials, he assured his followers that he had supporters within the government. Furthermore, he mentioned the name of Minister of war, *Mohammad Wali Khan*, and the previous lieutenant governor of eastern of Afghanistan, *Ali Ahmad Khan* those who were closed to the King" (Farhang 1995, 522-528).

Three days after the king's arrival in British India, the British allowed *Hazrat-e-Fazl Omar* (*Noor al Mashayekh*) to enter to *Dera Ismail Khan* (Center for his traditional followers). On 18, December *Omar* entered *Dera Ismail Khan* and reinitiated promoting propaganda against the king and his reforms among the Afghan nomads. *Noor al Mashayekh* had two

houses in *Dera Ismail Khan*, one of them was the British agents' donation, and due to the British order, he returned to *Dera Ismail Khan* to provoke local solidarity groups against the central government. The opposition, especially Mullahs him at this home and he suggested them the plan to dethrone of the king. He thereby prepared Mullahs and especially the people of Khost for uprising against *Amanullah*. (Stewart, *Fire in Afghanistan 1914-1929: The First Opening to the West Undone by Tribal Ferocity Years before the Taliban 2000*, 65).

In Kabul, *Mashayekh*'s brother and nephew (*Mohammad Sadiq Mojaddidi* and *Mohammad Masoom Mojaddidi*) made some plans to overthrow the king *Amanullah*. Two Mullahs that were called *Mullah Mohammad Hasan* and *Mullah Elyas* ordered to *Abd al Rahim* and *Mohammad Jan* to leave immediately for Khost in order to stimulate the People of *Jdran* and *Mangal* to revolt. In this regard, for *Jdran* tribe *Malek Boland Khan* was assigned, and *Malek Gholam Khan* was appointed for the people of *Gardez*¹. (Stewart, *Fire in Afghanistan 1914-1929: The First Opening to the West Undone by Tribal Ferocity Years before the Taliban 2000*, 54). In fact, the British elements could convince different local solidarity groups to arise against *Amanullah*. At this moment, the King along with conducting the final stage of reforms should handle the internal instability, which was occurred by the British expense.

3.11. Secularization

The final stage of *Amanullah*'s social reforms that were very secular initiated after his return from his long trip to European and Asian countries. In fact, he became strongly dynamic and encouraged after meeting the powerful individuals of Europe, observing the western technique and culture, and especially after visiting the reforms of *Mustafa Kemal Atatürk* in Turkey and *Reza Shah* in Iran. Besides, he accelerated implementation of his experience and reform programme in Afghanistan.

In October 1928, he established *Loya Jirga* with thousands of people, exposed to discussion his intentions, and hoped to accelerate the process of social change. First, the king reported on his trip and then proposed the plan of reforms and rapid changes in the economic and social conditions in Afghanistan. It should be noted before his trip some parts of his reforms, which were relatively basic and fundamental, were successful and pretty well received by the people. Indeed, approving the new constitution, organizing the

¹ Gardez is located in south of Afghanistan and It is the capital of the Paktia Province.

education system, changing the structure of the government all were conducted in consultation with other reformers. Nonetheless, his reforms after his trip were imitation of western culture and completely superficial, and even some reformers were disagreed with some of his new reforms and his haste in the implementation of them. In this regard Ghobar mentioned, “[The king after his trip] was not the previous King and became very arrogant and selfish. Afghanistan soon became susceptible to a negative repercussion due to King’s hasty measures” (Ghobar 1981, 530-531). His close associates such as *Mahmud Tarzi* and *Mohammad Wali Khan* neither participated in his plans nor were concurred with the content of reforms and the manner of their implementation. Notwithstanding, they expressed the reasons for their opposition and the king disregarded their ideas (Ghobar 1981, 530-531).

However, King *Amanullah* in *Loya Jirga*, which arranged in *Paghman* in 1928, approved the following programmes:

- Child marriage was banned;
- Marriage age was determined from 18 to 22-year-old;
- Testimony was provided to the Mullahs;
- Land tax was increased;
- The national flag was marked with mountains, sun and wheat;
- The veil (Hijab¹) was free;
- Compulsory military service was determined for three years without any change and forgiveness;
- *General Audit Office* was established under the direct supervision of the king and also were established the *National Council Selective* including 150 literate lawyers of the country instead of the state council;
- Finally, the freedom of the press and criticism was approved (Ghobar 1981, 1278).

Furthermore, he changed the official holiday from Friday, which was an Islamic holiday and the day of Friday prayer, to Sunday, which is the day of Christians’ Pray. Enactment of these legislations angered Mullahs and provoked their dissatisfaction, and finally representatives of *Loya Jirga* left the meeting while they were very upset and confused (Ghobar 1981, 1278). In addition, intellectuals were completely disappointed with King *Amanullah* by virtue of his obstinacy in handling some affairs such as having Chancellery

¹ Headscarf worn by Muslim women to cover their hair; custom in Muslim societies of women to dress decently outdoors.

Ministers and the lack of responsibility for the government ministers in the national assembly. Besides, it could be argued that from this moment a severe political abstraction performed in Afghanistan, and the government had no legitimacy in the view of the intellectual elites.

Unveiling women and making uniform dress for the men were the critical reform programmes conducted by *Amanullah* for modernizing the society in the final stage of reforms. The King in consequence of being influenced by western culture, civilization, industry, and technology conducted these reforms after his trip to European countries. Additionally, he objected severely to Afghanistan's backward social conditions and believed that to reach European countries' social conditions should be westernized each aspect of traditional system of the Afghan society. Accordingly, he precipitately initiated to imitate the superficial trappings of western culture and civilization; moreover, he decided to make a preferable amount of changes in the minimum time. The king by taking some measures undermined the previous symbols of Afghan value, which he previously promoted and encouraged them (such as the use of homemade products especially clothes and homespun fabric) (Ghobar 1981, 554). At this moment, King *Amanullah* instead of wearing a homemade, simple, and closed collar shirt wore western suit and necktie.

In the beginning, the king proposed women's liberation and stood up to defend their rights. In July 1928, his wife Queen *Soraya*, in an article in the *Aman-e-Afghan* gazette explained the necessity of removing the veil. Then, the king invited the senior officers in the education system to the royal palace and expressed them regarding the progress and freedom of women in other countries. He emphasized on respecting the women's rights and remarked that he would personally help the women in this regard (S. M. Farrokh 1993, 465, Ghobar 1981, 531).

The king ordered to put in the special road in Kabul signs with this phrase: "No woman with a *Burqa* can pass through here". The king enforced this programme by putting the police force in the intersections. Nonetheless, by virtue of various reason many women could not follow this programme and they, therefore, were forced to stay at home (Ghobar 1981, 1276).

Furthermore, men were ordered to wear uniform and hat chapeau instead of the traditional clothes and it was declared that in case of violation of law they would be fined. On the other hand, uniform clothes were made for the men and especially representatives of *Loya*

Jirga Paghman were forced to wear a suit, tie, and chapeau hat, which caused to dissatisfaction of *Loya Jirga*'s representatives with such secular and anti-tradition policies. (S. M. Farrokh 1993, 481).

It could be argued that the mandatory implementation of these programmes provoked dissatisfaction regarding the reforms among the people (Ghobar 1981, 1277, Farhang 1995, 531). The worst of all was that shaking hands became forbidden and the people had to remove their hat from head and waved it like European. Further, *Sikhism*¹ people that based on their religious orders wrapped their long hair in a turban were forced to cover their turbans and heads together with an elastic woollen hat. These issues led the Afghan society to a very complicated situation. (Ghobar 1981, 1277).

It should be mentioned that similar to these kinds of reforms were implemented a little earlier by *Mustafa Kemal Atatürk* in Turkey and later by *Reza Shah* in Iran (Kashf -e- Hijab az Soye Reza Khan, [The unveiling by Reza Khan] 1997, 14). It is worth pointing out that unveiling policy, which even implemented by *Reza Shah* in Iran always was regarded as a struggle with Islamic clothing and promoting western culture in the Eastern countries. It should be remarked that implementation of these issues would require two conditions:

- First, providing the cultural and social context for acceptance such culture;
- Second, a powerful agent and organized programme for implementation the reforms (Haddad-Adel 1987, 46-47).

Regarding the first condition should be remark that despite the fact that some efforts were made to provide this context, but nevertheless they were not sufficient. Thus, in order to achieve this purpose, in the summer of 1927, he created the association for the protection of women and twelve women lawyers of Kabul took management of the mentioned association, and thus they initiated to promote the unveiling in the society (Taghire-lebas va kashf-e- hijab be ravayat-e asnad, [Change clothes and unveiling according to documents] 1998, 80). Regarding the second condition, it should be said that a centralized control and decentralized authority is needed to implement successfully the government policies, *Amanullah*'s government due to internal conflict and external sabotage did not have such ability at that time.

¹ Monotheistic religion that combines elements of Hinduism and Islam and was founded in northern India in the sixteenth century.

In October 1928, King *Amanullah* established an assembly composed of officers, senior government officials, and capital's outstanding personalities. It occurred in the garden of the Foreign Ministry and was held for five days. In this assembly, Queen *Soraya* participated unveiled and the king offered his long statement regarding backwardness of the country. Furthermore, he displayed a video regarding his trip to Europe and requested the people to emancipate women. He indicated to the Queen in front of the audience to remove her veil (Azimi 1998, 13, Habibi 1984, 191).

It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the king recognized correctly the problem and found the exact solution, which was training of technical and qualified forces as the political, economic, and cultural foundations of the country. Accordingly, he established and developed the new style schools and conducted some educational policies in order to provide these forces. Nonetheless, in the manner of implementation of these policies he could not find an appropriate manner for Afghan society, moreover, he could not proposal any manner in this regard.

In his view, all the western developed countries at that time could be model for progress in Afghanistan. Accordingly, he employed some forces from different countries such as Egypt, Turkey, Italy, Germany, and France. Additionally, as it was previously stated, each of the three schools that he established in Kabul was a copy of a particular country. For instance, *Amanieh School (Esteghlal)* was not only a copy from French schools, but also the teachers from French taught there. *Nejat School* was modelled on the German school and the German teachers taught there, and in *Ghazi school* the lessons were taught in English (Nancy Peabody Newel, Richard S. Newell 1981, 37). Later, a number of male and female graduates of these schools were sent abroad for higher education in developing countries.

Likewise, the successful implementation of the king's first stage of reform until 1924, made him arrogant, thus after his trip to Europe, he exaggerated and kept away a substantial number of his close associates and advisors, who had co-operated on the first and second stages of his reforms. In this issue should not be disregarded Britain's mysterious interference. He selfishly implemented some programmes, which neither were pursuant to the Afghan traditions nor were very considerable factors in development and progress. Regardless of blindly imitating the western culture, the king's new programmes flouted the rules of life and attacked values and religious beliefs of Afghans. Additionally,

People realized that implementation of his reforms not only would not lead to progress, but also it was regarded as an insult to the national culture. Likewise, it was an excuse for a number of opportunistic to misuse the critical situation and completely changed the process of reforms in order to achieve their own interests.

His critical position in front of a number of influential people in the Afghan society such as Mullahs was the most important issue that demonstrated the king's inexperience. The hidden hand of colonialism, in order to benefit from such elements, spread the general tendency for Mullahs and Molavis¹ in the closed and tribal community of Afghanistan. For instance, they were utilized in the excommunication the followers of other religions, which apparently was for defending the religion, whereas in fact it was for stimulating the people against the king's policies. It goes without saying that it would be a consequential policy to frustrate the reforms and regain their lost privileges (Davoudi, *Zamine va pishinehe eslah talabi dar Afghanistan*, [Background and History of the Reform Movement of Afghanistan] 2000, 184).

3.12. Bache Saqaw's Uprising

In November 1928, in a conflict between a group of nomads of *Soleymankhil* and a group of *Sangokhil Shinwari*, the supreme ruling appointed by the government upheld *Soleymankhil*, which provoked *Shinwari*'s hostility to the government. Furthermore, some intense propaganda had been distributed among *Shinwari* people regarding the disbelief and injustice of the government, which meant secret and organized hands were trying to prepare the context for rebellion (Ghobar 1981, 818).

Shinwaris occupied *Achin* and *Kahi* military posts and achieved large stores of weapons and ammunition, undermined the route of Kabul to Peshawar and finally arrived in Jalalabad. In consequence of the weakness of the government, lack of decision-making many *Shinwari* people joined the rebellion. Jalalabad the centre of the eastern province soon fell and the king's summer palace was burned. When the king recognized the seriousness of the situation, was too late. Despite of the fact that the central government dispatched military forces to control the tribal area handle the rebels, it was not consequential.

¹ Sunni cleric called Molavi.

It is noteworthy that in the beginning, the uprising appeared to be some limited tribal conflicts, which had religious colour; however, it rapidly developed into a very large rebellion. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that this was in consequence of the widespread propaganda, news of the *Shinwari* victory, the activities of British spies such as *Abdolvahed Shinwari*, Mullah's eloquent speech and sending messages to other tribes, establishing several *Loya Jirga*, and using the reforms as means of anti-regime by Mullahs and religious leader.

Considering the conditions of the cease-fire, which on December 29th were sent to the insurgents by *Golam Sedigh Khan Charkhi* - the envoy of King *Amanullah* for negotiations, demonstrates the hidden hands of colonialism. The demands of the insurgents were as follows:

- *Mahmud Tarzi* and his family had to be exiled from Afghanistan;
- King had to divorce Queen *Soraya*;
- All girls' schools had to be closed;
- Afghan girls had to return from Turkey;
- Except for Britain diplomatic representation, all the rest diplomatic representation had to be closed;
- The new law and the statute had to be repealed;
- Taxes had to be reduced;
- The law of wearing European clothes had to be revoked;
- The form of *Chador* had to be changed into its previous form;
- Islamic law had to be declared as state law;
- The regime had to provide appropriate positions for Mullahs within government (Stewart, *Fire in Afghanistan* 2005, 84-216).

However, the first demand of the rebels was exile of *Mahmud Tarzi* and his family from Afghanistan. At that time, *Tarzi* was a close expert adviser of the constitutionalists, and the rebels, therefore, endeavoured to deprive the constitutionalists of experiences of such nationalist and aware advisor and accordingly requested them to exile *Tarzi* from Afghanistan.

The critical situation in the East of the country prepared the background of insecurity, prevalence of robbery and banditry in the north of capital - the region of *Parwan* and *Kapisa* - leading by *Habibullah Kalakani*, also known as *Bache Saqaw*. He had been

charged with robbery in British India and was sentenced to eleven months in prison. Nonetheless, he escaped from prison, returned to Afghanistan, and continued his criminal activities. However, *Shinwar* rebellion intensified in late November and involved the government in a huge crisis in the east.

In December, the fire of rebellion of *Nangarhar* sparked and the local ruler *Malek Mohsen* and some other people were arrested and were accused of supporting *Bache Saqaw*. Subsequently, the government sent *Ahmad Ali Khan Lodin* - the governor of Kabul - with full authority in order to fighting the rebellion of *Nangarhar*. Additionally, *Ahmad Ali Khan Lodin* in *Parwan* and *Kapisa* adopted the same promised manner of the government which was the policy of “negotiation and understanding” in handling the rebels. He left *Jabal al-Seraj* for *Saraye Khajeh* and informed the government that in order to satisfy the people it was reasonable release those who had been imprisoned by virtue of supporting *Bache Saqaw*. After that a large *Jirga* was established and was performed the policy of “negotiation and understanding” with leaders of *Parwan* and *Kapisa*, which led to reach an agreement between two sides. Furthermore, *Bache Saqaw* recognized the weakness of the government and he, therefore, increased his activities and killed many military forces in a sudden attack on the route of Kabul. The central government ordered *Ahmad Ali Khan* to reach an absolute agreement with *Bache Saqaw*. Ultimately, they signed an agreement and *Bache Saqaw* promised to stop the opposition to the government.

According to Ghobar, after this scandalous and unprecedented agreement *Ahmad Ali Khan Lodin* brought *Bache Saqaw* and his comrades to *Saraye Khajeh* and requested the ministry of war to provide eighty-two guns for them. The king issued separate commands to the ministry of war (*Abd al Aziz Khan*), minister of finance (*Mir Hashim Khan*) and the governor of Kabul (*Ahmad Ali Khan Lodin*) and affirmed the commitment of *Ahmad Ali Khan* (Ghobar 1981, 821). This demonstrates the incapability of the government to decentralize its authorities in the local and tribal areas, which forced the king to make such agreement with the opponents.

Ahmad Ali Khan established another *Loya Jirga* in *Tagab*¹ in order to encourage the people to support the government and find volunteers for fight with the rebels of *Shinwar*. Nonetheless, the people of *Nangarhar* declared that they never fight against brothers. Accordingly, he requested the religious leader of *Tagab* (*Abd al Hamid*) to attract the

¹ Tagab District is located in the east of Kapisa Province, in the north-east of the Afghanistan.

support of people, but nevertheless he was concurred with people as well. Concurrently *Bache Saqaw* became very powerful and on December 10, 1928 in the castle of King *Amanullah*, in collaboration with some Mullahs, Khans, and his comrade, announced himself as the Sovereign of Afghanistan. Thus, it was conducted the final and the considerable resist to the king (Ghobar 1981, 822).

Hereinafter, the conditions were more prepared for the collapse of the king's government. On December 11, *Bache Saqaw* pillaged the local government of *Saraye Khajeh* and disarmed some governmental forces in that area. He intended to attack the capital by three hundred people and simultaneously sent his friend *Seyyed Hossein* to *Charikar*¹ and *Saraye Khajeh*. First *Seyyed Hossein* conquered *Charikar*, where was abandoned with no forces. Subsequently, *Saraye Khajeh* was conquered without fighting and the military forces were surrendered. On 12 December, *Habibullah Kalakani* attacked Kabul, where he confronted with resistance by government's forces. The governmental forces forced *Bache Saqaw* to escape to mountains, but nevertheless he continued sporadic fighting (Ghobar 1981, 822).

On December 17, Britain's embassy demoralized him by flying its aircrafts in the Kabul's sky without authorization of the Afghan government. The British aircrafts distributed announcements in which they warned people, in case of threatening the life and property of the British embassy staff, Great Britain would strongly take revenge. Following this announcement, on 23 December, the British planes landed in Kabul and took the women of embassies, which was the second shock to *Amanullah's* government (Ghobar 1981, 822).

Involving a large part of the military forces to cease the uprising of the eastern tribes, confronted *Amanullah's* government with collapse along with *Bache Saqaw's* attack on Kabul. On 7 January 1929, he released *Mohammad Sadegh Mojaddedi*² from prison in order to pacifying the religious opponents and making relationship with *Mullah Abdul Hamid*, moreover, on 8 January he issued a decree and rescinded a substantial number of his proposed reforms, but nevertheless such policies were non-functional as the conditions were out of his control. Finally, on 14 January, the king left Kabul for Kandahar and left

¹ Charikar is located in the Kohdaman Valley and the capital of Parwan Province in the north of Afghanistan.

² Mohammad Sadegh Mojaddedi (hazrat-e shor bazaar) owing to having supported Bache Saqaw was in prison.

Kingdom for his brother Enayatullah Khan who was the king only for three days (S. M. Farrokh 1991, 52). On 18 January, *Bache Saqaw* ascended the royal throne of Kabul.

It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the disapproval of the powerful and spiritual family of *Shor Bazaar*, their alliances with tribes against the government's policies and its reforms had a key role in toppling *Amanullah's* government. In fact, these alliances and subsequently rebellions in the country forced the king and other Afghan constitutionalists and reformists to be neutral and silent for half a century. In addition, Ghobar believed that "the collapse of the reign of King *Amanullah* and subsequently establishment of turbulent government of *Bache Saqaw* in Afghanistan was in fact a historical disaster" (Ghobar 1981, 834).

3.13. The Connection between Uprisings and Reforms

On one side, the uprisings chronologically happened after the first and third stages of reforms; on the other side, the government opponents considered the social reforms, which had been suggested by the government, as propaganda against the government, moreover, these reforms were main causes for resistance to *Amanullah's* government, which resulted in its collapse. Accordingly, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the uprisings were results of the reaction of the people to the reforms.

Evaluation the causes of uprisings and failure of the king's plans depends on the analysis of its complex and abstruse factors. It is true that the uprisings caused to delay and interruptions of the reform processes and ultimately overthrow of *Amanullah's* government, but nevertheless the failure to reform should be separated from the overthrow of his government. In order to recognize whether the reforms led to uprising or the reforms were victimized by uprising, the various factors of uprisings and their differences from what claimed by the religious opponents of the king should be examined.

It is sometimes suggested that the king never thought his reforms would lead to uprisings and rebellions, contrary his government was victimized by political transfer, which was stimulated and supported by religious fanatic (Kargon 1985, 84). Nevertheless, some western historians and their Afghan followers consider the uprisings as a direct result of reforms. They are of the opinion that the main considerable issues during the *Amani* era are the prejudice and backwardness of Afghan society, the king's acceleration in

performing his reforms and his misconception regarding the conditions of the country and Afghan society.

Reviewing the view of experts on Afghan society can illustrate whether the Afghan people strongly opposed the process of modernity and progress. As stated by Ghobar, “*Amanullah*’s government after removing the British colonialism from Afghanistan initiated making domestic reform. Afghan people that desired for development seriously assisted and cooperated with the government. They practically welcomed all of the new reforms, and like during the war with Britain spent their lives and properties. They even accepted a particular type of tax, which called “contribution of education” in order to progress the new education. They offered voluntary service to build streets and strongly supported new industries and democratic system. Even women entered in social activities such as establishing some local schools, publishing a magazine that called *Ershad-I-Niswan* (Guidance for Women), and establishment of an association that called *Hemayat-I-Niswan* (Protecting Women). Overall, the Afghans cooperated in all of these unfamiliar reforms and without any prejudice and obscurantism supported the young Afghan government. Thus, despite the foreign conspiracies and the reactionary forces’ opposition, King *Amanullah* could successfully and courageously implement all of his reforms in the first stage (1919-1924). [...] After 1927, the reforms were intensified, as well as despite their general consequences, they were destructive. [...] It is not true the judgment of those who believed the failure of reform attempts was a sign of rigor and prejudice of the Afghan people. Normally the Afghan people wanted to develop the lifestyle like any developed community. Afghanistan’s history does not demonstrate that the Afghan people rebelled against civilization and culture in any era” (Ghobar 1981, 789).

As it was reported by Fazl Ghani Mojaddedi, the grandson of Mohammad Sadegh Mojaddedi, “*Amanullah*’s reforms were not the real cause of sparking of the revolution. The Afghan people collaborated with him on implementing a substantial number of the reforms, but nevertheless which motivated the nation’s hostility to reforms were the manner of implementing the reforms, and attendance of the dishonest people within the government. In addition, the authority and local governors were involved in the ignition of revolution” (Mojaddedi 1977, 221).

The government’s opponents utilized some part of reforms as propaganda against the government. Some social and cultural reforms especially those that were related to

customs and traditions, such as obligation to wear Western clothes, women's emancipation and equal rights, prohibition of polygamy and child marriage, sending girls to study in Turkey, and regulations against the high cost of weddings, were among the controversial social reforms. The government's opponents referred these reforms as the main reason for public opposition to the government.

It is worthy of note that *Amanullah's* reforms were comprehensive with the goal of modernization the entire country and not just conducting some social or governmental system with the developed world. For instance, in the economic programmes of products and tax regulations supported the commercial project and the agricultural initiatives. Besides, the economic projects could promote education plans, and the education programmes could promote economic projects. There is not a shadow of doubt that the extent and volume of the developmental measures, implemented by King *Amanullah*, could be inferred in the terms of the nature of reforms and in his speech that he said, "I hope to see a fundamental change in all the essential aspects and diverse activities in my country" (W.K 1967, 213).

There is no dispute that the king was a young man and was not perfect and faultless. He was impatient and wanted to achieve soon his desirable and human goals, which were the welfare of the people and promoting the progress and development in the country. In some cases, he implemented some minor and unimportant reforms while the majority of critics criticized him with no examining exactly the reforms. It goes without saying that such judgement is unfair and far from reality, and in this regard the following points should be considered;

- It is true that the implementation of some obligatory reform such as wearing western dress was limited to the court and official circles and in fact, it was voluntary.
- It is true that emancipation of women was faced with a substantial resistance. Nonetheless, in this case, the government instead of the use of force and violence, endeavoured to convince the people and reach a deal with them, as well as the mentioned plan was not so efficient and effective.
- It is true that some traditional reforms such as mourning ceremony and weddings took legal nature. Nonetheless, people generally did not consider it and continued

their traditions as before. Besides, there was no example in which offenders were brought to justice.

In order to study and verify the reforms and their connection to uprisings the social reforms are supposed to be examined, which the oppositions regarded them as the main reason for the public opposition to the reforms. In this manner, it could be discovered whether the main reason for public opposition were *Amanullah's* social reforms or there were other factors as well.

Leon Poullada is of the opinion that in order to analyse the modernization programme, three important factors are noteworthy:

- First, the scope of these programmes was limited to the provinces and important cities, and they were voluntary in the small cities, moreover they were not implemented in some parts of the country.
- Second, in provinces, the impacts of these measures were largely in the upper class of the society, and the ordinary people neither were affected nor were interested in these measures.
- Third, there are sufficient evidences that even the classes that were affected by social reforms demonstrated no resistance against them (Poullada 1973, 143-144).

Leon Poullada thought that if the social reforms were implemented on a limited number of people in Afghan society and people demonstrated no hostility and resistance, so the reasoning that stated opposition to social reform resulted in uprisings proposed based on what? (Poullada 1973, 146-147) However, in order to answer this question should be remarked that the social reforms were the best means of propaganda, frighten and intimidation of residents and inducing the tribal areas. Consequently, the classes of society that were not affected by the reforms and had no direct experience in this regard were deceived by many deceptions and rumours. Furthermore, some parts of the reforms intervened in the sensitive issues such as religion, ideology, and family affairs, which in the ethnic society by virtue of tribe and kinship are very momentous and fundamental. Accordingly, *Amanullah's* opponents targeted his social reforms and the foreign press excitedly and affectivity utilized this simple interpretation of the reasons for the uprisings. Eventually, it became a general view and many writers confirmed it with no investigation into the main causes of uprisings (Poullada 1973, 146-147).

There are many criticisms regarding the reform programmes of King *Amanullah*. One of these criticisms is regarding the changes in the army's conditions. A group of writers blames the king according to his speech in which he declared "[Now is] the era of the pen, not of the sword" (Adamec, *The History of political relations in Afghanistan from Amir Abdul Rahman till independence 1970*, 58). He reduced the military budget and the number of armed forces. His critics indicated the governments of *Kemal Ataturk* and *Reza Shah* and argued that *Amanullah* like them was supposed to rely on a powerful army to implement his reforms. They believed that the weakness of the military system was the reason for toppling of King *Amanullah*. There are many evidences that the king in order to establish a strong and viable military system, within the framework of his priorities on national development plan, made some non-functional efforts. He believed that by justifying and reasoning would convince his people and attract their contribution to advance the country's development programme. He endeavoured to encourage his people and gain their political support by convincing them that his plans were convenient for the country and nation. Initially, he opposed using force and pressure to achieve the goal, as well as he was against the military establishment that widely imposes a burden on national income. He preferred economic and education development, which was not comprehensible for his opponents. He did not want to establish a weak military system however, he wanted the country's military system to be fitted to the needs of a modern state and be consistent with his aspirations. The manners that were used to reach the goals could be examined, whereas in fact there are no doubts on the significance of his goals (Adamec, *The History of political relations in Afghanistan from Amir Abdul Rahman till independence 1970*, 112).

It is remarkable that the foreign policy of the government that obtained somewhat the predicted successes set the context of gaining economic assistance for realization of reform programme and making innovation in the fields of economic, social, educational, civil, military, political and administrative. According to a document, dated 26th December 1923, from the U.S. National Archives, an Italian expert who assisted Afghanistan in the financial affairs stated that the king had sufficient money for his projects, but nevertheless a remarkable part of it was spent in the *Khost* rebellion (Stewart, *Fire in Afghanistan 1914-1929: The First Opening to the West Undone by Tribal Ferocity Years before the Taliban 2000*, 337).

Another criticism was regarding the king's trip. Unlike the assertion of high costs of the king's trips to European and Asian countries, it should be noted that these trips were not just a political act but also they were the most important part of the reforms. The king in order to make fundamental economic and social changes, besides strengthening his political position required to attract the necessary assistances. Accordingly, *Aman-e-Afghan* wrote, "This trip will be taken in order to prepare the conditions for welfare and improvement and increasing the development of our country" (*Aman-e-Afghan* 1927). The king could attract the attention of the industrial circles of some European countries. It is worthy of note that the strict observance of the principles of national independence was seriously regarded in attraction foreign capitals in the country's economy. He did not travel to the United States as they declared that he must settle his travel expenses. Later it was realized that the American government as a result of the British authorities' request endeavoured to dissuade him and declared that he would not be as an official guest of the government.

Enforcement of the new laws, which were contrary to *Shariah* (Islamic law), was another criticism regarding the reforms of *Amanullah*. New constitution, marriage law, criminal codes, commercial codes, women's education, civil registration, recruitment, and tax law were the critical issues of discussion in the *Loya Jirga* in 1924. As it was previously stated this *Loya Jirga* on 16 July, at the peak of the *Khost* uprising occurred in *Paghman*. It was strongly influenced by an intense religious excitement, which had been arisen by virtue of the *Khost* rebellion. A number of notable religious scholars took advantage of the problems of the government and as the first time publicly argued against the government's reform policies. In the mentioned *Loya Jirga*, the opposed religious scholars requested to repeal of all laws that in their opinion were contradicted *Hanafi* jurisprudence. In the second day of *Loya Jirga*, *Molavi Mohammad Ibrahim Kamwi* suggested that first of all the criminal codes should be reviewed. Ulema, those who had not shared in the codification of the laws all together requested the king to amend the criminal code in completely compliance with *Hanafi* jurisprudence. Further, they wanted to prepare new criminal codes based on *Islamic Fatwa*,¹ which instead of *Tamasok al Ghozat* could be implemented. Ulema's serious and public demands demonstrated their remarkable concern regarding recent changes in the legal system. Among their requests, there was restoration of judges' rights regarding determining the punishment. They indicated that the *Qur'an*

¹ Fatwa is authoritative religious decree of Islamic law.

has not determined the punishment of minor offenses and religious scholars argued that the punishment before the offense was contrary to *Shariah*. According to the provisions of *Shariah*, type and amount of punishment depended on different circumstances of time and place and thus they suggested that Afghanistan's scholars "based on strong and well-documented reasons and their own knowledge issue sentences" (Kateb 1923, 318). They unanimously declared determining duration of imprisonment before the crime was illegal because duration of imprisonment in the books of *Hanafi* jurisprudence had been determined until the advent of signs of repentance and modification (Kateb 1923, 314).

However, King *Amanullah* endeavoured to convince representatives to consider the following issues:

- If a criminal before committing the criminal offense knew the punishment, he would not commit it.
- In the past, criminals threatened judges while they were issuing their verdict as there was no determined punishment. Accordingly, if the punishment would be already determined, there was no possibility for the criminals to threaten the judges.
- Setting punishment before the crime would be resulted in undermining the bribery gate and corruption context.

Nevertheless, the king's efforts had no result and opponents were disagreed about determining punishment before the crime (Kateb 1923, 311).

It should be added that many Mullah believed that translation of the religious sources to Persian would reduce their religious sanctity among common people (Kateb 1923, 116). One of the scholars of border areas claimed that there were some false rumours among the tribes regarding the Afghan government's cooperation with *Qadiani* sect. He insisted that in order to deny these rumours and remove false ideologies, should be emphasized *Sunni* in the constitution and should be declared the government's adherence to *Hanafi* jurisprudence (Kateb 1923, 151). King explained that the underlying cause that avoided him from mentioning the *Sunni* as the official religion was that the *Shiite* minority in Afghanistan's neighbouring countries like Iran would be threatened. Nonetheless, the king's reason in this case and other cases had no effect and Ulema could impose their views in *Loya Jirga*.

In the new constitution, there was no difference between Muslims and non-Muslims, which was another concern for Ulema. Accordingly, they expressed their concern that lack of investigation into this case could result in violation of the Shariah and for Islamic government of Afghanistan would be risky. Even *Molavi Abdul Vase Ghandehari*, who had an outstanding role in drafting the constitution, declared his opposition to the article ninth of the constitution, as well as he indicated that this article had been added in his absent (Kateb 1923, 125-126).

Ulema requested that the word of freedom, which had been utilized in the article ninth of the constitution, should be explained. *Molavi Mohammad Ibrahim Kamwi* stated that the word of freedom could interpret religious freedom or freedom of activities against the moral principles of Islam (Kateb 1923, 136). The king in a long speech responded to *Molavi Kamwi* and explained the meaning of individual freedom. He outlined the cruelties of the previous regimes and lamented that despite Ulema's claims of being defenders of Islamic justice, they were silent at that time. Nonetheless, they opposed his proposals, which were conducted to improve social justice.

The subjects of polygamy and child marriage created long and acute arguments in *Loya Jirga*. The king explained the social problems, which caused by the child marriage and polygamy, and endeavoured to attract the consideration of the opposition in this regard. The king declared that his main objective of approving marriage law was removing or at least reducing family problems, which was one of the main reasons for disunity and social disorder. *Amanullah's* other statement was regarding advocacy of women's rights pursuant to the guidance of the *Qur'an*, and informing Muslim men of *Quranic* principles of justice. The king by reciting a verse from *Qur'an* concerning the issue of polygamy stated that Muslim men had just accepted half of this verse, which told, "marry one, two, three or four times". Nevertheless, they disregarded the second part of the mentioned verse, which told, "If you concern that you could not abide by the principles of justice, you should confine just to one marriage" (Kateb 1923, 129-137).

Molavi Abdul Rashid and *Mohammad Hossein*, both were members of the delineating board, by reciting a verse from the *Quran* and quoting *Hadith*¹ from the prophet Muhammad regarding the women, approved the king's statement and supported his idea for women's rights.

¹ Collection of writings that document the sayings and actions of the prophet Muhammad, one of the main sources of Islamic law (second in authority to the Koran).

Molavi Abdul al-Bashir, one of the members of the supreme religious council, added that polygamy was not prescribed in Islam for Muslim men's sensual pleasures; however the underlying cause that it were allowed was that women, who had lost their husbands in the war, would not remain without husband. *Molavi Abdul al-Bashir's* statements about protecting women's right and marriage law were faced with severe protests. Finally, *Hazrat-e Shams al-Mashayekh*, who was supervising the debates, suggested that in order to obviate the approved provisions of polygamy should be deleted from the marriage law (Kateb 1923, 73).

King *Amanullah*, personally, was not opposed to religion and was a true Muslim. Nonetheless, like his grandfather *Amir Abdul Rahman*, he believed that some people for political and economic exploitation held the religious institutions in order to use the religion to obtain their personal benefits. Leon Poullada is of the opinion that methods that the king adopted to reform the religious affairs, all born of his own thoughts. The king regarded educating Mullahs as the most significant step. He likewise decided to reduce their power in educating children and their influence in judicial affairs. Additionally, reforming of these affairs was necessary for Afghanistan in order to handle the contemporary world. Religious institutions and religious scholars played a significant and considerable role and had a stable position in the Afghans' life. They spread their authorities not only in the urban centres, but also there was no village or fort that Mullah was not there. Even nomads and tribes were under their influence, sometimes they were on the move with nomads, and sometimes they waited for them to arrive. Besides, the army was under the influence of Mullahs, and getting master and disciple was prevalent in the camps. Religious institutions deeply affected all social classes, and Mullahs informally and effectively spread their preaching all over the country (Poullada 1973, 145-147).

According to Leon Poullada, *Amanullah's* problems with religious leaders were essentially political problem and not religious. In the beginning, the king was pro-Turks and anti-British partner of Pan-Islamism and Mullahs were his fans and supporters. Nonetheless, the situation was gradually changed and some Mullahs changed their opinion about him. This change was not due to his weakness in the religious beliefs; in fact, they regarded the king as religious person. In fact, their real motivation was concern over implementation of the king's reforms. The reform programme included the establishment of a systematic and proactive system of administration and threatened the benefit of the religious leaders in two levels. Religious leaders in the cities and governmental centres performed the duty of

the judge, mufti, ¹ and scrivener. They knew that the establishment of a pure administration and pursuant to the law would offend their political and economic influence. King *Amanullah* with the intention of making their activities within the framework of law, provide a modern position for them and made them skilled and competent in conducting their traditional and religious tasks. Consequently, the religious scholars actively were shared in the state administration and their responsibility as prominent individuals in society got significant. However, they were not satisfied and always sought to regain their previous privileges, which in consequence of the reform they became deprived of them.

Indeed, the situation was exacerbated everywhere; child education reform, which the king seriously pursued it, were in contrast with Mullah's interests. Furthermore, some administrative reforms, such as tax collection and recruit troops jeopardized the interests of the rulers. Notwithstanding the administrative reform had no connection with religion, Mullahs that were the natural allies of authority and power in rural areas were affected by these changes. They, therefore, gave religious colour to their complaints and oppositions (Poullada 1973, 147-149).

3.14. Internal Factors of the Collapse of King Amanullah Khan's Government

As previously stated, one of the considerable consequences of the reforms was that the influential groups including clergies, khans and commanders lost their absolute authority, pension rights, and privileges, which resulted they became opponents of the king. In this regard, it seems to be consequential to examine the critical function of the opponent religious leaders, betrayed generals, commanders, and courtiers.

First of all, the important function of the clergies and their motives for opposition to the regime should be examined. According to Senzil Nawid, Mullahs or rural low ranking Ulemas conducted the first outbreak of opposition to *Amanullah's* reforms. In 1928, various religious groups in a united front revolted against the government and with provocative propaganda condemned the king as apostates and who had exceeded the limits of law (Nawid, *Amanullah and the Afghan Ulama: Reaction to reforms, 1919- 29 1987*, 128).

¹ A Muslim who is an expert in legal matters connected with Islam.

Indeed, not all clergies opposed the reforms; a number of influential and anti-British clerics not only supported *Amanullah's* government until late 1928, but also fought along with their followers to protect the regime in South turbulence. As previously stated *Hazrat-e-Fazl Omar Mojaddidi (Hazrat-e Noor al-Mashayekh)* and his brother *Mohammad Sadegh Mojaddedi (Hazrat-e shor bazaar)* had a prominent role in anti-government activities. It should be remarked that *Hazrat-e-Fazl Mohammad Mojaddidi* who after the death of his father became head of *Mojaddidi* family along with his brother *Fazl Omar* demonstrated courage and dedication in Afghanistan's independence war, and received from the king state titles, symbols, and governmental concessions. As mentioned earlier, during the South turbulence King *Amanullah* wanted to imprison *Noor al-Mashayekh* unless he would expel from Afghanistan. Thus, *Noor al-Mashayekh* on the pretext of *Hajj*¹ left Afghanistan and resided in *Dera Ismail Khan* in India. His exile increased his hostility and tenacity to *Amanullah's* government. Accordingly, his activities made an irreconcilable enmity between the king and powerful and influential *Mojaddidi* family.

As reported by *Fazl Ghani Mojaddedi*, "King *Amanullah* at the beginning of his reign benefited from approval of the Islamic clerical establishment. Nonetheless, in the middle of his reign, especially after 1925, he lost the support of the Islamic clerical establishment as a result of the method and speed of implementation of reforms" (*Mojaddedi 1977, 323*).

Olivier Roy, the famous French scholar of Islam believes that announcing the policy of modernizing Afghan society by the king disturbed his relations with influential Muslim clerics. It is worth pointing out that this point was the termination of the *Pan-Islamism* alliance, which had been established in tribes, society and reformist government. The main reason for this issue was disagreement regarding the relationship between Islam and the westernization. According to standpoint of fundamentalist clergies, defence of Islam was defined as guiding the society toward Islam and *Shariah*, however, King *Amanullah* was of the opinion that defence of Islam was the political issue of anti-imperialism, and the Afghan society could lead to modernity by tendency towards the Western society (*Roy 1992, 100-101*).

Regarding the reason for changing the regime's policy should be mentioned that *Amanullah's* political status in the independence war brought to him admiration and

¹ The religious journey to Mecca that all Muslims try to make at least one in their lives.

popularity. His initial policy was based on opposition to British colonialism, advocacy of *Pan-Islamism* and nationalism. The king after gaining independence continued to support the Caliphate and the Indian liberation movements. Nonetheless, after the peace agreement with Britain and consolidating his reign, the king took the policy of a relative friendship with the powerful neighbours Britain and Russia. On the other hand, transformations in central Asia, failure of Amir of Bukhara, Killing Anwar Pasha, abolition of the Caliphate, and other transformations that occurred outside Afghanistan, had their impacts in Afghanistan as well.

Most of the historians believe that disagreement between Muslim clergies and *Amanullah's* government was by virtue of political challenges and not religious matters. The underlying causes that they initiated to oppose his government, partially was by virtue of their political position and former privileges, which were in conflict with *Amanullah's* progressive programmes, and to some extent, it was by virtue of diminishing their religious authority in the judicial affairs and their backward character. According to Leon Poullada the issue that scared Mullahs, contrary to the false accusations of heresy, was the king's firm belief in Islam. Mullahs regarded the efforts to progress and develop the Afghan society as grave menaces to their own interests (Poullada 1973, 150).

Fazl Ghani Mojaddedi, believes "*Amanullah's* personal stance on Islam that was interpreted by some of his opponents and blaming him for avoiding from Islam were unfair. We disagree on this issue with the king's opponents; through research, we comprehended that regarding faith he was better to his ancestors and was not reputed for drinking wine and having a mistress. Removing the veil cannot be owing to his blasphemy" (Mojaddedi 1977, 330). He added that "if we take into consideration comments of *Mohammad Sadegh Mojaddedi* - the king's chief opponent - we cannot find any notes regarding the king's unbelief and avoidance of the *Shariah*" (Mojaddedi 1977, 221).

Leon Poullada, scrutinized the role of the clergies and the reasons for their oppositions and believed that King *Amanullah*, in consequence of his trip, particularly was inspired after observing the strong programme of *Mustafa Kemal Pasha* in Turkey and *Reza Shah* in Iran. In the *Loya Jirga* in August 1928, in which more than one thousand people were summoned, he shared his dreams with the public. First, the king provided a report on his trip and then presented his reform programme for rapidly changing the socio-economic

conditions in Afghanistan. The programme, which targeted the heart of clerical rule in Afghanistan, was included Mullahs' educations, establishing a school for judges, establishing a secular law school, complete abolition of endowments, eliminating master and discipleship in the army. However, conservative religious leaders considered these reforms as declaration of war (Poullada 1973, 125-126).

Among the factors, that could be pointed to the undermining *Amanullah's* government, was treason, and corrupt of subservient generals and courtiers. Groupings within the government, sabotage of the royal family, the abuse of the religious beliefs of laity led to instability in the central government. Disloyalty and in many cases disagreement and hypocrisy of courtiers and senior officers had a remarkable role in undermining the king's government.

One example in this regard is *Sardar sher Ahmad Khan*. He sent many messages by British agent to British India and informed them of disagreement between people and King *Amanullah*. He endeavoured to convince Britain to occupy and promised his support. He awarded British India of hostilities and conflicts in the royal family. Furthermore, *Faiz Mohammad Khan Zakaria*, a close friend of the king and Minister of Education at that time, was included those that according to British intelligence documents, later had contact with *Noor al-Mashayekh* and was involved in conspiracies against the king's government.

During the *Mangal* disturbance, when *Mohammad wali Khan Darwazi* was fighting in *Khost*, and *Mahmud Tarzi* did not still arrive from Paris to Kabul, *Sardar sher Ahmad Khan* was responsible for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He previously was responsible for Minister Plenipotentiary in Rome and later the head of parliament. On 17 September 1924, *Sardar sher Ahmad Khan* in a meeting with *Maconachie* - British ambassador in Kabul - in addition to disclosure of the state secrets, criticized the king and *Mahmud Tarzi* in order to attract British satisfaction (Stewart, *Fire in Afghanistan 1914-1929: The First Opening to the West Undone by Tribal Ferocity Years before the Taliban 2000*, 274). According to documents in the archives of London *Sardar sher Ahmad Khan*, was among the senior members of *Amanullah's* government, with whom *Noor al-Mashayekh* during the anti-regime activities in British India, had regular contacts. In 1928, while intellectuals demanded separation of rule and monarchy, the king appointed *Sardar Sher Ahmad Khan* as Prime Minister in a new cabinet. Nonetheless, owing to the lack of special conditions

among political, intellectual, and conservative groups, they deprived him of their cooperation and reported his failure to handle affairs to the King.

Another example regarding the treason, and corruption of generals and courtiers is *Wali Ali Ahmad Khan* who was *Amanullah's* brother in law and the king had many confidences in him. Nonetheless, during *Shinwar* disturbance he was sent to the east, instead of using his influence to pacify the disturbances betrayed to the king and carried out anti-regime activities. He opened the gates of Jalalabad for rebels, and declared himself as King.

British archive documents demonstrate that *Wali Ali Ahmad Khan* years before *Shinwar* disturbance, intended to plot a coup against the king and in order to take the power. In one of these documents is shown, on the 14 May 1927, when King *Amanullah* was busy in the north to visit and inspect, *Shahghasy Ali Ahmed Khan* - the governor of Kabul - invited *Basil J. Gould* - British chargé d'affaires - to a dinner party. *Ali Ahmed Khan* asked him if the Soviets attacked Afghanistan or intervened in Afghan affairs, what policy would be taken by Britain? *Basil J. Gould* predicted that regarding the upcoming conditions, practically giving an answer would require a few weeks or months. *Ali Ahmed Khan* remarked that Afghans hated *Amanullah's* policies, manners, and advisors that all were subordinate to the Russian interests and related to an objectionable doctrine. He added that the detestation spread in a large part of the army, the population of Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar and all tribal areas. In an appropriate time, the responsible nationalists and Britain's fans should confirm themselves. As well as *Ali Ahmed Khan* introduced himself as an influential and powerful person among tribal and local solidarity groups and alarmed the British of an impending coup, which could increase the Soviet domination in Afghanistan and threaten the British position in the region. (Poullada 1973, 314).

Destructive activity of *Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan*, who was another of the significant senior officers of *Amanullah's* government, could be understood from the follow examples of the British intelligence documents:

- The secretly supporting the British policy in Amir *Habibullah's* court; the issue of entering into war against the British and in favour of Turks, during the First *World War*, divided *Habibullah's* court and ruling circles into two opposing groups. One group wanted to remain neutral in the war, including Amir *Habibullah*, *Abdulghodous Khan* – the Chancellor - and a number of traders that were trading with the British India. The second group that the so-called *War Group* was

included the traditionalists under the leadership of *Sardar Nasrullah Khan* and Chief Justice *Haji Abdolrazagh Khan*, and it was supported by the clerics, tribal leaders and reformists under the leadership of *Tarzi*, and also *Amanullah* were the member of this group. Nonetheless, the British intelligence documents revealed that the position of *Mohammed Nadir Khan* (brother of *Mohammad Hashim Khan*) and his brothers was not completely clear. They favoured the British interests and preferred to be neutral in the conflict. In addition, the fear of being accused pro-British, forced them to formulate their policies in a manner that it would adhere to the decisions of Amir *Habibullah*. *Mohammed Nadir Khan* and his other family members endeavoured to take control of the tribes from fighting against British forces (Olesen 1999, 101).

- Spreading virulent propaganda against *Amanullah's* government by *Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan* among *Mohmand* tribes; in the secret note of the British intelligence agency in the North West Frontier Province states, was observed a correspondence on 15 February 1923, between *Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan* and an Afghan ruler in *Mohmand*. It demonstrated in the summer of 1922, the tribes on the east side had been excited as a result of the spreading a rumour regarding deviation of the King, Ministers and scholars of Kabul from explicit observance of Islam and pursuing the anti-religious innovations and reforms. *Mohammad Hashim Khan* in September assured his correspondent and asked him to propagandize the king's religious belief and his supporting of non-Islamic education (British Secret Service Bureau, British Intelligence Agency North West Frontier Province, for the week ending 15 February 1923 1923, 84th Paragraph).
- The king's concerns in relation to deteriorating the situation by *Sardar Mohammad Hashim*; in another document of British Intelligence Agency of North West Frontier Province on 10 April 1924 was reported that King was apparently concerned with deterrent measures of the Supreme Ruler of Jalalabad, which hindered the process of implementing social reforms and exacerbated resistance. The king plans to dismiss the Supreme Ruler from his position. He also issued two orders concerning *Shinwaris* and others, in which the King emphasized him to deal with people moderately and use reconciling methods. However, the Supreme Ruler abandoned the *Nazyan* and regarding the murder of two military forces arrested

several people of *Sangokhil*¹. Further, deputy commissioner of *Peshawar* informed *Mohammad Hashim* regarding maltreatment of the Supreme Ruler with “*Kodakhil*” and “*Isakhile*” [warrior tribes that were armed struggle against the British] behaved violently and rudely with them and threatened them that they would face with punitive reactions from Afghan and British joint expedition. This is because he thought these people were involved in the murder of two Afghan soldiers that were working for the British agents. However, *Mohmand* people claimed that they did not shelter *Dawood Shah*, but nevertheless they obviously stated that if they arrest him [*Dawood Shah*], they would never hand over him to supreme Ruler (British Secret Service Bureau, British Intelligence Agency North West Frontier Province, for the week ending 10 April 1924 1924, 198th Paragraph). *Dawood Shah* and *Ardali* were two people of *Shinwari Sangokhil* that on 8 April 1923 killed two British military officers, who were the security forces of building rail lines in *Khyber* Pass. Such events demonstrate grave challenge between public and the authority, which prepared the background of the public backlash.

- Undermining *Amanullah*'s government; *Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan* was in Russia as the Afghan ambassador in Moscow, He established confidential relationship with British diplomats and the ambassador in Russia and discussed the unrest in Afghanistan (Stewart, *Fire in Afghanistan 1914-1929: The First Opening to the West Undone by Tribal Ferocity Years before the Taliban* 2000, 303). In this regard, a report dated on 17 November 1926, from the British representative in Moscow is considerable. In this letter, the British representative appreciated *Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan*, the Afghan ambassador, and emphasized that he had extremely friendly relationship with British representatives during his two years staying in Moscow. The British representative also remarked that *Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan* and his brother *Mohammed Nadir Khan* were disagreed with the Kabul government regarding sending young people to study abroad. Further, it was indicated *Mohammad Hashim Khan*'s idea about growing discontent and dissatisfaction in Afghanistan and probability of an impending revolution. (British Secret Service Bureau, Huteson British ambassador in Moscow to the Foreign Ministry Dated 17 November 1926).

¹ Sangokhil is the name of one part of Shinwaris.

These few examples of the courtiers' disloyalty and betrayal in *Amanullah's* government are sufficient to fulfil the political weakness of his regime. Besides, it could be argued that the king was dealing with grave problems even before the uprisings, as well as these instances demonstrate that the venality and corruption in ruling circles provided the context of undermining the foundations of the government. The government employees' corruption besides the courtiers' disloyalty and betrayal, and the conspiracies of others caused the king lost his best friends and supporters. The influential ethnic people, who were between him and their tribes as bridge, became disappointed. Accordingly, expanding the scope of political influence in tribal areas became very problematic for the government.

Disagreements and groupings within the court regarding the government's domestic and foreign policies and negative competition of the groups, were among the factors that deteriorated the government from inside. A typical example of such disagreements was between Chancellor and Foreign Minister. It could be observed in a letter dated on 17 July 1920 that *Abd-al-Ghodos Khan* from Kandahar sent to *Noor al-Mashayekh*, in which spoke about his concerns and threatened to quit the government. He indicated in his letter that the solution for the constitution was following *Shariah*, constitutionalists should be obligatory killed and then the new sciences should be taught. He indicated that he wanted to start teaching the new education in Kandahar, but nevertheless according to *Shariah* the constitutionalism should be destroyed. Accordingly, *Abd-al-Ghodos Khan* asked *Noor al-Mashayekh's* collaboration in this regard. (Mojaddedi 1977, 223, Ghobar 1981, 802). In the context of his request of *Fatwa* from Ulema of Kandahar, *Sardar Abd-al-Ghodos Khan* wrote explicitly "... Something that I cannot accept it as my principle is just one thing that is constitution. [...] therefore, I want to remove these principles with your agreement..." (Ghobar 1981, 802). Additionally, the religious scholars positively responded to his detailed question and just endorsed the monarchy. They knew that all the rests including political, natural constitutional or Republican, the *Bolsheviks*, and the *Mensheviks* were rationally and religiously rejected (Ghobar 1981, 804).

According to Ghobar, despite the fact that the religious scholars of Kandahar rejected the constitutional regime with this answer, they refused to issue a fatwa to demonization of constitutionalists, which was requested by the Chancellor. Ghobar mentioned that not only the Chancellor had fundamental disagreement with foreign minister and King, but also in the central government and the provinces, a major part of the government officials

opposed the government's new plans and became its enemy, thus they decide to quit the government. This situation gradually prepared the context of a serious disorder, and those who mysteriously moved on a certain plan, did not hesitate to use different sorts of undermining. For instance, the government sought to modernize the army and in this regard employed some detectives and foreign officers such as *Zia Baig* and his colleagues. They took under their control a substantial unit in *Mahtāb Qal`ah*, and with the new orders and educations trained soldiers and officers and changed into a modern unit. The unit that was the perfect example for the entire army called "Sample Unit", nevertheless the opposite officers formed another unit, which called "Breaker Sample". Finally, "Sample Unit" was removed, and the classic mode remained in the camp.

In the British intelligence documents on August 1920, it was reported forming a group by Generalissimo *Mohammed Nadir Khan* and its opposition to *Mahmud Tarzi*. The mentioned report stated *Ghulam Haider Khan* Minister of Commerce, *Pir Mohammad Khan* and *Niranjan Das* were the members of this group. Report added that inclusion of *Niranjan Das* demonstrated the ability of the mentioned group (British Secret Service Bureau, British Intelligence Agency North West Frontier Province, for the week ending 26 August 1920). Another report of British intelligence agency elucidates that *Nadir Khan's* influence on King *Amanullah* was increasing the opposition to *Tarzi* and it was hoped that in *Missouri* conference they would have the opportunity of criticizing *Mahmud Tarzi*. (British Secret Service Bureau, British Intelligence Agency North West Frontier Province, for the week ending 17 June 1924 1924).

In another one of these reports from British intelligence documents, *Chelmsford* on May 25, 1920 reported directly to the king of Britain regarding the situation of Afghanistan. The report described that there were two groups in Afghanistan; one of them was under the leadership of *Mohammed Nadir Khan*, the Afghan army generalissimo (P N Chopra, Prabha Chopra, Charles I. Randall 1998, 200). The Britain authority recognized in consequence of the weak position of *Amanullah*, his government was incapable of controlling the army.

Reforms deprived influential groups, including religious leaders, commanders, and Khans of their former absolute influences, privileges, and pension rights. Accordingly, they became opponents of the government. Betrayal of commanders besides competitions and oppositions of groups within the government, undermining family of companions,

courtiers' corruption, and flattery led to weakness and instability in the central government. British colonialism always regarded Afghanistan as a strong obstacle and King *Amanullah* as a major threat to achieve its political, economic, and military interests. Great Britain that by various plots could not obtain its desired objects, took advantage of this opportunity to collapse of the king's government. However, the next section examines the external factors that had a substantial function in the collapse of his government.

3.15. The Function of External Factors

The most important external factor in the overthrow of *Amanullah's* government is British conspiracy. Great Britain, from the beginning, opposed prince *Amanullah Khan* and believed his rise to power was incompetent with their interests. In the early 1917, British officials received some reports, which informed them of the peak of nationalist struggles, prince *Amanullah Khan's* liberation, and anti-colonial ideas, increasing his popularity and the possibility of his rise to power (Adamec, Afghanistan, 1900-1923; a diplomatic history 1967, 108). Britain, therefore, always endeavoured to sabotage in order to prevent the king from catching the power and obtaining Afghanistan's independence that they never succeeded in achieving these goals.

When the king ascended the throne, declared Afghanistan's independence and cancelled all of the previous treaties. Thus, the British government was in front of accomplished facts and confronted with critical problems to handle. Great Britain became very puzzled about accepting or rejecting Afghanistan's independence as an indisputable fact. Additionally, British India had no motive to challenge the status of the new King and under existing conditions could not refuse his request for signing new treaties between two autonomous nations. Great Britain's government regarded the *Anglo-Afghan* treaties as obligations that had been contracted with the Afghan king accordingly, at this time it was difficult for Britain to accept *Amanullah's* request for signing a new treaty with Afghanistan. There was a school of thoughts in the Foreign Ministry of British India that after the declaration of independence of Afghanistan the lives of the previous personal and national contracts were terminated (British Secret Service Bureau, British Intelligence Agency foreign frontier branch, for the week ending October 1920 1920, 712th Paragraph). Accordingly, it is obvious that Britain regarded the king as an obstacle to getting its interests in Afghanistan so always endeavoured to remove this obstacle.

One of the British strategic warfare in the battle of 1919 was removing King *Amanullah*. The king decided to gain Afghanistan independent either by negotiation or by war. Nonetheless, Great Britain's reluctance and delay in recognizing the independence of Afghanistan compelled him to initiate the fight. The British sought to portray third Afghan War as an insignificant war. According to *Brian Robson* the underlying causes that the British endeavoured to portray this war insignificant, are as follows:

- In this war, the British killed many unarmed people;
- They could not gain any interest in the war;
- The British were involved in other global changes and events such as the Bolshevik October revolution, Paris Peace Conference, economic and political reconstruction of Europe after *World War I*;
- The British government was very imperious by virtue of victory in the *World War*; in the beginning they did not consider *Amanullah's* demand, and violating the accepted norms they did not respond to the king's letter on time;
- The British Minister of State in India wanted to ensure that this war was just a border war and would handle it as a border fighting;
- Sir Hamilton Grant one of the British leaders who participated in this war considered this war one of the most meaningless, idiotic and unnecessary war in history (Robson 2004, 3).

It is noteworthy that the British offered peace had different factors. They were incapable of continuing the fight, and except for *Khyber* front, they had failed almost on all fronts. They feared not only of Afghanistan's relations with the Bolsheviks, but also of the wrath of Muslims in India. The British in relation to negotiations and armistice conditions adopted bribes and threats policy. *Denys Bray* the state secretary for Indian affairs regarded the policy of peace and reconciliation; he urged Afghans to close their doors to foreigners, especially Russians and forced them to pursue British policies in the foreign affairs. It could be argued that in the modern history, Afghanistan was one of the first eastern countries, which achieved independence and their independence inflicted a severe damage to British prestige and interests.

The history of the British intelligence activities in Afghanistan and the Indian subcontinent was initiated from the seventeenth century. They gradually expanded their intelligence activities in Afghanistan. However, considering the plans that implemented by Britain in

Afghanistan, India and Arabic countries could bring this idea in mind that the purpose of their activities was concentrated on conspiracy, influence in ruling circles, appointing puppet Kings and princes. They influenced courtiers, influential ethnic people, and spiritual circles of the countries with special skills and awareness; however, the best manner of achieving their goals was using money. Indeed, they use it to buy or recruit people, provoke disturbances and distribute the propaganda against the government. Further, they made disbelief and disagreement within the royal circles, political groups and common people (Wali 2008, 73).

The British elements endeavoured to provoke dissatisfaction and conflict in the Afghan Royal family and courtiers for exerting pressure on the government of Afghanistan. In 1919, after announcing *Amanullah's* reign, they encouraged *Saradar Nasrullah Khan* to come to British India. British always endeavoured to convert the natural borders and spread the context of discord and war in the future. For instance, by imposing the *Durand Line* border, attempted to separate *Pashtun* tribes and families in Afghanistan, moreover, they provoked border disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

One of the useful methods utilized by the British colonial was fuelling the fires of religious discord. The Colonial Secretary of Britain, besides other activities, commanded its spies to provoke the religious conflicts and retain the Muslims in ignorance and unaware. Besides, the British spies were commanded to spread chaos and corruption among the government officials. In addition to provoking religious disagreements, the British established and strengthened *Qadiani* religious groups for their colonial purposes. The British for control of Afghanistan employed so many spies such as *William Moorcroft*, *Abbé Huc*, *Charles Stoddart*, *Arthur Connolly*, *Joseph Wolff*, and *Josiah Harlan*.

Ghobar is of the opinion that the British government's policy in Afghanistan in the different stage, either through military operation or through implantation policy, attended certain objectives and strategies. Indeed, collapse and division of the Afghan government, resulted the country became disunited, weak and separated from the world. Owing to the fact that in a direct invasion the people could recognize the external enemy and would react, the most destructive part of the British policy in Afghanistan was domination the country through its rulers. In addition, the enemy under the internal face could penetrate and confuse its intervention (Ghobar 1981, 444-445).

The British endeavoured to prevent the establishment of Afghanistan's political relations with the world. After declaring independence of Afghanistan, one of the main objectives of the foreign policy of *Amanullah's* government was the establishment of diplomatic relations with the other countries. Thus, a diplomatic mission headed by ambassador *General Mohammad Wali Khan darwazi*, was sent to Europe and America. Between 1921 and 1922, the Afghan government succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations with France, Italy, and Germany. The purpose of *Mohammad Wali Khan's* mission was introducing the new and independent Afghanistan (Inayatullah Shahrani, Burhanuddin Namagh 2007, 201).

Indeed, this diplomatic action of *Amanullah's* government was the second major measure to diminish the prestige and dignity of the British Empire after the declaration of independence. For this reason, British colonialism in order to defeat Afghan mission and frustrate *Mohammad Wali Khan's* activities, endeavoured to prevent the leaders of the other countries from welcoming the Afghan mission. In Paris, French Foreign Minister welcomed Afghan mission and French President met with them. British ambassador in Paris declared the French authorities that despite the fact that Afghanistan had apparently gained its freedom, it was still Great Britain's sphere of influence. Italy was one of the first countries that signed trade agreement with Afghanistan and it was scheduled an Italian delegation that in July 1919 move toward Kabul. Several attempts were made to prevent Italians from making any relationship with Afghan, but nevertheless they were unsuccessful.

Although the Afghan mission met with *Harding* - the President of the United States - and this meeting could be regarded as innately recognition of King *Amanullah* and Afghanistan's independence, no relationship between US and Afghanistan was established, which demonstrated another sign of the British obstructionism in Afghanistan's affairs.

On 2 July 1921, *Mohammad Wali Khan's* mission moved towards the United States. In New York, on 11 July, *Mohammad Wali Khan* stated that he came to the USA to establish diplomatic relationship. He added that the king for the economic development was interested in the America's investment in Afghanistan (Ma'arroof 1987, 22).

On 17 July, *Mohammad Wali Khan*, before meeting with Secretary of State of America, declared to the press that relations between Kabul and Washington would provide remarkable opportunities for American businessperson investments in Kabul. The British

never wanted to establish diplomatic relations and friendship between America and Afghanistan. Even Great Britain previously had reminded some issues to the American ambassador by the British ambassador in Paris.

3.16. Analytic Summary

Amanullah's reforms had root in the rationalism and westernization, which in the seventeenth century emerged as the age of enlightenment. Their main objectives were rationalizing the government and its policy, which intended to remove superstition and ignorance in both government and its policy. In terms of the type, the reforms had large and comprehensive dimension and involved in the economic, social, and political affairs. In the economic affairs, King *Amanullah* regulated the tax system, boosted the trade, and sought to industrialize the country. In the social affairs, the king focused on national alliance, social justice, equality of all people before the law, expansion of education and training, promoting political awareness through releasing the press and constructing schools, and eliminating the supremacy and avarice in the country. In the term of political affairs, he wanted to create a constitutional government based on codified and democratic law whose policies would be aligned with the interests of citizens and the public welfare.

It is often argued that the British conspiracy, extreme westernization, ignore the rule of tradition and religious values by King *Amanullah* and his state officials, corruption sabotage of the courtiers and Mullahs, and finally public backlash against reforms were the main causes of the failure of his reforms and his government. First of all it should be regarded that in order to create a modern, rational, and constitutional state the government was inevitably supposed to take the same manner that were smooth by the Western. It is remarkable that for the first time the western world realized the power of reason to discover the facts and progress. The West realized that the best criterion for evaluating the divine issues and claims of religious and non-religious scholars is reason. Conservatives and traditionalists regarded rationalism as an irreconcilable enemy of traditions, superstitions, rearing disciple and myth. Further, they regarded it as their personal and professional interests. Accordingly, they became hostile to the reason and accused the rationalism in the name of westernization and anti-religion.

Owing to the fact that the foundations of government's policy became rational, they became incapable of interpreting their personal and professional interests as public interests and convincing the people to pursue their ideas, thus they declared their

opposition to the government's policies. In the rational government, any adopted policy has to be indictable in the collective wisdom; accordingly, just the action or policy that provides the public interests would be approved, whereas self-interested people would not accept such sort of policy. Accordingly, the best ways to divert people mind, human consciousness, exploiting laity and make the people disciple and imitator were prevalence traditions, superstitions, hero-worship, rearing disciple and myth in society, fighting against rationalism, and charging of westernization. It is quite clear that the Afghan authorities were forced to implement the anti-rationalism policy in order to obtain legitimacy by religion and tradition. When King *Amanullah* requested them to provide evidence for substantiating their religious educations, they became irritated owing to the fact that presenting rational or objective evidence signified that Mullahs' religious and scientific education was questioned.

Likewise, the rational review of religion and tradition would threaten Mullahs' interests, and religion and tradition would come out from their monopoly and would be public. Accordingly, it is obvious that a modern and intellectual government is in contrast with tradition and superstition. Accordingly, it is impossible to integrate them and a society can choose one of them and has to desist from another. The process of the reform programmes during *Amani* era was faced with such ideological obstacles, which could be regarded as substantial roots of the failure of the reform programmes. However there are some other remarkable obstacles in this regard, which are as follows:

- I. Plenty of inherent shortcomings could be recognized in the reforms, which as imperfect plans could not achieve the position of national success. These plans were so raw and proposed in the inappropriate time and place, and also they mostly were implemented by non-meticulous methods. In fact, the Afghan society in terms of culture was regressive as well as religious fundamentalism was a dominant issue in the society. Thus, the society did not have the necessary background for the king's reform programme. Furthermore, intellectual and political context of the society suffered from intensity of long-term effects of cultural and political reaction. Reform experience in the *Amani* era, besides its intrinsic raw, was implemented in an inappropriate place that inevitably was faced with resistance of political and cultural reactionary factors because any effort to reform was disappointing to classic interests of the old ruling class, thus, ultimately, it was defeated.

- II. It is particularly significant that the reform experience of King *Amanullah* was powerless and it did not consider substantial or intrinsic matters, or at least they were not regarded as a priority. For instance, in this experience, “democracy” was not as a fundamental premise of the reform efforts and it was not a priority. This caused his reform experience remained an experience in its essence and just an isolated elite experience. Accordingly, different strata of the society were excluded from political participation, having role in management reform experience and in implementation of its related projects. Consequently, the reform process did not influence from surfaces to nature and from elitism to democracy, thus, it is quite clear that lack of national force and public commitment led to its failure.
- III. *Amanullah*’s reform experience was based on patriarch’s charisma and was not been changed into a systematic experience that could rely on systematic activities. Thus, the king’s reform programme after leaving the first originator did not retain continuity in institutions and as a historical phenomenon joined history. There is no dispute that the survival and continuity are essential for the fundamental reform experiences to change them into systematic activities, which in his reforms cannot be seen.
- IV. The king’s reforms had procrustean character and did not consider national reconciliation and determination. Overall, the king’s intellectual and attitudinal results were in consequence of dealing with the Western civilization, and they were not preceded by any kind of discussion and national reconciliation. In fact, this reform experience was not introduced as a product of disputes and consultations of active intellectual, social, and political movements in the society. Furthermore, for acceptance and absorption in the society, the necessary background was not provided. Thus, the reform programme could not earn the national commitment to short-term and long-term goals. Consequently, despite all their importance, they remained unsuccessful.
- V. The foreign colonialism especially the British were always looking for an opportunity to bother the Afghan government in launching its reform policies. The colonial power of Britain was always stimulating and funding conservative and anti-reforms movements in Afghanistan. It also attempted to frustrate any kind of endeavours and movements that was supposed to provide independence for Afghanistan, afford remarkable self-sufficiency in governmental politics and manage its internal and external affairs. Further, the foreign colonialism

endeavoured to remove the factors that release the country from vulnerability of colonialism and external dependency. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that colonial powers using the political and cultural reactionary factors could frustrate *Amanullah's* reforms.

The next chapter studies *the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan* (1978-1989), as the second case study.

4. CASE STUDY 2-THE PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN, UNDER THE SOVIET HEGEMONY: 1978-1989




Figure 4-1: Structure of Chapter Four

4.1. Introduction

The previous chapter painstakingly examined King *Amanullah's*, and pinpointed their dimensions, targets and causes of their failure in regards to the views of different scholars and writers. This chapter studies People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, under the Soviet hegemony 1978-1989, as the second case study. The method applied in this chapter is descriptive and analytical, which is conducted using historical texts and political documents, and macro paradigms of reforms.

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (the PDPA), also known as Afghan *Marxist* political party, was established simulations with implementation a new system and constitutional reforms in Afghanistan (1963-1973), which gradually led to freedom of political parties. At the beginning of 1965, *the PDPA* was formed and *Nur Mohammad Taraki* was selected as the first secretary-general, *Babrak Karmal* became his deputy. Although *the PDPA* ideology was democratic and nationalist in the beginning, in 1978 it had *Marxist-Leninist* orientation. The party was divided into two factions, the *Khalq* faction led by *Taraki* and *Hafizullah Amin*, and the *Parcham* faction led by *Karmal*. The *Khalqis* were from rural areas and out of capital and majority of them were Pashtuns while the *Parchamis* were from Kabul and principally composed of Persians and Tajiks (See Figure 4-3).

On 27 April 1978, the two factions were united in their coup against the monarchy of *Daoud Khan* and took control of the country. In the same year, *the PDPA* initiated making a number of political and radical social reforms including land tenure, education, women's right, and making some changes in family law even regarding dowries and banning forced marriage. These reforms, which were stemmed from party's antireligious and anticlerical ideas, provoked Afghans, who believed in religious laws and accustomed to traditional system, and landowners and old military commanders, who were at stake their interests in the wake of political reforms.

In late December 1979, the Soviet Armed Forces (SAF) invaded Afghanistan and remained there until 1989. The Soviet invasion sparked Afghan resistance and brought suffering to the people. *The PDPA* followed its reform programme also after the Soviet invasion. Pro-Soviet conducted National Socialism programme and both factions regarded the Soviet as a model to implement the mentioned policy. This programme was to be attained through revolutionary manner of conciliation and compromise, which put

Afghanistan into internal conflict and forced the *Khalqis* to rise up against the government and *Najibullahis*' national reconciliation policy. Failure of attempts and national reconciliation policy brings this question in mind, that what was the cause of the failure of reforms? Furthermore, did the external factors contribute to the failure of the reform and inciting the people against the government? Researchers have given many different answers to these questions. This chapter is going to answer above questions and examine the ideas of different theorists.

The importance of this case is that *the PDPA* held close ties to the Soviet intelligent agency, however in the process of implementation of reforms confronted public resistance and could not achieve significant success. Thus, *the PDPA* reform programme instead of achieving further success, even could not achieve *Amanullah's* initial success in implementing the reforms. Accordingly, the questions are

- What were the obstacles to state-making and reform-making, during *the PDPA* rule in Afghanistan?
- Why *the PDPA's* government from the beginning was an unpopular government?
- What was the role of *the Cold War* in the state building process in this era?
- What was the Soviet Union role in disunity and disagreement in *the PDPA*?

Conspiracy and intervention of the Soviet spies; contradiction between *Marxist*-style reform programme and traditions; the government's brutal treatment; disunity and internal dispute in *the PDPA*; treason and sabotage of government officials and party members appear to be the cause the of failure of attempts and resistance to the government. The urban society unlike the rural and tribal population supported the government. The internal rivalries and conflicts in the party, which caused the split in the party and ethnic and religious contention in the Afghan society, made them in trouble to rule efficiently over the people and lead the society towards a communist society. Furthermore, launching aggressive and repressive policies and making decisions by a communist revolutionary programme regardless of the feelings of the population, resulted in many popular uprising led by local leaders. The Soviet policy was based on intervention on the progressive matter of the Afghan civil war and there was no motivation and benefit for them to support and develop *the PDPA* reforms. Their invasion caused further controversy in the Afghan society, which means the Soviet in order to make further disagreement and disunity in the

Afghan society imposed some social and military policies, and as a result, tribes and ethnic groups felt grave menace. Stalinism policy was not able to unify all the strata of the society to handle entrenched reactionary matters. Furthermore, lack of an organized and powerful army made them weak in handling those, whose interests were threatened by *the PDPA's* reforms. Increasing civil war and having just one popular basis that was concentrated in Kabul deprived the government of having an independent organisation of the ordinary people.




Figure 4-2: Conceptual Model for the Roots of the Failure of *the PDPA*

The principal methodology of this chapter is a systematic summary of *the PDPA* regimes based on literature and media review. This idea discovers every methodological theory by bringing the historical background in every occurrence. The study verifies the state's performance in reforming and reasons for resistance against the government. Lastly, subsequent to these examinations, the chapter presents a comprehensive analytic summary regarding the second case study.

First of all, the chapter discusses the *Saur* coup and *the PDPA's* rise to power. Then, it scrutinizes political, social, and educational reforms of the government, and the adopted manner of implementing the reforms. The Soviet Union stance on reform programme and their role in *the PDPA's* policies are meticulously examined. It also depicts the public reaction to reform and the government's function in handling it. Further, it verifies the internal dispute in *the PDPA*, effects of the Soviet invasion, resistance to their occupation, and failure of *Najibullah's* national reconciliation policy. Finally, it offers an analytic summary.

The PDPA officially was created in 1965, when political parties were allowed to operate freely. Indeed, this party is originated from the anticolonial Young Afghans movement of

the 1920s. The first formal meeting of the party was in January 1965, in which people from different social groups participated. From the beginning, the party split into main faction, including *Parcham* (flag) and *Khalq* (people). The party's secret constitution approved by the first party meeting and clarified party's doctrine as "adopting the Marxism-Leninism principles", which was a copy of rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The *Parchamis* and *Khalqis* had ideological and tactical differences. The *Parchamis* were non-Pashtun and principally were from the cities; however, the *Khalqis* were mostly Pashtun and were from the rural population (See Figure 4-3).




Figure 4-3: The *PDPA*'s Structure

Indeed, they could not be united and integrated, and also they were not able to make any considerable progress in Afghan society. They were constantly competing and winning the position in the ruling apparatus. In 1969, the *Parchamis* made a Secret alliance with *Mohammed Daoud Khan* and when he seized the power selected his civilian ministers and advisers from the *Parcham* faction; thus the *Parchamis* were hoped to catch the power after his death. Nonetheless, *Daoud Khan* gradually demoted the *Parchamis* in his ruling apparatus, which infuriated the *Parchamis* and their supports in the Soviet Union. Thus, the Soviet endeavoured to make reconciliation in *the PDPA* to overthrow *Daoud Khan* from power.

4.2. The Saur Coup in 1978

On 28 April 1978, (*Saur 7*, 1357 *Hijri* solar calendar year) a coup occurred in Afghanistan that was the beginning of the unrest and conflicts, lasted more than twenty years and caused the superpowers such as Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Furthermore, it goes without saying that this coup caused Afghanistan involved in the ruinous civil wars. Following this ominous coup and its painful consequences, Afghanistan lost everything and its oppressed people endured many countless suffering. The coup resulted in irreparable damages in different aspects of political, cultural, economic, humanitarian issues, which was not compensated for any time and for years kept away Afghanistan from civilization and the progress made in Afghanistan.

The mentioned coup was performed by militaries of People's Democratic Party, which in the ruling class of this party was called the *Saur* revolution and sometimes was mentioned as the proletarian revolution. Even the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was linked to the coup changes in leadership of the Party from *Hafizullah Amin* to *Babrak Karmal*, which was regarded as the new stage of evolution of the *Saur* Revolution. Some elements of *Marxist* and leftist groups, whose publications were the sources of intellectual power of *the PDPA*, did not mention the coup of this party as revolution. Besides, they expressed this critical and doubtful point after the collapse of the socialist Russian camp and deterioration of *the PDPA*.

4.2.1. Threatening Factors to the Soviet's Interests in Afghanistan

The main factor that threatened the objectives and interests of Russians was *Mohammed Daoud Khan's* tendency to the western country. The various factors such as people's hatred for communists and also *Daoud Khan* by virtue of his totalitarian methods and collaboration with communists, the growth of the Islamic movement, failure of the government to solve social, economic and political problems, caused *Daoud Khan* under the pressure of the Soviet Union implemented a series of measures. In the first step, in 1974 he removed the people from the *Parcham* faction from the cabinet and governmental system. In 1977, he initiated purging of the leftist from armed forces. However, it was not a successful strategy because Moscow's influence in the sensitive military centres led to take further time to identify and purge them. In order to release from the political and economic pressure from the Soviet, Afghanistan expanded its relationship with Pakistan

and Iran and the Arabic countries - united with west - in the Middle East and requested their financial aid, which was accepted by them.

Mohammed Daoud Khan's tendency to the west led to satisfaction and contentment of USA, and the Soviet partly lost its former position in Afghanistan. *Daoud Khan* averted Russia, moreover, in the conference of non-aligned countries demanded the expulsion of Cuba, the close ally of the Soviet Union. Mir Mohammad Sediq Farhang, quoted in "Afghanistan in the past five centuries", *Daoud Khan* in his last trip to the Soviet Union on 12 April 1977, during negotiations with Leonid Brezhnev got irritated and left the meeting by virtue of Brezhnev's criticism regarding Western experts' activities in northern Afghanistan. He said that he would not permit anyone to suggest him how to run his country (Farhang 1995, 44).

It could be argued that such policy was incompatible with the Soviet's economic, military, and political investments in Afghanistan that they had already implemented in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The Soviet Union until that time about one Milliard dollars as loans and new weapons had granted to Afghanistan's government. Furthermore, with the large cultural and political activities, they had organized groups that were oriented to Moscow's policies. Afghanistan's efforts to approach the Western countries cut Russian's hand and thwarted their sixty years of planning.

Furthermore, rise of the Islamic revolution in Iran and shaking the foundations of the monarchy in this country, was one of the major factors that, especially in terms of ideology, threatened Russian interests in the region and in the world. Russians considering the attraction of Islamic Revolution for Muslims predicted that after the Islamic revolution not only Marxism would be insignificant in Islamic countries and the Third World, but also the occupied republics of the central Asia and Caucasus would be affected by this revolution. Accordingly, they decided to undermine the Islamic Revolution in the region from the beginning. The only manner of performing it was interfering in Afghanistan affairs, where people had always wanted to found an Islamic state and the Islamic movement. Later, the high-ranking Soviet officials admitted that their campaign in Afghanistan had to be on the target to prevent Islamic revolution from growing.

Considering above-mentioned threatening factors, Russians immediately utilized the opportunity in order to protect their interest in Afghanistan and handle potential threats. The opportunity that Iran, an important neighbour of Afghanistan, was burning in the fever

of the Islamic Revolution. Thus, America and the western world that their interests were at stake in Iran, hurriedly sought to preserve them. Accordingly, they did not desire to be involved in the crisis that Russians had created in Afghanistan. Furthermore, America and the Western countries did not have very much interest Afghanistan at that time. Additionally, arresting leaders of both factions of *the PDPA* by *Daoud Khan* in such circumstances provided very convenient excuse for Russians and their agents, who launched the *Saur* Revolution to rescue the party leaders,. Furthermore, it should be mentioned *the PDPA* leaders were not ready for such coup, which could be realized in disagreements between the *Parcham* and *Khalq* factions' leaders regarding the coup.

4.2.2. Pre-Saur

As mentioned above, Russians desired to overthrow *Mohammed Daoud Khan*'s regime immediately, however the *Saur* coup did not occur suddenly and with no previous plan. Accordingly, *Nur Muhammad Taraki* a week after the coup, said at a press conference, "from three years ago we were ready to launch coup, however we asked nobles to share the power with us as a party" (Afghanistan. Viz̄arat-i Ittil̄ā'at va Kult̄ur 2007, 59).

Some substantial issues prepared the conditions for Russians to topple *Daoud Khan*'s regime. Russians provided the background for his overthrow, keeping their main plans. Accordingly, on 9 December 1975, they sent to Kabul *Nikolai Podgorny*, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, to renew the treaty of neutrality and non-aggression between the two countries in order to seduce *Daoud Khan* for another decade. After that, the Russians did systematically their efforts to overthrow the Afghan government. The mentioned steps were as follows:

- I. The two factions of the People's Democratic Party, the *Khalq* and *Parcham* became united; *Daoud Khan* changed his policy by virtue of disapproval of the different classes of people and armed operations that occurred to him in 1975, got close to Islamic countries such as Iran, and reduced hostile propaganda against Pakistan. The *Khalq* and *Parcham* felt grave menace as a result of the government new policies. Both factions that until that time accused each other of being CIA's mercenaries suddenly put aside their disagreements, and distributing a leaflet in January 1977 announced their alliance. In this alliance, *Nur Muhammad Taraki* as General Secretary of the Party and *Babrak Karmal* as his deputy were appointed.

- II. While *Daoud Khan* was under political pressure from *Khalq* and *Parcham*, Russians suspended the economic contracts and agreements between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union to put economic pressure on *Daoud Khan*.
- III. Another step was the assassination of *Ali Ahmad Khorram*, Minister of Planning on 16 November 1977, who was an adherent of the West in *Daoud Khan*'s cabinet. The government accused a Muslim militant called *Mohammad Mrajan* of murder of *Khorram*, but he did not have sufficient incentives to assassinate *Khorram*, moreover, there were not sufficient documents to accuse him. There are those who maintain that Russian agents involved in the assassination of *Khorram* and introduced *Marjan* as a dependent factor on *PDPA*. Accordingly, if *Marjan* was the murderer, there would be no doubt regarding the involvement of the Russians. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the Russians had two goals of *Khorram*'s assassination; first, seducing *Daoud Khan* and second, concealing the Soviet's opposition and intimidating *Daoud Khan*. Russians using the plot of *Khorram*'s assassination wanted to ensure *Daoud Khan* of their agents and introduce the Islamic movement and his western supporters as the main threat to his regime. Thus, Russians could implement their interventional plans and *Daoud Khan* got involved in killing Islamic factors. In other hand, in case of the disclosure of the Russians' involvement in the mentioned plot, Soviet could have intimidated *Daoud Khan* would have avoided him from opposition to Soviet influence in Afghanistan. This indirect threat could be understood seven months after *Daoud Khan*'s trip to Moscow and his radical and liberal handling Brezhnev. Additionally, disclosure of this plot later caused *Daoud Khan* became more upset with Russians and convinced him to release himself Moscow's domination. Nonetheless, when these attempts were made, Russians had already influence on Afghanistan's military and security forces, and Afghanistan had owed four million dollars to the Soviet Union.
- IV. Coordinating hired officers with *the PDPA* could be another remarkable action. Russians in order to deprive *Daoud Khan* of opportunity for handling the critical situation the resistance issued mobilization order to the unknown mercenary of Kremlin in Afghanistan's army and coordinated them with *Hafizullah Amin*. It is worth pointing out that Russians during the reign of *Zahir Shah* and chancellery of *Mohammad Daoud Khan* from 1960 had begun influence operations in Afghanistan's army. Nonetheless, communists' organizational activities in the

army had begun from 1970, and in 1973, *Hafizullah Amin* was commissioned by the *Khalq* faction to implement the party activities in the army.

- V. Mysterious murder of *Mir Akbar Khyber* on 17 April 1978, one of the leaders of the *Parcham* faction, was the introduction of the *Saur* coup. The leaders of both factions of *Khalq* and *Parcham* with thousands of party members converted his funeral *Khyber* into a street meeting and demonstration and requested *Mohammed Daoud Khan* to arrest and punish *Khyber*'s killer. *Mir Akbar Khyber* in the early years of the Republic of *Mohammed Daoud* was responsible for the secret military organization of the *Parcham* faction. *Khyber* was one of the figures on the left movement in the seventies and for some time the royal government imprisoned him by virtue of his revolutionary ideas and his activities in the development of the leftist *Marxist* thoughts. In the early years of the activities of *the PDPA*, he had a close relationship with *Babrak Karmal*, the leader of the *Parcham* faction, and as mentioned above *Khyber* was one of the leaders of this faction. Although he was regarded as founders of *the PDPA*, he did not attain the membership of the first congress of party formation due to his job in the state police. Concerning his terror, which led to *Saur* coup different theories were presented by both factions of *the PDPA*. *Abdul Quddus Ghorbandi*, a supporter of *Hafizullah Amin* and member of the *Parcham* faction, linked *Khyber*'s terror to *Babrak Karmal* and charged him for this terror. *Ghorbandi* claimed that *Taraki* and *Khyber*'s family had the same opinion; moreover, *Khyber* had declared that *Karmal* had threatened to kill him (*Ghorbandi* 2000, 57). Nevertheless, *Karmal* and his advocates accused *Amin* of *Khyber*'s assassination. *Sultan Ali Keshtmand* mentioned that regarding *Khyber*'s assassination *Karmal* expressed that the prevailing concept was based on involving *Amin* in this conspiracy. *Amin* always had intense hostility with *Khyber* and regarded him to be his serious rival by virtue of his good position among party members, Pashtun nation and militaries (*Keshtmand* 2002, 325). It is remarkable that there are no evidences regarding involving *Daoud Khan*'s government in this assassination, but nevertheless regarding Russians' involving there are some evidences. Dr. *Anahita Ratebzad*'s confession could be taken into consideration as evidence. *Ratebzad*, who was one of the senior members of the *Khalq* faction, in celebration of the fifteenth anniversary of the founding of *the PDPA*, said, "there are still evidences *Mir Akbar Khyber*, member of the central committee of our party, by his (*Hafizullah Amin*) homicidal gang and in collusion with reactionaries

and savage terrorists has been martyred” (Afghanistan. Viz̄arat-i Ittil̄ā‘at va Kult̄ur 2007, 571). It is worth pointing out that Russians pursued two goals in *Khyber*’s assassination; first, alliance between *Khalq* and *Parcham* in that critical condition for Russians was very important. *Khyber* who opposed *Taraki* and *Amin*, had no desire to make alliance with the *Khalq* faction, therefore, Russians removed *Khyber* that was an obstacle to making this alliance; second, they wanted to create disruption and chaos in the society in order to provide context and pretext for staging the coup. It could be argued that regardless of the fact that which political group or factions of *the PDPA* could be regarded as the elements for *Khyber*’s assassination, it was the starting point for a bloody conflict in *the PDPA*, and it initiated from the first days of the coup and continued in all the years of ruling of the party. Furthermore, it led to the military coup and establishment of the rule of the coup in the country, which converted the country into the field of regional and global competitiveness and invasion.

4.2.3. The Coup d'État

On 28 April 1978 *the PDPA* initiated the coup against *Daoud Khan*’s government following the order of *Hafizullah Amin*. Although it was supposed that the coup would be initiated in August, subsequent to killing of *Mir Akbar Khyber* and arresting the leaders of the *Khalq* and *Parcham* factions, its time was changed to April (Azimi 1998, 135). It is remarkable that, the government did not arrest some of the leaders of two communist factions, low-ranking individuals in the army and military forces. Accordingly, *Hafizullah Amin* the chief commander of the *Khalq* faction could issue the order to start the coup and direct it.

“On the morning of 28 April, *Hafizullah Amin*, before being arrested, sent the news of arresting of the party leaders to some specific places by his son and issued the command to start the coup” (Ataee 2004, 397). On the morning of 28 April, *Hafizullah Amin*’s through his son informed *Sayed Mohammad Golabzoy* that the party leaders have been arrested and the coup should be initiated. After victory the coup and *Daoud Khan*’s assassination, there were still some resistances in some parts of the army, which soon got frustrated. Thus, the military parts in the capital and other provinces were under control of the coup regime.

One of the most important and considerable issues concerning the *Saur* coup is the role of the two faction of *the PDPA*. Although many members of the *Khalq* and *Parcham* factions

mentioned the *Saur* coup as revolution and sometimes as armed uprising led by *the PDPA*, their expression and analysis regarding the process of events were different. For instance, *Sultan Ali Keshtmand*, one of the leaders of the *Parcham* faction, in one comment regarded this coup as a long-term decision of *Taraki*, *Karmal*, *Nur Ahmad Nur* and *Dr. Shah Wali*, but nevertheless in another comment he mentioned that *Hafizullah Amin*'s main motivation for launching the *Saur* coup were his adventure and ambitious tendencies. In fact, *Keshtmand* believed that the *Saur* coup was an accident and not a pre-planned event (Keshtmand 2002, 347). It is sometimes suggested that Dastagir Panjsheri, one of the members of the *Khalq* faction, believed that the *Saur* coup was a pre-programmed plan of both factions, led by military leadership (Panjsheri 1998, 79).

Furthermore, involvement the *Parcham* faction in the coup was another obscure and vague point in this event. Although a number of the militaries of the *Parcham* faction assisted the militaries of the *Khalq* faction, this coup occurred with no command given by the leaders of the *Parcham* faction. *Nur Ahmad Nur* the responsible for the military part of the *Parcham* faction in the army, in the coup day made no connection with the member of the *Parcham* faction in the army. In fact, many members of the *Parcham* faction in the armed forces of Afghanistan had no information regarding the *Saur* coup (Omarzai 1994, 39). After the victory of the coup, the *Khalq* faction and especially *Amin* discussed the weak function and contribution of the *Parcham* faction, and in division of powers regarded it as a point of weakness for the *Parchamis*. Thus, the *Parcham* faction members got fewer and weaker share than the *Khalqis* in the government.

Another considerable issues concerning the *Saur* coup is the role of Soviet Union in it. There are those who refuted the Soviet interference and involvement in the *Saur* coup, but nevertheless there are some factors, which refuted their theory. Selig S. Harrison an American researcher of Afghanistan quoted from Colonel *Samyran*, responsible for military part of Indian embassy in Kabul, that Qader informed the Soviet military and intelligence services of *Amin*'s plan while he had received no command about collaboration with the Soviet in the coup. Nonetheless, in early 1978, many of Soviet technicians were deployed to Kabul and Bagram airfield to train the Afghan air force and maybe the *Saur* coup could not succeed without the support from Soviet technicians (Selig S. Harrison; Diego Cordovez 1995, 27). Political consultant appointed by Moscow to the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party in Kabul did not believe the contribution of Moscow to the coup, but nevertheless he admitted that the Soviet

intelligence agents were aware of the details of the coup. Admittedly, the Soviet intelligence agents (*KGB*) and the Soviet military intelligence (*GRU*) that were in the Afghan army as military advisers had a significant role in the planning of the coup (See Figure 4-4).

A very important discussion on the coup is *Hafizullah Amin's* relations with Russians. According to *Keshtmand*, the Soviet Union was not aware of the *Saur* coup because *Amin* did not inform the Soviet agents of his plan. In fact, Moscow, Washington, Carter, and Brezhnev had no information about the coup because they had stated before their opposition to launch any coup, Accordingly, informing them of the coup was a substantial mistake (*Keshtmand* 2002, 348).

There is a school of thoughts that Russians had a substantial function in *Saur* coup. As stated by Farhang, "The coup order was prepared in the Soviet embassy in Kabul and by an officer who called *Sarwar Mangal* was sent to *Hafizullah Amin*" (*Farhang* 1995, 81). Dr. Haqshenas mentioned that Russian aircrafts flew from Tashkent and bombed *Daoud Khan's* palace. There is not a shadow of doubt that the Soviet military intelligence (*GRU*) was aware of the coup (*Haqshenas* 1989, 417). Selig S. Harrison and Diego Cordovez mentioned that studying the details of the *Saur* coup demonstrates that the coup was organized in the last opportunity by the Afghans. Additionally, if the Soviet intelligence agencies assisted Afghans in this regard, it was performed after starting the operation; it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that Soviets were dealing with an accomplished fact (*Selig S. Harrison; Diego Cordovez* 1995, 25). The *KGB* was informed of the coup despite the fact that *Amin* kept secret the coup order from the Russians. Furthermore, the *KGB* neither prevented *Amin* from conducting the coup nor informed *Daoud Khan* of the coup. According to Alexander Morozov who initiated his deputy weeks before the *Saur* coup, Moscow's recommendation to *the PDPA* was based on avoiding from staging the coup. Furthermore, the *KGB* found out that *Amin* had commanded to conceal the coup from Russians (*Selig S. Harrison; Diego Cordovez* 1995, 27). It is obvious that the underlying cause that *Amin* kept secret the coup from the Soviet was the Soviet's recommendation for avoiding mounting the coup and not due to his distrust of Soviet or vice versa (See Figure 4-4).

4.3. The Khalq Rule

On 29 April 1978, the transfer of power from the military council to the revolutionary council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was announced. Communists in order to seduce people utilized the title of “*Armed Forces Revolutionary Council*” in their first announcement and avoided mentioning explicitly the title of *the PDPA* and the name of its leaders. In the first step, their goals were the prevention of provoking the sentiments of people and the Muslim part of the armed forces, as well as they wanted to determine explicitly the coup results. The revolutionary council, which composed of members of the central committee of *the PDPA* issued the first decree as “The Decree Number One” on 30 April. In the decree, it was declared that the revolutionary council at its first meeting elected *Nur Muhammad Taraki* as chairperson of the revolutionary council and head of the government, and this council as the highest state authority unanimously adopted the following:

- “After this date (10 *Saur* 1357 / 30 April 1978) Afghanistan in terms of political organization, is the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.
- Government, as the supreme executive power of the country, will be elected by the revolutionary council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) and will be called the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The government is responsible for the revolutionary council of *the DRA*.
- The revolutionary council of *the DRA* unanimously adopted that until further notice military rules will exist throughout the country.
- The revolutionary council of *the DRA* in the earliest opportunity will elect the deputies and members of the government of *the DRA* and will approve and announce their policies.
- The supreme affairs of the government will be executed based on the commands of the revolutionary council of *the DRA* and the government” (Afghanistan. *Viz̄arat-i Ittil̄aʿat va Kult̄ur* 2007, 1).

The revolutionary council of *the DRA* issued the second decree on 1 May 1978 and appointed *Babrak Karmal* as vice president and *Hafizullah Amin* as foreign minister (Afghanistan. *Viz̄arat-i Ittil̄aʿat va Kult̄ur* 2007, 2). Among the twenty-one cabinet members, twelve people were from the *Khalq* faction nine people were from the *Parcham* faction, and the revolutionary council had thirty-five members.




Figure 4-4: Nominal People’s Democratic of Afghanistan Party Structure 1980 (Mullins 2011, 51)

4.3.1. Foreign Reaction

The Soviet government that after falling of the monarchy of Zahir shah and establishing a Republic government in Afghanistan, immediately recognized Muhammad *Daoud Khan*’s coup on 17 July 1973 this time after one day it recognized the *Saur* coup as the first country. The Soviets did not rush to recognize the *Taraki* regime owing to the fact that they wanted to ensure the success of the coup. Further, they sought to demonstrate their unawareness of how the coup had been implemented and pretend that they had no role in the coup. After the Soviet, all the eastern countries at that time, India, western and third world countries one after another recognized the communist regime.

The three neighbouring countries of Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and Iran despite the fact that recognized *Taraki*’s government, they expressed their concerns regarding the new conditions in Afghanistan. When the *Saur* coup occurred in Afghanistan, political unrest

had been initiated in Iran and every day its scope and depth became more momentous. Party publications always recommend Iran to develop the relationship with the Afghan revolution. After the coup, *Huang Hua* foreign minister of China, travelled to Iran and Pakistan, and in meeting with the leaders of these countries and expressed his country's concern regarding the progress of his so-called "*social-imperialist*". Subsequent to the *Saur* coup, Pakistan's government declared its support for the opposition to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which led to unpleasant relationship between two countries. Pakistan's government assisted the oppositions of central government of Afghanistan in establishing parties, camps, training and arming that finally led to overthrow the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. America recognized the communist *Saur* coup and continued its economic, technical, and cultural aids. Theodore *Lyman Eliot*, an American ambassador in Kabul, sent a letter to White House and encouraged America's officials to assist Afghanistan. He continued negotiations regarding the future aids of United States Agency for International Development (AID) and the cultural programmes of Peace Corps Volunteers and endeavoured to achieve the agreement of Senate Parliament in this regard.

Americans disregarded the Soviets' involvement in the *Saur* coup and regarded it as a nationalist coup and an internal event. Even *Jimmy Carter* declared that the new government in Afghanistan could not be considered as a puppet government. In fact, Americans believed that *the DRA* was not a Communist government and Soviets had no intervention in the *Saur* coup (The New York Times 1987, 18).

Statements of the political officials and American experts regarding the Soviets policy of non-interference in the *Saur* coup and their doubts regarding communist nature of the coup can only be justified in terms of political considerations; otherwise, there are many reasons to confirm the Soviets interference in the coup. Besides, the communist nature of the coup is so obvious that there is no need to discuss. In fact, Americans had already accepted the Soviets influence in Afghanistan and avoided being involved in the problem of this country. Further, they did not have the capacity and possibility to interfere in Afghanistan's affairs. Some people argued that why America did not prevent the *Saur* coup and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The answer to this question is quite clear; America's interests at that time did not require such action. Accordingly, America permitted the Soviet Union to involve in Afghanistan's issues, in order to collapse earlier the Soviet Union.

It is obvious that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Shah of Iran were the comrades of America in the region at that time. They are not willing to assist the people of Afghanistan and overthrow the communist regime. America's position in the *Saur* coup is not unrelated to theory of western and American political experts. When the *Saur* coup occurred, there was a theory between the western political experts that the spread of Communist coups in third world developing countries put demanding pressure on poor economy of the Soviet Union, which led to political and military defeat of this country.

Unfortunately, Afghanistan was one of the poorest and most vulnerable countries in the third world, where theory of incapacitation the Soviet Union could be better experienced than some other countries. In addition, the mentioned theory was experienced in Afghanistan and subsequently the Soviet Union collapsed, however, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that Afghans were the victim of this experience.

4.3.2. New Reforms

Nur Mohammad Taraki's government following the patterns of the communist government initiated its reform programme and issued eight decrees during eight months in order to change Afghanistan's political system and social, cultural, and economic organizations. The decrees were as follows:

- I. As was mentioned earlier the first decree meanwhile introduced *Nur Muhammad Taraki* as chairperson of the revolutionary council and head of the government, changed Afghanistan's political system as well.
- II. All the properties of the previous Kings, *Mohammad Zahir Shah*, *Mohammed Daoud Khan* and commanders of *Nadir Khan's* family were confiscated.
- III. The previous constitution was abolished and was formed the new Supreme Judicial Council and military tribunal.
- IV. The decree number four that was issued on 12 June 1978 was about changing official insignia and the national flag (See Appendix B).
- V. All languages in the country were respected and the languages of Uzbek, Baluchi, Turkmen, and Nuristani were utilized in the publications.
- VI. On 12 July 1978, was issued a decree regarding prohibition of lien,¹ limitation of landowners' profit, discount amount and timing of payments, moreover, in certain

¹ The right to keep somebody's property until a debt is paid.

cases, it was performed the complete cancellation of farmers' debts (See Appendix B).

VII. According to this decree, which was issued on 16 November 1978, women's dowry was determined based on Sharia ten Dirham (according to the price of silver in the bank at the time), which was according to three hundred Afghanis. In this case, the bride price was abolished and was regarded equal rights for men and women. Marriage age was determined 16-year-old for girls and 18-year-old for boys (See Appendix B).

VIII. On 29 November the land reform programme was issued. The decree stated that who works on the land would be recognized as landowner (Afghanistan. Viz̄arat-i Ittil̄a'at va Kult̄ur 2007, 1-4).

After issuing the governmental decrees, the political and ideological nature of the government pretty unfolded and it was obvious that the government intend to move in line with the Soviet model, which was as follows:

- The non-capitalist manner of development,
- Reliance on Warsaw Pact countries,
- Building a Russian kind of the democratic society.

It is particularly significant that the new decrees could not assist in establishing the communist rule and social order because all the decrees were issued hastily and were not based on the ideas and beliefs of the people of Afghanistan. The first decrees made the people shocked and they heard new words in the official system, which they had never heard, such as "the leader of the Democratic People", "the president revolutionary council", "the central committee" and several other terms. Thus, Afghan people were amazed and felt that these words could improve their conditions.

A meticulous examination of the decree number one and number four demonstrates that these decrees were issued in order to change the Afghan national and political identity and make this country a part of the Soviet colonialism. There is not a shadow of doubt that such matter could be acceptable for nobody except for the communists that were affiliated to Moscow. There is not a shadow of doubt that the majority of the Afghan laity could not easily comprehend the anti-religious and communist nature of the *Saur* coup and its leaders. Additionally, raising the red flag, applying obsolete and *Marxist* words and terms such as "Khalq", "democratic", "socialism", "feudalism", moreover, praising excessively

the friendship between Afghanistan and Soviet Union, and the Afghan government's impression of the socialist revolution of October, assisted the people to comprehend the communist nature of *Taraki's* regime.

One of the major shortcomings of the underdeveloped countries, especially Afghanistan, was lack of stable and strong system in the legal, legislative, and executive processes, which was trusted by the people. The governments always used to abolish the previous laws in order to create new laws, which were according to the desire and willingness of the new rulers. This important issue could be observed after falling of King *Amanullah* in the period of *Nadir Shah*, *Zahir Shah*, and *Daoud Khan's* Republic.

On 14 May 1978, the coup government issuing the third decree abolished the constitution of 1977 and announced the establishment of the new civilian and military courts. Furthermore, on 14 June of the same year, the government announced deprivation of citizenship of 23 people of the royal family. In fact, these two decrees threatened the legal immunities of citizens and beside the deep crisis in the customary and traditional system, which had been emerged as a result of the mentioned decrees, the people lost every type of their legal backing in the customary, traditional, formal and civil aspects. This legal weakness gradually took on broader aspects, thus mechanisms of war and armed conflict destroyed law, social order, and personal and social safety.

It goes without saying that in order to establish a legal system in a society, the three branches of the legal system should be stabilized, separated, and strengthened. Governments not only are responsible for the law and the people, but also in case of convicting and violating the rights of others, they should defend themselves before a fair and non-corrupt judiciary system. Governments should not dominate judiciary and legislature system and according to their desires influence on them. They should not prosecute their political and ideological opponents in the military courts and according to their desires deprive the citizenship of their citizens.

In many centuries, especially in Afghanistan, one of the considerable problems of the ruling system was that the government confused its historical, civil, and national identity. The communist government of Afghanistan regardless of the historical and cultural identity of the Afghan society, made some changes in the official insignia and the national flag. Indeed, the official insignia and national flag are the symbol of historical identity, civilization, culture and the existence of a society, which is created due to consensus of the

majority of its population and over time, it became the symbol of national identity of the society. The government, regardless of these profound meanings and just due to the ideological emotions, endeavoured to change the historical and national identity in a short time. Selecting the red flag - the *Khalq* faction's symbol - shook the society and meant the declaration of war against all beliefs, customs, traditions, norms, and habits of the people. This was the best weapon in the hands of opponents and rivals of the government and its supporter, Soviet Union. Furthermore, this was the beginning point of the Islamic religious propaganda against "communist red flags".

Decrees No. 6, 7, and 8, whose majority items were completely at variance with long-standing social traditions and religious beliefs of people, stimulated people's emotions against regime, and also they encouraged the widespread public backlash. It could be argued that these decrees were in pursuit of a sudden change in the social structure of Afghan society. Therefore, owing to lack of any background in the Afghan society in this regard, public did not accept them and consequently they effectuated extreme social tensions.

In these decrees, the intellectual and spiritual context of the religious and traditional part of the Afghan society was disregarded. The decree number sixth not only was disappointing to owners and capitalists, but also made the most remarkable losses to peasants. As a consequence of issuing the mentioned decree, the lands remained in the owners' hand and the farmers still did not gain the money. Subsequently, the lands were ceased from farming that led to a shortage of crops in the country. Furthermore, capitalists were willing to obtain financial resources and debtors that did not have anything involved in further problem. Additionally, they were forced to cooperate with the communist and opposed capitalists in order to settle their debts.

On 12 July 1978, the decree of prohibition of lien and limitation of landowners' profit was issued. A while after the government announced that eleven to twelve million peasants were relieved of profiteers' domination, large landowners, the traditional system, and the old feudalism. Historical experiences have shown that in the process of underlying growth and development, reconstruction of the dominant traditional structure of the society without reforms and fundamental changes in the social and economic structure of society is not possible.

When the *Saur* coup occurred in Afghanistan, a complex customary and traditional system based on various pre-capitalism relations was dominated in the country. Economic and social relations and contracts in the field of trades, profit sharing, cultivation, loan, change or transfer of ownership had been implemented based on customs, Islamic *Shariah* and traditional relationship. It should be added that the banking system, new financial institutions still found no manner of reaching the rural society.

The coup government without doing the necessary research and considering the practical alternative abolished the customary and traditional relations and turned the economic and financial chaos in the rural system into a deep crisis. The government's action made disappointing effect on transactions, credits, properties, businesses, investments and the normal economic process of the society, which led to the widespread popular uprisings, public protests and long-term wars.

In order to eradicate cruel contracts and unfair relations from the society, the government has renovate and reconstruct the structure of the society in terms of political and civil capacity, to become consistent with the economic, social, and cultural developments. In order to achieve this important matter long-term plans and programmes are required. Attractions and dominance of the customary and traditional system are stemmed from people's trust, moreover, lack of an alternative system causes the society would be addicted to it. It is worth pointing out that instead of this mentioned critical decree, the government expanded the banking system, cooperative and loan organizations, as well as it increased development aid to farmers through agricultural banks, familiarized the farmers with insurance system, and established other necessary institutions.

The government in the running for the new decrees established the cooperative funds in the rural areas and endeavoured to implement them at the initial level in the chaotic and critical context of rural community, which were not consequential. As stated in *Etefagh-e-Islam* - a state newspaper - "From 1980 to 1981, 12116 peasant cooperatives were established, which was composed of 200 thousand farmers" (Etefagh-e-Islam newspaper, 3). The people did not trust in the mentioned cooperative funds and the government did not have sufficient knowledge and experience in the establishment and management of them. These cooperative funds did not have the necessary funds, and poor farmers could not provide their requirements. Likewise, these cooperative funds were not established in consequence of the peasants' desires and needs, but nevertheless the government

implemented its political and ideological goals, which was not compatible with the dominant culture and tradition of the society. Spreading popular uprisings and wars led to collapse of all these loose organizations, and gradually the society got into violence, armed conflict, and widespread crisis.

The decree number seventh was directly opposed to the religious beliefs of the people. This decree emphasized on the equal rights of men and women, marriage age (16-year-old for girls and 18-year-old for boys), elimination any kind of bride price, dowry, and traditional wedding ceremonies. The marriage of boys and girls did not require the permission of girl's father any more (Law on childbirth leave enforce 1979). Accordingly, many girls and boys in the important cities went to court to marry and complained about their parents' treatments. Thus, in the new constitution the *Shariah* laws were not regarded, which caused the religious scholars stood in front of it and provoked the people to support them. Additionally, after issuing this decree, occurred disagreements among many families and a new feud between people was formed. Girls and boys, those whose families opposed their marriage, without the consent of their parents and with the government's support could marry.

The decree number eighth was the most controversial decree. Some peasants seized the land of owners and their reason was that they worked on the lands, and not owners. The mentioned decree assigned 30 acres ¹ of land to owners and 5 acres of land to the peasants. Nonetheless, a large part of the lands had not been divided legally and religiously between the heirs and the land of grandfather was legally in the name of one person. According to the mentioned decree the land of grandfather less than 5 acres was divided among the heirs, but nevertheless this little land might be not sufficient for owners. Additionally, the peasants that were working on the land of owners, who had migrated to cities, consequently claimed the land. Accordingly, this was one of the considerable problems of land reforms and the government supported the peasants. Land division effectuated the dispute among a substantial number of villagers and it led to the immigration of many people to the cities. Subsequently, the most intense disapproval of the majority of the Afghan society performed against approvers of the mentioned decrees. Furthermore, religious scholars supported the people and declared the decrees against Islamic law. Besides, it forced the central government to arrest religious scholars, influential people, critics, and many people that were not associated with the government. Until the second

¹ A unite for measuring an area of land, equal to 4840 square yards/ 4050 square meters.

half of the year, uncontrolled arrests and executions of people by the government prepared the grounds for opposition and uprising in the country.

Likewise, the mentioned decrees demonstrate that the communists after taking political power, seriously wanted to implement the Marxism ideas in the society and fight against Islam. The government, in order to implement the eight decrees, promoted the slogan of “Bread, Clothing and Home” through mass media and wrote on the walls of the city Lenin’s sayings and other communist slogans, and *Marxist* sociology and philosophy were taught in schools and universities.

Purgation of the army and other governmental organs from Muslims and nationalist initiated because the communists came to power and every day they arrested many anti-communists and handed them over to the courts for imprisonment or execution. Basement of Department of Defence, Department of Interior, Department of Finance, Chancellery and dozens of residential homes were converted into torture chambers. The intelligence service of Afghanistan (AGSA), which was organized by experts of the *KGB*, leading by *Asadullah Sarwari* initiated to the brutal murder of people in Afghanistan.

In addition, the dance party was held in the city streets and parks, in order to focused people especially the younger generation’s attention on pleasure and hedonism, and held them unaware of what was happening in their country. The communists’ function during their ruling in Afghanistan especially in the first years of the coup was very surprising. It was surprising that, on the one hand, they intensely and brutally endeavoured to impose the atheistic ideologies on them without any consideration and preparation. On the other hand, they wanted to seduce the people, who previously had been made aware of regime’s anti-Islamic and anti-national nature. In other words, in the beginning of their communist decrees and in some of their speeches addressed to the people they utilized the sentence of “In the name of God”, moreover, in the Ramadan the leaders of *the PDPA* participated apparently in the prayers and *Taraweeh*¹ ceremonies in the mosque of the presidential palace. It is worth pointing out that none of these apparent measures could seduce the people but also they made their feelings hurt.

The land reforms was announced on 28 November 1978. However, after a while, the government declared successful realization of this plan, but nevertheless in the practical

¹ Taraweeh is a kind of Islamic prayers, which are performed during Ramadan.

process its failure was confirmed over the time. The process of land reforms in terms of economic, cultural, and technical had obvious deficiencies. In fact, it had not been performed the necessary investigation and study on the social and economic structure of society and the previous economic and developmental plans were ceased. The government had not performed a comprehensive survey of the cultivated land area, barren land, amount of water, the culture of cultivation and land use, the possibility of developing the arable lands in case of reform and rebuild the irrigation network. The government did not have the necessary information about the forms of properties according to religious and customary rules in the society, the intellectual and ideological level of the people, the population that was absorbed in agriculture. The leaders of the government did not take into account the actual possibilities of the government, urban society and the capacity of the rural communities in the substitution of a new structure after land reforms. Further, they did not consider using the new technologies over the long-term plan for improving land and water, and finally they did not consider growth and development of industry and trade before division and transfer of the properties. Besides, it could be argued that they did not perform a comprehensive analysis and review of the positive and negative aspects of the land reforms.

Land division from the perspective of the religion and custom was contrary to the Islam and tradition. It is worth pointing out that in terms of the economy, politic and sociology the early collapsing the custom and tradition of the previous system before growth and development of the real elements of the new structure, led to social and economic crisis and chaos.

The mentioned reforms could not create a fundamental nature and essential effect in the economic and social structure of the Afghan society, as they had not been conducted with the development plans in the field of agriculture, industry, and culture. In fact, the mentioned action had further the form of fulfilling the political and ideological sentiments of the party and constantly was followed by the revolutionary ways. It could be said that this reform was, in fact, a kind of division and transfer of properties, which in the same old and inactive system could not accelerate the growth of the agricultural economy. Furthermore, division of the large and medium properties into limited properties increased the hidden unemployment, decelerated the process of production, and avoided largely the development of new technologies and increasing the quality. Consequently, the Production level and the country's per capita income descended.

In order to adjust properties and correct the traditional farming system in Afghanistan (regarding the beliefs, customs and traditions of the rural population) it was necessary to implement some fundamental measures. In fact, the government did not implement the basic steps for changing the old structure, improvement of irrigation networks, modernization the land use method, using the new technologies of growth and development in the industries related to agriculture, and economic regulation of the labour force in agriculture and in the related industries.

Indeed, the growth and development of agriculture and related industries leads to increasing the national income and not only the people income can increase, but also the government's annual income can increase as well. Government can use this revenue to promote social justice and through assisting with people, networks can assist the poor people.

The economic and social growth and development, creation useful job due to new internal and external investments, growth of trade and transit in the country, accelerating the economic growth, adequate exploitation of natural resources and mineral wealth, could eradicate poverty from society, which cannot be observed in the communist government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Distribution poverty, misery, and backwardness of the name of land reforms put the people increasingly under pressure and their situation became inferior to before.

In the technical and operational view, the mentioned reforms had obvious shortcomings. In fact, there were not sufficient professional and skilled personnel and in the course of the land reforms, the government performed more ideological propaganda. The previous landowners, rural proprietors, influential people, and villages' religious scholars were treated disrespectfully and violently, which led to provoke the feeling of dissatisfaction of people.

Failure of the land reforms was evident in the first few months. The government announced the number of land receivers between one and half to two million people, but previously, the number of farmers in the country had been announced between eleven and twelve million people. As stated in *Etefagh-e-Islam* "In the first phase of land reforms, two hundred ninety seven thousand hectares of land was distributed between 297 thousand peasant households" (Etefagh-e-Islam newspaper 1982, 3).

If was estimated Afghanistan's population at 17 million, and 85 percent was regarded as the rural population, the number of the rural population was more than 14 million people. Undoubtedly, the majority of them did not reach land, and despite the fact that they worked hard, they lost their economic support. Then, owing to spread of anti-government uprisings and wars, they lost their security as well.

The government with the hasty commands and unilateral contracts with the Soviet endeavoured to destroy the private sector and medium and large land ownerships, eliminate the prevailing customary and traditional system, and be away from the West capitalist. Besides, the government endeavoured to prepare the grounds for non-capitalist manner of development, increase the influence of Warsaw and the Soviet bloc, and implement the radical programmes.

In the first year, all the previous contracts were renewed by the Soviet Union and new contracts were signed as well, which are as follows:

- The contract of gas utilization on 29 April 1978,
- The contract of exchange of information and cooperation between the Afghan government and the Soviet Union on 1 May,
- Purchase contract for equipment required for mining projects on 11 May,
- Agreement of technical and economic study of Enrichment Institute of copper smelting on 16 May,
- Contract of survey and construction projects and exploitation of the *Kokchah* Sea on 17 May,
- Agreement of fight against locusts on 25 May,
- Contract of completion of economic and technical reports, which was signed by representatives of the Ministry of Mines and Industries and *Techno Export* company on 29 May,
- Agreement of modification three textile factories on 16 June (Cultural Council of the Nasr Organization of Afghanistan 1980, 117).

The government hastily and intensely initiated a comprehensive struggle against the dominant social and economic system in the political, economic, cultural, and ideological aspects and it directly was in opposition to the majority of the people. As stated by Fred Halliday, "Programme of People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan is a revolutionary programme and its goal is the socialist transformation of society in Afghanistan and

deposing the present ruling class. In the internal policy involves the three basic steps: land reform, nationalization of industries and the removal of the anti-democratic elements from the state apparatus” (Halliday 1978, 76). The government continuously endeavoured to control the country’s major industries and brought the private sector under the control of the government. Additionally, achieving this goal required the fundamental reforms and sufficient time. The government implemented the land reforms with no study and investigation; likewise, it endeavoured to impose its domination of the private sector. *Taraki*, the leader of the revolutionary council said, “The government will take under its control at least 51% of industries” (Halliday 1978, 66). The initial extreme measures of the government expanded chaos and crisis in the political, religious, and ethnic circles in the rural and urban societies and among private landowners and capitalists. Furthermore, within the party implemented intense competition between the *Khalq* faction led by *Nur Mohammad Taraki* and the *Parcham* faction led by *Babrak Karmal*, which resulted in the removal of high-ranking people of the *Parcham* faction. When the government’s ambitious plans still had had no result, it was arisen another strong divisions within the ruling party by virtue of disagreement between *Taraki*-the leader of the Revolutionary Council - and *Hafizullah Amin* - the Prime Minister of the government, which led to *Taraki*’s assassination.

The government’s radical decrees and plans, acute and bloody conflicts within the government apparatus and expansion of popular uprisings and armed conflict threatened seriously the survival of the government. The Soviet invaded Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, in order to prevent the collapse of the coup government.

4.3.3. The Public Backlash

Reform programme and function of *Taraki*’s communist government from the beginning were faced with disapproval of the overwhelming majority of the people of Afghanistan. The communists in order to implement their programmes and eliminate their opponents that in fact were all the people played their role rapidly and intensively. Local and limited resistance rapidly grew across the country in terms of quality and quantity, and got widespread and popular uprising. The major factors of the resistance could be outlined as follows:

- Religious belief; Afghan people soon found that *Taraki*’s government was a communist and anti-religious regime. The content of the eight decrees, especially

regarding the distribution of land, abolition of women's dowry and changing the colour of the national flag and official insignia, were obviously in direct contradiction to principles of *Shariah* and Islamic values, which provoked different classes and groups of people including peasants, workers, clergymen, shopkeepers, clerks, students, and academics against the communist regime.

- Social and national traditions; the major sections of the eight decrees were inconsistent with Islamic Sharia and social and national traditions of the Afghans. For instance, some people attacked the name of feudal and forcibly took their lands. This action not only angered tribal and local elders and landowners who the communists called them exploiters, but also it annoyed the peasants and those the confiscated lands were distributed among them. Consequently, farmers were under pressure; moreover, production of agricultural products decreased and raised expensiveness and inflation. The plan of mandatory literacy courses for women was recognized opposed to the social aspects because there was no possibility of accepting it pursuant to Islamic values.
- Intimidation; the coup regime, according to the *Marxist* principle of “*Dictatorship of the proletariat*” so brutally proceeded to arrest and massacre. In fact, it was created a system of repression and terror, and some of the communists admitted this problem. For instance, *Babrak Karmal* in his first radio statement, which was broadcasted concurrently with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, mentioned this problem. He said, “Before presenting the policy of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, I would like to dedicate to you the deepest impressions and compassion, the extraordinary respects [...], on behalf of the central committee of the *People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan*, revolutionary council, the *DRA* and on behalf of myself *Babrak Karmal*, [...] owing to imprisonment, exile, forced migration, persecution, inhuman and brutal torture, martyring, the mass murder of tens of thousands of our mothers and fathers, brothers, sisters, daughters, sons and children that were performed by direct orders from this murderer and executioner, *Hafizullah Amin*” (Afghanistan. *Viz̄arat-i Ittil̄a'̄at va Kult̄ur* 2007, 7). It is obvious that the crimes and oppression that the communist imposed on the Afghan people did not implement only by *Hafizullah Amin* whereas in fact all of them and generally both faction of *Khalq* and *Parcham* were involved in these crimes. Communists were more cautious regarding literate people, scientists, religious scholars, especially the *Shiite* community of Afghanistan. A substantial number of

teachers of schools and universities, and Muslim students that did not cooperate with *the PDPA* were arrested and disappeared. The *Mojaddedi* family members, who were the influential *Sunni* leaders, arrested in Kabul and other provinces and killed. Wherever they found *Shiite* religious scholars, immediately handed them over to torture chambers and *Shiite* common people with a little doubt were arrested and killed. There were countless cases of terrorism and crimes, whereas in fact these terrorism and crimes instead of suppressing the opponents, forced the people to confront the regime. Finally, resistance was widespread throughout the country and the flag of *Jihad* was raised.

4.3.3.1. Waygal, Jadran and Nuristan Uprising

The first uprising against the communists was from South and North east of Afghanistan and initiated from *Waygal* and *Jadran* valleys. Less than one month after the *Saur* Coup, Muslim religious scholars of Afghanistan comprehending the heretical nature of *Taraki's* regime reacted against his regime. The Afghan people in some areas and later in further provinces and localities, with the fatwa issued by Islamic scholars, raised the flag of *Jihad* for protecting Shariah and for saving the country from foreign domination. The uprising of *Waygal* Valley dwellers in Nuristan was regarded as the first spark of a series of armed uprisings of the Afghan people against communists. This uprising occurred on 22 May 1978, 24 some days after the *Saur* coup. *Jadran* tribe in *Paktia* province led by some family members of *Babrak Khan* - one of the fighters of third *Anglo-Afghan* war in 1919 - revolted and expelled the government forces from the *Jadran* valley. On 20 July, the people of *peach* valley - one of the districts of *Kunar* province in East of Afghanistan - fought back the government forces. *Nuristani* people after this fight initiated nationwide uprising in *Nuristan* valleys, *Waygal*, *Beshgal* and *Ramgal*. Finally, on 4 October 1978, they took *Nuristan* province under their control. In *Kunar* province until 1979, the communists killed more than thousand people. In addition, the uprising of *Waygal Valley dwellers* in Nuristan was more important from the point of view that it was the outset of Islamic *Jihad* in Afghanistan.

4.3.3.2. Darya Suf Valley Uprising

The people of the *Darya Suf* Valley opposed the government's policies comprehending the nature of the communist system. Therefore, the government decided to detain some of the Mullahs and lords of the mentioned area. The government accused them of seizing the

people's properties, misleading them, and provoking them against the authority. Thus, in September 1978, owing to the fact that the communists regarded the Mullahs as the main factor in uprising the communists arrested many Mullahs the so-called by the communists "*Ikhwan Al-Shayatin*" (the brothers of Satan). The people of *Darya Suf* Valley involved in many problems during *Taraki's* government. The government initiated recruiting and prevented the people from moving from one village to another village. The uprising occurred on 14 February 1979, when a delegation consisting of the Mayor, finance officer and government troops were sent by the government to the mentioned village in order to arrest and repress, especially the clergymen. The Muslim people initiated to defend themselves and the invading forces were forced to retreat. Subsequently, task forces with many weapons and equipment moved from the centre of *Samangan* province in order to suppress the people of *Darya Suf* Valley. These forces after approaching the mentioned area were faced with the armed resistance of the people. A fierce battle occurred and consequently eight fighters were killed, however the people succeeded in killing 24 of the enemy forces including the provincial chief of police and took *Darya Suf* Valley under their control. On 17 February 1979, armed forces of three thousand with tanks and artillery attacked *Darya Suf* Valley. Popular forces were forced to retreat and subsequently the government forces looted people's properties and desecrated the women. Besides, violence by the government forces could not cease the people's uprising; they arose again leading by combatant Ulema and on 6 March 1979, and conquered the district of *Darya Suf* Valley.

Dr. Haqshenas regarding *Darya Suf* Valley uprising wrote: "On 25 February 1979, shouting *Allah Akbar* and revenge the revolution expanded across *Darya Suf* Valley. Its brave and faithful people arose against godless government and thus a bloody battle among them occurred, *Taraki* subsequently sent troops that had no precedent until that date. In addition, the enemy entered the battle with the entire aerial and ground equipment and shattered heroic movement of the brave but poor people of *Darya Suf* Valley. Atrocities and crimes that Russian mercenaries committed in the mentioned Valley are such shameful things that it is better not to discuss them" (Haqshenas 1989, 584).

It is remarkable that in this uprising, the *Shiite* and *Sunni* people participated together and this collaboration had an important impact in encouraging the people. After the *Darya Suf* Valley uprising the people of *Charkint* rose on 22 February 1979, subsequently, on 12

March the people of *Urozgan* and *Farah* upraised; on March 15 the bloody uprising of the people of *Herat* occurred and this trend continued.

4.3.3.3. Herat uprising

One of the largest urban uprisings was Herat uprising, which occurred on 15 March 1979 and left hundreds dead, wounded, and disabled. This and subsequent uprisings confirmed the existence of a regime in the country that the people did not consider it as a legitimate regime and did not accept its authorities. In the view of people and their leaders and religious scholars, this regime was heathen and opposed to their beliefs, customs and traditions. Thus, *Sibghatullah Mojaddedi* declared *Jihad* against the regime and this declaration of *Jihad* accelerated uprising among people. Arrestment of the influential people, elders and religious scholars in this province, implementing programmes and commands of the government such as land reforms and literacy courses that everyday were implementing in one part of the province, were intolerable for the people. In addition, the government with the arrestment of two prominent and influential religious leaders, *Hazrat Abdolbaghi Mojaddedi* and *Sayed Moazam*, injected a substantial shock to the society. Orgy of the Governors and the Communists caused Friday preacher and a number of the influential local elements encouraged the people to oppose the regime. On 28 February, protests and movements initiated in *Ghurian* and *Gozareh* districts; and the people evicted the staff of the land reforms and the literacy courses from the city or killed some of them. On 14 March, the people closed public roads of Herat to Kandahar airfield. Finally, on 15 March, the rest of the people joined them and thus the uprising was spread out. In addition, the government violently suppressed the uprising that its reflection in the country created other outbreaks of the uprisings in the next months.

Wilhelm Dietl, German Journalist recognizes the Herat uprising as a unique uprising in Asia (Dietl 1986, 42). When the Herat uprising occurred, the inhuman brutalities of the communist regime in Herat and all over Afghanistan had reached their peak, on the other hand the Islamic revolution in Iran had won, which was an important factor in boosting the morale of the Muslims.

4.3.3.4. Chandawal Uprising

The first public opposition occurred in the capital as an armed uprising. After more than one year of communist government's life, on 23 June 1979, the people took up arms in the centre of Kabul and approximately one kilometre away from the Presidential Palace, in

one of the old quarters of Kabul, called *Chandawal*. It is still not obvious how this uprising and the identities of its stimulators. Additionally, there are some assertions stating that a group of people from religious and political groups after conducting some military operations took under their control the mentioned area and were ready to attack the central government. This uprising was organized very well, and its purpose was provoking of *Sunni* and *Shiite* Hazara, so the organizers distributed some leaflets against the puppet communist government (Hyman, *Afghanistan under Soviet Domination, 1964-81* 1982, 153). Nevertheless, the communist military forces attacked the people with the support of Russian people. The military forces of the government surrounded the mentioned area and arrested a substantial number of people from every tribal, especially Hazara people because the majority of opponents were from Hazara community. Notwithstanding the government claimed to be the supporter of workers, peasants and the lower strata of society, all those who had been incarcerated were from these strata. This uprising destroyed the position of Communists and provided the background of the subsequent uprising in all over the country. According to one of the military officer at that time the cause of the *Chandawal* uprising was arrestment of religious leaders and elders of Hazara and *Shiite* (Azimi 1998, 192).

4.4. The Split

The two factions *Khalq* and *Parcham* that both had communist ideas and were supported by the Soviet Union, for a long time had controversial competition and dispute for reaching social influence, approaching Soviet Union, and gaining seats in the parliament. Both factions after coming to power, in order to gain further power increased their competition and dispute in a manner that they stood against each other. As stated by Mesbahzadeh “Although comrades of *Khalq* and *Parcham* made alliance together before the coup under pressure of internal and external factors, they could not put aside their differences during the coup that even was not sure to be successful. The *Khalqis* accused the *Parchamis* of supporting *Daoud Khan* during the coup and claimed that *Babrak Karmal* encouraged the central committee of *the PDPA* to escape and intimidate into the failure of the coup. For this reason, the party leaders including *Karmal* and *Taraki*, were transferred to *Khwaja Rawash* airfield, in case of the failing the coup they would escape out of the country” (Mesbahzadeh 1999, 48). As stated by Atae “Approximately two months after the *Saur* coup, the two factions of *Khalq* and *Parcham* opposed each other. The *Khalq* faction, led by *Hafizullah Amin*, treated autocratically and endeavoured to

monopolize all the power. They said that the leader of *Parcham* was not faithful to the revolution because the *Saur* coup was a national democratic movement and not a revolution in the view of the *Parchamis*. These disputes and arguments intensified and soon the Soviet advisers regarded the best interest in making away the leaders of *Parcham* from the country and sending them as ambassadors to abroad. Soon the leaders of *Parcham* were deported from the country. Indeed, they were dispatched as ambassador or chargé d'affaires to the other countries. (Ataee 2004, 404).

Two months after coming to power their disagreement intensified. *Sultan Ali Keshtmand* mentioned "Approximately two months after the *Saur* coup the totalitarian policies of the leader of the *Khalqis* in the party and public administration took the absolute power. They did whatever wanted, and resistances conducted by *Babrak Karmal*, the leader of the *Parcham* faction and other *Parchamis* were regarded as an unforgivable sin from the view of the leader of the *Khalqis*" (Keshtmand 2002, 375). *Keshtmand* also believed that differences between two factions were growing intensely, and in his opinion, the reason for differences was the *Khalqis*' monopolization, especially Amin's concepts and actions, which were in competition and conflict with *Babrak* and endeavoured to capture all the power. *Keshtmand* added, "He gradually took over in all three departments of power: the state, party and army" (Keshtmand 2002, 376).

In the meeting of the Revolutionary Council on 12 June 1978, the disagreements between the two factions reaches its peak. Accordingly, in this meeting *Taraki* requested both of them to resolve their disagreements through voting among party officials. However, *Amin* succeeded received the support of majority of party and government officials from his faction and thus he was certain of defeating *Barbak* and consequently the *Parcham* faction. The gap between the two factions was evident on 8 July 1978, in the meeting of the political bureau of the central committee of the *PDPA* (See Figure 4-4) headed by *Nur Mohammad Taraki*, and in which some changes occurred in the cabinet members. New appointments indirectly demonstrated that *Babrak Karmal* and *Nur Ahmad Nur* had been set aside since *Karmal* was the secretary of the central committee of the party and *Nur Ahmad Nur* was Minister of interior. In July ending, several names were announced as new ambassadors of Afghanistan in some countries that all of them were from the *Parcham* faction. It is particularly significant that after sending abroad the heads of the *Parcham* faction, it was announced that a coup was discovered in which the *Parchamis* were involved (Keshtmand 2002, 405).

After the deportation of six leaders, in the extraordinary meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of *the PDPA* (See Figure 4-4) on 18 August 1978, the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence was given to *Taraki* and it was ordained that *Hafizullah Amin* assisted him in the affairs. In fact, practical and administrative responsibility of the ministry of defence was given to *Hafizullah Amin*. Furthermore, in the mentioned meeting it was issued a notice regarding the discovery of a conspiracy against the government, in which was stated as follows;

“... The government recently discovered and investigated a conspiracy, in which a number of traitors to the people and the country participated. Among them General *Abdul Qadeer*, Defence Minister, Major General *Shapur* the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Mir Ali Akbar* the president of *Jomhoriyat* hospital were arrested” (Afghanistan. *Viz̄arat-i Ittil̄a‘at va Kult̄ur* 2007, 447).

In August ending, it was announced that according to authoritative documents, *Keshtmand* Planning Minister and *Mohammad Rafi* Public Works Minister participated in the mentioned conspiracy as well. The mentioned people were arrested, but nevertheless there was no mention of *Karmal*'s participation in the conspiracy until 28 November 1978. *Taraki* in the plenum of the central committee stated that *Babrak Karmal*, *Nur Ahmad Nur*, *Anahita Ratbzad* had a remarkable role in the conspiracy. Furthermore, he accused some of the *Khalqis* of trying for the rehabilitation the *Parcham* faction against the *Khalq* faction. *Taraki* in the mentioned plenum requested severe punishment for *Karmal*, *Nur Ahmad Nur*, *Anahita Ratbzad*, *Mohammad Rafi* and *Qadeer*, which was approved by the member of the central committee of *the PDPA*.

After this event, the government urged the ambassadors to return to the country, but they stole all of the assets of embassies and escaped to Moscow (Sharq 1994, 165). Additionally, in the country *Keshtmand*, *Qadeer*, *Mir Ali Akbar* were sentenced to death. The death penalty did not perform and was commuted the punishment of some others, such as *Mohammad Rafi* that was sentenced to twenty years in prison. Furthermore, some the *Khalqis* voluntarily were withdrawn from political Bureau of *the PDPA* and remained at the level of experimental members of the party.

In connection with the mentioned coup, *Babrak* and his comrades in the *Parcham* faction were charged that they planned to arrive in Afghanistan through Pakistan and Iran, in order to lead the coup and create a government of national common front. The *Khalqis* likewise

claimed that in the *Parchamis'* coup, the foreign factors were involved too, however they provided no evidences in this regard. In the introduction, which *Khalqis* wrote for confessions of *Keshtmand*, *Mohammad Rafi* and *Qadeer*, was stated about foreign intervention as follows;

“... In the answers of *Mir Ali Akbar* and other conspirators, explicitly and evidently was indicated to involving the foreign factors, [but] for the time being, will be avoided from announcing them, because it has not been found sufficient evidences to arrest them” (Afghanistan. *Viz̄arat-i Ittil̄a‘̄at va Kult̄ur* 2007, 1268).

The confessions of *Keshtmand* should be regarded to clarify the coup and its objectives. Although most of these confessions were made under coercion and torture, they are more detailed and comprehensive than the others. According to his confessions could be argued that the *Parchamis* did not intend to change the nature of the communist regime and wanted to share the power with the *Khalqis*. It is worth mentioning that in the mentioned coup, were made some efforts that the opposition and the so-called progressive forces, who were out of the *Parcham* and *Khalq* factions but in fact were under the leadership of *the PDPA* and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, could enter into the system of government. As stated by *Keshtmand* “Gathering all dissidents of the society, could be regarded as the main goal of this alliance. Perhaps in the future this alliance would be called the United National Front Alliance. About the foreign policy should be said that some efforts were made in order to focus on neutrality and non-aligned policy to attract the support of all countries. In this government various forces participated, and it, therefore, would be beneficial to get support of all countries...” (Afghanistan. *Viz̄arat-i Ittil̄a‘̄at va Kult̄ur* 2007, 1283).

Indeed, after revealing the coup plot, it was conducted an extensive purgation of the *Parchamis* from the party and the government. A substantial number of the *Parchamis* were imprisoned and murdered, but nevertheless the Soviets prevented killing of *Parcham* leader in order to use them in another opportunity.

4.4.1. Conflict within the Khalq Faction

After purging the *Parchamis* from the high-ranking of the government and making sure that they would not threaten the *Khalqis* regime any more, the *Khalqis* clashed together to obtain more power. *Hafizullah Amin*, who was introduced himself as a faithful disciple of

Taraki got in a competition with him. He obviously claimed that he had been more intelligent in the rescue of the revolution from the collapse, but nevertheless other party members regarded him a dictator and Stalinist.

At first, some party members opposed him and selected *Taraki* as their advocate. However, *Taraki* was not against him and he provided the context for improving the political conditions. Additionally, *Amin* was afraid of the conditions and in all circles introduced himself as his faithful disciple in order to avoid revealing his suspicion. *Amin* could not trust *Taraki* and appointed some people to report his meetings. *Taraki* regardless the warnings of his comrades in the party and government and *Pozanf*, the Soviet ambassador in Afghanistan, gradually increased his power. As it was mentioned earlier *Taraki* appointed him as Defence Minister, however, in order to consolidate his position rapidly utilized his supporters in this ministry (Ataee 2004, 407).

Regarding the disagreements between *Amin* and *Taraki* and *Amin*'s plan to deal with *Taraki*, Mesbahzadeh said, "... Thus, in late August 1979, he (*Taraki*) travelled to Cuba to attend conference of non-aligned countries and on his return departed to Moscow to meet the Kremlin officials and *Karmal* that was in the Soviet and had a discussion with them concerning *Amin*' situation. In this discussion, it was decided to remove *Amin* from the scene, but nevertheless *Amin* was succeeded to remove *Taraki* and took the power on 16 September" (Mesbahzadeh 1999, 50). *Amin*, in order to release from his so-called master, planned a plot to kill him. Accordingly, on 17 September the so-called faithful disciple ordered to kill *Taraki*. Following this event, *Amin* became the first person in the country.

Amin in the period of three months and a few days of his government, besides killing the people in all around the country, many times spoke on radio and TV. He always claimed justice, safety, and legality, but nevertheless he forgot the motto of "food, housing and clothing". It is very strange that *Amin* endeavoured to rebuild the mosques that he had killed their worshippers. Additionally, none of these measures could postpone the time of his murder by Russians into the country's legal system and change people's views regarding him. The Soviets were severely upset about the arbitrary killing of *Taraki* and they were very furious with *Amin*. In fact, the Soviets consider him to be held in contempt by them and thus they would retain their composure to him, and initiate to praise and compliment him as a brave commander of the *Saur* coup. Finally, Soviet invaded to

Afghanistan on 27 December 1979, and Soviet officers killed *Amin* terminated one hundred days of his bloody governance.

Extreme commands and programmes of the *Amin*'s government, acute and bloody disputes within the government apparatus, and expansion of popular uprisings and armed conflict, seriously threat to the survival of *the DRA*. In this regard, the Soviet interests were threatened, which forced them to attack Afghanistan in order to control the situation in this country. (Sharq 1994, 171).

4.4.2. The Soviet Invasion

On 27 December 1979, 700 people of the Soviet Union in Afghan uniforms, including Special Forces of the *KGB* and the *GRU* from Alpha group, seized the important governmental and military centres, radio, and television building along with the main target of the Presidential Palace in Kabul. The Soviet military command at Termez - located on the border with Afghanistan and Uzbekistan - through Kabul Radio announced that Afghanistan became released from the dominion of *Amin*'s rule.

At this time, the Revolutionary Council appointed *Babrak Karmal* as leader of the government. He was former Deputy Prime Minister and leader of the *Parcham* faction, but following takeover of power by the *Khalq* faction he was demoted to less important post of Czechoslovak Embassy and later he was dismissed. He was the Soviet puppet and insisted on the Soviet military presence. With the arrival of Soviet forces in Afghanistan initiated a new round of panic, and blood and fire engulfed the country. On the night of 27 December, *Karmal* spoke on the Radio Central Asia and mentioned *Amin* as traitors, anti-people and against the interests of the country. When *Karmal* riding the Russian tanks entered the country, the people gave him the title of Russian *Shah Shuja*. Besides, *Shah Shuja* in the last moments sympathized with the people, whereas in fact *Karmal* never supported the people and always preferred Russians to his nation.

Indeed, one hundred and twenty thousand Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, and in return the people initiated nationwide uprising against the Soviet and the fronts and bastions of anti-Russian resistance became gradually stronger. On each side, it was undermined Russians' forward progress in Afghanistan and finally they were disappointed at complete and permanent control over Afghanistan. The *Parchamis* after coming to power demonized the *Khalqis* and *Amin*'s supporters, and at the earliest opportunity executed

some of the *Khalqis*' leaders and imprisoned a substantial number of the *Khalqis*. However, the Soviet sought to mediate between the *Parchamis* and *Khalqis* to find a solution to the conflict among them. In this regard, the Soviet could convince the *Parchamis* to appoint some of the *Khalqis* as minister. For instance, *Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoy* was appointed as Interior Minister and *Mohammad Aslam Watanjar* as Minister of Communications.

Karmal announced that his government's main purpose was defence of the remarkable achievements of the *Saur* revolution (Afghanistan. *Viz̄arat-i Ittil̄'a'at va Kult̄-ur* 2007, 8). In order to fulfil this purpose from the night of 27 December, some rapid measurements was implemented. Thus, *Parcham* members were released from custody while a number of activists and members of *Khalq* leaders were imprisoned (Omarzai 1994, 376). His government through public meetings and publications endeavoured to attribute the injustices of the almost last two years to *Amin* and gave good tidings that the people would not see the cruelty any more. According to one of the Russian general, who was in the government, the *KGB* was converted to *KHAD KhADamat-e Aetla'at-e Dawlati* (State Intelligence Agency), (See Figure 4-4), (Lyakhovsky 1995, 4).

Babrak Karmal was wise and seasoned veteran of the political affairs. Although he entered the country when the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, he took on long-term projects. Although he failed to implement them, he could undermine early success of *Mujahidin*. He established the National front of *Pedar-e-Watan* (Fatherland Party) and conducted some projects like giving autonomy to some areas, establishing assembly of Islamic dignity, the Ministry of ethnic groups and tribes. Although these measures delayed the defeat time of the Communists, it was not a propitious time to perform these measures and the war changed from the regional aspect and to general and public aspect.

On 15 June 1981, National front of *Pedar-e-Watan* arose during a seminar in the Presidential Palace in Kabul. This national front attempted to bring together all political and social organizations, in order to strengthen the rule of the central government and cease the struggle against it, but nevertheless his measures did not succeed in achieving these goals. According to *Keshtmand*, the prime minister at that time, the underlying causes that *Karmal* could not achieve his goals were as follows:

- Abnormal conditions of continuing the war in the country;

- Increasingly arming, financing, encouraging and emboldening the armed people on Pakistan's territory, and intensifying their attacks on Afghanistan;
- The Soviet Union military presence in the country;
- Lack of readiness of forces in the country;
- Lack of political will from the top for power sharing;
- Rejection of political pluralism (Keshtmand 2002, 672-679).

Indeed, *Karmal* was not able to reach any result with their projects and thus some differences within the party were revealed which confused him in dealing with the situation. Finally, he resigned from the leadership of the party and later from presidency of Afghanistan. It should be highlighted that in his resignation, structural changes in the Soviet regime and the death of the old leaders in that country, which occurred successively, played a remarkable role. It is worth pointing out that after the death of *Konstantin Chernenko*, *Mikhail Gorbachev* came to power that was not concurred with the Soviet military present in Afghanistan and he had remarked this issue previously. *Gorbachev* came to power in 1985 and immediately *Babrak Karmal* with a number of leaders of the *Parcham* faction, who was in power, were summoned to Moscow. In the negotiation that settled between the new leader of the Soviet and the Afghan boards, the Soviet leader was not satisfied with the presence of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. He asked *Karmal* whether they could defend themselves if Soviet withdrew its troops from Afghanistan and *Karmal's* response was negative. However, *Mohammad Najibullah* responding to the same question announced they had sufficient equipment and could defend themselves (Ataee 2004, 440). Consequently, after this negotiation was appeared that the Soviet leadership considered *Najibullah* to be the president. In fact, the Soviet Union was involved in many internal problems and required to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, which *Najibullah* regarded it in his speech. After this event, *Karmal* did not return to Kabul and *Najibullah* provided the conditions for coming to power. Three months later *Karmal* returned to Kabul, surrendered the power to *Najibullah*, and returned to the Soviet. It could be seen that the communist government in Afghanistan had no power in handling its internal and external issues. The Soviet Union decided for the Afghan government in the every political, social, economic issue and launching any policy without approval of the Soviet was not possible. In fact, the government had no sufficient financial capacity to implement any kind of reform. As well as all, the communist rulers endeavoured to demonstrate their faithfulness to the Soviet Union. *Najibullah* was not

concerned whether it was possible to handle the internal and external issues of the country without the Soviet Union's presence in Afghanistan. He knew the Soviets could not spend further time in Afghanistan. Accordingly, in order to catch the power in Afghanistan, he proposed the plan of withdrawing the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, which was pursuant to the Soviet Union's desires. It goes without saying that, his personal interests were preferable to nation interests in this regard. It is worth pointing out that invading Afghanistan was already a substantial mistake, but nevertheless leaving the country in critical conditions at that time could be regarded as another political blunder of the Soviet Union.

At the beginning of 1986, the disagreement among the leadership of *the PDPA* once again increased, however, this time without changing the top leaders, it could not be subsided. Most members of the political bureau regarded the matter of changing the leader as serious and essential matter (See Figure 4-4). They gradually reach the conclusion of determining *Najibullah* as the successor to *Karmal* in the position of the leadership of the party. Besides, among the leaderships of the party there was a critical situation as if everywhere there was disbelief and stagnation (Keshtmand 2002, 725).

Karmal wrote his resignation, which omitted him from Secretary General of the Party and was published on 3 May 1986. Subsequently, the Party Central Committee unanimously elected *Najibullah* as president and this was the first time that the exchange of power between the Communists occurred peacefully. Thus, the third most powerful communist after *Amin* stepped down from the party leadership, approving the party members and the Soviet leaders that determined the power in the communist countries at that time. Nonetheless, *Karmal* remained as ceremonial president and finally on 20 November 1986, he was relieved of all the assigned posts and this time the scene was ready for political manoeuvring of *Najibullah*. There are those who maintain that when *Najibullah* came to power *Karmal* was exiled from Afghanistan and was sent to the Soviet (Keshtmand 2002, 240).

In the *Karmal's* period, several thousand young people were sent to the Soviet and European countries in order to prop up the urgent needs of the future in many aspects. Furthermore, in order to strengthen the party and implement the purposes of the *Saur* coup some institutions such as Organization of Democratic Youth, Organization of Democratic Women were established under the leadership of *the PDPA*. His government apparently

wanted to take up irregularities in context of land reforms. Thus, maintaining the same purposes was issued a new decree as supplement of Decree No. 8 that had the aspect of giving bribes to convince a number of people to join the ranks of the armed forces.

Karmal's government's policy followed the basic principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. According to these principles, Afghanistan would follow the policies that countries under the Soviet control had to pursue it (See Figure 4-4). Inclusion of some expedient articles in the "main lines" had no interest in his government. Here two examples will be mentioned:

- I. In the context of Islam, they mentioned "the resolute compliance with holy religion of Islam". Although it was obvious that the members of *the PDPA* beliefs were irreligious and had materialist beliefs, his government endeavoured to prevent further abstraction of the Party. Furthermore, owing to existing gap in terms of opinion between the party and the majority of the society, the PDPA government pretended to be Islamic. Additionally, neither their claims nor dramatic movements, such as the participation of leaders in mosques and religious circles, did not convince the people to consider *the PDPA* as an Islamic government. On the other hand, persecution acts of the government, inadmissible measures of the Soviet forces and occupation of their country, forced the people to stand opposite them.
- II. *Karmal's* government claimed offences against human dignity and torture were not allowed (Osool-e asasi hezb-e democratic Khalq e Afghanistan, [Fundamental principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] 1980, No. 30). Nevertheless, in his government like the previous periods still there were torture, forced confessions along with the various harassment, human rights violations, shootings, and hangings of opponents.

The *Karmal's* government exerted a strong influence on all educational system and cultural institutions and forced them to promote the ideology of the party. In the "fundamental principles" of *Karmal's* government for scientific and artistic activities such framework was specified: "Freedom of scientific, technical, cultural, and artistic activities must be pursuant to the objectives of the *Saur* Revolution" (Osool-e asasi hezb-e democratic Khalq e Afghanistan, [Fundamental principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] 1980, No. 29). Accordingly, the quality of education has deteriorated and

especially in the rural areas, the basic educations collapsed. Mohammad Akram Andishmand in his extensive research regarding the status educations at that time wrote, “This decline after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan expanded...” (Keshtmand 2002, 158).

Indeed, prosecution, inspection the houses, imprisonment, torture, executions of opponents, and the implemented inadmissibility could be regarded as the reprehensible characteristics of the *Khalqis*’ government. In fact, these acts increased malice and hostility and meanwhile the tensions between the *Khalqis* and *Parchamis* were still going on, as well as the Soviet officials gradually realized that the invasion of Afghanistan brought crisis and catastrophe for them.

4.4.3. Social and Economic Crisis

Advancing the Soviet Army into warm waters and energy resources in the Middle East and South Asia was opened a new page in the history of the competition poles in Afghanistan, in the region and in the world, and gradually Afghanistan’s issue got national and international dimensions. The various struggles of the people, which had spontaneous and local potentials, got public and national view over the time. These struggles with the foreign multilateral supports became the form of “Anti-communist *Jihad*” and “Struggle between Atheism and Islam”. Thus, Afghanistan became a battlefield of the world’s dominant poles.

The *Parchamis* led by *Karmal* did not have anything to say and any practical and comprehensive plan for reform. The presence of Soviet troops on the one hand put them against national and religious feelings of the people, on the other hand, against the outright opposition from the West world and the Arab Islamic countries. *Karmal* in his statement that was broadcasted from the Soviet territory, addressing *Amin* as *Mir Ghazab* (unmerciful) blamed all the mistakes, shortcomings, and crimes on him.

In the early of *Karmal*’s period, in order to gain public support, it was announced a series of superficial and propagandist reform such as the release of political prisoners, ban on prosecution and investigation into individuals’ homes and freedom of the press and assembly, which did not have favourable results. Providing a long list of executions provoked further public outrage, and release of a few of prisoners could not assist to calm the situation. The events such as shooting at the student protest on the street and the

repression by the state offered no opportunity for freedom of the press and assemblies. Military pressure increased over time, and home inspection and unreasonable detention became very normal actions.

After failing the first phase of reform, *Karmal's* government officials, according to advices of the Soviet consultants, endeavoured to develop the political, economic, and social reforms. In fact, they partly conceived the negative effects of their primary decrees and superficial plans, which fuelled the popular uprisings and armed conflicts. Nonetheless, they did not intend to cease their ideological goals and excessive revolutionary acts pursuant to realities of Afghanistan, the region and the world. Due to this reasons, the proposed reforms that were formed in line with the radical aims and inconsistent with Afghan society, were not successful.

As was mentioned earlier, *Karmal's* government in order to strengthen the spiritual and political bases of the party and government established the National front of *Pedar-e-Watan*. Subsequently, the government created “the primary core of people and tribes and nationalities”. Furthermore, it established “Islamic affairs” in order to reduce the ideological outrage and the religious feelings of the people. On the other hand, in the field of economic and social affairs, land reform adjusted and provided further fields for private enterprises.

Indeed, the reforms of this stage did not have the sufficient depth and the government still did not want to abandon its radical goals. For instance, *Karmal* in his statement in October 1982, in Herat province said: “Indeed, land and water reforms are the main and major core of our national and democratic revolution” (Etefagh-e-Islam newspaper 1982, 3). Additionally, some adjustments had been taken place in land reforms, which appear to be very late and negligible. “After the evolutionary and the new phase of the revolution, land ownership increased from one acre to two acres” (Etefagh-e-Islam newspaper 1982, 3).

Despite the fact that during the *Karmal's* era some reforms were implemented, there was no change in the main goals of the government and the country's dependency on the Soviet. In fact, the government endeavoured to improve the tactic and method of implementing the same basic goals and adjust its programme with a better comprehension of the circumstances and situation of the society. In the Ninth Plenum of the Party Central Committee on 27 July 1982, it was mentioned that “During the political interaction with masses of party, social organizations and ideological institutions of the country, the

character of the strata and different social group should be regarded and handled them in various manners. Besides, the principles of the holy religion of Islam, the traditions and customs of the people, historical and cultural values of nationalities, people and tribes of Afghanistan, which announced by *the PDPA* and the government of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, continuously should be regarded” (Etefagh-e-Islam newspaper 1982, 1).

In October 1982, *Karmal* in his speech appreciated the Soviet aids as follows, “Selfless and generous aids of the Soviet Union and our confident ally played a valuable and unique role in solving the economic problems” (Etefagh-e-Islam newspaper 1982, 3). Furthermore, in this period, some efforts were made to encourage private entrepreneurs and increase the government’s economic ability. In fact, the private sector developed under the leadership of the governmental sector and by the government’s aim. In this regard, in *Etefagh-e-Islam* newspaper was mentioned as follows:

According to decrees of 18 and 22 of the basic principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, “The government encourages, supports and controls private enterprises. Thirty-six medium and limited projects have been purposed with a total investment of 498 million Afghanis, which involves different sectors such as raisins, cleaning, textile, poultry farming, soap, cotton production” (Etefagh-e-Islam newspaper 1982, 1).

4.4.3.1. Severe Military Pressure and Reforms

After the failure of the government reform programme and further development of the armed struggle, the joint Soviet and Afghan government forces increased severely the pressures on *Mujahidin*’s areas in villages and winter quarters, and many villagers were forced to leave their homes. Inhuman policy of destruction residential areas in villages was expanded throughout the country, and the peak of this destructive action was from 1983 to 1985. Under these political and social pressures, the economic situation of the peasants, winter quarters, and nomads became completely destroyed.

At the beginning of the *Saur* coup, owing to the clumsy planning reforms of the government, the economic and social construction of the peasants involved in fundamental flaws and under the firebombs and heavy weapons ripped apart. More than five million people were forced to migrate to foreign countries, especially Pakistan and Iran. In fact, instead of the previous normal structure of the society there were mechanisms of war; thus, the society involved in the war and crisis.

In the midst of harsh military pressure, new changes emerged in the Soviet Union. Following the death of the old leader of the Soviet, *Mikhail Gorbachev* came to power in February 1985. Regarding acceleration reforms in the Soviet Union, the process of governmental reforms was accelerated in Afghanistan. Subsequently, criticism of the previous policies of the Soviet Union increased. Pravda newspaper, the official organ of the Soviet Communist Party, in an interpretation on 19 February 1986, stated the Soviet's mistakes in Afghanistan. "Some mistakes has taken place in the early stages of revolution [in Afghanistan], because in surpassing the revolutionary periods, the economic and social reforms had been implemented regardless considering the existing realities and the national and social characteristics, and ultimately they have had a negative effect" (Saberi 1991, 27).

Indeed, *Karmal*, who was still under the previous illusions, in the new stage of the reforms, was not a competent leader to improve the reforms in Afghanistan. Furthermore, according to the offensive nature of the Soviet, *Karmal* in his international policy was exactly in line with the overall alignment of the regional and global policy of the Soviet Union. Moscow's government officials, even in determining the details of Kabul policy were very sensitive. Notwithstanding the forces of the Soviet Union were still present in Afghanistan and in consequence the independence of Afghanistan was unacceptable, *Karmal* called Afghanistan "including the Non-Aligned Countries".

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had a huge reaction in the global scope that perhaps it was not predictable for the Kremlin leaders. Many countries and international organizations were against the invasion. The United States of America due to their competition with the Soviet Union were more serious in intensifying the struggle against the Soviet. US attention to this invasion was so meticulous that Jimmy Carter on January 8, 1980 mentioned it as the grave menace to peace, since the Second *World War* (Bradsher 1999, 150). Despite the fact that a part of the sanctions such as banning wheat exports, boycott of the Olympic Games, cancellation of the second stage of treaty of limiting strategic weapons were imposed, America by implementing some serious measures provided the background of the complete failure and collapse of the Soviet. Besides, in the Ronald Reagan era US opposition were looking more seriously.

Increasing aid to *Mujahidin* by the government of Pakistan and implementing the diplomatic, military campaigns and intelligence operations between the superpowers at

that time brought the most remarkable impacts on the Afghan governments. The Soviet invasion and the *Karmal's* government created many opportunities for Pakistan and China. According to Pierre Metge one of the analyst authors of these events, it must be admitted that Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan saved General *Zia-ul-Haq*, who seized power in 1977 in Pakistan, however this event brought to him political support and funding from Washington (Metge 1984, 20).

The DRA headed by *Karmal* was not deprived of receiving any contribution that was proposed for its settlement. The Soviet Union and its allies provided all equipments, facilities, and advices for the Afghan government. Although they did not hesitate about making any kind of effort and using all the facilities, equipment, and committing crimes to subdue the people, none of these measures led to any considerable result. Besides, the Soviet leadership gripped a huge crisis regarding Afghanistan issue that was appeared no prospect to rescue it. Accordingly, Moscow decided to review its multi-year policy in Afghanistan. In addition, the Soviet Union in revising the previous policies went to such an extent that *Eduard Shevardnadze* Gorbachev's foreign minister said, "We were against human values" or "we have lost the battle for *the PDPA*" (Lyakhovsky 1995, 4). Accordingly, *Karmal's* presence at the head of party government had no advantage for them; therefore, some measures were taken to overthrow him (Lyakhovsky 1995, 4). Finally, On 4 May 1986 a coup occurred in Kabul to overthrow *Karmal*. Dastagir Panjsheri wrote according to the order of interior minister, approximately 20 people of *Karmal's* close comrades and colleagues and relatives were arrested by Khalil Aminzadeh - Kandak institutions commander - and were transferred to *Golkhaneh* castle in the Presidential Palace (Panjsheri 1998, 79). There is not a shadow of doubt that the Soviet Union's aids to Afghanistan were in order to launch its own policies and protect its interests in Afghanistan. In *Karmal's* period, lack of financial resources to make any policy and his government's excessive dependence on the Soviet Union, caused all the conducted policies and implemented reforms were pursuant to the Soviet Union's approval.

In consequence, the same hands that assisted *Karmal* to occupy the head of government and party ousted him in 1986. *Karmal* was first dismissed from the leader of the party and subsequently lost control over his government, which was characterized by elements of brutality, blood shedding, and corruption.

For more detailed comprehension of *Karmal* examining several points of his weakness is very essential. Vladimir Basov, who was for some time a member of the International Relations Branch of CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), regarded the blindly following the Soviet Union and lack of an independent and national plan as the factors of continuation the crisis in Afghanistan. He believed that *Karmal* always followed the Soviet consultants, who were very trustworthy for him (Tanin 2005, 329). When the crisis continued, the number of the Soviet advisers in Afghanistan, who had often decisive role had increased. Vladimir Basov likewise added, “The number of the Soviet advisers astronomically increased. The Soviet advisers were engaged in the departments of the Army, Interior Ministry, the *KGB*, party, economic and diplomatic sector, moreover, it was to the extent that they requested sending to Kabul some consultants in the religion affairs, in order to regulate the relations between the state and Islam” (Tanin 2005, 329-330).

Lieutenant general Boris Gromov, who for a while was the commander of Soviet forces in Afghanistan and as the last Soviet military left Afghanistan on 15 February 1989, declared that “It is obvious that in 1979 the *KGB* made a mistake appointing *Karmal* as the leader of the new government of Afghanistan. [...] *Karmal* neither was trusted by his colleagues and the people nor was trusted by our counsellors. He was an unreasonable person and supporter of factionalism that could elaborately hide it amidst the revolutionary speeches. This talent assisted him to create a halo of a leader in his surroundings (Gromov 1996, 152-153). Furthermore, *Karmal* was addicted to alcoholic beverages, Boris Gromov wrote in this regard, *Karmal*’s apparent willingness to alcoholic beverages caused his collapse character became increasingly aggravated (Gromov 1996, 152). “Likewise, the *PDPA* anti-Islam campaign forced young Army conscripts to drink alcohol” (Joes 2010, 188). It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that who did not consider Islamic issues, could not modify the society pursuant to Muslims’ desires.

One of the dark points of *Karmal*’s life was that his assumption of power coincided with the arrival of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Thus, the Soviet leader, *Gorbachev*, considered this issue. He believed that the people did not respect *Karmal* and they regarded him as the Soviet puppet. Owing to the fact that his rise to power was coincided with the arrival of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, he was supposed to be removed from the political scene. In his opinion, the restoration of national and international reputation was too late (Azimi 1998, 308). Additionally, it was decided in Moscow that *Babrak Karmal* would be removed from the political scene. “They wanted someone to come to

power in Afghanistan that would obey indisputably the orders of Moscow and certainly would provide the conditions of withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan [...] Moscow believed that if it put one of the submissive Pashtun leaders in power, it could provide the conditions of withdrawal of its forces” (Azimi 1998, 311-312).

Doctor *Najibullah* was only desirable person who the *KGB* could trust him. He explicitly stated his support regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. He believed that only in a short time could organize the Afghan armed forces to defend independently the territorial integrity and national independence (Azimi 1998, 311-312).

4.5. Increasing of the Internal Tensions within the Party

Najibullah was appointed as general secretary of the Central Committee of *the PDPA* through the eighteenth plenum of the Central Committee. The mentioned Plenum held on 4 May 1986, and accepted *Karmal's* resignation from general secretary of the Central Committee and instead selected *Najibullah* in this position. In fact, the eighteenth plenum of the Party Central Committee was *Najibullah's* bloodless coup against *Karmal* within *the PDPA*, which realized by virtue of Soviet military presence. Notwithstanding the coup scenario was written in Moscow, the eighteenth plenum provided the view of a normal transformation in the party organization.

Najibullah at the beginning of leadership spoke about the party the collective leadership and endeavoured to reduce the intensification and expansion of intra-party disputes. Furthermore, he endeavoured to win the confidence of the *Parcham* and *Khalq* factions and their different fractions. He even went to *Karmal's* supporters and using threat and encouraging policies endeavoured to reduce their oppositions against his government. It is striking to note that *Najibullah*, in order to convince *Karmal's* supporters to accept the change in the leadership of the party, introduced it as the willingness of the Soviet leadership and a result of transformations in the Soviet Union.

Contrary to the notion of providing party unity with the leadership of *Najibullah*, under his leadership the party was more involved in disunity and discord. The Soviets assumed that with the leadership of *Najibullah* would provide the unity between the two factions of *the PDPA* and the *Parcham* faction that was divided into two or further groups. As stated by *Sultan Ali Keshtmand*, “After the mentioned plenum (plenum 18) so incessant struggle occurred in the party, which gradually had a new form. On one hand, *Karmal's* adherents

did not desist from the opposition and it became more organized and numerous over time; on the other hand, *Najibullah* increased the opposition to them and utilized various forms of pressure such as collective incarceration. He likewise summoned *Karmal*'s longstanding opposition from both the *Khalqis* and *Parchamis* and gave privileges to them in order to restrain them. Nonetheless, after occupying the leadership position by *Najibullah*, the *Khalqis*' opposition not only did not subside, but also it took on some new aspects. Some new groupings among the *Khalqis* emerged that some of them were *Najibullah*'s adherents, some others were in position of hostility [...] as well as owing to *Najibullah*'s dual policy the leading member of the *Parchamis* were divided into factions, and each one individually was regarded or rejected by him. Furthermore, mediocre policy regarding *Karmal*'s adherents continued until the end" (Keshtmand 2002, 980).

In addition to *Keshtmand*, some activists and leaders of the *Khalq* faction discussed his dual policy in this leadership. As stated by Mir Sahib Karval, "Despite the fact that *Najibullah* in the early days [as necessity] depended on the *Khalqis*, he changed very soon his policy and as a result of the pressures of the *Parchamis*' leadership especially *Noor Ahmad Noor*, *Sultan Ali Keshtmand* and *Karmal*'s adherents endeavoured to calm down and lure them. He endeavoured to demonstrate that he had never been surrendered to the *Khalqis*, and would maintain and strengthen the *Parchamis* doctrine even more than *Karmal*" (Karval 2005, 152).

4.5.1. National Reconciliation

Najibullah after taking power in the Revolutionary Council performed some measures for consolidating his power in the party and made some appointments and dismissals in the new cabinet. The officials from the *Khalq* faction were dismissed and instead of them, the *Parchamis* were appointed. *Najibullah* continued the pursuit and arrest of *Karmal*'s adherents who were spreading propaganda against him. In October 1988, dozens of *Karmal*'s adherents between prominent officials were arrested and sent to prison.

Changing, replacement, promoting and demoting of senior members of *the PDPA* at the highest leadership organs of the party was another part of *Najibullah*'s measures for consolidating his power. *Najibullah* from the beginning of his leadership continuously was replacing the party circles especially in the political bureau and the Central Committee. Although *Najibullah* with handling his adherents of both factions in the key the ministries endeavoured to strengthen the basis of his authority, this measure created a new and deep

rift in the party and government. As he was unable to attract solidarity and support of all branches and elements of the *Parcham* faction, even regarding the *Khalq* faction he could not succeed so. The main part of the *Khalq* faction led by Sayed Mohammad *Gulabzoy* was in opposition and hostility. *Gulabzoy* initially demonstrated his agreement to these changes while later when he was assigned to the embassy in Moscow continued to oppose *Najibullah*. Apart from the opposition stemmed from traditional confrontation and hostility between two factions of *the PDPA*, it arose from competition between the two factions over managing the intelligence agency of the Ministry of Interior as well. Both sides in order to strengthen their own official organs endeavoured to close themselves to the Soviet Union. “President forcefully opposed the appointment *Gulabzoy* as the president of Garrison of Kabul and putting all the stationed troops in Kabul including the special guard at his disposal. President indicated that *Gulabzoy* wants to make a huge system that it was not required” (Lyakhovsky 1995, 58).

Creating various military units within the framework of intelligence agency and the Ministry of State Security (MSS), and increasing the forces of the National Guard was an important part of his function to strengthen the basis of his authority. *Najibullah*, after becoming the leader of the party and government established Supreme Command Headquarters of the Armed Forces included the forces of the Ministry of Defence, Interior and Security and Supreme Commander headed this camp. He had many motivations and energies in leadership of the party and the government, and thus by continuously working at the presidential chief of the Armed Forces Headquarters and the leadership, established another organ of the Supreme Council that called *Defae Vatan*. This action assisted him to provide his relationships and control over the military forces and their operations across the country and enhanced the mental and qualitative capacity. In the meetings of the camp, always Senior Soviet military advisers used to participate. *Najibullah*'s military adviser claimed, “Every evening or morning before the holding of meeting of Supreme Command Board, president and I used to verify plan of his orders. I usually remind him the main issues that should have been issued an order about” (Gharif 1998, 153).

After the withdrawal of Soviet forces, *Najibullah* in order to strengthen its position made further changes in the military forces of the government. He removed some certain brigades of border regions of Pakistan and the forces of these brigades were integrated into the army of the Ministry of Defence or combined them to create a new army. It should also be stated that the formation of a new force within the Ministry of Security or intelligence

agency of the government that called the Presidential Guard and then it was renamed the National Guard was one of the substantial steps in creating an accessible and reliable force under his command. Mir Sahib Karval, the senior officer of the Ministry of Defence and a member of the political bureau of *the PDPA* (See Figure 4-4) believed that National Guard was established as a parallel force to the forces of the Ministry of Defence and it was based on advice and support of the *KGB* and the Soviet advisers. It is worth pointing out that its staffs were provided from the party member and social organisations. The security of all key areas such as airports and other locations was provided by the National Guard, which in terms of logistics, modern weapons, and the other financial assistance was supported by the Soviet Union. It is worth pointing out that *Najibullah's* Soviet advisers always warned him not to trust the forces of defence and interior the ministries. A special group headed by three general of the *KGB* were assigned to ensure that *Najibullah* understood the Soviet's intentions and the required conditions would be prepared for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. This group created Joint Staff consisted of skilled persons in Kabul and adjusted economic and military plans for the defence of the regime. Furthermore, this group negotiated with *Najibullah* about receiving a series of better and further aid from the Soviet. The *KGB* warned him not to rely on the loyalty of the Afghan army. Thus, they provided him with money and the necessary equipment a new presidential guard with new high salaries and benefits and this presidential guard was as his private army (Karval 2005, 178).

One of the Soviet generals and *Najibullah's* advisers likewise spoke about president's reliance on the National Guard and the forces of intelligence agency. "President in his relations with the armed forces gave priority to special guard of the Ministry of State Security. This action stimulated the displeasure of the *Khalqis*, army command staffs and the security forces, moreover, it was obvious that he was highly dependent on the Ministry of State Security and did not trust the army and the Interior Ministry. Although he knew without the support of the army would not be able to resolve the military and political issues, he feared of strengthening it" (Lyakhovsky 1995, 38). Further, the garrison of Kabul was regarded as a new force in securing the capital, which was under the leadership of the Ministries of Defence, Interior, and National Security.

Spreading the militia or paramilitary forces was another part of *Najibullah's* measure to consolidate his authority, which during the rule of *the PDPA* was developing year by year. This process had very negative impact on the social and political system of the country,

and consequently it provided the context of lawlessness, violence and the collapse of social order. The remarkable point is that the policy of the militia finally was one factor in downfall of *the PDPA*. In fact, this policy increased the party's internal divisions and disagreements, which caused the collapse of the government, army, and party. Militia forces initially were regarded as the grass roots and local forces in support of *the PDPA*'s government, party and state institutions in rural areas. Nonetheless, increasing weakness of the army, police, and government regular forces strengthened the militia forces and in many areas took over the responsibilities of the police and army. Fleeing the soldiers from the army and avoiding the qualified youths from doing military service during the rule of *the PDPA* resulted in increasing the militia forces.

The number of militia forces in many other provinces increased during *Najibullah*'s regime. Antonio Giustozzi is of the opinion that Kandahar governor's in his attempt to extend militia forces went to such an extent that he did not attract recruits to the army anymore and instead for those who were willing to join militia, paid twenty thousand Afghans. *Najibullah* not only for the tribal youth, who joined self-defence local units, offered exemption from military service, but also demonstrated willingness to release those who previously joined military forces (Giustozzi 2000, 226).

Indeed, during the rule of *Najibullah* in the key provinces of Afghanistan militia forces played an important role in the defence of the government of *the PDPA*. To the same extent that the militia forces were strengthened during *Najibullah*'s regime, their role was increased in the years of war. During these years, the militia forces were equipped with heavy weapons, including armoured tanks and some types of missiles and artillery. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1988, they were adjusted as an independent unit within the framework of the Ministry of Defence and National Security. Increasing and strengthening of the militia forces resulted in increasing their authority in the provinces. Militia leaders and commanders in proportion to their military activities against opponents of *Najibullah*'s regime successively received military ranks and increased their authority within the government. Several factors and motivations caused the president strengthened the militia forces.

The process of enhancing the militia forces initiated from the early eighties, however during his leading in the intelligence agency and then during his leadership in the party and government these forces constituted his most trusted forces. The opposition and hostility

between him and the *Khalq* faction and *Karmal*'s adherents forced him to trust and rely on the militia forces and intelligence agencies. Furthermore, expansion of the state's social base outside the capital and important cities was another part of the motivation of *Najibullah* to strengthen the militia forces. *Najibullah*'s policy of strengthening and increasing the militia forces was taken into consideration as the competition between these forces as well, which resulted in the intensification and expansion of social and ethnic divisions in Afghanistan. He made militia forces from different ethnic groups and tribes and in the combat operation utilized various ethnic militias.

Another part of *Najibullah*'s measures for consolidating his power was the policy of national reconciliation, which was including adopting the new policy, agreement with the opposition forces and participation the leftist groups in the government. In fact, the idea of national reconciliation in Kabul was reflection of Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika policy. *Najibullah* endeavoured to moderate his policies in order to pave the way for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. These adjustments and changes in the set of policies and practices of *Najibullah* were formed in the name of national reconciliation, which had been conducted by *Karmal*. Antonio Giustozzi believed that initially, *Najibullah* took steps along the way that *Karmal* had been traced, but nevertheless he could implement just a part of the process only in the last years of his leadership (Giustozzi 2000, 155). *Najibullah*'s national reconciliation policy was the continuation of the ten tactics of *Karmal*, which was declared and approved in the sixteenth central committee plenum. However, *Karmal* and his supporters could not go beyond the framework of ten tactics. (Vadan 1999, 18). Lieutenant general Boris Gromov regarding *Najibullah*'s national reconciliation policy told, "After the selection of *Najibullah* as the secretary general of *the PDPA*, with immediate assistance and support of the Soviet party consultants, new strategies were developed with the aim of removal of internal confrontation in the country" (Gromov 1996, 192).

Indeed, *Najibullah* adopted ceasefire plan, national reconciliation, and the formation of a coalition government as his main policies and goals. The politburo and the presidium of the Revolutionary Council regarding these policies passed some rules and established a National Reconciliation Commission, which had 295 members. Then, the Revolutionary Council of *the PDPA* said in a statement in case of agreement of the opposition from 15 January 1987 would be established a six-month ceasefire. *The PDPA* conference in support of the national reconciliation policy was held in Kabul from 18 to 20 October 1987.

Outlines and the main points of the policy of national reconciliation in the conference were determined as follows;

- Alliance organizations and leftist group with *the PDPA*,
- Freedom of political parties,
- Creating coalition organisation with the armed opposition and employing them at high levels in the ministries,
- Continuing unilateral ceasefire,
- Drafting a new constitution,
- Preparations for the election of the president,
- Organizing the second congress of *the PDPA*.

Loya Jirga approved the new constitution on 29 and 30 November 1987 (See Appendix B), and the name of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was modified into Republic of Afghanistan. Dozens of adherents of *Hafizullah Amin* in the *Khalq* faction, those who after the overthrow of his government had been detained, were released within the framework of national reconciliation policy and were appointed to government's positions. Political parties were permitted to operate although most of these parties were remnants of the democratic left in the sixties and a few came from the state intelligence agency. *Najibullah* utilized a number of non-party people in his cabinet. For instance, in May 1988 he appointed Mohammad Hasan Sharq as Prime Minister instead of *Sultan Ali Keshtmand*. In June, the National Council replaced the Revolutionary Council as the legislative organ of *the DRA* that a number of its members were appointed by election.

In 1989, the president conducted some measurements to eliminate the Soviet influence in Afghanistan. Afghan-Soviet friendship rooms in Kabul University and other educational institutions, and the office of Soviet advisers in the departments and official agencies were closed. The state monopoly over transportation fuel and sugar were removed. Besides, the issued commands of the Revolutionary Council during *Taraki* concerning the cost of the wedding and land reforms were abolished. Finally, some adjustments were made in the constitution and revoking the citizenship of *Mohammed Zahir Shah* and his family were declared invalid.

Regarding national reconciliation issue some significant changes in political and economic system was enshrined. Market economy was regarded and it was approved selling farms and government institutions - in both agricultural and industrial sectors - to private

companies. In June 1990, holding the second congress, *the PDPA* changed its name to *Hezbe Watan* and were created fundamental changes in plans and objectives of the party. In fact, the party changed from democratic left party based on Marxism-Leninism ideology to the right.

Indeed, during the ruling of *Najibullah* there was no consistent vision and policy of national reconciliation within the party and government. Not only politicians of different factions of *the PDPA* did not have a common position on concept and policy of national reconciliation, but also the comprehension and interpretation of highest institutions of the party, such as the political bureau of the Central Committee of the Party, and national reconciliation was different. Although *Najibullah* claimed that reconciliation is a mutual peace that two sides should participate in it, the policy of national reconciliation never regarded equal partnership and bilateral cooperation with *Mujahidin*. In fact, he wanted to attain his goals with the escalation of war and repression on *Mujahidin*; moreover, in his view, national reconciliation was accepting the ruling of *the PDPA* by armed opponents or *Mujahidin*. Although he was speaking to promote national reconciliation, he expanded and strengthened the militia forces in various provinces. In the first session of the commission on national reconciliation, he inconsistently expressed his opinion regarding reconciliation, and he threatened his opponents and tacitly supported the Soviet Union and his international friends.

Najibullah, on one hand emphasized national reconciliation policy; on the other hand, he mentioned the power of the army and the irreversibility of the revolutionary process under the auspices of the Soviet Union. He said in one of his speeches; “We recommend truce; we recommend peace”, but nevertheless then he said, “Revolutionary process in Afghanistan is irreversible and it could not be ceased; it does not accept any cease. Extremists several times announced that it would be terminated the revolutionary power. However, Democratic People’s Republic of Afghanistan is alive, powerful and fights successfully” (Azimi 1998, 464). It is remarkable that despite the fact that *Najibullah* announced the national reconciliation policy to reach peace with *Mujahidin*, in a press conference - at the termination of six months after the announcement of the national reconciliation - he gave an interview to the foreign journalists regarding national reconciliation. He regarded the conflict in Afghan society as a class conflict between progressive and reactionary classes in society and not a conflict between Islam and

disbelief (Asnad-e tarikhi darbarehe mosalehe melli, [Historical documents about national reconciliation] 1986, 85).

Collapse of the ruling People's Democratic Party, five years after the implementation of the national reconciliation policy demonstrates the failure of this policy. Nonetheless, in the context of this defeat there are signs of success and progress regarding bringing a number of *Mujahidin* commander in alignment with the government and getting their agreement to desist from fight against the government. In this regard, the *Najibullah's* policy from some points of view appeared to be effective and consequential. Nonetheless, joining a number of armed forces of *Mujahidin* and their commanders to *Najibullah's* government, or refraining from fighting against government forces, were the results of the government's security and intelligence activities and not in consequence of the policy of national reconciliation. Negotiations and agreements with the *Mujahidin* commanders inside the country and even with their leaders of some *Jihadi* organizations or their representatives outside the country implemented through intelligence and security institutions in order to force armed opponents to accept the ruling of *the PDPA*. In the mentioned negotiations instead of bilateral cooperation on a political platform, the *Mujahidin* commanders regarded trading and earning money. According to Alexander Lyakhovsky, commanders and the local authority did not want to be notorious by virtue of negotiation with a weak regime, but nevertheless some middle-class groups endeavoured to establish a relationship and alliance just by virtue of money worship, financial benefit, and obtaining arms and ammunition from the government. In addition, alliance was very unstable and by providing favourable conditions at any time, they refused to cooperate with the government and joined the rebel camp. Accordingly, joining opposition groups to *Najibullah's* regime could not be trusted by the government (Lyakhovsky 1995, 8). Besides, joining these forces and *Mujahidin* commanders to the government and the national reconciliation policy brought about the motivation and willingness of government forces in the war against *Mujahidin* considerably reduced.

The idea of national reconciliation policy from the beginning was regarded obsolete. Regarding the fact that this plan was raised by the party-state, there was not a shadow of doubt that it would have failed. The only manner of success was that such plan should have conducted by a third force such as religious scholars (Giustozzi 2000, 168). The underlying cause that this policy, raised by *the PDPA's* government, did not have sufficient efficiency and effectiveness was that the government had been already involved

in the numerous conflict and crime during its life, which threatened its success as a trustable side of reconciliation inside and outside Afghanistan. *Najibullah* proposed the national reconciliation policy in order to establish significant changes in the programme and objectives of the Party. The party that until that time led the country based militarism and intelligence service could not be considered as a symbol of peace and reconciliation in society.

The influence of internationalism of *Marxist-Leninist* ideas in *the PDPA*, tendency to the Soviet Union and presence a number of obedient leaders and cadres in the party by the Soviets, undermined the character of nationalism in the party (See Figure 5-2). Besides, *the PDPA*'s government by virtue of the tendency to maintain the monopoly of state power was incorporated into a new political organization, which called the state party. Accordingly, the party could not conceive its existence apart from the state and the principle of division of powers and withdrawing from it, which was proposed by the national reconciliation policy, was impossible for them to implement.

Najibullah during the national reconciliation, especially after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, always benefited from the financial and military support from the Soviet and consulted with the *KGB* agents. As stated by Mahmoud Gharif, he had close ties with the *KGB* agents and significantly was obedient to them. "*Najibullah* presumably could not find time to meet with Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army ground forces that was visiting Kabul while he spent several consecutive days with the *KGB* officers who visited Kabul" (Gharif 1998, 172). Thereby, *the PDPA* dependency on the Soviet caused disbelief and distrust against *Najibullah* and his national reconciliation policy.

Many elements of circles within the party factions believed that *Najibullah* utilized the national reconciliation policy to consolidate his power and undermine his opponents within and outside the party. One member of the political bureau of the *Khalq* faction wrote, "*Najibullah* entirely utilized the national reconciliation policy to consolidate his personal power in the party and state. Although he made some changes, transformations and appointments in the several positions in the cabinet, when somebody went beyond the limits he rapidly removed him from his positions" (Karval 2005, 154).

As it was mentioned earlier, the name and objective of *the PDPA* changed within the framework of the national reconciliation policy, but nevertheless all of the leaders and officials of *Hezbe Watan* were the same as *the PDPA*, and the party with the new name

refused to abrogate the monopoly of power. In fact, many opposition parties that in the ruling party were formed based on the national reconciliation policy were made by intelligent service of the party. Even some members of *the PDPA* acknowledged this issue. “With the exception of the Afghanistan’s Revolutionary Organization that to a certain extent had facilities in the Northern Province particularly in *Badakhshan* and *Takhar*, the majority of other factions were superficial and formed by intelligent service (*KHAD*), and they had no role at all in defending the sovereignty” (See Figure 4-4), (Karval 2005, 154).

The national reconciliation policy had opponents within the party that was by virtue of different stances of the party members regarding this policy and the conflict over power between the different factions and branches of the party. Different factions of the party utilized this policy in order to manage intra-party challenges. The opposition was very wide and, in fact, many different factions and branches of the party despite participation in governance were incompatible with the policy. The *Khalq* faction that regarded the replacement of *Karmal* by *Najibullah* as an unfair action believed that the success of this policy would result in consolidating the power of *Najibullah* and the *Parcham* faction. Sayed Mohammad Golabzoy one of the leaders of the *Khalq* faction told, “It should be utilized the language of force with the miscreants, they (*Mujahidin*) have no comprehension of national reconciliation except for our weakness and inability” (Azimi 1998, 389). Even in the *Parcham* faction, there was not a consensus to support this policy. Regardless of the fact that the real reason for these oppositions to *Najibullah* within the party was the national reconciliation policy or something else, it should be highlighted that these oppositions were very serious obstacles to the success of this policy and put him into trouble in implementing it. Alexander Lyakhovsky according to Soviet intelligence source wrote, “After *Najibullah*’s assumption of power, the internal conflicts did not decrease in the party, on the contrary, they became severer and factionalism in the party depending on the rivalry between “*Khalq*” and “*Parcham*” was more critical. Besides, the traditional factions that emerged some new groupings in the party practically gathered around each member of the Political Bureau of the Party and pursued their greedy goals (See Figure 4-4). Tribal and national factors performed a significant function to make further escalation of the conflict not only within the party, but also in anywhere else, which led the party to be in further chaos. The Party organizations, provincial and district committees, the Central Committee and its apparatus, and in the Politburo and Secretariat of the Party

Central Committee openly initiated to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with *Najibullah's* policy” (Lyakhovsky 1995, 25).

It is remarkable that Islamic and *Jihadist* organisations and many *Mujahidin* commanders stood opposed to the policy of national reconciliation in Afghanistan. The disagreement stems from ideological hostility and animosity of *the Cold War* between two superpowers, the Soviet Union, and the United States of America, which continued at the time of National reconciliation. Although *Mujahidin's* doubt about the national reconciliation policy and Islamic parties was attributed to religious and theological dimensions, peace with *the PDPA* was seen as a betrayal of Islam and *Jihad*. However, this claim and treatment was a deception and pretence in order to use religion as a means of realizing their goals. Despite the negotiation between the government and commanders and leaders of opponents, *Mujahidin*, Islamic parties and their external supporters were determined to continue of *Jihad* to overthrow the government.

The United States of America and their allies, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, in the Islamic world opposed the policy of national reconciliation *Najibullah*. Notwithstanding the Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan and *Najibullah* enthusiastically attempted to establish relations with the Western countries especially the United States of America, it was non-functional and he was not successful in this regard. “Since the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan was an act of aggression violating basic principles of international law, including respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention in internal affairs, the Western nations, and other members of the international community strongly denounced the action by the Soviet Union. Thus, the Afghan problem has become a “symbol” of East-West confrontation” (See Figure 4-5), (Major Issues in the International Community and Roles of Japan n.d.).




Figure 4-5: Symbol” of East-West Confrontation
(Major Issues in the International Community and Roles of Japan n.d.)

Americans were not very interested in *Najibullah's* policy, and owing to over half a century of *the PDPA's* dependency and relationship with the Soviet Union, they could not trust him to be their alliance. Even Americans were not concerned about Moscow's policy leading by Gorbachev that led to the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. He removed the Soviet forces from Afghanistan to gain Americans' trust, which in their view was a sign of weakness and defeat of the Soviet.

There was a direct relationship between *Najibullah's* national reconciliation policy in Kabul and Gorbachev's Glasnost and Perestroika policies in Moscow. The success of Glasnost depended on the success of the national reconciliation and Glasnost and Perestroika policies were effective strategies to release the CPSU from crisis, strengthening the Soviet Union and the rule of the Communist Party. In fact, the national reconciliation policy was a reflection of Glasnost and it was regarded as a strategy for strengthening the rule of *the PDPA* and weakening the belligerent or *Mujahidin*. Additionally, as there was not a consistent view regarding Glasnost and Perestroika policies within the CPSU, in Kabul the Soviets did not have an integrated view regarding the national reconciliation policy too. The Soviets was aware of the opposition of the elements and factions of *the PDPA* to the government policy, but nevertheless they adopted a policy of silence and put no pressure on them.

Indeed, the duality of Soviet policy was by virtue of hypocrisy of the Soviet authorities. On the one side, Gorbachev and his colleagues that were conducting Glasnost and

Perestroika policies supported the national reconciliation policy as adherence to their policies, on the other side Red Army and the *KGB* strongly supported strengthening and surviving *the PDPA*. Additionally, *Najibullah* had close ties with both groups; in fact, he had a long history of interaction and in the war against *Mujahidin* and established a close working relationship with the militaries in the Soviet army. Withdrawal of Soviet forces undermined national reconciliation policy contrary to the impression that it would strengthen the reconciliation process in Afghanistan. *Najibullah* thought Moscow would connect withdrawal of its forces to develop the national reconciliation policy, whereas in fact Moscow withdrew its troops from Afghanistan regardless of success and failure of this policy.

With the notion that the national reconciliation policy - as reflecting the Glasnost policy - was a strategy to withdraw the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, two years after launching the mentioned policy in Kabul, the Soviet forces retreated from Afghanistan. During the negotiation of the *Geneva Agreement*, in the first meeting with Gorbachev, *Najibullah* declared that without an acceptable guarantee of cessation of Pakistan's involvement would not sign any agreement. Nevertheless, he adjusted his demands with Gorbachev's desires and paved the way for the signing of the *Geneva Agreements*.

Many individuals and leaders of *Mujahidin* believed that the withdrawal of Soviet troops that was based in *Geneva Agreement* was a sign of victory of *Jihad* in Afghanistan. After the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan, this country became the field of competition between the Soviet Union and western countries. In addition, the Soviets after nine years of war and spread of instability left Afghanistan without gaining any practical agreements with other countries and their rivals to restore peace and stability.

4.5.2. The Social and Economic Conditions

On the verge of withdrawing the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the general opinion was that the Kabul government would soon collapse, but nevertheless owing to the lack of unity and coordination of different groups and existence of the various disorders in the resistance movement it did not realize. *Najibullah's* government was able to continue his political life and accelerate the reform process in Afghanistan. At this time, the main goal of the economic policy of the government was to prepare favourable conditions for suitable economic growth, which accelerated from 1989 to 1990. The government in the process of the economic reform focused on the private sector, and thus development of a

free market economy was introduced. The government in order to reconcile the policy of national reconciliation with economic and social realities of Afghan society conducted some policies. On the one hand, the president endeavoured to attract the attention of the international community; on the other hand, he accelerated implementation of new reforms. He endeavoured to encourage European countries and capitalist world to re-establish economy and trade relations. In fact, this policy was the best tactic for him to gain political acceptance and economic support.

Furthermore, he implemented some measures to attract the national capitals and foreign investments. The government's goal of this economic policy was to rebuild economic and social future of the country based on its long-term goals and coordinate it with the new policies of the Soviet Union. In fact, this policy was a critical goal and difficult to achieve for the government. Conditions for normalizing relations with the western world and the United States were not still favourable. Accordingly, the policymakers of Kabul endeavoured to be forefront of the new social and economic movement and continue their political life in the secure, democratic, and political space of the future and they wanted to rescue themselves from bloody revenge of *Mujahidin*. Development and strengthening of the governmental sector and old type of economic policy lost their importance. It should also be stated that as mentioned earlier, commands of the Revolutionary Council during *Taraki* such as land reforms and private property were abolished, and state law recognized the right to private property. Besides, the government made some efforts to promote private sector and launch the mechanism of the free market.¹

Najibullah's government's economic plan not only was different from the state-building process in early *Saur* coup, but also theoretically, during the reign of *Mohammed Zahir* and *Daoud Khan's* Republic, the free market economy was not proposed to this extent. Additionally, Kabul government in order to implement the above plans required to expand the cities and strengthen their bureaucratic organisations. From the beginning, *Najibullah's* government demonstrated interest in the growth of cities and industrialisation of the country and regarded it as the best manner of developing its political and strategic interests. It was obvious that throughout the years of war, the structure of economic, social, and traditional life of the Afghan society was affected and millions of immigrants, who were accustomed to the phenomenon of urban life, were unwilling to return to rural life. It should also be stated that resistance movements and *Mujahidin* were still connected to the

¹ For further information see: *Etefagh-e-Islam* newspaper, 6 October 1990/ 14, 7, 1369, p.2.

previous social and economic structure and supported local, traditional, and spiritual culture of the society and could not coordinate themselves with the new flow in the society and take the leadership of the new flow.

It is noteworthy that the government made some efforts to flourish private sector and accelerate the process of industrialization of the country based on the development of urban centres. Nonetheless, it was not appeared practical and efficacious realization of this strategic plan without growth and development of agriculture, reconstruction, and renewal of the previous economic and social structure. In fact, the plan of industrialization of underdeveloped society of Afghanistan before providing the necessary and actual conditions in addition to getting negative results would exacerbate the country's economic and social dependence. Although strengthening and expansion of urban areas in short-term was consequential for the Kabul government, in long-term could effectuate acute economic and social problems, such as increasing consumerism, creating false occupations and unemployment. The government from the early years attempted to dominate rural areas through the cities, conversely armed *Mujahidin* from rural sites and surrounding areas put pressure on cities to collapse government's resistance. It is noteworthy that the main issue was not just hostility between *Mujahidin* and the government; in fact, it was a conflict between two movements and two social and economic strategies.

As historical experiences have shown, a plan based on thoughtful actions and experience leads to success. In other words, the government's policies should have been proportional to the time in order to provide coordination between social, economic, and cultural realities of the Afghan society and regional and global situation. Although Kabul government regarded the realities of Afghan society to some extent and demonstrated interest in the growth of cities and industrialisation of the country, from various views the conditions for national reconciliation, regional and international coordination and cooperation, and the background for social and economic trends in Afghanistan were still unprepared.

4.6. Resistance to the Afghan Puppet Government and the Soviet Occupation

In the mid-1980s, United States and Great Britain and some other country supported the Afghan resistance movement and provoked national and international movement against Soviet troops. Americans knew that the war in Afghanistan became full-fledged battle of the *Cold War*; they, therefore, initiated sending military and financial assistance to

opponent forces through Pakistan's intelligent service. Furthermore, in consequence of activities of Afghan fighters militant supporters emerged in Islamic and Arabic countries with the intention of supporting doctrinal matters or even earning money. The most important among them was a young Saudi named *Osama bin Laden* and his Arab group called *al-Qaeda*. In fact, the war led to raising some important international political groups, which later played an important role to create the political events.

In the early years of the war, many military bases affiliated to *Mujahidin* were formed, which were connected to the main parties in Pakistan and received financial and strategic assistance from them (See Figure 4-5). In the helm of *Mujahidin*, spiritual leaders had a significant role and position. Regional, ethnic, and sectarian divisions of *Mujahidin* in Pashtun regions in the East, South, and South East with multiple and competing tribal structure and sub-sectors established basis of several military organisations and leadership system. Generally, movements and mobilizing of the forces of campaigns were implemented due to public and traditional desire to fight and loyalty to tribal armed forces. Considering this issue, it could be argued that the organisations could rapidly reach several thousand people in case of favourable conditions. For instance, in the battle of eastern provinces and the siege of *Khost* city in the 1980s these forces performed a significant function. The strength of the local forces led to a number of limited defeats for the Soviet forces and they surrounded them many times.

Equipping *Mujahidin* against the non-Pashtun areas created a very critical problem. Before the Soviet invasion, a few non-Pashtun areas had some firearms. Furthermore, after beginning the war, they had the readiest forces compared to military or police departments, who were weak or were sitting in ambush. International sales of weapons and foreign military support caused the local forces tended to achieve of the occupied territories. It is worth pointing out that *Mujahidin* likewise benefited from sabotage operations. In most cases of these operations, they pursued goals such as disturbing and explosion in electrical transmission lines and pipelines carrying the explosive materials, radio stations, government offices, airports, hotels, cinemas. They attempted to perform rocket and missile operations within and adjacent to villages in the field of Soviet artillery, which put the villagers in danger. They likewise widely put land mine in different areas and constantly recruited from the local inhabitants and children.

Mujahidin attacks on military and civilian focused on many targets such as destruction of bridges, undermining main roads, attacks on convoys crossing, disconnecting electrical transmission systems and industrial products, attacks on police and military headquarters of Afghanistan and the Soviet and air bases. They likewise attempted to assassinate government officials and *the PDPA* members and occupied remote and frontier posts. In March 1982, the Ministry of Education's bomb blast caused damage to several buildings; some days after this event, explosion of power transmission tower caused widespread power outages in Kabul. In June of this year, a group of the young members of the Communist Party, those who were dispatch to work in the *Panjshir* valley were attacked and suffered heavy casualties.

As it was mentioned earlier, the basis of withdrawal of Soviet forces apparently was the *Geneva Agreement*. Although these negotiations initiated during the rule of *Karmal*, *Najibullah* adapted his ideas with *Gorbachev's* and convinced him to sign the agreement. *Mujahidin* regarded withdrawal of Soviet forces as their desirable success. It should be noted, withdrawal of Soviet forces at that time was a substantial mistake as much as Soviet military invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. In fact, it was an unfair and irresponsible decision as they left Afghanistan without doing their practical agreements in order to restore peace and stability in the country. Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General declared that during the *Geneva Agreement* there was not assigned any task to decide on Afghanistan's future and the two superpowers did not support the negotiation board to have discussion about Afghanistan's future (Farhang 1995, 335).

The first step in withdrawing of Soviet troops was transfer of responsibility for fighting *Mujahidin* to Afghan military forces, with the aim of preparing them to continue to operate without Soviet support. In this period, the Soviet military activities confined to support the Afghan Armed Forces artillery, air supply, and technical assistance. Nonetheless, the Soviet military bands were still conducting some operations. Antonio Giustozzi is of the opinion that Soviet sources claim that Afghanistan's government did not definitely believe that the Red Army would leave the country and actions that were recommend to handle *Mujahidin* was not implemented until the last days. Party and government officials never wanted Soviet to leave. Even *Najibullah* did not believe the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in the beginning. First he endeavoured to postpone Soviets plan to initiate withdrawing their troops in April 1987, whereas in fact when the Soviet army initiated withdrawing, he sought to convince the Soviet government to send back to

Kandahar 3000 of 5000 of their force to protect the city from the siege. Two months later, he requested the intervention of the Soviet Air Force in *Jalalabad*, where took place a momentous battle (Giustozzi 2000, 187).

In addition to *Najibullah*, opponents of revisionism in the CPSU leadership, army and the Cuban and Angolan allies arose to oppose unconditionally withdrawing of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (Roger Keeran; Thomas Kenny 2004, 303). Mikhail Gorbachev's new idea in foreign and domestic policy was the most important factor in the Soviet decision to withdraw from Afghanistan. As mentioned before, Gorbachev endeavoured to change the recession and conducted two glasnost and perestroika programmes to make political-economic reforms. He likewise signed intermediate-range nuclear weapons reduction treaty to reduce *the Cold War* tensions and ordered withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, whose presence in Afghanistan had been increased international condemnation.

Soviet troops initiated to withdraw in May 1988, and 15 February 1989 the last Soviet troops behind their commander Boris Gromov, by crossing over the *Oxus* had left Afghan soil. Gromov regarded the Soviet war in Afghanistan without victory and defeat and believed that there was no basis for the verification of defeat and the pretence of winning the war in Afghanistan was baseless (Gromov 1996, 222). Despite his doubts about existing the basis for verification of defeat and victory in the war, the Soviet defeat in the war and the basis of their defeat are obvious. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that withdrawing of the Soviet force from Afghanistan was not a military defeat with classical failure criteria. In fact, Soviet war in Afghanistan was not against a regular army, therefore, victory and defeat in it could be calculated with classical criteria. Soviet war in Afghanistan was to impose an ideological political system of *the PDPA*. In fact, they rush to save the sovereignty of *the PDPA* in Afghanistan. Victory and defeat of the Soviet in Afghanistan should be evaluated based on the motives and goals of their invasion, which at the time of their withdrawal were not achieved.

Simultaneous with withdrawal of Soviet troops, a group of *Mujahidin* stationed in Peshawar conducted a plan for attacking to Jalalabad in February 1989. Pakistan's military intelligence (ISI) intelligence agency, in consultation and cooperation with Intelligence agency United States of America (CIA) played a major role in organizing and stimulating of *Mujahidin* (See Figure 4-5). They organized many meetings with *Mujahidin* to

implement the programme (Coll 2004, 190). Due to the fact that this attack against the government implemented just by one ethnic group in Afghanistan, it was doomed to failure from the beginning. In fact, the country consisted of several ethnic groups with diverse political interests, therefore, if one of them wanted to take control of all the affairs of the country, it would face strict opposition from other ethnic groups and bothered it to govern effectively. When *Mujahidin* in Peshawar conducted a plan for attacking to Jalalabad, *Ahmad Shah Massoud* Commander of board of supervisors had military power and influence among some part of Afghans. Furthermore, Islamic Unity Party was formed in *Bamyan* and the people of central areas supported its power and influence. Accordingly, the rule of Peshawar headed by *Ahmad Shah Ahmadzai*, failed to topple the Kabul government. Although the victory in the Jalalabad war called an independent defence in the absence of the Soviet forces, *Najibullah's* regime with a huge financial and military aid from the Soviet Union was able to achieve this victory.

After *Mujahidin's* failure to topple the Kabul government, in March 1990 occurred a *Khalqis* coup, headed by Defence Minister *Shahnawaz Tanai*. As was mentioned previously, one of the motivations for choosing *Najibullah* for the leadership of the party and the government with the approval and support of Soviet was gaining satisfaction and creating balance and trust between the *Parcham* and *Khalq* factions, which was not successful. The coup plotters believed that *Najibullah's* regime relied on foreigners, which could not be accepted by *the PDPA*, army and Afghanistan's people. They objected to the military restructuring of the army, developing it to ethnic, militia, and personal bodyguard structures and giving all material and spiritual privileges to the army structure (Tanin 2005, 342).

Mohammad Hassan Sharq, believed that after withdrawing *Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoy* from the political scene, the *Khalqis* under the leadership of *Shahnawaz Tanai* endeavoured to force *Najibullah* and a few of his close associates to resign in order to have favourable grounds for negotiations with *Mujahidin*. However, if they were successful, they could attract the majority of the *Parchamis*, who have similar ideas (Sharq 1994, 300). After the collapse of his government, some authors - including some of the supporters of *Najibullah* - argued the Soviet intervention in the *Tanai* coup. *Najibullah* and coup opponents within the party and government continuously exchanged their ideas with the *KGB* regarding ways to handle the coup (Gharif 1998, 179). *Tanai* ordered army and air force to attack major centres, including the Presidential and *Darul Aman* palaces. It is

noteworthy that it was the first time that the heavy weapons and bombers were utilized to pummel targets in Kabul. In addition, the resistance of *Najibullah's* loyal forces, particularly the Presidential Guard defeated the plan of *Shahnawaz Tanai* coup.

Failure of the coup weakened the position of the *Khalq* faction in the army and increased power and authority of the *Parchamis* in the party, army, and government. In addition, the remarkable issue was that these officers were mostly supporters of *Karmal* and their increasing power after the failure of the coup led to overthrow *Najibullah's* government. They expelled him from his seat of government, the party leadership, and the General Command of the armed forces, as well as, he was forced to depart to the United Nations as refugees, fugitive and failed leader.

After the failure of the *Tanai* coup, the *Parcham* faction was divided into many categories and was involved in internal disagreements. In addition to *Karmal's* supporters, many the *Parchamis* in the party and government expressed strong opposition to *Najibullah's* government. Alexander Lyakhovsky believed that the main cause of internal conflict was hegemony of the Pashtun. As was mentioned earlier, during the rule of *Taraki* and especially *Amin* the *Khalq* faction conducted the Pashtunization policy adopted by the government. During *Najibullah's* government, the tendency toward the Pashtunization policy was engulfed the government, army, and the *Parcham* faction. For instance, the overwhelming majority of master and associate members of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee, administrators and the Council of Ministers, senior officers and generals were Pashtun. This policy provoked aggression and reactivity of representatives of tribal communities, who the majority of them constituted the lower and middle ranks of the armed forces. The battle over the leadership of the party along with ethnic and factional fighting has intensified, which led the government to a complete collapse (Lyakhovsky 1995, 51). In fact, dissenting factions within *the PDPA* especially in the *Parcham* faction increasingly surrounded *Najibullah*, moreover, his government was always in challenge as a result of the conspiracy and sabotage. It is remarkable that *Najibullah* was unable to rule regardless of the factional orientation and ethnic and linguistic tendencies.

It could be argued that after withdrawing *Karmal* from leadership of the party and government, and also handling his supporters within the *Parcham* faction, *Najibullah's* policy and function were not very balanced and consistent. Sometimes he imprisoned

them, and sometimes gave them the Ministry and the presidency. In the shadow of such policy, he concurred in *Karmal's* return from Moscow to Kabul, which led to the escalation of hostilities within the *Parcham* faction and weakening of his position in the party leadership and government. *Karmal's* supporters that hated *Najibullah* and a number of them were held in contempt and jail by the government, considered *Karmal's* presence in Kabul as an opportunity to handle *Najibullah*. Thus, once again within the *Parcham* faction there was confusion and the government encountered with crisis in dealing with *Karmal* and his adherents.

Najibullah was determined to continue his leadership in the party and government. He consolidated foundations of his authority by dismissing and rejecting of his opponents in the military and security forces, and appointing some trusted person in the structure of government. Nevertheless, the failed coup of August 1991 in the Soviet Union and its consequences made non-functional all of these efforts. It is noteworthy to mention that failure of the Soviet extremists' coup also deprived *Karmal* of returning to the seat in the party leadership and governance. Overall, the failed coup of August 1991 for *Karmal* and *Najibullah* had the same and similar results. The Soviet Union and the Russian Federation on separate boards made several direct negotiations with *Mujahidin*, which severely weakened *Najibullah's* position and his government. Tension and division between representatives of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation were evident in the negotiation process. The Soviet government delegation has little influence in the negotiation process. Finally, their negotiations led to the adoption of a joint declaration in which was approved the transfer of power to the transitional Islamic Government. Furthermore, for new Russian rulers led by *Boris Yeltsin* was very important to release from responsibility of supporting *Najibullah's* government in Kabul.

Najibullah was very concerned regarding declaration of ceasing the Soviet civilian and military aid, and even he was of the opinion that the collapse of the Soviet Union was equal to the collapse of *the PDPA*. Furthermore, factions and different sects of *the PDPA* had no desire to achieve the power and preserve the achievements of the *Saur* revolution since the party's ideology and values that motivated them to attend and compete in the field of social and political struggles were faded. Accordingly, for leaders of party factions was very obvious that the Soviet collapse would lead to *the PDPA* collapse.

As was mentioned earlier, there is not a shadow of doubt that division and discord within the ruling *PDPA* were one of the main factors of its collapse. Additionally, this disunity was rooted in different factors and elements within the factions of *the PDPA*. *Najibullah's* failed leadership was one of the main factors of escalation of conflict and hostility within the party. Furthermore, regardless of the reasons that provided causes of the failure of his leadership, he was incapable of providing the integration in *the PDPA*. In addition to the *Khalqis'* hostility and conflict with him, he never could obtain the *Parchamis'* trust and lost both factions of the party, and was involved in deep and widespread opposition within the party. It is worth pointing out that even National Guard, whose members mostly were from the government intelligence service, was not loyal to him.

While the division and hostility within *the PDPA* and pressure from external enemies made extremely shaky and vulnerable the basic rule of *the PDPA*, being deprived of aid of the Soviet Union led to the collapse of its shaky foundations. In fact, *the PDPA* regime's survival was dependent on the continuation of Soviet aid in all aspects of life of the regime. The party's survival in the seat of power after the collapse of Soviet Union and without the previous the Soviet military and economic aid was completely impossible. Signs of the collapse of *the PDPA's* rule after the failed coup of August 1991 in Moscow were revealed. Besides, before the coup of August 1991 Soviet forces left Afghanistan and ceased their generosity to *the PDPA*. After the coup and especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, *Boris Yeltsin* ceased completely the Soviet aids, which led *the PDPA* to collapse. In April 1992, the *Mujahidin* forces entered in capital and establishing an Islamic Council took control the situations in the country.

4.7. Analytic Summary

The PDPA's reform programme led to the failure due to various reasons, which are as follows:

- I. Intellectuals, highly educated people, and senior officers of the army founded *the PDPA*, whose policy was based on Stalinism. The *Saur* coup, which led to taking the control of the country by the party, was a Soviet plot. The Soviet Union was very content of running a communist party in Afghanistan; moreover, it sent plenty of aids, whereas in fact the military corps and state bureaucracy were benefited from the Soviet aids. The urban Society unlike the rural and tribal population supported the government. The internal rivalries and

conflicts in the Party, which caused the split in the party, and ethnic and religious contention in the Afghan society were very problematic issues for the government to rule efficiently over the people and directed the society towards a communist society.

- II. *The PDPA's* reform attempts composed of a package of democratic reforms that emphasized on continuing the cooperation with the Soviet Union. In fact, *the PDPA* in cooperation with the Soviet Union conducted a series of radical reforms in order to help lower classes of society and move the country toward socialism. However, the reforms were against Afghan culture and many fundamental Islamic traditions. In fact, *the PDPA's* government was a non-Islamic system with non-Islamic reform programme, which could not be implemented in an Islamic and traditional society like Afghanistan. They interfered in local affairs of the people and endeavoured to modify or change them, which in a tribal society needs a long-term and fundamental planning. Furthermore, *the PDPA* as a Soviet puppet government brought the Soviet domination in the country (See Figure 5-2) and its reforms threatened interests of feudal lords and religious leaders. Disunity within *the PDPA*, ungodly and bureaucratic structure of the reforms, along with an imperialist subversion undermined the foundations of *the PDPA*. It demonstrates obviously that Stalinism policy was not able to unify all the strata of the society to handle entrenched reactionary matters. Furthermore, lack of an organized and powerful army weakened them in handling those whose interests were threatened by *the PDPA's* reforms. Increasing civil war and having just one popular basis concentrated in Kabul deprived the government of having an independent organisation of the ordinary people.
- III. *The PDPA's* policies not only made no specific development in the Afghan society, but also it even destroyed the government organizations founded by former states. *The PDPA* utilized coercive manners to implement its policies and did not consider approval or disapproval of the people. *The PDPA's* government, like former Afghan governments, was not a popular and legitimate government and had no support from the local solidarity groups. Arresting, torturing and executing, which forced the people to leave the country, launching aggressive and repressive policies, and making decisions by a communist revolutionary programme regardless of the public sentiment

resulted in many popular uprising led by local leaders. Widespread resistance to the government plans in many provinces ceased implementing the government's policies. Notwithstanding the modest modern programmes that were fundamentally urban, disintegration of the society and economy was more obvious and critical. This disintegration was in consequence of implementing Stalinist programme and convinced by the reasoning that the theory of independent bourgeois democratic development is not functional. In fact, in order to develop the society and improve people's lives is necessary a significant increase in the productive forces, which did not happen during ruling *the PDPA*.

- IV. *The PDPA's* government was incapable of containing the popular uprisings, which provide an opportunity to the Soviet to invade Afghanistan to preserve a friendly regime and frustrate imperialism's plot. In fact, when the Afghan government's interests were at stake, the government encouraged the Soviet to attack on Afghanistan in order to preserve its interests. Besides, the Soviet policy was based on intervention on the progressive matter of the Afghan civil war and there was no motivation and benefit for them to support and develop *the PDPA* reforms. Their invasion caused further controversy in the Afghan society; in fact, the Soviet in order to make further disagreement and disunity in the Afghan society imposed some social and military policies, which provoked the xenophobic sentiments of tribes and ethnic groups. Launching some economic policies by the Soviet resulted in deteriorating the life of poor people. These measures resulted in the public backlash, which confronted with arresting, torturing, hanging of dissidents, and bombarding.

Subsequent chapter provides comparison of two epochs, analysis of facts in order to obtain findings of the study.

5. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS




Figure 5-1: Structure of Chapter Five

5.1. Introduction

Having presented and discussed two cases of reform and resistance to the government in Afghanistan's modern history in Chapters three and four, this Chapter intends to provide a comparative analysis of the mentioned cases, and also scrutinizes the foundations of reforms and causes of resistance to the government.

The analysis is conducted according two stages. First, *the PDPA's* and King *Amanullah's* regimes are compared according to the governments' structure, their reform projects, and roots of reaction to them. The model of the analysis is *Macro-Level*, which pursues comparative historical methodology and is destined to offer general classifications and characteristics that are typical of Afghan Society. The second stage of analysis is destined to set more meticulous comprehending of each regime's function in conducting the reform programme, and also scrutinize causes and sorts of resistance that occurred during each regime. It is worth pointing out that a significant advantage of *Macro-Level* is assessment of the government function in handling internal and external resistance to the reforms and each government's policies in this regard.

This comparative analysis is destined to determine the main differences between a monarchical and a democratic system in implementing the reforms, and also inspect the external elements in the failure of the regimes' reform projects. It is worth pointing out that the analysis is arranged to provide a wider perspective regarding the Afghan society, to demonstrate government's function in increasing unity and consolidating its power to handle popular backlash against its policies. Finally, this chapter provides the meticulous result based on the analysis.

5.2. Comparative Analysis of Cases

The cases discussed in second and third Chapters embraced two decades of Afghanistan modern history, during which the country saw a decade of Monarchy system of King *Amanullah* and another decade of the communist regime of *the PDPA* under the Soviet hegemony.

These two regimes demonstrate a complete dissimilar basis for comparison that requires more meticulous scrutinising. Although each of them spans different political background, they had some substantial parallels. In both epochs, the authorities enforced their reform projects. Their ideological adherents were limited to the urban community, who were in

the minority and whose ideas were not compatible with the feelings and beliefs of the majority of the people.

Both regimes implemented the reform programme by the top-down method, regardless of making adequate arrangements and conditions, and with no attention to comprehension and approval of those who could be affected by their reform policies. They had no regulated and institutional ties with the ordinary people in the rural and peripheral area and also were incapable of establishing a permanent agreement with the Afghan local solidarity groups.

It goes without saying that both of the reform projects proposed to decrease the power of people in the rural and peripheral area. Consequently, aside from the military forces, both of regimes were supposed to establish their control of the local and tribal area in order to settle the disagreements and increase unity by making mutual concessions. Furthermore, in both cases, the primary causes of the public resistances to the governments was their intervention in the private and local affairs of the people, moreover, the ideological motivations could be regarded as the secondary reasons.

It is particularly significant that although *the PDPA* regime regarded King *Amanullah* as a pioneer, innovative, and modernist King, it did not consider his failure as a political experience in order to implement successfully their policies. As was mentioned earlier *the PDPA* regime's main characteristic was its brutal crimes and inhuman policies, which distinguished it from *Amanullah's* government.

It is particularly remarkable that getting huge amount of financial aids and also political support from the Soviet Union, which assisted *the PDPA* to be on the political scene following the Soviet collapse, could be regarded as another sign of differences between *the PDPA's* and *Amanullah's* regimes. An overall analysis of both cases illustrates some substantial points regarding two regimes (See Table 5-1).

	Form of regime	Nature of Regime	Religion	Regime Transition	Foreign factor	Dependency	Public trust in the government	Status of reforms	Basis of Resistance
Amanullah's regime	<i>indigenous</i>	<i>monarchy</i>	<i>Islam</i>	<i>Struggling</i>	<i>Great Britain</i>	<i>Independent</i>	<i>Semi-popular</i>	<i>Failed</i>	<i>Tribal</i>
PDPA's regime	<i>Foreign</i>	<i>Democracy</i>	<i>Secular</i>	<i>Coup</i>	<i>The Soviet Union</i>	<i>Dependent</i>	<i>unpopular</i>	<i>Failed</i>	<i>Ethnic</i>

Table 5-1: Comparative Analysis of two cases

As was mentioned previously the outstanding point regarding comparison of the two regimes is that the policy of both of them was very influenced by foreign policy. It is quite clear that *the Great Game* during the *Amani* era and *the Cold War* during *the PDPA* fulfilled functional role in the Afghan government policy and in conducting its reform projects. As the table number 1 shows the king's regime was a monarchy system while *the PDPA* authorities claimed that their rule was on the foundation of democracy, which deserves deliberation and discussion. It goes without saying that the king's policies were based on Islamic Issues, nonetheless *the PDPA* regime was secular and endeavoured to replace religious and traditional laws with secular and *Marxist-Leninist* ideas (Tabarani 2011, 88).

In both cases, the processes of coming to power were associated with struggle and challenge caused by internal and external factors, and it severely affected the process of the state-making. During the rule of King *Amanullah*, the internal factors were tribal, religious, and intellectual elites while for *the PDPA's* era, in addition to these factors, communists and *Mujahidin* could be regarded as the further obstacle factors. It could be argued that regarding handling the external factors King's policies comparing *the PDPA's* ones were independent. In fact, the king always endeavoured to decrease the British involvement and domination, nonetheless *the PDPA* regime was, in fact, a Soviet puppet.

It is worth pointing out that the adopted policies by both regimes were regardless of public desires, which could be regarded as one of the chief causes of the failure of their policies

and collapse of their governments. Furthermore, *Amanullah's* regime was an indigenous regime while *the PDPA* had foreign roots and the majority of its authority members had been trained in the Soviet Union. It is noteworthy that both regimes took advantage of Islam to obtain legitimacy and also implement their policies in the country. It is quite clear that *Amanullah's* Pan-Islamist movement was to unify Muslims against colonial powers and achieve full political independence for Afghanistan. Additionally, he wanted to use pan-Islamism in order to modernize Afghanistan and implement his reforms.

In addition, the regimes endeavoured to win people's trust; nonetheless, they were unsuccessful in this matter. Even though for the Afghan authority was essential to receive the support of the tribal, religious and intellectual elites, they aggressively and oppressively forced the people to follow their policies. It could be argued that the governments in order to fulfil their own goals changed Afghan traditional structure and thus made deep gaps in the society. It is quite clear that those who were in ruling system substantially benefited from their position while the other people did not have even right to express their opinion.

In summary, this introductory analysis of the two cases demonstrates subtle distinctions between the two cases in implementing their policies and governments' function in handling religious forces. (See Table 5-1) Repeating *Amanullah's* political blunder by *the PDPA* and disregarding of experience of 50 years earlier is recognizable. Furthermore, Islam was a permanent motive of political movements, opposition to the external intervention, and reaction against antireligious policies that were imposed by the king's and *the PDPA's* regimes.

5.3. Analysing Government Functions

The monarchical of King *Amanullah* and the democratic regime of *the PDPA* had different function in conducting reform programmes and handling solidarity groups and irregular forces that steadfastly resisted the governments' modernizing policies. It is quite clear that King *Amanullah* was based on the *Rationalism* and *Westernization*, however, *the PDPA* was a *Marxist* state. Although *the PDPA* ideologically was democratic and nationalist in the beginning, in 1978 it got *Marxist-Leninist* orientation.

5.3.1. Monarchical regime

The characteristics of the international situation of Afghanistan after the First *World War* forced King *Amanullah* to provide a specific consideration to the foreign policy. Accordingly, he attained full independence in the country as a first substantial step. It is worth pointing out that releasing Afghanistan from the British hegemony appeared to be very critical due to changing international situation, which was in consequence of social and political instability in all British India and also Great Britain. However, in order to implement this issue a series of policies such as sending political envoys to other nation and establishment political and trade relations with other countries. It is quite clear that public support encouraged him to take decisive action and gave him confidence to declare war to gain Afghanistan's independence. Thus, he equipped the army and sent military troops to East and South side (Ghobar 1981, 753). The remarkable point in this regard is that he requested Ulema to assist him in the war; simultaneously he armed ethnic and national forces. Indeed, he comprehended that without getting support from religious forces and local solidarity groups withdrawing foreign forces would be very impossible.

King *Amanullah*, at the beginning of his rule, conducted a pan-Islamic military policy. Soon after his accession, an attempt was made to improve relations between Afghanistan and its neighbour Bukhara. In this regard, Afghanistan suggested Bukhara that alliance of the Muslim community was essential for the people of Bukhara, Afghanistan, and for the rest of the Muslim world. In order to encourage Bukhara, Afghanistan emphasized that in its contract with Russia would be provided to recognize the independence of Bukhara. Thus, King tried to prepare a coalition with the neighbouring countries to handle the British colonialism.

It is worth pointing out that Egyptians regarded *Amanullah* as a democratic and nationalist King. They believed that his policies would be the best solution to obtain freedom and stand against British colonialism for them and the Eastern people. It is quite clear that Egyptians admiring the king wanted him to express his abhorrence for the Egyptian King and British colonialism.¹

It is particularly significant that along with the raising the independence campaign, King *Amanullah* formed his positions as an anti-imperialist figure in the Muslim world and at

¹ For further information see: Fazl Ghani Mojaddedi, *Afghanistan during the Kingdom of Amanullah Khan*, p.330.

the beginning of his rule he followed the militant pan-Islamic policies. Furthermore, he supported the caliphate against threat from the British and the Bolsheviks, and he assisted Amir of Bokhara and Turkestan *Basmachis* in handling the Bolsheviks.

The Bolsheviks seized Bukhara and *Khiva* in September 1920; however, King *Amanullah* did not allow them to establish the centre of their campaign against the British in Kabul. Notwithstanding the first Afghan-Soviet friendship treaty signed on November 28, 1921, following concluding the treaty, the Bolsheviks did not implement the obligations, and in this regard, the king believed that they certainly were not trustworthy (Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan 2005, 32). Indeed, *Amanullah* comprehended that neither the Bolsheviks nor the British had good intention to Afghanistan; however, he was forced to deal with the Bolsheviks in order to attain their support to affirm Afghanistan's international situation. It goes without saying that the king's efforts to make an alliance with the Bolsheviks in order to put pressure on Britain increased the British hostility to him. Nonetheless, the essential reason for Britain's detestation of the king was the third *Anglo-Afghan* war, which effectuated the independence of Afghanistan. Further, the king believed that Afghanistan as a free country had the right to have a close relationship with neighbouring countries. Accordingly, he encouraged Indian Muslims to refuse to Britain rule that led to Britain's grave dissatisfaction with him. In fact, such policies resulted the Britain commenced taking decisive steps to eliminate the Afghan king from the political scene.

It is likely that *Amanullah's* Pan-Islamist movement was in order to unify the Muslim world against colonial rule and gain full political independence for Afghanistan. Furthermore, he sought to take advantage of pan-Islamism in order to modernize Afghanistan and execute his reforms. In fact, the roots of his Pan-Islamism policy were essentially connected to *Mahmud Tarzi's* thoughts that encouraged Muslims to be united to withdraw the British colonization from Muslim territories.

It could be argued that independence and the rule of law in the country were of the highest importance and priority among the goals of the constitution movement, based on which the constitutionalists had to remove internal barriers to achievement these goals (Ghobar 1981, 726).

It goes without saying that King *Amanullah* comprehended a grave menace to the Caliphate and the Islamic world from the western world, thus he made some efforts to unite all Muslims especially in Afghanistan. He opposed racial and ethnic prejudice and

believed that all people had the same right and nobody had superiority over another one (Pamir 2002, 107).

At the end of the third decade of the twentieth century, Afghanistan was one of the most backward countries in the Middle East. Although *Abdul Rahman Khan* could establish the substructure of the modern state of Afghanistan within its boundaries, he made it by the feudal and autocratic methods, which often disregarded tribal-cultural principles and the most common human values. His successor, *Habibullah*, was interested in public affairs and in a series of political and educational innovation, especially regarding the development of the modern educational institutions, made some efforts. However, at the end of his reign the development process was halted in Afghanistan. It is likely that the main elements that the government was supposed to handle them were included the remnants of feudalism, the commanders, nobles and property owners, the religious scholars and foreign policy makers that were leading from London. Nonetheless, in 1919, *Amanullah* and Afghan constitutionalists were compelled to modify and change everything immediately, and modification of all social mechanisms and the governance structure required a large arrangement.

It is worth pointing out that the political system in Afghanistan since the configuration of an independent state in 1747 had been based on monarchy. The main factors that had led the country to disorder and instability were monopoly power and inter-tribal rivalry between Pashtuns. Furthermore, discrimination and injustice hindered the Afghan society from getting any kind of freedom. The existence of the colonial phenomenon in Afghanistan impeded setting relations with any other country, except Britain. It could be argued that the old colonial political dominance in Afghanistan, internal despotism of rulers, lack of communication with the outside world, and finally political, cultural, and intellectual isolation of Afghan community resulted in backwardness of different parts of the country and led to undesirable consequences. King *Amanullah*, in order to develop and modernize Afghanistan, changed the political and social structure. There is not a shadow of doubt that the political reforms of the king could be regarded as the most critical step in changing the governance structure with the purpose of releasing the country from its dramatic situation. Indeed, Afghanistan's political and social structure due to having tribal and ethnic character was very complicated, and the King comprehended in the process of modification the local solidarity groups could fulfil a consequential function in this regard.

King *Amanullah* followed the principle of constitutionalism that assisted him to reach the position of authority and foundation a new political system was the king's primary goal. Afghan young movement's objectives besides gaining full political independence, was reform in administration and the formation of a constitutional government, based on which the king was not absolute and people had role in policy-making for the country. It is sometimes suggested that the constitutionalists substantially established the background of free criticism and judgment against the government at least in the first stage of the reform programme.

Amanullah comprehending the significance of the national unity considered a special proposal to realize it in the first stage of his reform programme. Establishing an independent state and avoiding from tribalism and issues related to the legitimacy were under the king's careful consideration. It is worth pointing out that King *Amanullah* was beholden to his liberation comrades for accompaniment of national unity; moreover, the attainment of political independence demonstrated a preferable tendency toward the objects of intellectuals and reformists.

Before the reign of *Amanullah*, the absolute sovereignty of Kings had resulted in establishing the totalitarian regimes and arising autocratic rulers that disregarded the subjection to any law and regulation. During the *Amani* era the reformers attempted to establish the rule of law, thus the ordinary citizens and governors were under the rule of law and based on the national passion the principles of freedom, democracy, and equality of citizens were stabilized. With the purpose of realizing such objects, intellectuals and reformers endeavoured to prepare Afghanistan's first constitution. It could be argued that in planning such policy the tribal and ethnic background of the Afghan society was completely disregarded, due to which in the process of implementing the Afghan new constitution the society did not have adequate background to comprehend it.

In 1922, it was formed a *Loya Jirga* in Jalalabad, headed by King *Amanullah*, in order to ratify the primary constitution. Furthermore, in 1923, Afghanistan's first constitution was ratified in 73 articles, it was titled "Afghan state constitution", and later in *Paghman Loya Jirga* it was approved (See Appendix A). It is particularly significant that in the new constitution for the first time, state power were defined based on separation of legislative,

executive and judiciary powers (Habibi 1984, 222).¹ It goes without saying that approval of the constitution was the initial stage in the termination of the rule of personal interests in the society.

It is quite clear that when King *Amanullah* regarded western models of considering honesty and integrity in performing duties, opposition to his theory was emerged in consequence of incompatibility of such theory with individual interests. Elimination of the bias and anti-bias system and the phenomenon of favouritism were under his special consideration. In this regard, he interrupted pension of some member of *Mohammadzai* and other influential Ulema. Furthermore, he imprisoned one of his relatives with the purpose of demonstrating the people that all were equal before the law and nobody was superior to another, and any action against the law would be punished according to law. It is worth pointing out that local solidarity groups not only did not support the king, but also he was criticized by virtue of deviating from ethnic and tribal obligations. It could be argued that launching these policies by King *Amanullah* severely threatened the position and interest of the influential persons in tribal communities, which provided the background of their reaction.

The king, collaborating with the young reformist Afghans and some Turkish and Indian experts, conducted some policies to regulate and adjust the state in order to release from the old tribal and ethnic system (See Figure 3-3) and establish a modern administrative state. Accordingly, he established the state structure based on the three branches, including legislative, judicial, and executive. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the modern administrative from the beginning was doomed to failure in consequence of disregarding the principles of the local and solidarity groups. For instance, the judiciary system of the King was based on a modern system, which was in striking contrast with the local judiciary system. In this regard, Tapper believed that the King wanted to establish a new state with no consideration to tribal and local rule (Tapper 1983, 37).

It is worth pointing out that this combination had its own characteristics. Indeed, with the exception of the judiciary sector there was no considerable difference in comparison with the substructures of the previous systems. Thus, in the legislative sector, “*Dar al Shora*”, by adjusting changed into “*Shora e Khas*” (the special council) and later called “*Shora e Dowlat*” (the council). The council was comprised of members appointed by the king and

¹ For further information see: Sarvar, Danesh, *An introduction to adoption of the new constitution of Afghanistan*, p. 54-58.

elected members. It had responsibility for examining the legal projects and sending them to the king through the council of ministers for validation and confirmation (Ghobar 1981, 1248-49). Indeed, the King established a new administration in which the function of the King was as the previous administration systems, but the previous influence of the religious and tribal leaders was eliminated.

Before this era, the judiciary was apparently autonomous, but practically it could be regarded as parts of the servant of King, moreover, the judges were under subjugation of King. In the new constitutional law, judicial independence was still held in esteem, but nevertheless the wide discretion of the judges was limited. King *Amanullah* compiled two volume books, which called “*Tamasok al Ghozat Amanieh*” and codified criminal codes.¹ Such influence of Amanullah in the Judiciary system especially after 1923 demonstrates that a totalitarian authority was ruling in Afghanistan. He claimed to respect principles of freedom, however, practically he disregarded the tribal and religious principles in ratifying the new justice rules.

It is worth pointing out that the reforms in the field of educational and cultural system of the country could be regarded as the most outstanding part of *Amanullah*'s reforms. Opening schools and the training of technical people were very significant steps to extend the public education system and thus he endeavoured to establish the foundation of a modern and civil society. It is particularly significant that the educational reforms were conducted with the intention of development of young intellectuals in the country, training the technical staff in different fields of science and technology, and finally training efficient and skilled labour (Fayyaz 2010, 101).

One of the obvious characteristics of this era was spreading the idea of freedom, liberalism, and modernity. Due to attract foreign experts and scholars in Afghanistan and creating cultural connection with the other countries the government made the people familiar with the lifestyle in the developing countries. Furthermore, owing to the king's support and consideration to writers and reformists, who made several efforts for the development and progress of the country, the previous oppressive political and social atmosphere was removed, and the reformists prepared the conditions for establishing an open and obvious society.

¹ For further information see: Mir Gholam Mohammad Ghobar, *Afghanistan dar masire tarikhi*, [Afghanistan in the Course of History], vol. 1, pp.1248-1249.

Language titivation, diversity in literary genres and the press comparing previous epochs were widespread, which increased the impact of the press on human growth. Furthermore, personal publication resulted in increasing the number of journalists in Kabul, and the press provided further information to the people on the different field (Naderi 2007). In fact, in this period publishing the press was based on social, economic, and political requirements. The king was decisive to modernize Afghanistan in all fields, which required the responsible press for elucidating for the people the necessity of launching such policies (Naderi 2007).

As it was mentioned earlier, King *Amanullah* with the purpose of adjusting Afghanistan's domestic policies conceived the national unity and endeavoured to assist the Afghan society to release from fundamentalism. In this regard, his government granted religious and intellectual freedom to all Afghan people regardless ethnic and racial variety. Furthermore, he drew his attention to social equality and emphasized on the equal right for all citizens. In the new constitution, it was stated in eight articles that all Afghans without religious supremacy were regarded Afghan citizens with equal rights. It was mentioned in the ninth article that the Afghan people are allowed to commit their religious affairs and had their personal rights and freedoms.¹ (See Appendix A) Afterwards, *Shiite* religious ceremonies and their religious places were allowed and *Hazara* slaves were released from slavery (Ghobar 1981, 1274).

The king without indicating to any sect of Islam declared Islam as the official religion of Afghanistan. Nonetheless, in the second *Loya Jirga*, the king was forced to recognize the *Hanafi* sect in the new constitution as a result of the pressure from some *Sunnite* scholars. Notwithstanding the king revealed intention to recognize *Shia*, in consequence of extreme *Sunnite* scholars' opposition he was discouraged to recognize it (Davoudi, *Zamine va pishinehe eslah talabi dar Afghanistan*, [Background and History of the Reform Movement of Afghanistan] 2000, 181-182).

It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the first stage of the reforms was prosperous and all reformists were concurred with the manner of implementing the reforms. It is worth pointing out that modification of the tax system and subsequently releasing the majority of the people such as farmers, livestock and artisan from paying heavy taxes, was the most critical reform for the reformists. This reform enraged the khans and landowners because

¹ For further information see: Mir Gholam Mohammad Ghobar, *Afghanistan dar masire tarikh*, [Afghanistan in the Course of History], vol. 1, p. 1274.

monetary tax was imposed on lands and all people could directly pay the tax. Accordingly, the people were linked to financial offices of the government without interference of Khans. It could be argued that this matter forced the Khans and chieftains to oppose land reform programme that threatened their influential positions among people.

It is worth pointing out that many factors, such as increasing tax, changing in penal codes and family law motivated the Khost people. Subsequent to third Afghan war, Britain cut the financial aid to Afghanistan. Furthermore, in consequence of the mentioned war the government had to deal with very high costs. Accordingly, the government increased taxes as well as in the new constitution changed the tax law. Thus, the government imposed taxes on the landowners.

It is noteworthy that the new system of collecting tax created a further opportunity for corruption among the government officials despite being modelled on the western taxation system and being annihilated any possibility for corruption. According to Ghobar, the king organized an inspection team to examine the new system of collecting, as well as the mentioned team was successful in handling tax-collecting process (Ghobar 1981, 691).

It is particularly significant that ordinary people regarded *Amanullah's* social reforms as a direct intervention in the most private aspects of their life such as marriage, funeral, and prohibiting wearing some costumes. Besides, people were very resentful of the reform programs as a result of the government policy on compulsory military service and its policy regarding identity card. Indeed, the military authority of the Afghan tribes was weakened by the policy of obligatory military service, as well as the policy of issuing identity card for all Afghans controlled child marriage and polygamy. In consequence of the mentioned policies, many people expressed their dissatisfaction and reacted to the reform program.

Conspiracy and adverse publicity against the government during the king's trip to Europe was one of the critical issues that his government was supposed to handle it. It goes without saying that British elements played a significant function in running the propaganda and provoking the people against the government. As it was mentioned previously, the British lost their influence in Afghanistan after third Afghan war. They, therefore, always endeavoured to find an opportunity to weaken the foundations of the government, which had a very destructive consequence in the government's reform programme. There is a school of thoughts that beyond all acts the British secret police

organization Britain focused on weakening *Amanullah's* position in Afghanistan. Despite all of these obstacles and complications made by internal and external factors, the king with the new ideas, taken in the meeting with *Kemal Pasha* in Ankara, initiated a new stage of reform programs (Nehru 2007, 1665-66).

The king's reforms before his trip were relatively basic and fundamental and they were successful and pretty well received by the people. All the reforms of the first and second stages such as approving a new constitution, organizing the education system, changing the structure of the government were implemented in cooperation with intellectual and knowledgeable people. In addition, the last stage of the reforms was imitation of western culture and it was completely perfunctory, as well as some reformers opposed some of them. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the king's haste in the implementation of the reforms led to performing cursory actions in the country, which soon became susceptible to a negative consequence.¹

It is remarkable that approving of some new legislation in *Loya Jirga* that happened in *Paghman* in 1928, irritated Mullahs and provoked their discontent and changed them to be upset and confused (Ghobar 1981, 1276). Likewise, intellectuals were angry with King *Amanullah* by virtue of his stubborn refusal in handling some matters such as having Chancellery Ministers and missing responsibility for government ministers in the national assembly.

It could be argued that King *Amanullah* accurately recognized the problem and suggested the accurate solution, which was improving the educational system and preparing the qualified forces as the political, economic, and cultural substructures of the country. Accordingly, he founded and developed the new style schools and conducted some educational planning with the purpose of training the skilled forces. Nonetheless, in the manner of conducting of these policies he was not proficient to find a suitable model for Afghan society, moreover, he was not able to make plans for conducting such model. He strongly believed that all the western developed countries at that time might be a proper model for progress in the country.

It is worth mentioning that *Amanullah's* critical position against a number of influential people in the Afghan society like Mullahs and tribal leaders could be regarded as the most

¹ For further information see: Mir Gholam Mohammad Ghobar, *Afghanistan dar masire tarikh*, [Afghanistan in the Course of History], vol. 1, p.1276.

noteworthy indication that demonstrated his failure to deal with the local solidarity groups, especially after European trip. The British colonialism with the purpose of profiting from such elements directed the general tendency towards Mullahs and Molavis in the closed and tribal society of Afghanistan. As a case in point, they excommunicated the believers of the other religions, which were apparently for protecting Islam, whereas in fact it was for provoking the people to arise against the king's policies, impeding the reform process and regaining their lost privileges. It should be indicated that one of the stipulations of the cease-fire on December 29th, 1928, that was underlined by the insurgents was that in exception for Britain diplomatic representation, all the rest diplomatic representation had to be closed (Stewart, *Fire in Afghanistan* 2005, 84-216), which demonstrates the British exerted a strong influence on the opposition.

The disapproval of the influential and spiritual family of *Shor Bazaar* and their coalition with the other tribes in opposite to the government's policies and reforms performed a significant function in overthrowing *Amanullah's* government. In fact, the mentioned coalition and subsequent uprisings in the country kept the king and the other Afghan constitutionalists and reformists inactivated for five decades.

Investigation into the reasons for rebellions and failure of *Amanullah's* policies is subject to analysis of its complicated and abstruse factors. It is a fact that the rebellions interrupted and slowed down the reform processes, and eventually overthrew the king's government. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the failure of reform should be regarded apart from the collapse of his government. In order to discover whether the reforms resulted in rebellions or they were failed by rebellions, several causes of rebellions and their contrasts to what was stated by religious opponents of King *Amanullah* should be regarded.

There are those who maintain that the king's reforms could not be considered as the actual cause of uprisings. Even the people cooperated with the king on conducting the process of the reforms, but nevertheless the issue that provoked their resistance to reforms were the troubles in conducting the reforms and existence of some dishonest individuals within the government. In addition, the state apparatus and local rulers were involved in the fire of rebellions.¹

¹ For further information see: Fazl Ghani Mojaddedi, *Afghanistan during the kingdom of Amanullah Khan*, p.221.

It is likely that one of the effective propaganda tools for the government's dissidents was some parts of reform programme. Some social and cultural reforms, especially those that were related to customs and traditions, were the reasonable excuse for the government's dissidents to react against its policies. They regarded these reforms as the principal motivation for emerging public backlash against the government's policies and toppling the regime.

As it was mentioned earlier the Social reforms were the effective tools of propaganda, however the ordinary people that were not influenced by the reforms and had no knowledge and experience regarding them were deluded by many misleading policies. Further, the reforms intervened in the sensitive issues such as intellectual and doctrinal issues and family affairs, which in the tribal society due to traditional values were very significant and sensitive. In consequence of such issues, *Amanullah's* dissidents condemned him account of ignoring Afghans' beliefs.

In addition, there are those who maintain that the main parts of the problems were connected to the social reforms, which was confirmed by many researchers regardless of any consideration of the most significant reasons for rebellions (Poullada 1973, 146-147). One of the most significant criticisms of the reforms of King *Amanullah* is regarding the changes that happened in the military system. The king believed that the era of military war had been terminated already and the scientific war had been initiated, which allowed some people to find fault with him. The king reduced the military expenditure and the number of military forces. In this regard, his dissidents believed that in order to implement successful reforms a strong military system were essential. They likewise argued that lack of a strong military system was one of the main reasons for failure of the reform attempts and collapse of the government.

Furthermore, the king was of the opinion that by justifying and arguing would attract people's support and contribution to steer the country towards development. At least in the first stage of his reform programme, he was against using violence and force to implement his policies, thus he made many attempts to attain the general approval for his progressive plans. Additionally, he severely opposed developing the military system and excessive spending in this section. It is likely that he did not want to weaken the military system while he was decisive to adjust the military system to the requirements of a developed government and adapt it to his ideals. The methods that were utilized by the Afghan king

to conduct the reform policies could be examined, whereas in fact there is no uncertainty regarding the adequacy of his reform programme (Poullada 1973, 112).

It could be argued that the guidelines of the government for political interactions with other countries slightly achieved the favourable outcomes and thus it was provided the conditions of gaining foreign assistance for conducting the reform programme and modernizing the economic, social, political status of the country. King *Amanullah* roughly estimated the true cost to implement the reform process, and some critical issues forced him to seek for foreign aids. Based on a document dated 26th December 1923 from the U.S. National Archives, the king had sufficient financial resources to implement his reform programme, but nevertheless some parts of the mentioned resources were spent in the *Khost* rebellion (Stewart, *Fire in Afghanistan 1914-1929: The First Opening to the West Undone by Tribal Ferocity Years before the Taliban 2000*, 337).

It is obvious that making fundamental changes in the economic and social aspects in Afghanistan required that the king in addition to consolidating his political power endeavoured to obtain the essential supports. Accordingly, the king's trip could provide the conditions for development of welfare and increasing the effective speed at which the reform programme might be implemented (Aman-e-Afghan 1927). Additionally, attraction of the industrial circles of some European countries and some contracts with the western companies to found railways and mine the mineral resources, could be regarded in consequence of the mentioned trip. Furthermore, in the process of attraction foreign aids and assistances in the country there was strict observance of the principles of national independence, however, the extent of its achievement is debatable.

The king's dissident, therefore, criticized him for enforcing the new laws, which as it were indicated previously, was in striking contrast with *Shariah*. New constitution, marriage law, criminal and commercial codes, women's education, tax law were the critical issues, discussed in detail in the *Loya Jirga*, in 1924. As it was previously indicated, the mentioned *Loya Jirga*, which was established as a result of *Khost* uprising, was strongly penetrated by religious scholars. They took advantage of the problems of the government as an opportunity to argue that the government's policies were to blame. It is worth pointing out that the dissidents opposed government's interference in religious matters, and therefore requested repeal of all laws that in their idea were contradicted *Hanafi* jurisprudence. Furthermore, some of them suggested preparing new criminal codes

according to Islamic Fatwa in order to implement it instead of *Tamasok al Ghozat*. It is likely that Ulema's aggressive position and serious requests demonstrated their remarkable concerns about the modifications of the legal system. They likewise demanded restoration of judges' rights regarding determining the punishment arguing that determining the punishment before committing the crime was contrary to *Shariah* and the *Qur'an*. Indeed, based on principles of *Shariah*, kind and quantity of punishment were contingent upon different issues. They proposed that the judges based on reasonable evidence and well-documented reasons and their own knowledge issued sentences (Kateb 1923, 318). They likewise had the same idea regarding determining duration of imprisonment before the crime, which was contrasted with *Hanafi* jurisprudence (Kateb 1923, 314).

It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the king was not against religion; however, he was of the opinion that some people utilized the religion as a means of achieving their own political and economic goals. One of the king's momentous religious policies was educating Mullahs, regardless of considering the religious sensitivity in the Afghan society. Furthermore, he wanted to reduce Mullahs' power in educational and judicial system and endeavoured to control the army, which was under the influence of Mullahs, and its strategies were conducted based on their interests. It goes without saying that launching these policies was very essential to handle the Afghan society with the modern world (Poullada 1973, 154-147). However, in consequence of implementing such policies not only the government lost the support from local solidarity groups, but also they became the opponent of the government and the main obstacle to its reform programme.

Olivier Roy is of the opinion that launching the policy of modernizing the Afghan society by King *Amanullah* confused his relationships with influential Muslim religious scholars. It is particularly significant that this point could be regarded as the termination of the *Pan-Islamism* alliance by virtue of differences of opinion among them regarding balancing the religion with modernisation. From the point of view of fundamentalist religious scholars, defending of Islam was leading the society to attain Islamic values; however, the king regarded the issue of defending of Islam as a political issue of anti-imperialism and argued that the consequential policy to develop the Afghan society could be tendency towards the western values (Roy 1992, 100-101). Afghan people, in consequence of their xenophobic sentiments, opposed such ideas and they, therefore, endeavoured to impede the process of anti-religion and anti-tradition reforms.

It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that *Amanullah's* policies in the independence war resulted in increasing his popularity and attaining the legitimacy. His primary policy opposed foreign hegemony, especially British colonialism, and supported *Pan-Islamism* and nationalism. Subsequent to achieving independence, he continued supporting the Caliphate and the Indian liberation movements. In addition, the king, following making the peace agreement with Britain and consolidating his political position, initiated improving Afghanistan's friendship with its powerful neighbours. It is worth pointing out that transformations in central Asia, failure of Amir of Bukhara, killing *Anwar Pasha*, and abolition of the Caliphate that occurred outside the country strongly influenced the developments in Afghanistan.

It is likely that groupings within the government conducted by foreign powers, sabotage of court members, and the exploitation of the beliefs of the people resulted in declining the foundation of the government. Difference of opinion, political groupings within the court regarding the government's internal and external policies and rivalry among them could be regarded as the considerable factors that caused the collapse of the government from inside.

It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the British conspiracy should be regarded as the significant foreign factors in the collapse of *Amanullah's* government. From the beginning, Great Britain's agents planned many difficulties for him and they believed that his rise to power could be a grave threat to their interests. British spies in the early 1917 reported growing nationalist struggles, liberal and anti-colonial ideas, increasing prince *Amanullah Khan's* popularity and the probability of his rising to power (Adamec, *Afghanistan, 1900-1923; a diplomatic history* 1967, 108).

The majority of the people in the Foreign Ministry of British India believed that declaring independence of Afghanistan resulted in the termination of the previous personal and national contracts (British Secret Service Bureau, British Intelligence Agency foreign frontier branch, for the week ending October 1920 1920, Paragraph No. 712). The king, therefore, became the main obstacle for British agents to obtain their goals in Afghanistan and thus they always used to hatch several plots to overthrow him from the political scene.

Ghobar is of the opinion that the British policy in Afghanistan either during the war or contribution policy pursued one strategy. The most ruinous point of the British strategy in Afghanistan was keeping the country under its control through the Afghan governments.

The British considering the xenophobic feelings in Afghanistan comprehended that in case of a direct interference the people could detect enemy's footsteps and thus British policies would be faced with the public backlash. Accordingly, the best option for Britain was taking advantages of the internal factors in order to implement British policy under the name of an Afghan government (Ghobar 1981, 444-445).

As it was mentioned earlier, Britain made many attempts to interrupt Afghanistan's political relations with the other governments. The British agents seriously pursued this policy, especially after the attainment of independence of Afghanistan. Nonetheless, development of Afghanistan's political relations with the countries was a priority for King *Amanullah* in formulating the foreign policy. Accordingly, with the purpose of introducing Afghanistan's independent ambassador *darwazi*, the head of a delegation, was sent to Europe and America. It is worth pointing out that between 1921 and 1922, the Afghan government succeeded in making massive development in the political relations with European countries such as France, Italy, and Germany.¹ Abdul Samad Ghaus, believes that the king's hostility to the British while good relationship with Russia and other European countries could be regarded as unorthodox foreign policy, which may have contributed to the downfall of his government in 1929. (Ghaus 1988, 47)

There is not a shadow of doubt that the king's diplomatic policy and developing Afghanistan's relations was another action to undermine the British position in Afghanistan. Additionally, Great Britain with the purpose of frustrating ambassador *darwazi*'s activities averted the authorities of the other countries from acceptance the Afghan delegation. British ambassador in Paris declared the French that although Afghanistan had apparently obtained its independence, it was still under British influence. Further, they averted Italian authorities from making any relationship with Afghans, but nevertheless their attempts were ineffective.

Despite the meeting between the Afghan delegation and *Harding*, which could be regarded as recognition of *Amanullah*'s sovereignty and Afghanistan's independence, there was no relationship between America and Afghanistan, which demonstrated the British attempts to prevent the other country from making any relation with Afghanistan. Furthermore, ambassador *darwazi* on 2 July 1921 went to America and in New York, declaring that his

¹ For further information see: Inayatullah Shahrani, *Burhanuddin Namagh. Shah Mohammad Wali Khandarwazi wakil al saltanehe Alahazrat Amanullah Khan Ghazi [Shah Mohammad Wali Khan Darwazi, Amir Amanullah's representative]*, p.201.

mission to America was with the purpose of making diplomatic relationship between two countries, and *Amanullah's* government expected America's investment in Afghanistan (Ma'arouf 1987, 22). However, the King's diplomatic activity could not be considered very effective in consequence of the British sabotage and destructive measures against Afghanistan.

5.3.2. Democratic Regime

Regarding the government's function during *the PDPA* rule in Afghanistan, the first outstanding point is the *Saur* coup in Afghanistan that was the starting point of more than twenty years of the grave public backlash and internal conflicts that provided an opportunity for the Soviet to invade Afghanistan. Subsequent to the mentioned violent coup and its critical effects, the people of Afghanistan involved in a situation that required an urgent solution and emerged the uncompensated losses in political, cultural, economic, humanitarian conditions after the coup in the country.

Communists with the intention of attracting the public support and obtain the legitimacy did not mention the name of *the PDPA* and its leaders in the first announcement and instead selected the title of *Armed Forces Revolutionary Council*. Even in the army, they endeavoured to obtain the support of the Muslim part of the military forces, as well as they planned to specify the coup consequences and goals. The revolutionary council on 30 April exactly one day after the official announcement issued the first decree as *The Decree Number One*.

“Though the PDPA had been beset by bitter factionalism almost from its inception, and had a small membership (less than half of 1 percent of the population), it was able to seize political power a scant 13 years after its establishment. The party's remarkable success was due to several factors. One was the faltering development of democratic political institutions in Afghanistan. Another was suppression, during President Mohammad Daoud's strongman rule (1973-78), of moderate and right-wing political parties, while at the same time tolerating the existence (in part because of Soviet pressure) of the Marxist *PDPA* as a semilegal [semi-legal] party. Taking advantage of its tolerated status, the PDPA grew in importance as the only publicly perceived opposition group. The failure of five moderate or rightist coup attempts against Daoud only served to further weakening of the non-communist opposition, leaving the field to the Marxists. Where in the 1960s rightist Moslem student organizations regularly reacted to leftist demonstrations with counter-

demonstrations, by 1978 no rightist or centrist party or organization effectively existed in the country” (Amstutz 1986, 34).

USA recognized the *Saur* coup as a nationalist and internal event and did not consider the Soviets’ significant role in it. Even Jimmy Carter discerned the new government in Afghanistan as an independent and autonomous government. Based on Americans’ impression *the DRA* was not a Communist government and Soviet Union performed no role in the process of the *Saur* coup (The New York Times 1987, 18). It is worth pointing out that the America’s idea regarding the Soviet non-intervention policy in the *Saur* coup and the character of the coup can only be regarded in term of political justifications. In other respects, there are many evidences to demonstrate the Soviet’s intervention in the coup. It goes without saying that the communist character of the coup is very obvious that there is no need for further discussion.

The PDPA’s reforms like *Amanullah’s* second and third stages of reforms were implemented hastily and were not concurred with the opinions and aspirations of the people. Thus, the new decrees could not provide the suitable conditions for establishing the communist rule and making social orders in the country. By issuing the first decrees of the new constitution, the people became deeply upset and confused by virtue of the unfamiliar terms in the official system, such as "the leader of the Democratic People", "the president revolutionary council", "the central committee". In addition, the people comprehended that it was not possible to take advantage of such terms to realize their requirements.

It goes without saying that *the PDPA* abrogated the constitution of 1977 by issuing the third decree, and in fact it accomplished the establishment of new civilian and military courts. It could be argued that the initial decrees put at stake the legal immunities of citizens, and in addition to threatening the customary and traditional system, deprived the people of every aspect of their legal support such as the customary, traditional, formal and civil aspects. Further, the legal weakness by the time imperilled broader aspects; therefore, the mechanisms of war and armed conflict led to the destruction of law and social orders, and subsequently, it threatened personal and social safety.

The PDPA’s government believed that the decree of prohibition of lien limitation of landowners’ profit could release 11 to 12 million peasants from large landowners, traditional and feudalism system. It goes without saying that the process of fundamental development, without making essential reforms in the social and economic structure of

society, would not result in the modification of the controlling traditional system of the society.

It is particularly significant that *the PDPA's* government abrogated of the customary and traditional connections between the people or different tribal groups, with no regard to potential problems and doing the indispensable and comprehensive examination, and also regardless of the applicable alternative. Consequently, the economic and financial confusions in the rural area ran into a grave crisis. The government's measures resulted in disappointing impressions on interaction between the tribal groups, properties, businesses, investments. These disregarded actions effectuated the popular resistances to the government reform programme and the internal conflict.

Establishment of the cooperative funds was one of the innovative measures of *the PDPA's* government in the rural areas. The government attempted to implement the mentioned plan at the initial level in the disorderly and confused circumstances of the rural community; however, it did not have prosperous consequences. According to *Etefagh-e-Islam* "From 1980 to 1981, 12116 peasant cooperatives were established, which was composed of 200 thousand farmers" (Etefagh-e-Islam newspaper 1982, 3). The People had no confidence in the mentioned cooperative funds, as well as the government did not have sufficient awareness and familiarity in conducting and handling of such plans. In fact, these cooperative funds were not supported by the adequate financial resources, the poor families, therefore, were not able to provide their essential needs. It goes without saying that the cooperative funds were not established in consequence of the peasants' appeals and requirements, as well as, the government conducted such plans in order to pursue its political and ideological aspirations. Accordingly, it was not adaptable to the controlling culture and tradition of the society. Along with spreading the public protests and increasing the fire of the resistance in the country, all these baseless organizations collapsed and the society involved in confusion and grave crisis.

Indeed, the communist government in the first year of their governing in Afghanistan conducted very critical policies. It is noteworthy that from one point of view, they seriously endeavoured to enforce the atheistic ideologies on the people regardless of preparation the necessary background and careful attention to people's beliefs. From another point of view, they endeavoured to persuade the people to follow their policies, but nevertheless the people in the light of many proofs took cognizant of the government's

anti-Islamic and anti-national character. It is noteworthy that *the PDPA's* government at the introductory of their communist decrees and also in some of their statement to the people took advantage of some Islamic sentence to show themselves as faithful Muslims. The Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan stated, "Respect and defence of the holy religion of Islam are ensured in *the DRA*. All Muslims are guaranteed complete freedom in the performance of religious rites" (Gupta 1986, 115). Likewise, some of the leaders of *the PDPA* apparently participated in the prayers and Islamic ceremonies in the mosque of the presidential palace. It is quite clear that not only none of these pretended measures could lead astray the people but also they provoked the public's emotions.

The first radical steps of the government spread confusion and tension in the political, religious, and ethnic figures in rural and urban societies. Additionally, within the party happened acute competition between the *Khalqis* and the *Parchamis*, and this led to the removal of high-ranking people of the *Parcham* faction from the power structure. One of the *Parchamis'* fundamental principles was making a rapid progress in the project of socialism in the country. This opinion was arranged by the *Parchamis* owing to the fact that they believed that technology was not adequate to go through a real proletarian revolution that was requested in the Communist Manifesto. As it was mentioned previously, the *Parchamis* were mainly from the urban area and were a part of intermediary social rank between the affluent and the destitute people (Hussain 2003). The Persian-speaking of Pashtuns was the dominant group that was moderated and educated. Opposed to this group were the *Khalqis* that were radical and in direct connection to the Soviet Union. They were more influential and powerful than the *Parchamis* and they founded a Soviet-style communist government in Afghanistan. They endeavoured to transform the Afghan society based on *Marxist* and *Communist* ideologies, with the purpose of eradicating the traditional and religious beliefs of the Afghan people. However, in consequence of the xenophobic feelings of the Afghan society the Soviet-style communist government of *the PDPA* faced with a public backlash.

According to Anthony Arnold, "as long as *Parcham* and *Khalq* had been in quasi-legal opposition to the Afghan government, the USSR had had leverage to force them into mending their differences. Once the reunited *PDPA* succeeded in "wresting the political power" from *Daoud* in April 1978, however, it gained a greater measure of independence from the USSR, especially in the conduct of its internal affairs. Inasmuch as both the

Khalq and *Parcham* factions were apparently equally pro-Soviet, Moscow initially seems to have assumed that it did not matter that very much which faction emerged victorious in their own internal struggle. There was probably some hope that the two in fact could reach a lasting compromise, and if they could not, Moscow was then prepared to go along with whichever faction triumphed. A few leaders might be deposed, jailed, or even executed while finally the party would emerge the stronger for having purged itself of leadership elements personally unable to accommodate to the winners” (Arnold 1985, 75).

The both factions *Khalq* and *Parcham* after attaining the position of power endeavoured to obtain further authority, which led to their rivalry and increased internal dispute in the party. It is worth pointing out that before the coup the members of the *Khalq* and *Parcham* factions were united in spite of having pressure of internal and external factors. Indeed, they could not relinquish their disagreements during the coup whose victory was not even definite (Mesbahzadeh 1999, 48).

Subsequent to the *Saur* coup, the two factions of *the PDPA* opposed each other. It goes without saying that the *Khalq* faction’s policies were autocratic and they wanted to have all the authority. They believed that the leader of *Parcham* was not loyal to the revolution because the *Parchamis* regarded the *Saur* coup as a national democratic movement and not a revolution. It is sometimes suggested that escalation of these disagreements was a outstanding opportunity for the Soviet advisers to send the *Parchamis* as ambassadors to abroad. Thus, soon the leaders of *Parcham* were sent away from the Afghanistan as ambassador or chargé d’affaires in the other countries (Ataee 2004, 404).

There are those who maintain that differences between two factions were growing intensely. *Keshtmand* regarded the *Khalqis*’ monopolization as the main reason for disagreement within *the PDPA*. Furthermore, *Amin*’s rivalry with *Karmal* and his efforts to capture all the power were very substantial factors in this regard.¹

Furthermore, *Keshtmand* is of the opinion that alliance between the *Parchamis* and *Khalqis* was with the purpose of uniting all dissidents of the society, which could be called the United National Front Alliance. It is worth pointing out that regarding the foreign policy some strategies were conducted with the intention of emphasising on neutrality and

¹ For further information see: Sultan Ali *Keshtmand*, *Yaddashthaye Siasi va Roydadhaye Tarikhi: Khaterat-e Shakhsi ba Borhaee az Tarikhe Siasi Moaser-e Afghanistan*, [Political Notes and Historical Events], vol. 1, p.376.

non-aligned policy in order to obtain the support of all countries (Afghanistan. *Viz̄arat-i Ittil̄ a‘at va Kult̄ ur* 2007, 1283).

It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that extreme commands and programmes of the Amin’s government, acute and bloody disputes within the government apparatus, and expansion of popular uprisings and armed conflict, could be regarded as the grave menace to the survival of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. In this regard, the Soviet interests were likewise threatened, which forced them to attack Afghanistan in order to control the circumstances in this country and preserve their own interests.

Keshmand is of the opinion that the factors that bothered *Karmal* to implement his policies were the abnormal conditions of continuing war in the country. Arming, financing, encouraging and emboldening the armed people on Pakistan’s territory, and intensifying their attacks on Afghanistan are other highlighted factors by *Keshmand*. Furthermore, he also supposed that the Soviet Union military presence in the country, lack of readiness of different forces in the country; lack of political willing in the authority for power sharing, and finally rejection of political pluralism could be other obstacle to the *Karmal*’s government.¹

“Karmal’s loyalty to the Soviet Union was well known. He would say even in the presence of non-*Parchamis* that he wished to make Afghanistan the sixteenth republic of the Soviet Union” (Kakar 1995, 64). It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that any reform programme and policy implemented by such dependent and puppet system, certainly could not achieve the approval of the people and also it could never receive the legitimacy from religious elites.

The *Karmal* focused on educational and cultural system and obliged them to follow the doctrine of *the PDPA*. According to *Karmal*’s principles, freedom of scientific, technical, cultural, and artistic activities must be in conformity with the objectives of the *Saur* Revolution (*Osool-e asasi hezb-e democratic Khalq e Afghanistan*, [Fundamental principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] 1980, No.29). Accordingly, the quality of education especially in rural areas became inferior. Even Mohammad Akram Andishmand confirmed the mentioned decline after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.²

¹ For further information see: *Ibid.*, vol. 3, pp. 672-679.

² For further information see: Mohammad Akram Andishmand, *Amozesh va parvareh modern dar Afghanistan*, [Modern Education in Afghanistan], p. 158.

It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the reforms in the *Karmal's* era were out of the sufficient profundity and the government still was supporting its radical goals. It is worth pointing out that *Karmal* supposed that the land and water reforms were the main objective of the *Sour* coup.¹ However, the mentioned reforms did not implement in an appropriate manner to bring consequential effects for the Afghan society. Additionally, it could be argued that even the reformists of *the PDPA* did not have an exact realization of the shortages in the Afghan Society and as a result, there was no prioritization in the process of implementing their reform policies.

Despite the fact that in the *Karmal's* period some effective reforms were implemented, *the PDPA* made no change in its principal doctrine and retained reliance on the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that the government made some attempts to improve its methods in order to attain the principal objectives of *the PDPA* and regulated its programme with more cautious comprehension of the circumstances. *Karmal* appreciated the Soviet aids and believed that they performed a consequential function in solving the economic problems.²

It is worth pointing out that foreign policy during *Karmal's* era policy in an accurate manner was in line with the interests and policies of the Soviet Union. Moscow's agents even were involved in launching the details of *Karmal's* policy. Notwithstanding of the shaky foundations of the Soviet Union, its forces still attended in Afghanistan, which demonstrated that the Soviet Union did not consider Afghanistan as an independence country. It is particularly significant that *Karmal* believed that Afghanistan was "including the Non-Aligned Countries".

It is quite clear that numbers of the Soviet advisers had a position in the departments of the Army, Interior Ministry, the *KGB*, party, economic and diplomatic sector, and thus *the PDPA's* government requested the Soviet Union to dispatch to Kabul some consultants on the religion affairs with the purpose of adjusting the relations between the communist government and Islam.³

¹For further information see: *Etefagh-e-Islam* newspaper, Herat: 24 October 1982/ 2, 8, 1361, p.3.

²For further information see: Ibid. 24 October 1982/ 2, 8, 1361, p.3.

³ For further information see: Zahir Tanin & Mohammad Kazem Kazemi (Editor), *Afghanistan dar gharne bistom*, [Afghanistan in the Twentieth Century; 1900-1996], pp. 329-330.




Figure 5-2: Major Soviet Institutions Making Afghan Policy

(Tomsen, *The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers* 2011, 137).

Figure number 5-2 depicts the Soviet involvement in the making of Afghanistan's policies. According to Peter Tomsen, "The rapidly deteriorating internal situation in Afghanistan inspired the creation of a four-man Special Commission within the Soviet Politburo to focus on Afghanistan. Although heavy in seniority, the commission's membership was ill suited to understand the Afghan relations. The members, *Yuriy Andropov*, *Dmitry Ustinov*, *Andrey Gromyko*, and *Boris Ponomarev*, were all taken from the Politburo's conservative wing. Each had ascended up the CPSU rungs during the doctrinaire Stalinist era; creative, flexibility, and dynamism were not their strong suits. In microcosm, the body reflected the deep domestic paralysis gripping the Soviet Union during the late 1970s and early 1980s" (Tomsen, *The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers* 2011, 137).

Karmal's rise to power was simultaneous with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Moscow concluded that *Karmal* should be dismissed from the seat of power. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that Moscow required an absolute obedient in Afghanistan

that would develop Moscow's interests and provide the condition of withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country. Russian advisers believed that appointing one of the Pashtun leaders in power could lead to providing this condition (Azimi 1998, 311-312).

It is remarkable that in addition to the hostility stemmed from traditional confrontation among the *Parchamis* and *Khalqis*, there was a competition among them regarding managing the intelligence agency of the Ministry of Interior. It could be argued that both factions with the purpose of strengthening their officials made some attempts to be closer to the Soviet. For instance, *Najibullah* forcefully opposed the appointment *Gulabzoy* as the president of a garrison of Kabul.¹

In the framework of intelligence agency and the Ministry of State Security (MSS), *Najibullah* established various military units. There is not a shadow of doubt that he increased the forces of the National Guard with the purpose of consolidating the basis of his authority. Furthermore, following taking the position of the leadership of the party conducted Supreme Command Headquarters of the Armed Forces. He likewise established another Supreme Council that called *Defae Vatan*, which assisted him to control over the military forces and their operations all over the country. It is worth pointing out that in the meetings of the camp were present the Soviet military advisers, which demonstrates the influential function of them in the *Najibullah's* system.

It is particularly significant that considering the special guard by *Najibullah* led to emerging displeasure of the *Khalqis*, military staffs and the security forces, as well as he trusted the Ministry of State Security more than the army and the Interior Ministry. It could be argued that he knew without getting support from the army it would be difficult to handle the military and political issues, but nevertheless he was always afraid of reinforce it (Lyakhovsky 1995, 38).

The remarkable point of increasing the number of the militia or paramilitary forces was that this policy could be regarded as one of the main factors of collapse of *the PDPA*. It is likely that this policy intensified the party's internal conflict, which finally effectuated the collapse of the government, army, and party. It should be highlighted that the Militia forces in the beginning were regarded as local forces, supported by *the PDPA* in the rural area. However, increasing weakness of military forces of the government provide the

¹ For further information see: Alexander Lyakhovsky, *Tragedy and Courage in Afghanistan*, p.58.

condition for the militia forces to extend their influence in the army and state. In this regard, Antonio Giustozzi mentioned that the government did not attract recruits to the army anymore and instead, he made some attempts to increase the militia forces.¹

The defeat of the national reconciliation policy, which was a reflection of *Gorbachev's* glasnost and perestroika policy, could be regarded as another factor in the downfall of the government. The main goals of the mentioned policy were alliance organizations and leftist group with *the PDPA*, freedom of political parties, creating coalition organisation with the armed opposition and employing them at high levels in the ministries, continuing unilateral ceasefire, drafting a new constitution, preparations for the election of president, and finally organizing the second congress of *the PDPA*.

It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that dominance of internationalism of *Marxist-Leninist* ideas over *the PDPA* and attendance many Soviet puppets as leaders in the party, threatened the spirit of nationalism in the party (See Figure 5-2). Additionally, *the PDPA's* government due to retaining the monopoly power was formed into a new political organization, which called the state party. It is quite clear that the party could not conceive to be apart from the state and power, which was proposed by the national reconciliation policy.

Due to existing different point of view regarding the national reconciliation policy within the party, not only it could not be functional to decrease the problems, but also it provoked the internal fire within the party. Different factions of the party took advantage of it for intra-party challenges. In addition, the government conducted some policies with the purpose of reconciling the policy of national reconciliation with economic and social realities of Afghan society. For one thing, the president attempted to attract the attention of the international community. In addition, he accelerated implementing new reforms. He endeavoured to encourage European countries and capitalist world to re-establish economy and trade relations. He likewise believed that this policy was the most reasonable to gain political acceptance and economic support, which finally was not functional and effective for *the PDPA*.

¹ For further information see: Antonio Giustozzi, *War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan: 1978-1992*, p. 226.

5.4. Findings

According to the previous analysis of a monarchical and a democratic government's functions and resistance to their policies, several significant findings have been revealed. However, the findings are not merely to provide trivial proof as to why the regime of King *Amanullah* was independent and also prosperous in implementing some part of his reform programme, and *the PDPA* regime did not have such prosperity. It is worth pointing out that it has been made an attempt to disclose an immense comprehending of Afghan rule and challenges to it. Further, the study has meticulously scrutinized the role of internal and external factors regarding these challenges and resistance to the government. These findings are chiefly divided into two sections, including delineating the characteristics of functional Afghan government and also delineating the characteristics of resistance to the Afghan government.

5.4.1. Delineating Characteristics of Functional Afghan Government

In this section, the substantial factors for a functional Afghan government with successful reform policies are examined. These factors are provided based on scrutiny of two phases in Afghanistan's modern history, which are crisis phase (*Amanullah's* era) and conflict phase (*the PDPA's* era).

5.4.1.1. Foreign Support

It goes without saying that the examination of both cases has pored over external support either to attain the position of authority or in the struggle to retain it.

King *Amanullah's* assumption of power was simultaneous with the termination of the tension between Russia and Britain, which was as a result of the Russian revolution of 1917. Afghanistan, therefore, took advantage of the international conditions to emphasize its complete independence and also cease international intervention in its internal affairs. The Afghan king's substantial change regarding external policy immediately initiated following his rise to power. In fact, unstable situation of the British encouraged the king to overthrow the British forces in collaboration with local solidarity groups resident in the Afghan-British borders. Although King *Amanullah* declared Afghanistan's independence and disallowed the British control of Afghanistan's foreign affairs, the British authorities disregarded his declaration; consequently, King's forces on some fronts defeated them. Nonetheless, owing to the fact that both sides were willing to make peace and settlement a

ceasefire concluded among them. It is particularly significant that Afghanistan had already embarked on its own foreign policy concluding the new agreement with the Soviet in the first year of *Amanullah's* rule. Notwithstanding the Afghan side and British side were concurred in Afghanistan's independence in the foreign affairs, the second round of Afghan-British negotiations effectuated no definite decision. The Afghans asserted entire control over the tribal regions on the British side, which was very rejected by the British. It is noteworthy that the assertion of Afghan authority was based on its agreement with Russians in 1921, which regarded the Afghan control over tribes on the Russian side *Bukhara, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan*, and all northern Afghan territory (Alikuzai 2013, 449). It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that this issue convinced the Afghan authority to implement some policies in order to have tribal assistance to handle British tenacious hegemony.

King *Amanullah* consolidated Afghanistan's diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1920, moreover from 1921 to 1923 Afghanistan's relations with Turkey, Italy, and France substantially improved. Although Afghanistan independence was in its infancy, its relations with the British and the Soviet could be regarded as the most authoritative stance of its foreign policy. It goes without saying that subsequent to Saint Petersburg convention, *the Great Game* tensions over Afghanistan were considerably descended. It is quite clear that Moscow in the beginning adopted the policy of appeasement of Muslims inside and outside of the Soviet territory, based on which the Soviet leaders were astutely wanted to establish amicable relations with abutting Muslim regions in Afghanistan. Moscow's intention of adopting such policy and making close relationship with Kabul was menacing Britain that was doing sabotage encouraging counterrevolution activities in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, when Afghanistan dispatched an envoy to Moscow in 1919, Moscow received it warmly, and Moscow reciprocally sent a delegation to Kabul and offered aid to Kabul government. It could be argued that this alliance with Moscow provided the opportunity for the Afghan government to take advantage of the British faintness in the British India during and even after the third *Angolo Afghan* war. It is remarkable that Afghanistan despite having a feeble military position in the mentioned war as a result of having tribal support obtained an outstanding diplomatic conquest.

It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that during the *Amani* era Soviet-Afghan relations in consequence of strategic importance of Afghanistan for Moscow's authorities at any particular time. Indeed, Moscow considered Afghanistan as a mechanism for

managing the Soviet's Muslims minorities and also for gravely menacing the British interests. Accordingly, Moscow was very assistive with Kabul government just when they needed to manage the Soviet Muslims or during its critical relationship with the British relations with the British (Alikuzai 2013, 450).

Extensive study of the *Amani* era demonstrates that the Afghan authority always suspected the Soviet; however, Kabul retained its connection with Moscow in order to attain assistance and support from the Soviet and also taking advantage of relations with the Soviets in handling the British grave menace. Thus, the Afghan-Soviet treaty of Friendship was the first international agreement after Afghanistan's independence in 1919. Although Moscow provided Kabul with aid as early as 1919 and also throughout the 1920s Moscow granted cash subsidies for Kabul, King *Amanullah* never recognized Russians a trustable neighbour and deduced an optimistic view regarding the Soviet authority. It goes without saying that the Soviet oppressive policies regarding Muslims across the border, in order to manage Central Asia through deportations and oppression resulted more than any other time Kabul opposed Moscow's policies. (Alikuzai 2013, 450).

It is likely that Soviet interference in Afghanistan, especially subsequent to *World War II*, was intentionally planned to force Kabul authority to accept Soviet hegemony (See Figure 4-4). Accordingly, it goes without saying that Moscow took advantage of several policies interactivity to fulfil this objective.

It is worth pointing out that before *World War II* increasing diplomatic relations and economic aid were preferably under the Soviet's consideration, however subsequent to it the Soviet expanded its policy to embrace military assistance and political affairs. The accomplishment of these policies was reflected in the influential role of the USSR in 1978. Indeed, Moscow was the most momentous trade partner and financial supporter of Kabul, and had modernized the Afghan military forces, as well as with its support *the PDPA* had overthrown *Daoud's* government from power and was ruling the country. In April 1978, it was very fulfilled Moscow's winning *the Great Game* that let Moscow's government take another step toward the Arabian Sea.

It goes without saying that by late 1979, it was apparent that *the PDPA's* government would topple unless the Soviet Union supported it. It is quite clear that Moscow's direct military intervention resulted in the transformation the Afghan war into a regional and geopolitical conflict, which ultimately ruined the country. Furthermore, this military action

prompted the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism and instead effectuated Islamism in the *Sunni* area of the Muslim World. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that these events gradually reinvigorated and changed *the Great Game* for reach and control Central Asia while *the Great Game's* trait and some of its performers changed (Goodson 2001, 53).

Afghanistan by virtue of its strategic position (being connection point of Middle East, South and Central Asia) was the scene of the rivalry between the great powers (Gregorian 1969, 10). The two colonial powers Russia and Britain from the late nineteenth century regarded Afghanistan's territory to be a buffer state among them. In addition, the colonial competition between these colonial powers until the mid-twentieth century, led to foreign invasions and interferences and ultimately becoming Afghanistan as a buffer state. King *Amanullah* adopted anti-British and anti-colonialism policies, which weakened the British position in Afghanistan. The Soviet, therefore, endeavoured to make a good relationship with the king and thus Afghanistan became the scene of rivalry between Britain and the Soviet.¹ It is noteworthy that the king required financial resources to implement his reform programme, which forced him to make a good relationship with the Soviet Union. Although he concluded a treaty with the Bolsheviks, they fulfilled none of their obligations. The king believed that the Bolsheviks could not be trusted and he knew that Russians in their promises had never been honest.² It could be argued that the king endeavoured to make an alliance with the Bolsheviks in order to put pressure on Britain, which led to the hostility of the British with him. In addition, the fundamental reason for Britain's detestation was the third *Anglo-Afghan* war that led to the independence of Afghanistan. Although during *the Great Game* tribal and ethnic competition in Afghanistan provided opportunity for Britain to launch its strategic policy in Afghanistan, the king's anti-British and anti-colonialism policies placed the Afghan local solidarity groups in a united front against the British. Likewise, there is no dispute that his government's pro-Soviet character resulted the British assisted the opposition to collapse his government. Notwithstanding the Soviet conducted some plans to return the abdicated King to power, they were ineffective as a result of the fact that at that time the British had better geopolitical access in Afghanistan.

¹ For further information see: Amin Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival*, (New York: I.B. Tauris), pp.60-74.

² For further information see: Rhea Talley Stewart, Mohammad kohsar Kabuli (Trans), *Fire in Afghanistan*, p.32.

The Soviet Union took advantage of the same opportunity during *the Cold War* in order to launch the *Saur* coup and bring to power *the PDPA's* regime, which was communist and the Soviet's follower (See Figure 5-2). It goes without saying that *the Cold War* resulted in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that a communist party's assumption of power in Afghanistan could be regarded as the starting point for serious Soviet influence in Afghanistan. Although the *Khalq* faction encouraged the Soviet to invade Afghanistan, there were many other intentions for the Soviet invasion. It is particularly significant that *the PDPA* was incapable of fulfilling the Soviet interests and handling *Mujahidin's* opposition. Afghanistan was an important crossroad in the region between India, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. Accordingly, the Soviet Union wanted to reach Iran's oil field and trade way through Indian Ocean.

Indeed, foreigners' intervention and subsequently their invasion along with internal conflict and completion destabilized the foundations of the state and effectuated instability in Afghanistan. Owing to the fact that foreign agents had strong influence on the Afghan state that any kind of change and modification should have maintained their interests, each policy to handle these internal disorders from the beginning was doomed to failure. Furthermore, competition between religious intellectual and tribal chiefs offered an opportunity for foreigners to implement their policies in Afghanistan. Each group of elite that took the power need foreign support to maintain its power. It should also be remarked that state-making process and conducting reform policies were always from top to down, and with no attention to the opinion of the society and its significant function in the mentioned measures, due to which, the governments faced with many reactions from the society to their policies.

It is particularly significant that incapability of attaining legitimacy and public support persuaded the governments to strengthen their military forces in order to preserve their authority, and this forced them to provide external support. Additionally, in both cases the weakness of the army resulted in inward collapse of civil institutions. For instance, lack of organized and powerful military forces in *the PDPA's* era -especially after the Soviet Union's collapse- could be regarded one of the main factors of *Mujahidin's* victory (Englehart 2007, 144).

A substantial distinction of the external support was provided for each regime, but nevertheless is that in cases where the regime was more purposeful and prosperous in

instituting rule and improving government function. It goes without saying that *Amanullah's* regime was capable of protecting its independence without external support while *the PDPA* regime was appeared to be the puppets of its foreign supporters (See Figure 5-2), and so that it could not obtain any legitimacy for its rule.

It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that Afghanistan required external support and not external intervention, which was effectuated by superpowers by virtue of fulfilment their interests and developing their domination of the country.

5.4.1.2. National Identity

The significant function of the national identity in two studied epochs has been demonstrated by several occurrences. Nancy Hatch Dupree is of the opinion that national identity had an effective role in the process of state-making during Afghanistan contemporary history. She likewise indicates, "A glance at Afghan history affirms an oft-repeated pattern of altering periods of fissions and fusion. Afghans may quarrel happily among themselves, but they stand together and assert their pride in being Afghan when outsiders threaten. A sense of national identity does exist, elements of divisiveness and notwithstanding" (N. H. Dupree 2002, 977-989).

It is worth pointing out that tribal identity appears to be one of the most remarkable barriers in the process of formation a government and conducting its policies while national identity could be regarded as a constructive factor to create a consolidated government. In consequence of the fact that government policies could not be aligned with the desires and interests of all tribes, there have always been some tribes, whose concerns were incompatible with the government's policies. It is particularly significant that one of the fundamental reasons for unprosperous policies of the Afghan regimes negligence for considering tribes in the structure of power.

It could be argued that King *Amanullah* took advantage of the national identity in order to unite different political and social groups in Afghanistan and gain independence of the country from Britain. Thus, national identity performed a significant function to remove Britain's domination from the country. Further, the king implemented his reform programme with no consideration of tribal and religious identity of Afghans; consequently, he confronted public backlash against his reforms, which was organized by the same factors that collaborated with him during the war of independence. There is not a shadow

of doubt that the paying special consideration to the issue of national identity effectuated constructive results for the government and lack of attention to this issue resulted in destructive consequences.

5.4.1.3. Legitimate Government

One of the most remarkable factors that troubled both regimes in conducting efficaciously their policies was inadequacy of their institutional system. It is likely that this issue arose from the legitimacy crisis, the incompatibility of the state and society, and incompetency of the governmental institutions.

It is quite clear that legitimacy is essential to any regime in Afghanistan, for without it, they would immediately be ousted by the nation those oppose authority system. As it is discernible in the first case of this research the Afghan regime historically focused on a charismatic leader, whose power was absolute, moreover, who got legitimacy on the foundation of charismatic, traditional, and rational authority.

It goes without saying that both regimes were involved in the legitimacy crisis, but nevertheless King *Amanullah* in consequence of declaration of *Jihad* against Britain could temporarily release from this crisis, whereas in fact *the PDPA* due to planning the *Saur* coup to attain the power from the beginning was involved in this crisis (Brecher 1997, 356). In fact, the elites determined the legitimacy of the government based on their own interests and objectives. Diversity of intellectual, tribal and religious elites was consequence of social, religious and linguistic diversity in the country, which led to the variety of the roots of legitimacy to King *Amanullah's* and *the PDPA's* governments. It is particularly significant that tribal and religious elites granted legitimacy to government based on Islam and tribal codes, whereas intellectuals followed the foreign ideology, and thus were more compatible with the reformist ideology fulfilled by both regimes. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that oppression of tribal and social elites in *Amanullah's* period could be regarded as one of the foremost causes of the miscarriage of his policies. It is worth pointing out that during *the PDPA* intellectual elites were under the influence of communist ideas and they, therefore, upheld the ruling system. In both regimes, they were in power and tribal and religious elites were in challenge with them and always stimulated the mass to arise against them; nonetheless, neither the king nor *the PDPA* could effectively handle them. There is not a shadow of doubt that the constant internal conflicts

troubled the Afghan governments to establish a stable situation in the country and conduct functional policies.

In addition, the presented regimes in this research had at least one, or more, charismatic leaders. *Amanullah's* rule was based on charismatic, traditional, and rational authority. His traditional authority was his antecedent while his charismatic character of his leadership was on account of his capabilities. Furthermore, he established his rule based on rational regulations. Regarding *the PDPA* regime, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that none of its communist leaders had adequate capability of obtaining the minimum level of the legitimacy.

In addition, one supplementary significant finding stemmed from the comparative analysis of two regimes (See Table 5-1) is that an indigenous system is very essential for the Afghan regime to attain and retain legitimacy. This concept highlights that if the government is a puppet and dependent on a foreign power, it could be deprived of legitimacy by the traditional and religious elites; this concept demonstrates the contrast between external control and legitimacy.

5.4.1.4. Indigenous Government

As it was previously stated, an authority originated from Afghanistan with domestic and autonomous administration, whether monarch or democrat, has been more prosperous in attaining further legitimacy and improving government's function as compared to a puppet one that has been controlled by a foreign agent. It goes without saying that *the PDPA* established a puppet government based on *communist* and *Marxist* doctrine (See Figure 5-2), foreign legitimacy and administration, which was controlled by the Soviet agents; while *Amanullah's* government was an indigenous authority that was founded based on Islamic ideology, domestic legitimacy and the system of bureaucracy.

It is quite clear that the root-and-branch reforms provided by *the PDPA* were fundamental and quick, with the purpose of implementing widespread reform with predominantly considering the interests and policies of its external benefactors. Accordingly, the people opposed the government's programme regarding civil rights and the emancipation of women, as they were opposite of what they believed. Further, the *PDPA's* regime fulfilled hasty decrees and conducted radical objectives, which abrogated customary principles of the tribal society of Afghanistan and revoked the previous tribal ruling system.

It is worth pointing out that *Amanullah's* military reforms and conscription policy were implemented with the intention of establishing a modern and potent army that could provide internal security. *Kemalist* Turkish officers assisted him regarding organizing the army; as a result of these officers' pretty hasty plans for the army, the inspiration of Afghan nationalists, and also arranging well-trained Afghan officers a remarkable transformation was accomplished in the structure of the army and thus a national army arranged by *Amanullah*. Nonetheless, disunity among the tribal solidarity groups and also the government's incapability of reaching an agreement with them in 1928, moreover, arising a sweeping unrest resulted the Afghan indigenous army rapidly was broken apart. Alternatively, *the PDPA's* army had always been reliant upon external assistance. Its puppet and semi-indigenous army (See Figure 5-2) was unpopular and disloyal to the government, moreover, there was a huge gap between high-ranking officers and corps. Although the non-indigenous army's dependency on the Soviet support from one point of view increased its power, from another point of view it diminished Army's legitimacy and popularity.

King *Amanullah's* indigenous authority was capable of obtaining public legitimacy in consequence of the establishment of effective organizations that ensured the safety of the state. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that establishing a legitimated Afghan regime and independent of any external support required implementation of consequential policies to reach agreement with the opponents and attain public support; thus the regime could retain its authority and also abolish previous forms of traditional administration.

5.4.1.5. Totalitarian Authority

In Afghanistan, the foundation of the government was autocratic, and tribal-patriarchal relationship was established in the society. Relations between nation and state were never defined based on equality, justice, and freedom. The rulers introduce themselves as the representative of God on earth (Farhang 1995, 425). Their approved law was implemented by their power. Resistance to the king meant resistance to the law, and people just had right to unconditional submission and obedience (Majmoeye maghalate seminare ayandeh Afghanistan va ghanoon asasi, [Proceedings of the seminar on the future of Afghanistan and the constitution] 2003, 19).

Amanullah's rule had somehow the same definition. Although he endeavoured to consider the principle of citizens' individual rights and freedoms, it was based on his own desire

and also was not compatible with the potential of the society. In fact, by virtue of lack of education and knowledge, the society was not able to comprehend his reform programme. Consequently, the king was forced to adopt oppressive and coercive methods to implement his policies. It is worth pointing out that *the PDPA* regime from the beginning asserted that it would respect human right; nonetheless, the assertion was not practically regarded by its authorities. For instance, *Karmal's* government asserted that offences against human dignity and torture were not allowed (Osool-e asasi hezb-e democratic Khalq e Afghanistan, [Fundamental principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] 1980, No.30). Nevertheless, in his government, as the previous governments, still executed the torture, forced confessions along with the various harassment, human rights violations, shootings, and hangings of opponents. His government influenced all education and cultural institutions and was forced them to promote the ideology of the party, which was against the public beliefs. Furthermore, Afghanistan's multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic society troubled both regimes to handle the requests of different groups. The country's mountainous areas and impassable roads led to poor communication made a huge gap between the people and the governments. Besides, these factors assisted the tribal and ethnic group to be isolated and implement their own tribal rules in the isolated regions.

It is remarkable that Afghanistan's history demonstrates that a powerful authority was effective and was esteemed by the people. In addition, the semi-prosperous Afghan ruler, King *Amanullah*, ruled by some strict and strategic methods in order to handle the majority of unapproachable Afghan territory and combatant people that had shattered numerous of the strong armies established during Afghanistan's history.

During the *Amani* era it was installed a secular judicial structure that prevented religious leaders from involvement in the judiciary system, consequently it lost popularity with the public. Further, the comprehensive regulatory system that was founded in this era was a means for keeping the people updated and aware, and performing decrees that strove to improve the Afghan lifestyle, which was not considerably prosperous in realizing its subjects. In point of fact, *Amanullah's* judiciary system identified an illegal act in accordance with the constitutional law, which did not have approval of the religious scholars. Further, the *PDPA's* judiciary principles, which was based on *communism* and *Marxism* ideas, considered any insubordination to *the PDPA's* radical principles as crime.

It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that *Amanullah's* function in handling the opponents was more successful than *the PDPA's* one in this regard. Accordingly, it could be argued that one more significant point of prosperity of government in Afghanistan was the method of handling dissidents who seriously threatened ruling government. Although a totalitarian authority like *Amanullah's* comparing *the PDPA's* unstable authority appears to be more prosperous in centralizing control, in the process of conducting the reform programme king's totalitarian authority has not been able to attract public support and even it has been confronted with backlash in the second and third stages of the reforms.

In this regard, an egalitarian and popular system that considers equal rights for all the Afghan people, respects the ideological beliefs and political interests of different local solidarity groups, and esteems the position of the religious scholars could face with less trouble in the process of state-making and reform-making.

5.4.1.6. Handling Dissidents

One of the most remarkable points of the two regimes presented in this research was the entire military defeat of their political rivals, which assisted them to seize powerfully the power. In addition, the inefficiency of the Afghan government to handle its dissidents finally caused to appear considerable resistance to their policies. In both cases, the government's incapability of overcoming its dissidents offered an opportunity for its political opponents to challenge the government and finally overthrew it from the political scene and introduced themselves as the foundations of an alternative rule.

King *Amanullah*, in order to handle the external opposition (the British) during *Angolo Afghan*, unified the different local solidarity groups within the country; however, *the PDPA* appealed the Soviet assistance to handle internal opposition. It is quite clear that the military forces of both regimes were not reliable and strong enough to manage the internal conflict. Furthermore, along with emerging public oppositions, which was stimulated by different factors in all over the country, the authorities endeavoured to manage it with their weak military forces, which was not effective. This is because the character of the Afghan army that were principally composed of the people from the rural areas, who demonstrated special consideration and concern with the conservative opposition; consequently they supported the opposition to the government. Furthermore, along with expanding the fire of civil war, the Afghan army were weaker and it was supposed to deal with massive desertions.

It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that abreast of the importance of military capability, a functional Afghan prosperous government should be able to perform an exclusive control of society's confusion by the absolute supervision or undermining of traditional rule in the society.

5.4.1.7. Decentralized Government

It goes without saying that resistance to the Afghan government throughout both regimes was a popular phenomenon that was planned by masses; thus the governments were required to establish consolidated rule and decentralize control in order to handle effectively the resistance to their policies. It is likely that *Amanullah's* supreme authority and charismatic autocracy was more functional regarding managing public resistance compared to *the PDPA's* decentralized rule and control whose structure was based on tribalism and factionalism.

Despite the fact, that the Afghan army assisted *Amanullah* in coming to power, army's loyalty to his government remarkably diminished as a result of his policies that were suggested by his Turkish military advisors. Further, the king's policies regarding recruitment and prevention tribal leaders from running the army's affair disappointed the tribes with his government. Even Minister of War opposed his domestic policies and ignoring tribal sensitivities.

Common sense says that tribal resistance that collapsed King *Amanullah's* regime occurred apart from the resistance to his reform programme. Notwithstanding the reforms were more affected the urban population than tribal and rural population, there was no widespread resistance to the reforms in the urban area. Furthermore, tribal leaders and Afghan religious scholars found a shared purpose to upraise against government. Consequently, the king embarked on crushing tribal and religious leaders and systematically undermined their influence by his policies to establish a modern administrative and new political system. He replaced the previous traditional and local system with a contrived but advanced administration, in which local ruling bodies fundamentally substituted for loyal officials and government employees who enforced the government's policies and its authority on the lower classes. The king lost the loyalty of the army, which had supported him to attain power, as a result of his reforms within the army. It is worth pointing out that his efforts to implement social modernization did not threaten his government more than his measures to establish a consolidated government

between the two superpowers, Soviet and British. In addition, the phenomenon of tribal separatism during the *Amani* era, which appeared by virtue of lack of a dominant government, led to the bloody struggle between centralized power and Afghan tribes. Due to lack of a loyal army and also the desertion of the army unravelling this issue was unfeasible for the government.

The PDPA's ambition of establishing a modern socialist state forced them to embark on mass arrests, torture, and executions. Furthermore, owing to lack of popular support to perform its policies, *the PDPA* regime found itself in a critical position and also decentralized control. Furthermore, sweeping uprising all over the country and within the army became a potential menace to the stability of the government. Additionally, disunity within the party and the army offered an appropriate time for the Soviet to invade Afghanistan. It is particularly significant that the Soviets conducted systematic policy regarding taking advantage of intelligence service. In this regard, the *KhAD* that was instituted based on the Soviet *KGB* played a substantial function to suppress the opposition, as well as the consequential function of the Soviet advisors to direct the *KhAD's* agent cannot be disregarded (See Figure 4-4).

Despite the fact that *Karmal* made some efforts to unite the *Parchamis* and *Khalqis*, the consequence of none of them was constructive and not only it increased the disunity within the party, but also intensified the discontent and fragmentation into the army. It goes without saying that disunity within *the PDPA* and subsequently and lack of direct command over the army was so destructive and critical that the policy of recruitment was implemented to strengthen the weak position of the military establishment. The government embarked on organizing militia forces to handle Afghan rebel forces with the intention of establishing decentralized authority over the fractured country. However, it is quite clear that the policy in this regard was incapable of assisting the government to handle efficaciously the tribal rebel forces.

It is worth pointing out that even the Soviet authorities made some efforts to unify *the PDPA*. They comprehended that the only solution to stabilize Afghanistan was settlement of disunity within the party and developing the government domination throughout the country. In 1980, it was conducted a policy to strengthen *the PDPA's* domination into the rural and tribal regions. Although *the PDPA* was able to achieve somewhat a unity within the party before implementing the mentioned policy, it was not sustainable by some radical

elements of the party, and consequently it was undermined. Furthermore, lack of a stable and consolidated government in Afghanistan led to Soviet direct involvement in the country's affairs.

It is remarkable that when the country disposed of the tribal form of government, the government was supposed to create a consolidated and dominant administration. It goes without saying that along with the political and military weakness of *the PDPA* regime and expanding chaos in the country the sign of local and tribal rule was reappeared.

5.4.1.8. The importance of Local Control and Administration

The capability of instituting local administration under the control of a central government and implementing reform policies by a combination of local and state authority could be regarded one of the essential characteristics of a functional Afghan government. In this regard, *the PDPA* was not able to manage properly this important measure. In fact, it paid no heed to the fundamental issue of recognizing local forces and agencies within the framework of the central government. Although King *Amanullah* had performed better function, even in the *Amani* era like *the PDPA* regime the rivalry between the modern central government and traditional and local communities for local control was discernible. Consequently, local control and administration were the most momentous issues in the process modernizing the traditional ruling system that could be regarded as the actual roots of popular resistance to the government in Afghanistan's modern history.

King *Amanullah*, in order to rationalize and consolidate his government apparatus, established a national campaign. He founded a system of local control and administration through local elites at the local level. This new system of administration was composed of *Alaqadari* (sub-district) and *Woluswali* (district). In the beginning, he required popular support to cut the hand of British colonialism from Afghanistan; in this regard he implemented some policies to encourage local communities and gain their support. Accordingly, his reign became popular as his government mobilized local Ulema and tribal chief to create a strong military establishment to overcome British military. Additionally, his centralized government performed some transgressions against local communities' rights, such as the policies of extraction and taxation in the local areas. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that when his government had no longer control over the local administration and also it was incapable of handling properly traditional and religious forces lost its popular support.

As a matter of fact, King *Amanullah* could not organize a sophisticated local administration, in order to implement the consequential policy in the local community. Notwithstanding the king enabled local administration system, there was a substantial contrast between civilized and educated elites, who managed the local administration and the ordinary rural people. It is likely that the elites' function at the local community was not constructive.

In addition, lack of sufficient trained and skilful administrators in the local communities was another considerable point in this regard. The government's administrators, whose concerns were focused on maintaining or improving their own position and increasing their influence, did not function properly in the field of *Amanullah's* local administrative policies. It is worth pointing out that although the government by the policy of frequent transfer of its administrators endeavoured to prevent their influence in the local areas, the government, therefore, was incapable of establishing a stable relationship with the local community, and consequently it did not implement properly its reform at the local level.

Regarding state administration of *the PDPA* should be remarked that the Soviets regarded the Afghan communist government as party-state system of government, like the Soviet's system of authority. While *the PDPA* supposed, essentially the Afghan government as a result of extreme internal dispute within the party and disunity among the *Khalqis* and the *Parchamis* could not be matched the Soviet Communist party. It is quite clear that these complications disturbed the government administrations to run properly as a result of each faction's endeavour to strengthen its control of the various organization and administrative structure within the government. Further, the Soviet government sought to take advantage of local Afghan institutions to establish local and regional administration. It is worth pointing out that a substantial number of local institutions were largely bribed to achieve their collaboration regarding consolidating the government local administration structure.¹

Indeed, in this era lack of an organized and developed local control and administration resulted in strengthening self-governing, especially in the local communities. Although in many local communities there were *Shuras* (local councils), they were not organized and under the government control, as well as they did not systematically represent a specific

¹ For further information see: Minkov, Anton and Gregory Smolyneec, *4-D Soviet Style: Defence, Development, Diplomacy and Disengagement in Afghanistan During the Soviet Period Part 1: State Building*, Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol. 23 No. 2 (2010), P. 316- 320.

local community. Furthermore, *Shuras* were incapable of performing the function of the local administration because they did not have the capacity for making a good connection between the central government and local areas and putting into effect the government's policies.

The sphere of influence of *PDPA*'s government control was only in the urban, moreover, it retained full control in some strategic locations. It is particularly significant that in areas under resistance groups control and the opposition, and they implemented several administrative policies, principally regarding military and civilian matters. These administrative policies were assimilated *the PDPA*'s ones and demonstrated that the significance of the local administration was particularly deliberated by resistance groups as well.

5.4.2. Delineating Characteristics of Resistance to the Government

The substantial various characteristics of the resistance to the government are examined in this section. These distinguishing qualities are delineated based on scrutiny of the crisis phase of King *Amanullah* and the conflict phase of *the PDPA*.

5.4.2.1. Irregular Forces, Rebels

One of the momentous elements of the Afghan resistances was irregular and rebel forces. Afghan government have historically relied on irregular tribal and local forces such as militia and also on the other local and tribal units as a result of permanent lack of a reliable army. It goes without saying that the ruling years of both regimes saw many instances of the Afghan tribal resistance and their hit-and-run tactics against the central government or foreign invaders. The Great British army and Soviet Union's Red army were the prominent instances that faced with the Afghan tribes particularly the Pashtun. It is sometimes suggested that in consequence of Pashtun's habitation in the strategic passages of Afghanistan, they inevitably faced with foreign invaders and stubbornly defended their fatherland.¹

Besides the fact that the Afghan tribes' doctrine was established upon resistance to foreign aggressions, the foreign influence and interference was a favourable opportunity for Afghan divided tribes to be united for handling common and grave menace as well. Two

¹ For further information see: Fred Reinhard Dallmayr, *Border Crossings: Toward a Comparative Political Theory*, (Boston: Lexington Books, 1999), p. 113.

remarkable points are supposed to be highlighted in this regard; first, there were interactions between the irregular forces and the regular armies; second, the irregular forces had the popular support.

Notwithstanding the military operations of the irregular forces occurred at the local and regional level, their function caused national effects. The irregular forces assisted the government to defend the country, but nevertheless when the government's reform policies were against their beliefs and interests they functioned as anti-government and rebel forces. One of the outstanding situations regarding taking advantage of irregular forces was during the succession crisis following the assassination of *Habibullah Khan*, which resulted in King *Amanullah's* assumption of power. He prospered in managing the army and also most of the local tribal forces supported his government. It goes without saying that the same forces finally overthrew his regime.

Despite the fact that the communist government of *the PDPA* and its Soviet supporters did not have complete control of the irregular forces throughout the country, they relied upon militias to provide safety and legitimize the government. It goes without saying that reliance on militias caused new political equilibrium in Afghanistan. Subsequent to General *Tanai's* abortive coup, *Najibullah* could not trust the army anymore. He, therefore, increased the militia forces and also adopted some policies to organize them.¹

5.4.2.2. Local Population and Ethnic Groups

Local population and ethnic groups were other elements of the Afghan resistance. In both studied regimes the structure of the Afghan resistance to the government's reform policies local, tribal, ethnic. It goes without saying that none of the central governments was capable of controlling effectively the local, tribal areas, in consequence of the local population and ethnic groups' opposition to central government's reform policies. King *Amanullah* like his grandfather endeavoured to retain control over tribal leader while *the PDPA* regime was incapable of preserve its control, which led to strengthening the influence of tribal and ethnic groups and emergence of warlords against the central government.

¹ For further information see: Antonio Giustozzi, *War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan: 1978-1992*, p. 226.

It is particularly significant that tribal and ethnic groups like *qawm* were the main force of political mobilization and resistance to the government in two examined regimes. Furthermore, it goes without saying that these fundamental basis of Afghan identification were throughout both regimes were the dominant component of Afghan unity in handling external invasion.

During the *Amani* era, tribal and religious groups and the dominant ethnic groups like Pashtun were the major forces of opposition to the government. Further, they were the obstacle to modernizing the country and to consolidating the government's control over local areas. The conflict between the tribes and the central government principally was in consequence of the governments' efforts to abolish the tribal laws or regulations that were in contradiction to the new constitution. Both governments' desire was to restrict tribes' self-ruling system in order to decentralize their authority. The intellectual elites supposed that tribal chiefs to consolidate their self-ruling system took advantage of tribal laws, which could harm to centralize the government's control and implement the constitutional rule.

It is quite clear that throughout both regimes the most outstanding conflict between the Afghan government and tribal system was with the Pashtun tribes, which was in consequence of discordance of the *Pashtunwali* codes with the new constitution, approved by the Afghan governments. Consequently, along with the Afghan government's reform policies the country encountered opposition from the rural Pashtun tribes.

It is remarkable that sweeping anti-communist concerns after 1978 effectuated more extensive ethnic and tribal solidarity, which was the main root of resistance. Notwithstanding Afghan *Jihad* was against internal political structures that threatened directly traditional values, it was a front against an alien political and ideological invasion. Critical consequences of *Jihad* against the Soviets changed political equilibrium. Indeed, the Pashtuns were dominated ethnic group and well-armed among Afghan tribal community. However, *Jihad* against the Soviet invaders established some other ethnic groups like the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras that developed into being well-equipped and also well-trained tribes. Further, the Pashtuns fragmented into several limited Pashtun groups, which caused extensive ethnic and local groups became the strong basis to handle the Soviet invasion.

5.4.2.3. Importance of Islam

In Afghanistan's modern history Islam was an importance factor to unify the several ethnic, tribal, and linguistic groups and common denominator shared by Afghan solidarity groups; moreover, it was a primary source to provide legitimacy to the Afghan government. It is particularly significant that Islam had the function of source of legitimacy for two inconsistent purposes. From one point of view, as it was mentioned it provided political legitimacy to the Afghan governments; from another point of view local rebels took advantage of Islam to legitimise their uprising against the governments. Those disregarded their beliefs and values. Furthermore, Islam was a means to unite the people against foreign intervention like *Anglo-Afghan* wars, as well as based on Islam several tribal and local groups were united in opposition to King *Amanullah's* secular reform programme.

As a matter of fact, Islam was a favourable means for religious scholars and traditionalists to consolidate their position and handle reformers. It goes without saying that they regarded *Shariah* as the most reasonable interpretation of uprising against *Amanullah's* reform policies. It is worth pointing out that this consequential role of Islam during the *Amani* era could be comprehended during *the PDPA's* era as well. The communist government implemented particular aggressive anti-Muslim stance, promulgated Marxism, and abolished many Islamic laws and traditional rules that encouraged uprising of Islamists and traditionalists in the countryside.

In both cases, it was obvious that Muslim warriors and Afghan rival tribes unified under the flag of *Jihad* and faced with foreign invaders, the British and the Soviets, with the purpose of withdrawing them from their country. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that Islam had a fundamental function in provoking the resistance movements throughout Afghanistan's modern history.

It could be argued that the Afghan government was supposed to consider *Shariah* in its policies, and also it should consider religious and traditional beliefs of the society in its policies. Even though religious scholars did not have political power, their declaration of *Jihad* was the most powerful means of integrating rival forces to handle foreign invaders and infidel Afghan rulers.

5.4.2.4. *Xenophobic Resistance*

The Afghans' cultural xenophobia mobilised them against any foreign military occupying force, which could be regarded as another substantial factor regarding the origin of the Afghan resistance. It goes without saying that in both epochs superpowers' attempts to dominate Afghanistan were confronted with Afghan national resistance despite the fact that there were rivalry and disagreement among different Afghan groups. Indeed, Afghan people, in consequence of their xenophobic sentiments resisted to any invasion of their territory, either in the scale of alien invasion or in the scale of competition among Afghan tribes. It is particularly significant that in the scale of alien invasion Afghan's xenophobic sentiments were directed against traditional imperialists, Great Britain and USSR.

Reviewing the resistance movement throughout Afghanistan modern history demonstrates that Xenophobia would accomplished in Afghanistan when there were common feelings of hostility towards who had aggressive intentions to the country. *The Great Game* and the British and Russians aggressive intentions to Afghanistan provoked the Afghan tradition of xenophobic resistance. The British invasions resented the Afghan people and united the Afghan solidarity groups provoking the feeling of xenophobia. They, therefore, accomplished powerful resistance to Western cultural and political aggressions.

The British intervention in the *Khost* rebellion or the *Mangal* rebellion could be a remarkable example to illustrate the xenophobic feelings during the *Amani* era. *Abd al-Karim* from Indian British entered made some intercessions in the Afghan civil war. Despite the public inconvenience of the country's administration, the people maintained their neutrality in the *Paktia* war. Indeed, when they realized involving British spies in the *Paktia* rebellion, in addition to having religious neutrality, they retained their political neutrality as well. Thus, all people rose to support the government and were united against foreign intrusion (Ghobar 1981, 808). It is noteworthy that the young Afghan movement had a significant role in creating the spirit of independence and xenophobia among Afghan people.

It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that Afghan xenophobia as an aspect of Afghan culture could be attributed to the tribal and ethnic basis of the Afghan society. For instance, Pashtun's xenophobic tendencies that emanate from *Pashtunwali* codes could be highlighted as a huge tribal anti-foreign force in this regard.

In addition, the Great Britain in the third *Angolo Afghan* war and the Soviets following their invasion in 1979 confronted with the most common, effective and systemic xenophobia. Indeed, the Afghan tribes considered both of the mentioned invaders as a grave menace to the Afghan territorial integrity and to Islam. Consequently, they demonstrated a strong feeling of xenophobia, which mobilized them against foreign invasion. It is worth pointing out that when the government's policies disregarded Afghan tribes' autonomy, the tribes inevitably resisted to them, which demonstrates internal scale of Afghan's xenophobic resistance.

6. CONCLUSION




Figure 6-1: Structure of Chapter Six

6.1. A Summary of the Findings

Several efforts to modernize Afghanistan and decentralize Afghan government's authority throughout modern history of Afghanistan led to the failure. This study has scrutinized two periods of these efforts to illuminate the character of the resistances that bothered the governments to achieve their desired goals.

The blunder that was outstandingly disastrous to King *Amanullah's* and *the PDPA's* regimes was their negligence in considering appropriately the significant role of the local solidarity groups, whose influence were all-pervasive. In addition, the king during the first stage of his reforms comprehended that the mentioned groups could be either support or potential menace to stability of his government; thus, he made some efforts to attract their support, through *Jihad* proclamation and launching *pan-Islamism* movement. Nonetheless, *the PDPA's* government did not consider the mentioned groups neither as a support nor as a grave threat to their policies. The study has illustrated how King *Amanullah* at the outset of his reign handled the local solidarity groups and managed to attain the religious scholars' and tribal chiefs' supports to be united against the British hegemony. In other words, the king comprehended the national identity could be regarded as a consequential factor to bring together the different social and political forces in the country. It is worth pointing out that the king's regime, due to being an indigenous political system could recognize the significance of national identity in Afghanistan. However, *the PDPA* was a non-indigenous and as a consequence the authority could not even comprehend the Afghan national identity and made no effort to attain the support from the solidarity groups and also be united with against foreign hegemony.

King *Amanullah* taking advantage of the national identity was capable of attending the support of religious and traditional forces in the third *Angolo Afghan* war 1919. Indeed, the king as a result of the support from the mentioned forces was able to withdraw the British troops. It is worth pointing out that *Ulema* declaring *Jihad* against the British encouraged the popular forces to support the king, which effectuated that the government attained a substantial popular backing in the independence war. The king, unlike his predecessors, arranged many privileges for religious scholars and offered freedom to them in conducting the religious affairs at least in the first years of his reign. Consequently, religious leader were very satisfied with the king's approach and fulfilled a fundamental function in conducting the first stage of his reform programme. *The PDPA* regime initially

demonstrated no opposition to religious leaders and both *Taraki* and *Amin* endeavoured to recognize ostensibly their rights; however, the regime's policies were grave menace to the interests and principles of the religious class.

Despite the fact that the majority of the local solidarity groups initially supported *Amanullah's* regime and also demonstrated no opposition to *the PDPA's* regime, the clash commenced when the central government interfered in traditional rules and Islamic values with the intention of modifying them and fulfilling radical modernizations. These measures effectuated that *Amanullah's* government became deprived of the legitimacy, which was granted by religious elites as well as *the PDPA* never could obtain even a minimum level of it from religious elites.

It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that King *Amanullah's* initial policies to attain the support of the local solidarity groups were unstable owing to his political and social modifications. The king secularized and westernized his reform programme particularly following his journey to Europe in 1928, which inevitably resulted in failure of his reforms and collapse of his government. Furthermore, it goes without saying that when *the PDPA's* government's modernization programme trampled the Afghan traditional rules, the society demonstrated intense resistance to the state policies, as well as diverse elements of the society as a consequence of having a common threat became a united force to preserve their values.

It is particularly significant that both regimes' reforms as a result of their anti-religious and anti-tribal characters accomplished alien social and political rules in the country, and they, therefore, challenged with several grave reactions from the public against the alien rules. It is likely that Islam could be designated as a common character among all the resistance movements. Indeed, it was the connection point for different local solidarity groups and the main pillar of Afghan identity and thus every irreconcilable policy in this regard was doomed to failure. Additionally, such ideological background along with tribal identity empowered the local solidarity groups to be as the most determinative forces in the Afghan society. It is likewise worth pointing out that in consequence of intensifying international challenges such as *the Great Game* and *the Cold War* in twentieth centuries and simultaneously fulfilling modernization efforts, the function of Islam to coalesce the several Afghan tribal and local groups into a united force and protecting Islamic and tribal values became specifically essential. Furthermore, owing to such circumstances both

Shariah and *Pashtunwali* regarded critical menace from the external factors and also from the governments' modernization programmes, and they, therefore, were coerced into reacting.

It goes without saying that both studied regimes adopted some policies to centralized their controls and decentralize their authorities. It is quite clear that conducting such policies in the Afghan society, whose foundation was based on traditional and tribal factors, were so critical to the administrations. Although King *Amanullah* Kahn sought to arrange an organized army, neither his regime nor *the PDPA's* one had a reliable army to assist them in centralizing their controls and decentralizing their authorities. It is particularly significant that the regimes' policies in this regard were absolutely critical to local solidarity groups' authority and also for their traditional power. Accordingly, they challenged authorities to reclaim their traditional function and influence. Furthermore, another group that was overwhelmed by the regimes' mentioned policies was the religious one that was deprived of its privileges and also the authorities disregarded its beliefs. Thus, they were integrated into the local solidarity groups and supported anti-government revolts throughout the country. There can be no doubt that in consequence of lack of an organized army none of the regimes were capable of managing effectively the opposition.

It is worth pointing out that none of the regimes regarded an appropriate proposal to implement the reforms. The first case study demonstrates the remarkable function of the king's Turkish advisers in the process of reform-making and the second case highlights the Russians' performance in this regard. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that Turks and Russians advised the Afghan government according to the western method of change and improvement, which was very inappropriate for the Afghan society, was unfamiliar with such method of improvement.

It goes without saying that the authorities enforced the reforms on the society with the intention of implementing radical change in the country, regardless paying sufficient attention to the social and political background of the country. Although the regimes seemed to be very desirous to modernize the country, their aggressive policies to impose their hasty reforms on the Afghan people demonstrate that they were substantially far from principles of the modernization.

Amanullah's regime provided conditions for tribal chiefs and religious elites to attain political power more than any other Afghan regimes. It goes without saying that

achievement initial legitimacy, attainment tribal support and subsequently accomplishment some political success could be regarded as results of adopting such policy. In addition, *the PDPA's* regime did not consider religious and tribal factors as supportive factors in the implementation of its policies. Consequently, the opposition challenged the government's policies from the beginning, and it, therefore, requested the foreign support to implement its policies.

It is worth pointing out that none of the regimes had adequate financial resources to implement the reform programme; therefore, conducting fundamental economic reforms before social and political ones were very essential. Nonetheless, the authorities disregarded the fact that proposing some particular reforms to solve economic problems of the people were supposed to be observed as a priority. Despite the fact that both regimes implemented the fiscal and tax reforms, their outcomes imposed further tax and economic pressure on the people.

Although *Amanullah's* reforms did not attain the desired goals, there is not a shadow of doubt that it was the termination of backwardness of the country and also provided the background for making further reforms by the subsequent regimes especially *the PDPA*. One could draw the conclusion that both regimes' administrative efforts were capable of conducting the country's administration system in the course of development. Furthermore, their educational and cultural activities significantly raised the general knowledge of the Afghan people and largely moderated traditionalism and radicalism in the Afghan society.

It is particularly significant that Afghanistan owing to its strategic position was the scene of the rivalry between the great powers. As a result, it became a buffer state between Russia and Britain from the late nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth century. The colonial competition between these colonial powers, known as *the Great Game*, effectuated the phenomenon of foreign intervention and invasions of Afghanistan. *Amanullah's* policy was initially based on opposition to British colonialism and fulfilling nationalism. Although Afghanistan could gain independence from the British in August 1919, the British retained involvement in Afghanistan's internal affairs. When, the Soviet observed Britain's position in Afghanistan endeavoured to establish a good relationship with the king and due to that the country became the scene of rivalry between Britain and the Soviet.

It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the Soviet Union assisted the communist regime of *the PDPA* to rise to power with the intention of increasing its domination in Afghanistan, as well as *the Cold War* resulted in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although it is believed that the *Khalq* faction encouraged the Soviet to attack Afghanistan, there were many other reasons for the Soviet invasion. Indeed, it goes without saying that *the PDPA* was incapable of fulfilling the Soviet interests and handling *Mujahidin's* opposition. It is worth pointing out that Afghanistan was an important crossroad in the region between India, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. Accordingly, the Soviet wanted to reach closer to Iran's oil field and trade way through Indian Ocean.

Indeed, superpowers' intervention and subsequently their invasion along with internal conflict and competition destabilized the foundations of the state and effectuated instability in Afghanistan. It is quite clear that owing to superpowers' substantial influence on the Afghan state each policy to handle the internal disorders from the beginning was doomed to failure. This is because foreign agents forced the Afghan authorities to regard their policies and interests in implementing any kind of change and modification. Furthermore, by virtue of competition between religious intellectual and tribal chiefs an opportunity was provided for foreigners to implement their policies in Afghanistan, thus each group of elites that took the power need foreign support to maintain its power.

It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that resistances of traditional forces such as tribal and religious groups to the central government were the primary factors, and rivalries and interventions of the superpowers such as Russia and Britain were the secondary factors in disrupting the modernizing process and failure of the reformist regimes throughout Afghanistan's modern history.

6.2. Recommendations

Centralizing the power and decentralizing the authority in Afghanistan are particularly in need of human and financial resources. The arrangement of these necessities is essentially related to fulfilling unity between local solidarity groups and the central government. Furthermore, such unity can be only established by a political structure that regarded tribal and religious requirements and regarded the local solidarity groups' rights. It is quite clear that an aggressive and oppressive policy like *the PDPA's* does not assist the government to provide a strong sense of unity in the country. It is worth pointing out that the government should be regarded the consequential role of the tribal and religious elites, whose support

can provide legitimacy and popularity for it. Besides, the mentioned elites could fill the historical gaps the Afghan people and the Afghan government.

It does not seem unreasonable to recommend that an Afghan government should be originated from the heart of society and its policies are supposed to be matched with the people's demands. This importance is an essential strategy to legitimize and nationalize the apparatus of the government. Furthermore, the authority is supposed to fulfil the requests of the people regardless of their political and social orientations. A functional and responsible political system in Afghanistan requires a constitution that considers national interests. It is worth pointing out that providing further power for the local and tribal forces would increase domestic support for the government and also decentralize the Afghan authority.

The Afghan government is supposed to provide the condition to improve the education system. It is particularly significant that the important and essential step in developing Afghanistan is conducting reforms in the education system, which could assist the Afghan society to release from the superstition and traditional beliefs. Besides, it could likewise provide professional and educated staff for the government.

Foreign support is significant for the Afghan government in implementing its policies. In addition, the foreign powers seek for their own interests in Afghanistan, which are incompatible with the Afghan people's interests. Making fundamental and consequential reforms and put Afghanistan on the course of development without foreign support are problematic; however, foreign powers should endeavour to implement supportive policies instead of interventionist policies.

6.3. Avenues of Future Research

Nationalist-reformist movements throughout the twentieth century in the Middle Eastern countries such as Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, initiated to examine cautiously the Western methods and procedures of political and social reforms in order to provide adaptable reforms for the Islamic societies and their administrative system. In some countries, these reforms were successful and in others, they were faced with the resistance and failure. This thesis has focused on the two epochs of reform and resistance in Afghanistan in the twentieth century, and regarded some factors as the roots of the failure of the Afghan reformist regimes. The similar factors might be the reasons for the resistance and failure of

the reform attempts in the other countries like Iran, which could be suggested as an idea of further research in this regard.

The two most influential groups in Afghanistan that always played remarkable function along with the Afghan governments were religious and tribal groups. This thesis focused on their resistance to the government's reform programme, which disturbed the government in conducting successfully their policies. Furthermore, there were internal challenges among several tribal groups that offered further opportunity for the superpowers to seek their interests in Afghanistan that invites further research to scrutinize tribal challenges in this regard.

Finally, the current Afghan government's policies and resistance to them might be another field of the study to discover the reasons for the resistance to the government's policies and also scrutinize that the historical roots of the failure of the government's policies are still functioning or not.

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8. APPENDICES

8.1. The Constitution of Afghanistan April 9, 1923¹

NIZAMNAMAH-YE-ASASI-E-DAULAT-E-ALIYAH-E-AFGHANISTAN, 20 HAMAL 1302

FROM THE PERSIAN TEXT, WHICH IS A TRANSLATION FROM THE ORIGINAL PASHTU TRANSLATED BY M.A. ANSARI UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF LEON B. POULLADA WITH CORRECTIONS AND VERIFICATION BY FARUQ FARHANG.

ARTICLE 1

AFGHANISTAN IS COMPLETELY FREE AND INDEPENDENT IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF ITS DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS. ALL PARTS AND AREAS OF THE COUNTRY ARE UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HIS MAJESTY THE KING AND ARE TO BE TREATED AS A SINGLE UNIT WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE COUNTRY.

ARTICLE 2

THE RELIGION OF AFGHANISTAN IS THE SACRED RELIGION OF ISLAM. FOLLOWERS OF OTHER RELIGIONS SUCH AS JEWS AND HINDUS RESIDING IN AFGHANISTAN ARE ENTITLED TO THE FULL PROTECTION OF THE STATE PROVIDED THEY DO NOT DISTURB THE PUBLIC PEACE. (SEE APPENDIX B)

ARTICLE 3

KABUL IS THE CAPITAL OF AFGHANISTAN BUT ALL THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN ARE ENTITLED TO RECEIVE EQUAL TREATMENT FROM THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF KABUL ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ANY SPECIAL PRIVILEGES NOT EXTENDED TO THE PEOPLE OF OTHER CITIES AND VILLAGES OF THE COUNTRY.

ARTICLE 4

IN VIEW OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SERVICES RENDERED TO THE CAUSE OF PROGRESS AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE AFGHAN NATION BY HIS MAJESTY THE KING, THE NOBLE NATION OF AFGHANISTAN PLEDGES ITSELF TO THE ROYAL SUCCESSION OF HIS LINE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF MALE INHERITANCE THROUGH SELECTION TO HE MADE HIS MAJESTY AND BY THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN. HIS MAJESTY THE KING ON ASCENDING THE THRONE WILL PLEDGE TO THE NOBLES AND TO THE PEOPLE THAT HE WILL RULE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN THE SHARIA AND IN THIS CONSTITUTION AND THAT HE WILL PROTECT THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE COUNTRY AND REMAIN FAITHFUL TO HIS NATION.

ARTICLE 5

HIS MAJESTY THE KING IS THE SERVANT AND THE PROTECTOR OF THE TRUE RELIGION OF ISLAM AND HE IS THE RULER AND KING OF ALL THE SUBJECTS OF AFGHANISTAN.

ARTICLE 6

THE AFFAIRS OF THE COUNTRY ARE ADMINISTERED BY THE MINISTERS OF THE GOVERNMENT WHO ARE SELECTED AND APPOINTED BY THE KING. EACH MINISTER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS MINISTRY; THEREFORE THE KING IS NOT RESPONSIBLE.

ARTICLE 7

MENTION OF THE KING'S NAME IN THE KHUTBA (FRIDAY PRAYERS); MINTING OF COINS IN THE KING'S NAME; DETERMINATION OF THE RANK OF OFFICIALS IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPROPRIATE LAWS; AWARDING OF MEDALS AND DECORATIONS; SELECTION AND APPOINTMENT, DISMISSAL AND TRANSFER OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER MINISTERS; RATIFICATION OF PUBLIC LAWS, PROMULGATION AND PROTECTION OF PUBLIC LAWS AND OF THE SHARIA; BEING COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF ALL THE ARMED FORCES OF AFGHANISTAN; PROMULGATION AND PROTECTION OF MILITARY RULES AND REGULATIONS; DECLARING WAR, MAKING PEACE AND OTHER TREATIES; GRANTING AMNESTY, PARDONING AND COMMUTING LEGAL PUNISHMENTS; ARE AMONG THE RIGHTS OF HIS MAJESTY THE KING. GENERAL RIGHTS OF THE SUBJECTS OF AFGHANISTAN

ARTICLE 8

ALL PERSONS RESIDING IN THE KINGDOM OF AFGHANISTAN, WITHOUT RESPECT TO RELIGIOUS OR SECTARIAN DIFFERENCES, ARE CONSIDERED TO BE SUBJECTS OF AFGHANISTAN. AFGHAN CITIZENSHIP MAY BE OBTAINED OR LOST IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE APPROPRIATE LAW.

ARTICLE 9

ALL SUBJECTS OF AFGHANISTAN ARE ENDOWED WITH PERSONAL LIBERTY AND ARE PROHIBITED FROM ENCROACHING ON THE LIBERTY OF OTHERS. (SEE APPENDIX B)

ARTICLE 10

PERSONAL FREEDOM IS IMMUNE FROM ALL FORMS OF VIOLATION OR ENCROACHMENT. NO PERSON MAY BE ARRESTED OR PUNISHED OTHER THAN PURSUANT TO AN ORDER ISSUED BY A SHARIA COURT OR IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISION OF

¹ <http://www.afghangovernment.com/Constitution1923.htm> (accessed on June 12, 2014).

APPROPRIATE LAWS. THE PRINCIPLE OF SLAVERY IS COMPLETELY ABOLISHED. NO MAN OR WOMAN CAN EMPLOY OTHERS AS SLAVES.

ARTICLE 11

THE PRESS AND THE PUBLICATION OF DOMESTIC NEWSPAPERS IS FREE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPROPRIATE PRESS LAW. THE RIGHT TO PUBLISH NEWSPAPERS IS RESERVED TO THE GOVERNMENT AND TO CITIZENS OF AFGHANISTAN. FOREIGN PUBLICATION MAY BE REGULATED OR RESTRICTED BY THE GOVERNMENT.

ARTICLE 12

SUBJECTS OF AFGHANISTAN SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE PRIVATE COMPANIES FOR PURPOSES OF COMMERCE, INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE RESPECTIVE LAWS.

ARTICLE 13

SUBJECTS OF AFGHANISTAN SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO SUBMIT INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE PETITIONS TO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FOR THE REDRESS OF ACTS COMMITTED BY OFFICIAL OR OTHERS AGAINST THE SHARIA OR OTHER LAWS OF THE COUNTRY. IN APPROPRIATE CASES IF SUCH PETITIONS ARE NOT HEEDDED CITIZENS MAY APPEAL SUCCESSIVELY TO HIGHER AUTHORITIES AND IN CASE THEY STILL FEEL AGGRIEVED THEY MAY APPEAL DIRECTLY TO THE KING.

ARTICLE 14

EVERY SUBJECT OF AFGHANISTAN HAS THE RIGHT TO AN EDUCATION AT NO COST AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPROPRIATE CURRICULUM. FOREIGNERS ARE NOT PERMITTED TO OPERATE SCHOOLS IN AFGHANISTAN BUT ARE NOT BARRED FROM BEING EMPLOYED AS TEACHERS.

ARTICLE 15

ALL SCHOOLS IN AFGHANISTAN ARE UNDER THE CONTROL, SUPERVISION, AND INSPECTION OF THE GOVERNMENT WHICH IS CHARGED WITH DEVELOPING THE SCIENTIFIC AND NATIONAL EDUCATION OF ALL CITIZENS ON THE BASIS OF UNITY AND DISCIPLINE BUT THE METHODS AND TEACHING OF THE BELIEFS AND RELIGIONS OF PROTECTED AND REFUGEE SUBJECTS (HINDUS AND JEWS) SHALL NOT BE INTERFERED WITH.

ARTICLE 16

ALL SUBJECTS OF AFGHANISTAN HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES TO THE COUNTRY IN ACCORDANCE WITH SHARIA AND THE LAWS OF THE STATE.

ARTICLE 17

ALL SUBJECTS OF AFGHANISTAN SHALL BE ELIGIBLE FOR EMPLOYMENT IN THE CIVIL SERVICE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR QUALIFICATIONS AND ABILITIES AND WITH THE NEEDS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

ARTICLE 18

ALL DETERMINED FORMS OF TAXATION ARE TO BE COLLECTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPROPRIATE LAWS AND IN PROPORTION TO THE WEALTH AND POWER OF THE CITIZEN.

ARTICLE 19

IN AFGHANISTAN EVERYONE'S REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY IN HIS POSSESSION IS PROTECTED. IF REAL PROPERTY IS REQUIRED BY THE GOVERNMENT FOR A PUBLIC PURPOSE THEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF A SPECIAL LAW, FIRST THE PRICE OF THE PROPERTY SHALL BE PAID AND THEN IT MAY BE EXPROPRIATED.

ARTICLE 20

THE DWELLINGS AND HOMES OF ALL AFGHAN SUBJECTS ARE SACROSANCT AND NEITHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS NOR OTHERS MAY VIOLATE A SUBJECT'S HOME WITHOUT HIS PERMISSION OR DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

ARTICLE 21

IN THE COURTS OF JUSTICE ALL DISPUTES AND CASES WILL BE DECIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF SHARIA AND OF GENERAL CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAWS,

ARTICLE 22

CONFISCATION AND FORCED LABOR IS ABSOLUTELY PROHIBITED EXCEPT THAT DURING TIME OF WAR, LABOR SERVICES MAY BE REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF APPROPRIATE LAWS.

ARTICLE 23

EXCEPT AS PROVIDED IN THE LAWS OF THE STATE (NIZAMNAMAH) NOTHING WILL BE REQUISITIONED FROM ANYONE.

ARTICLE 24

ALL TYPES OF TORTURE ARE HEREBY PROHIBITED. NO PUNISHMENT MAY BE IMPOSED ON ANY PERSON EXCEPT AS PROVIDED IN THE GENERAL PENAL CODE AND THE MILITARY PENAL CODE. (SEE APPENDIX B)

MINISTERS

ARTICLE 25

THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE GOVERNMENT IS VESTED IN THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND INDEPENDENT DEPARTMENTS (IDARAH-YE-MUSTAQEL).

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS IS HIS MAJESTY THE KING. IN HIS ABSENCE THE ACTING CHAIRMAN WILL BE THE PRIME MINISTER OR IN HIS ABSENCE THE MINISTER HEADING THE RANKING MINISTRY. (SEE APPENDIX B)

ARTICLE 26

WHEN AN ACTING MINISTER IS APPOINTED IN THE ABSENCE OF A MINISTER, THE ACTING MINISTER WILL HAVE ALL THE AUTHORITY AND RIGHTS OF THE MINISTER.

ARTICLE 27

A SPECIAL HIGH ASSEMBLY (DARBAR-E-ALI) WILL BE CONVENED EACH YEAR BEFORE THE INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATIONS ON A DAY TO BE DETERMINED BY HIS MAJESTY THE KING. THIS ASSEMBLY WILL BE UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF HIS MAJESTY THE KING AND WILL BE COMPOSED OF THE HIGH OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE ELDERS OF THE PEOPLE, THE NOBLES AND OTHERS SELECTED SPECIALLY BY THE KING. IN THIS ASSEMBLY EVERY MINISTER AND THE HEADS OF INDEPENDENT DEPARTMENTS WILL REPORT IN OPEN SESSION ON THE ACHIEVEMENTS AND SERVICES RENDERED DURING THE PAST YEAR.

ARTICLE 28

HIS MAJESTY THE KING WILL SELECT AND APPOINT THE PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER MINISTERS.

ARTICLE 29

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WILL FORMULATE THE FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES OF THE GOVERNMENT. DECISIONS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, TREATIES, AGREEMENTS AND OTHER MATTERS THAT MAY REQUIRE RATIFICATION BY HIS MAJESTY THE KING WILL BECOME EFFECTIVE ONLY AFTER SUCH RATIFICATION.

ARTICLE 30

EVERY MINISTER WILL EXECUTE THE DUTIES APPROPRIATE TO HIS MINISTRY TO THE FULL EXTENT OF HIS AUTHORITY. MATTERS APPROPRIATE FOR DECISION BY THE KING WILL BE REFERRED TO HIM AND MATTERS GOVERNED BY THE REGULATIONS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WILL BE REFERRED TO IT. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WILL DISCUSS THE MATTERS REFERRED TO IT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS SPECIAL LAW AND SIGN THE DECISION AND VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THE COUNCIL.

ARTICLE 31

ALL MINISTERS ARE RESPONSIBLE TO HIS MAJESTY THE KING BOTH REGARDING THE GENERAL POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT AS A WHOLE AND THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MINISTER HIMSELF.

ARTICLE 32

ORAL COMMUNICATIONS AND COMMANDS FROM HIS MAJESTY THE KING TO MINISTERS SHOULD BE REDUCED TO WRITING AND SIGNED BY THE KING.

ARTICLE 33

TRIALS FOR OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT OF MINISTERS WILL TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE HIGH COURT (DIWAN-E-ALI) IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SPECIAL LAW ON THIS MATTER. TRIALS FOR PERSONAL MISCONDUCT OUTSIDE THE PURVIEW OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE COURTS OF JUSTICE AS FOR ORDINARY CITIZENS.

ARTICLE 34

A MINISTER WHO IS ACCUSED BEFORE THE HIGH COURT WILL BE SUSPENDED FROM HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES PENDING THE OUTCOME OF HIS TRIAL.

ARTICLE 35

THE SIZE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE VARIOUS MINISTRIES AND THEIR OFFICES AND DUTIES ARE PRESCRIBED IN THE LAW ENTITLED BASIC ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN (NIZAMNAMAH-YE-TASHKILAT-E-ASASIYAH -E- AFGHANISTAN)

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

ARTICLE 36

OFFICIALS WILL BE APPOINTED ON THE BASIS OF COMPETENCE AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPROPRIATE LAWS. NO OFFICIAL CAN BE DISMISSED UNLESS HE RESIGNS OR FOR MISCONDUCT OR FOR THE BEST INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT. OFFICIALS WHO MAINTAIN GOOD PERFORMANCE RECORDS WILL BE CONSIDERED WORTHY OF PROMOTION AND EVENTUAL PENSION.

ARTICLE 37

DUTIES OF OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED IN APPROPRIATE LEGISLATION. EVERY OFFICIAL WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUCH LEGISLATION.

ARTICLE 38

ALL OFFICIALS ARE REQUIRED TO OBEY THE LAWFUL ORDERS OF THEIR SUPERIORS. IF AN ORDER IS DEEMED BY AN OFFICIAL TO BE WITHOUT SANCTION OF LAW IT IS HIS DUTY TO REFER THE MATTER TO THE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES OF THE MINISTRY. IF HE EXECUTES SUCH AN ILLEGAL ORDER WITHOUT FIRST HAVING REFERRED IT TO THE CENTRAL AUTHORITY OF HIS MINISTRY, HE WILL BE CONSIDERED TO BE EQUALLY RESPONSIBLE WITH THE OFFICIAL WHO GAVE THE ORDER.

PROVINCIAL COUNCILS AND THE STATE COUNCIL

ARTICLE 39

THERE IS HEREBY ESTABLISHED A STATE COUNCIL IN THE CAPITAL OF THE KINGDOM AND LOCAL COUNCILS IN THE PROVINCES AND DISTRICT CENTERS, THESE COUNCILS TO ACT AS ADVISORY BODIES. (TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: DISTRICT CENTERS CONSISTED OF FIVE DIFFERENT LEVELS LESS IMPORTANT THAN A PROVINCE. THESE WERE:

- 1) HUQUMAT-E-ALA, OR HIGH GOVERNORSHIP, WHICH WAS EQUIVALENT TO A PROVINCE BUT SMALLER OR LESS IMPORTANT.**
- 2) HUQUMATI OF 1ST, 2ND, OR 3RD DEGREES WHICH DEPENDED FROM THE PROVINCIAL OR HUQUMATI-E-ALA GOVERNMENTS; AND**
- 3) ALAQADRI OR DISTRICTS WHICH DEPENDED FROM THE HUQUMATI.)**

ARTICLE 40

MEMBERSHIP IN THE STATE AND LOCAL ADVISORY COUNCILS CONSISTS OF BOTH APPOINTED AND ELECTED MEMBER.

ARTICLE 41

APPOINTED MEMBERS OF THE ADVISORY COUNCILS ARE THOSE OFFICIALS ENUMERATED IN THE LAW ON THE BASIC ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN. THE APPOINTED MEMBERS OF THE STATE COUNCIL ARE DIRECTLY SELECTED AND APPOINTED BY THE KING. THE NUMBER OF APPOINTED MEMBERS WILL BE EQUAL TO THE NUMBER OF ELECTED MEMBERS. THE ELECTED MEMBERS WILL BE SELECTED AND APPOINTED BY THE PEOPLE. SEPARATE ARTICLES IN THE LAW ON THE BASIC ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN PRESCRIBE THE ELECTION PROCEDURES FOR THESE MEMBERS.

ARTICLE 42

THE STATE AND LOCAL COUNCILS IN ADDITION TO THOSE DUTIES PRESCRIBED IN THE BASIC ORGANIZATION LAW WILL:

- A) MAKE SUGGESTIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF INDUSTRY, COMMERCE, AGRICULTURE, AND EDUCATION.**

B) PETITION THE GOVERNMENT REGARDING ANY IRREGULARITIES IN MATTERS OF TAXATION OR GENERAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION WITH A VIEW TO DEMANDING REMEDIAL ACTION (SEE APPENDIX B)

C) COMPLAIN TO THE GOVERNMENT REGARDING ANY VIOLATIONS OF THE BASIC RIGHTS CONFERRED UPON THE PEOPLE BY THIS CONSTITUTION.

ARTICLE 43

SUGGESTIONS, PETITIONS, OR COMPLAINTS BY THE ADVISORY COUNCILS WILL BE PRESENTED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE TO THE GOVERNOR OR EXECUTIVE OFFICIAL OF THE DISTRICT PERTAINING TO THE COUNCIL. SUCH GOVERNOR OR OTHER LOCAL OFFICIAL WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY. IF SUCH MEASURES WOULD GO BEYOND THE SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY HE WILL FORWARD THE MATTER TO THE APPROPRIATE MINISTRY WHICH IN TURN WILL TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION OR IN APPROPRIATE CASES WILL PROCEED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 30 HEREOF OR IF THE MATTER BE ONE OF LEGAL NATURE THEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 46 HEREOF.

ARTICLE 44

IF WITHIN A MONTH AFTER PRESENTING A PETITION, SUGGESTION, OR COMPLAINT TO THE GOVERNOR OR OTHER LOCAL OFFICIAL, THE ADVISORY COUNCIL HAS NOT RECEIVED A REPLY, IT MAY ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE FORWARD THE MATTER DIRECTLY TO THE STATE COUNCIL.

ARTICLE 45

THE STATE COUNCIL WILL THEREUPON PREPARE AN OPINION ON THE CASE AND FORWARD IT TO THE APPROPRIATE MINISTRY. IF THE MINISTRY DELAYS ACTION OF THE CASE THE STATE COUNCIL SHALL FORWARD IT DIRECTLY TO HIS MAJESTY THE KING.

ARTICLE 46

LEGISLATION PREPARED AND PROPOSED BY THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE SCRUTINIZED BY THE STATE COUNCIL AND THEN PASSED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS FOR FURTHER EXAMINATION. IF APPROVED IN BOTH BODIES THEY MAY THEN FORWARD IT TO HIS MAJESTY THE KING FOR RATIFICATION, AFTER WHICH SUCH LEGISLATION BECOMES THE LAW OF THE LAND.

ARTICLE 47

IN ADDITION TO THE PERMANENT APPOINTED MEMBERS OF THE STATE COUNCIL, CERTAIN HIGH RANKING CIVIL SERVANTS AND MILITARY OFFICIALS ABOVE THE RANK OF DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS AND GOVERNORS GENERAL AND FROM THE MILITARY RANK OF LEWA MISHR (BRIGADIER GENERAL) RESPECTIVELY, MAY BE APPOINTED AS TEMPORARY MEMBERS OF THE STATE COUNCIL UNTIL THEIR APPOINTMENT TO A NEW POST, PROVIDED THEY HAVE NOT BEEN RELIEVED FROM DUTY AWAITING TRIAL.

ARTICLE 48

THE STATE COUNCIL WILL REVIEW THE YEARLY BUDGET PREPARED BY THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE IN THE MANNER PRESCRIBED IN THE GENERAL LAW OF THE BUDGET (NIZAMNAMAH-YE-BUJET).

ARTICLE 49

THE STATE COUNCIL WILL REVIEW ALL CONTRACTS AND TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS MADE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND FOREIGNERS.

THE COURTS

ARTICLE 50

ALL TRIALS IN COURTS OF JUSTICE WILL BE PUBLIC PROVIDED THAT FOR CERTAIN SPECIAL MATTERS ENUMERATED IN THE GENERAL LAW ON COURTS (NIZAMNAMAH -YE-MOHAKAM), THE JUDGE MAY PRESCRIBE A CLOSED TRIAL.

ARTICLE 51

EVERY CITIZEN OR PERSON APPEARING BEFORE A COURT OF JUSTICE MAY USE ANY LEGITIMATE MEANS TO INSURE PROTECTION OF HIS RIGHTS.

ARTICLE 52

COURTS OF JUSTICE WILL NOT DELAY THE HEARING AND SETTLING OF CASES WHICH IT IS THEIR DUTY TO HEAR.

ARTICLE 53

ALL COURTS OF JUSTICE ARE FREE FROM ALL TYPES OF INTERFERENCE AND INTERVENTION.

ARTICLE 54

THE VARIOUS TYPES AND HIERARCHY OF COURTS ARE SET FORTH IN THE LAW ON THE BASIC ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN.

ARTICLE 55

NO SPECIAL COURT TO HEAR AND ADJUDICATE A SPECIAL CASE OR ISSUE MAY BE ESTABLISHED OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE REGULAR JUDICIARY.

THE HIGH COURT

ARTICLE 56

A HIGH COURT WILL BE ESTABLISHED ON A TEMPORARY BASIS FROM TIME TO TIME FOR THE SPECIAL PURPOSE OF TRIALS OF MINISTERS. AFTER COMPLETING ITS TASK IT WILL BE DISSOLVED.

ARTICLE 57

THE ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES OF THE HIGH COURT WILL BE PRESCRIBED IN A SPECIAL LAW.

FINANCIAL AFFAIRS

ARTICLE 58

COLLECTION OF ALL STATE TAXES WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL LAWS ON TAXATION.

ARTICLE 59

A YEARLY BUDGET DETAILING THE INCOME AND EXPENDITURES OF THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE PREPARED AND ALL REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES OF THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BUDGET.

ARTICLE 60

AT THE END OF EACH YEAR A FINANCIAL REPORT WILL BE PREPARED RELATING ACCRUAL REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES OF THE PREVIOUS YEAR TO THOSE DETAILED IN THE BUDGET.

ARTICLE 61

IN ACCORDANCE WITH A SPECIAL LAW PASSED FOR THIS PURPOSE, AN AUDITING OFFICE WILL BE ESTABLISHED. THE PRINCIPAL FUNCTION OF THE AUDITING OFFICE WILL BE TO INQUIRE AND REPORT WHETHER THE REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES OF THE GOVERNMENT HAVE ACTUALLY COINCIDED WITH THOSE PRESCRIBED IN THE BUDGET.

ARTICLE 62

THE ORGANIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINANCIAL REPORT AND OF THE BUDGET IS PRESCRIBED IN A SPECIAL LAW PASSED FOR THIS PURPOSE. THE ADMINISTRATION OF PROVINCES

ARTICLE 63

PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION IS BASED ON THREE BASIC PRINCIPLES:

- 1) DECENTRALIZATION OF AUTHORITY;**
- 2) CLEAR DELINEATION OF DUTIES;**
- 3) CLEAR DETERMINATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES.**

ALL THE DUTIES OF PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN DETERMINED ON THE BASIS OF THE ABOVE PRINCIPLES AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PERTINENT LAWS. THE AUTHORITY OF THESE OFFICIALS IS LIKEWISE LIMITED BY THESE PRINCIPLES AND LAWS AND EVERY OFFICIAL IS RESPONSIBLE TO HIS SUPERIOR ON THE SAME BASIS.

ARTICLE 64

BRANCH OFFICES OF THE MINISTRIES ARE ESTABLISHED IN THE PROVINCES, AND CITIZENS, DEPENDING ON THE SUBJECT MATTER, SHOULD INITIALLY HAVE RECOURSE TO THESE BRANCH OFFICES FOR HELP IN SOLVING THEIR PROBLEMS.

ARTICLE 65

IF THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE CITIZENS CANNOT BE FOUND BY THE OFFICIALS OF THESE MINISTRY BRANCHES, OR IF THESE OFFICIALS DO NOT DISPOSE OF THE CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS, THE AGGRIEVED CITIZEN MAY HAVE RECOURSE TO THE SUPERIOR OFFICIALS OF THE MINISTRY BRANCHES OR IF NECESSARY TO THE DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS OR GOVERNORS GENERAL.

ARTICLE 66

THE ORGANIZATION, FUNCTIONS, AND DUTIES OF MUNICIPALITIES HAVE BEEN SET FORTH IN THE SPECIAL LAW ON MUNICIPALITIES (NIZAMNAMAH-YE-BALADIYAH).

ARTICLE 67

MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY ADMINISTRATION MAY BE PROCLAIMED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN ANY PART OF THE COUNTRY IN WHICH SIGNS OF DISOBEDIENCE AND REBELLION ARE SUCH AS TO DISTURB THE PUBLIC SECURITY.

MISCELLANEOUS ARTICLES

ARTICLE 68

ELEMENTARY EDUCATION IS COMPULSORY FOR ALL CITIZENS OF AFGHANISTAN. THE VARIOUS CURRICULA AND BRANCHES OF KNOWLEDGE ARE DETAILED IN A SPECIAL LAW AND THEY WILL BE IMPLEMENTED.

ARTICLE 69

NONE OF THE ARTICLES OF THIS CONSTITUTION MAY BE CANCELED OR SUSPENDED FOR WHATEVER REASON OR CAUSE.

ARTICLE 70

THIS CONSTITUTION MAY BE AMENDED IN CASE OF NECESSITY UPON PROPOSAL OF TWO THIRDS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE STATE COUNCIL FOLLOWED BY APPROVAL OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND RATIFICATION BY HIS MAJESTY THE KING.

ARTICLE 71

IF NECESSARY ANY CLARIFICATION OR INTERPRETATION OF ANY ARTICLE OF THIS CONSTITUTION OR OTHER LAWS OF THE STATE MUST BE REFERRED TO THE COUNCIL OF STATE AND FOLLOWING CORRECTION AND EXPLANATION BY THE COUNCIL OF STATE AND APPROVAL BY THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS IT WILL BE PRINTED AND PUBLISHED.

ARTICLE 72

IN THE PROCESS OF LEGISLATION THE ACTUAL LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE PEOPLE, THE EXIGENCIES OF THE TIME AND PARTICULARLY THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW'S OF SHARIA WILL BE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

ARTICLE 73

SECURITY OF PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE IS ONE OF THE RIGHTS OF ALL CITIZENS AND ALL COMMUNICATIONS HANDLED BY THE POST OFFICE WILL BE SECURE FROM SEARCH AND INSPECTION AND WILL BE DELIVERED TO THE ADDRESSEE IN THE SAME CONDITION THEY WERE RECEIVED UNLESS A COURT ORDER HAS BEEN ISSUED PERMITTING INSPECTION.

THE ARTICLES OF THIS CONSTITUTION HAVE BEEN APPROVED UNANIMOUSLY BY THE MINISTERS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND BY ALL THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATION GATHERED IN A GRAND COUNCIL (LOYA JIRGA) IN THE EASTERN PROVINCE (MASHRIQI) AND 872 MEMBERS OF THAT GRAND COUNCIL HAVE SIGNED AND SEALED THIS DOCUMENT FOR THE SUCCESSFUL FOUNDATION OF THE EXALTED STATE OF AFGHANISTAN. IT IS OUR WILL AND COMMAND THAT THIS CONSTITUTION BE INCLUDED AMONG THE OTHER LAW'S OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THAT ALL ITS ARTICLES BE IMPLEMENTED.

(SEAL OF KING AMANULLAH)

APPENDIX B ANNOTATED AMENDMENTS OF JANUARY 28, 1925 (8 DALW 1303)

THE CONSTITUTION OF 20 HAMAL 1302 (APRIL 9, 1923) WAS AMENDED BY THE LOYA JIRGA WHICH MET IN PAGHMAN IN 1924. THE AMENDED TEXT BECAME EFFECTIVE ON 8 DALW 1303 (JANUARY 28, 1925).

THE AMENDMENTS WERE A DIRECT RESULT OF THE REBELLION OF THE MANGAL TRIBE IN 1924. THIS REBELLION WAS GIVEN A RELIGIOUS FLAVOR BY CERTAIN RELIGIOUS LEADERS WHO SIDED WITH THE REBELS. KING AMANULLAH IN ORDER TO EXPOSE THIS OFFERED TO SEND A DELEGATION OF RELIGIOUS SCHOLARS FROM KABUL TO DISCUSS THE OBJECTIONS OF THE MANGAL MULLAHS AND PROMISED TO MAKE ANY CHANGES AGREED UPON. THE DISCUSSION TOOK PLACE BUT NO AGREEMENT WAS REACHED IT BECOMING EVIDENT THAT THE TRIBAL MULLAHS SIMPLY WANTED PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY THE REBELLION. NEVERTHELESS AMANULLAH'S DELEGATES ON RETURNING TO KABUL RECOMMENDED THAT CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND OF SOME LAWS BE CHANGED SO AS TO REMOVE ALL PRETEXT FOR OPPOSITION. THE KING THEN SUMMONED A LOYA JIRGA WHICH MET IN PAGHMAN AT THE END OF 1924 AND RECOMMENDED CERTAIN AMENDMENTS AND CHANGES. THE AMENDED CONSTITUTION WAS THEN REISSUED WITH THE FOLLOWING IMPRIMATUR BY THE KING:

THE ARTICLES OF THIS CONSTITUTION WHICH WERE APPROVED UNANIMOUSLY BY THE MINISTERS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GRAND COUNCIL WHICH MET IN THE EASTERN PROVINCE FOR THE FOUNDATION OF THE EXALTED STATE OF AFGHANISTAN, HAVE ALSO BEEN PRESENTED TO THE GRAND COUNCIL OF PAGHMAN AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VOTES OF THE MINISTERS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND ALL THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATION INCLUDING SCHOLARS, SADATS AND OTHER RELIGIOUS LEADERS, THESE ARTICLES HAVE BEEN APPROVED. DALW 8, 1303.

(SEAL OF KING AMANULLAH)

FOLLOWING ARE THE SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ORIGINAL AND AMENDED VERSION OF THE CONSTITUTION:

ARTICLE 2 WAS AMENDED BY ADDING TO THE PROVISION THAT THE 'RELIGION OF AFGHANISTAN IS THE SACRED RELIGION OF ISLAM' THE FOLLOWING 'AND ITS OFFICIAL RELIGIOUS RITE IS THE SUBLIME HANAFITE RITE.' ALSO ADDED AT THE END OF THE ARTICLE IS THE PROVISION THAT 'HINDUS AND JEWS MUST PAY THE SPECIAL TAX AND WEAR DISTINCTIVE CLOTHING.'

ARTICLE 9 WAS AMENDED BY ADDING THE FOLLOWING: 'AFGHAN SUBJECTS ARE BOUND BY THE RELIGIOUS RITE AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF AFGHANISTAN.' THE INTENT OF THE ORIGINAL VERSION WAS CLEARLY TO ELIMINATE INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RELIGION OR OTHER SIMILAR DISTINCTIONS. THE AMENDMENT IN EFFECT PLACES A RELIGIOUS LIMIT ON THE FREEDOM OF THE CITIZEN. MOREOVER IT IS AMBIGUOUS, SINCE IT COULD BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT ALL CITIZENS MUST BE MUSLIMS OF THE HANAFITE RITE. THIS APPARENTLY WAS NOT INTENDED, ONLY MEANING, JUDGING FROM SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE, BEING THAT ALL CITIZENS OF WHATEVER CREED MUST RESPECT THE FACT THAT THE STATE RELIGION WAS THE HANAFITE AND SUNNI.

ARTICLE 24 WAS AMENDED BY ADDING AS THE END OF THE ARTICLE THE FOLLOWING: 'EXCEPT THOSE PUNISHMENTS WHICH ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES OF THE SHARIA AND WHICH ARE IN ACCORD WITH OTHER PUBLIC LAWS WHICH ARE THEMSELVES CODIFIED ACCORDING TO THE RULES OF SHARIA.'

ARTICLE 25 WAS AMENDED BY REMOVING THE WORD 'ACTING' BEFORE THE WORD 'CHAIRMAN' WHEN REFERRING TO THE PRIME MINISTER IN HIS CAPACITY IN THE ABSENCE OF THE KING. THE REASON FOR THIS AMENDMENT IS OBSCURE AND SEEMS TO BE BASED ON CONSIDERATIONS OF PERSONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE KING AND THE PRIME MINISTER AT THE TIME.

ARTICLE 42 (B) WAS AMENDED BY ADDING THE WORD 'STATE' BEFORE THE WORD 'TAXATION.' ACCORDING TO SOME SOURCES, THE PURPOSE WAS TO SPARE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FROM COMPLAINTS ABOUT LOCAL TAXES. ACCORDING TO OTHER SOURCES THE PURPOSE WAS TO CLARIFY THE POSITION THAT THE TAXING POWER WAS VESTED ONLY IN THE STATE AND WAS NOT TO BE USED BY LOCAL OFFICIALS OR LOCAL CHIEFS.

8.2. The Constitution of Afghanistan 1978¹

CONTENTS

DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

1 - PREAMBLE

2 - CHAPTER ONE: FOUNDATIONS OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

3 - CHAPTER TWO: FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOCIOECONOMIC SYSTEM

4 - CHAPTER THREE: CITIZENSHIP, BASIC RIGHTS FREEDOMS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE CITIZENS

5 - CHAPTER FOUR: LOYA JIRGA

6 - CHAPTER FIVE: THE PRESIDENT

7 - CHAPTER SIX: THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

8 - CHAPTER SEVEN: THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

9 - CHAPTER EIGHT: THE JUDICIARY

10 - CHAPTER NINE: THE ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

11 - CHAPTER TEN: THE CONSTITUTION COUNCIL

12 - CHAPTER ELEVEN: THE LOCAL COUNCILS

13 - CHAPTER TWELVE: THE FOREIGN POLICY

14 - CHAPTER THIRTEEN: MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN NUMBER

KABUL CITY

DATE (UNDATED)

DECREE ON THE SIGNING AND PROCLAMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN.

THE LOYA JIRGA (GRAND ASSEMBLY) OF 8 AND 9 QAU 1366 (29/30 NOVEMBER 1987) WHICH WAS HELD IN THE CITY OF KABUL ADOPTED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN AS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT NATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENT IN THIRTEEN CHAPTERS AND ONE HUNDRED FORTY NINE ARTICLES. IN CONFORMITY WITH THE AUTHORITY BESTOWED UPON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN WHICH HAS ENTERED INTO FORCE ON THE DAY OF ADOPTION, I HEREBY SIGN AND PROCLAIM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN FOR ENSURING PEACE AND TRANQUILITY, FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICY OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, PROSPERITY OF THE PEOPLE AND PROGRESS OF BELOVED AFGHANISTAN.

DR NAJIBULLAH, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

IN THE NAME OF ALLAH, THE BENEFICENT, THE MERCIFUL

OUR BELOVED HOMELAND AFGHANISTAN HAS A PRIDEFUL HISTORY ENRICHED WITH THE HEROIC STRUGGLES OF OUR COURAGEOUS PEOPLE FOR FREEDOM, INDEPENDENCE, NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS. THE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE COURSE OF RECENT YEARS HAVE PROVIDED FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR ATTAINING THE LOFTY OBJECTIVES OF THE PROGRESS OF THE HOMELAND AND PROSPERITY OF THE PEOPLE. IN THE PRESENT STAGE, THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN, AS THE INITIATOR AND COORDINATOR OF THE POLICY OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, ACTIVELY CARRIES FORWARD TOGETHER WITH OTHER POLITICAL, NATIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC FORCES THIS HUMANITARIAN POLICY.

THEREFORE, IN ORDER TO: CONSOLIDATE THE INDEPENDENCE, NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND DEFEND THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE COUNTRY; ACHIEVE RECONCILIATION AND STRENGTHEN NATIONAL UNITY KEEPING IN VIEW THE OBJECTIVE REALITIES, THE BEST TRADITIONS AND CUSTOMS OF THE PEOPLE; ENSURE SOCIAL JUSTICE AND EQUALITY; DEVELOP NATIONAL ECONOMY AND RAISE THE LIVING STANDARDS OF THE PEOPLE; RAISE THE ROLE AND PRESTIGE OF OUR BELOVED HOMELAND AFGHANISTAN IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA;

¹ <http://www.afghangovernment.com/Constitution1987.htm> (accessed on July 17, 2014).

WE, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN IN THE LOYA JIRGA, CONSCIOUS OF THE HISTORIC CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN OUR HOMELAND AND IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD, FOLLOWING THE TENETS OF THE SACRED RELIGION OF ISLAM, PRESERVING AND ENRICHING THE HERITAGE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT OF THE COUNTRY, RESPECTING THE UNITED NATIONS' CHARTER AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ENDORSE THIS CONSTITUTION AS THE MOST IMPORTANT NATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENT ON 9.9.66 (29/30 NOVEMBER 1987) IN 13 CHAPTERS AND 149 ARTICLES.

CHAPTER ONE

FOUNDATIONS OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

ARTICLE ONE:

THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN IS AN INDEPENDENT UNITARY AND INDIVISIBLE STATE HAVING SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WHOLE OF ITS TERRITORY. THE NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY IN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN RESTS WITH THE PEOPLE. THE PEOPLE EXERCISE NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH LOYA JIRGA, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND LOCAL COUNCILS.

ARTICLE TWO:

THE SACRED RELIGION OF ISLAM IS THE RELIGION OF AFGHANISTAN. IN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN NO LAW SHALL RUN COUNTER TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SACRED RELIGION OF ISLAM AND OTHER VALUES ENSHRINED IN THIS CONSTITUTION.

ARTICLE THREE:

THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN IS A NONALIGNED COUNTRY WHICH DOES NOT JOIN ANY MILITARY BLOC AND DOES NOT ALLOW ESTABLISHMENT OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES ON ITS TERRITORY.

ARTICLE FOUR:

THE DEFENSE OF INDEPENDENCE, NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IS ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL DUTIES OF THE STATE. THE STATE ENSURES THE SECURITY AND DEFENSE CAPABILITY OF THE COUNTRY AND EQUIPS THE ARMED FORCES.

ARTICLE FIVE: IN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, POLITICAL PARTIES ARE ALLOWED TO BE FORMED, PROVIDED THEIR PROGRAMS, RULES AND ACTIVITIES ARE NOT OPPOSED TO THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS OF THE COUNTRY. A PARTY FORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW CANNOT BE DISSOLVED WITHOUT LEGAL CAUSE.

ARTICLE SIX:

THE NATIONAL FRONT OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, AS THE BROADEST, SOCIOPOLITICAL ORGANIZATION, UNITES POLITICAL PARTIES, SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS ENROLLED IN THEIR RANKS FOR ENSURING THEIR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND CIVIC SPHERES ON THE BASIS OF A COMMON PROGRAM.

ARTICLE SEVEN:

TRADE UNIONS AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE ALLOWED TO BE FORMED IN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW. THE STATE ASSISTS IN PROMOTING THE ROLE OF TRADE UNIONS, PEASANTS' COOPERATIVES, YOUTH, WOMEN'S AND OTHER SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS IN ALL SPHERES OF SOCIAL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL LIFE OF THE COUNTRY AND ENSURES THE COOPERATION AND MUTUAL RELATIONS OF STATE ORGANS WITH THEM.

ARTICLE EIGHT:

PASHTU AND DARI ARE OFFICIAL LANGUAGES AMONG THE NATIONAL LANGUAGES OF THE COUNTRY.

ARTICLE NINE:

THE STATE EMBLEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN CONSISTS OF A RISING SUN, ADYTUM AND PULPIT WITH A GREEN BACKGROUND, ENSCONCED IN TWO SHEAVES OF WHEAT, A WHEEL AND WITH A TRICOLOR RIBBON IN BLACK, RED AND GREEN.

ARTICLE TEN:

THE STATE FLAG OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN IS A TRICOLOR DIVIDED INTO THREE HORIZONTAL EQUAL PARTS IN BLACK, RED AND GREEN STRIPES; THE EMBLEM SHALL BE, PLACED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE UPPER QUARTER OF THE FLAG CLOSE TO THE MAST. THE LENGTH OF THE FLAG SHALL BE DOUBLE ITS WIDTH.

ARTICLE ELEVEN:

THE CAPITAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN IS KABUL.

ARTICLE TWELVE:

THE NATIONAL ANTHEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN SHALL BE APPROVED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

CHAPTER TWO

FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOCIOECONOMIC SYSTEM

ARTICLE THIRTEEN:

THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN IS A MULTI-NATIONAL COUNTRY. THE STATE SHALL FOLLOW THE POLICY OF ALL ROUND GROWTH, UNDERSTANDING, FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN ALL NATIONALITIES, CLANS AND TRIBES OF THE COUNTRY FOR ENSURING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL EQUALITY AND RAPID GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONS WHICH ARE SOCIALLY, ECONOMICALLY AND CULTURALLY BACKWARD. THE STATE SHALL GRADUALLY PREPARE THE GROUNDS FOR THE CREATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS BASED ON NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS.

ARTICLE FOURTEEN:

THE STATE SHALL ADOPT NECESSARY MEASURES FOR THE GROWTH OF CULTURE, LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE OF THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN AS WELL AS PRESERVE AND DEVELOP THE WORTHY CULTURAL, TRADITIONAL, LINGUISTIC, LITERARY AND FOLKLORIC LEGACY OF ALL NATIONALITIES, CLANS AND TRIBES.

ARTICLE FIFTEEN:

IN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN FAMILY CONSTITUTES THE BASIC UNIT OF THE SOCIETY. THE STATE SHALL ADOPT NECESSARY MEASURES FOR ENSURING THE HEALTH OF MOTHER AND CHILD AND FOR THE UPBRINGING OF CHILDREN.

ARTICLE SIXTEEN:

THE STATE PERMANENTLY TAKES CARE OF THE YOUNG GENERATION AND PROVIDES NECESSARY OPPORTUNITIES FOR THEIR EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT, RECREATION, REST, SPIRITUAL AND PHYSICAL GROWTH AND SHALL HELP THE BLOSSOMING OF THE TALENTS OF THE YOUTH.

ARTICLE SEVENTEEN:

THE STATE SHALL PROMOTE CONSTRUCTION TO PROVIDE STATE AND COOPERATIVE HOUSING AND HELP IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF PRIVATE HOUSES.

ARTICLE EIGHTEEN:

THE STATE SHALL IMPLEMENT THE ECONOMIC POLICY AIMED AT MOBILIZATION AND UTILIZATION OF THE COUNTRY'S RESOURCES FOR REMOVING BACKWARDNESS, RAISING THE LIVING STANDARDS OF THE PEOPLE AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOCIETY. TOWARDS THIS END, THE STATE SHALL FORMULATE AND PUT INTO PRACTICE SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLANS.

ARTICLE NINETEEN:

IN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, STATE, MIXED, COOPERATIVE, RELIGIOUS TRUST, AND PRIVATE PROPERTY AS WELL AS PROPERTIES OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS EXIST. THE STATE PROTECTS ALL FORMS OF LAWFUL PROPERTIES.

ARTICLE TWENTY:

MINERAL RESOURCES, FORESTS, PASTURES AND OTHER NATIONAL WEALTH, BASIC ENERGY RESOURCES, HISTORIC RELICS, BANKS, INSURANCE INSTITUTIONS, MEANS OF COMMUNICATION, RADIO, TELEVISION, MAJOR DAMS, PORTS, MAIN MEANS OF PRODUCTION IN HEAVY INDUSTRY, TRANSPORT WAYS AND AIR TRANSPORT SHALL BE STATE PROPERTY. THE STATE SHALL DEVELOP AND STRENGTHEN THE STATE SECTOR OF THE ECONOMY.

ARTICLE TWENTY ONE:

THE STATE SHALL ASSIST STRENGTHENING AND EXPANSION OF COOPERATIVES AND SHALL ENCOURAGE THE VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION OF THE PEOPLE TO THIS END.

ARTICLE TWENTY TWO:

THE STATE ENCOURAGES AND PROTECTS THE ACTIVITY OF INDIVIDUAL CRAFTSMEN AND THEIR VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION IN TRADE UNIONS AND COOPERATIVES AND RENDERS AROUND ASSISTANCE FOR UPGRADING THEIR PROFESSIONAL SKILL, ENSURING MEANS OF LABOR AND THE SUPPLY OF RAW MATERIALS TO THEM AND SALE OF THEIR OUTPUT.

ARTICLE TWENTY THREE:

THE STATE GUARANTEES THE RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP OF LAND OF THE PEASANTS AND OTHER LAND OWNERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW. THE STATE SHALL ADOPT NECESSARY MEASURES FOR THE REALIZATION OF DEMOCRATIC CHANGES IN AGRICULTURE KEEPING IN VIEW THE INTERESTS OF PEASANTS AND OTHER LAND OWNERS. THE STATE ENCOURAGES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BIG AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANIZED STATE, MIXED AND PRIVATE FARMS AND HELPS THE RECLAMATION OF VIRGIN LANDS:

ARTICLE TWENTY FOUR:

THE STATE GUARANTEES BY LAW THE USE OF PASTURES BY NOMADS AND LIVESTOCK BREEDERS. THE STATE SHALL ASSIST IN THE CREATION OF FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE GROWTH OF ANIMAL HUSBANDRY, SALE OF LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS AND IMPROVEMENT OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND LIVING STANDARDS OF NOMADS AND LIVESTOCK BREEDERS.

ARTICLE TWENTY FIVE:

THE STATE SHALL GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT FOR THE GROWTH OF NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PROTECT AND ENCOURAGE THE PARTICIPATION OF NATIONAL CAPITAL HOLDERS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY, COMMERCE, CONSTRUCTION, TRANSPORT AGRICULTURE AND SERVICES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW. THE STATE SHALL EXPAND AROUND AND BENEFICIAL RELATIONS WITH PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS AND PROTECT THE PRIVATE SECTOR AGAINST THE COMPETITION OF FOREIGN CAPITAL. THE STATE SHALL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF PRIVATE SECTOR, IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW, WHILE WORKING OUT THE FINANCIAL, CREDIT, CUSTOMS AND PRICE POLICIES.

ARTICLE TWENTYSIX:

IN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN TRADE ARE REGULATED BY THE STATE, OBSERVING THE PEOPLE'S INTERESTS. TOWARDS THIS END, THE STATE ENCOURAGES THE ACTIVITY OF NATIONAL CAPITAL HOLDERS IN THE EXPANSION OF EXPORT AND IMPORT OF GOODS AND DEVELOPMENT OF WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE, AND, UNDERTAKES THE FIXING AND CONTROLLING OF PRICES. THE STATE SHALL ENCOURAGE THE AUGMENTATION OF PRODUCTION AND RAISING OF THE QUALITY OF EXPORT GOODS AND PROTECTS THEM AGAINST THE COMPETITION OF FOREIGN CAPITAL AND MONOPOLIES.

ARTICLE TWENTY SEVEN:

FOR THE GROWTH OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY, THE STATE PERMITS FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN AND REGULATES IT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW.

ARTICLE TWENTY EIGHT:

IN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, NO FOREIGN CITIZEN SHALL ENJOY THE RIGHT TO OWN REAL ESTATE SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE GOVERNMENT, REAL ESTATE MAY BE SOLD TO DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS AND ALSO TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN WHICH THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN IS A MEMBER.

ARTICLE TWENTY NINE:

THE HEREDITARY RIGHT TO PROPERTY SHALL BE GUARANTEED BY LAW ON THE BASIS OF ISLAMIC SHARIAT.

ARTICLE THIRTY:

EXPROPRIATION IS ALLOWED ONLY IN PUBLIC INTEREST AND AGAINST JUST AND PRIOR COMPENSATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW. CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY IS NOT ALLOWED WITHOUT THE SANCTION OF THE LAW AND THE RULING OF A COURT.

ARTICLE THIRTY ONE: IN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, THE CRITERIA, RATES AND TYPES OF TAXES AND DUTIES SHALL BE DETERMINED ON THE BASIS OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE.

ARTICLE THIRTY TWO:

THE STATE SHALL ADOPT AND IMPLEMENT NECESSARY MEASURES FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATURE, NATURAL WEALTH AND REASONABLE UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING ENVIRONMENT, PREVENTION OF POLLUTION OF WATER AND AIR, AND CONSERVATION AND SURVIVAL OF ANIMALS AND PLANTS.

CHAPTER THREE

CITIZENSHIP, BASIC RIGHTS, FREEDOMS AND DUTIES OF CITIZENS

ARTICLE THIRTY THREE:

THE CITIZENSHIP OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN IS EQUAL AND UNIFORM TO ALL CITIZENS. ACQUISITION AND LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP AND OTHER MATTERS RELATED TO IT ARE REGULATED BY LAW. EVERY INDIVIDUAL HAVING CITIZENSHIP OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW SHALL BE CALLED AN AFGHAN.

ARTICLE THIRTY FOUR:

NO CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN SHALL BE EXILED INSIDE OR OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY.

ARTICLE THIRTY FIVE:

NO CITIZEN OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN SHALL BE EXTRADITED, TO A FOREIGN STATE.

ARTICLE THIRTY SIX:

THE CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN LIVING ABROAD ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF THE STATE. THE STATE SHALL DEFEND THEIR RIGHTS AND LEGAL INTERESTS, STRENGTHEN THE RELATIONS OF AFGHANS LIVING ABROAD WITH THE COUNTRY, AND HELP THEIR RETURN TO THE HOMETLAND.

ARTICLE THIRTY SEVEN:

THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN GUARANTEES, ACCORDING TO THE LAW, THE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF FOREIGN CITIZENS AND INDIVIDUALS RESIDING IN AFGHANISTAN WITHOUT CITIZENSHIP. THEY ARE BOUND TO OBEY THE CONSTITUTION AND OTHER LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN.

ARTICLE THIRTY EIGHT:

CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, BOTH MEN AND WOMEN HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES BEFORE THE LAW, IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR NATIONAL, RACIAL, LINGUISTIC, TRIBAL EDUCATIONAL AND SOCIAL STATUS, RELIGIOUS CREED POLITICAL CONVICTION, OCCUPATION, KINSHIP, WEALTH, AND RESIDENCE. DESIGNATION OF ANY ILLEGAL PRIVILEGE OR DISCRIMINATION AGAINST RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF CITIZENS ARE FORBIDDEN.

ARTICLE THIRTY NINE:

THE RIGHT TO LIFE IS THE NATURAL RIGHT OF EVERY HUMAN BEING. NO PERSON SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF THIS RIGHT UNLESS BY LAW.

ARTICLE FORTY:

IN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, THE FREEDOM TO PERFORM RELIGIOUS RITES IS GUARANTEED TO ALL MUSLIMS. FOLLOWERS OF OTHER RELIGIONS ARE FREE TO PERFORM THEIR RELIGIOUS RITES. NO INDIVIDUAL HAS THE RIGHT TO ABUSE RELIGION FOR ANTI-NATIONAL AND ANTI-PEOPLE PROPAGANDA PURPOSES CREATION OF ENMITY AND COMMISSION OF OTHER DEEDS CONTRARY TO THE INTERESTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN.

ARTICLE FORTY ONE:

LIBERTY IS THE NATURAL RIGHT OF EVERY HUMAN BEING. THIS RIGHT IS UNLIMITED, EXCEPT IN SO FAR AS IT HARMS THE FREEDOM OF OTHERS AND PUBLIC INTERESTS AS DEFINED BY LAW. LIBERTY AND HUMAN DIGNITY ARE INVOLABLE AND THE STATE RESPECTS AND PROTECTS THEM. INNOCENCE IS THE ORIGINAL STATE AND THE ACCUSED IS PRESUMED INNOCENT UNLESS FOUND GUILTY BY A FINAL VERDICT OF A COURT OF LAW. NO ACT IS CONSIDERED A CRIME, EXCEPT AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW. NO PERSON SHALL BE ACCUSED OF COMMITTING A CRIME UNLESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW. NO PERSON CAN BE ARRESTED OR DETAINED, EXCEPT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW. NO PERSON CAN BE PUNISHED UNLESS BY A VERDICT OF A COURT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF LAW AND IN PROPORTION TO THE CRIME COMMITTED. CRIME IS A PERSONAL DEED; NO OTHER PERSON SHALL BE PUNISHED FOR ITS COMMISSION. THE ACCUSED HAS THE RIGHT TO DEFEND HIMSELF PERSONALLY OR THROUGH AN ADVOCATE.

ARTICLE FORTY TWO:

IN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN PUNISHMENT INCOMPATIBLE WITH HUMAN DIGNITY; TORTURE AND EXCRUCIATION ARE PROHIBITED. OBTAINING CONFESSION, TESTIMONY OR STATEMENT FROM AN ACCUSED OR ANY OTHER PERSON BY COMPULSION OR THREAT IS PROHIBITED. STATEMENTS OR TESTIMONY TAKEN FROM AN ACCUSED OR OTHER PERSON BY MEANS OF COMPULSION SHALL NOT BE VALID. A PUBLIC SERVANT WHO TORTURES AN ACCUSED OR ANY OTHER PERSON FOR OBTAINING STATEMENTS, TESTIMONY OR CONFESSION, OR WHO ISSUES ORDERS FOR TORTURE, SHALL BE PUNISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW. ACTING ON THE ORDERS OF SUPERIORS IN THE COMMISSION OF UNLAWFUL DEEDS CANNOT BE THE GROUND FOR THE PLEA OF INNOCENCE.

ARTICLE FORTY THREE:

INDEBTEDNESS CANNOT BE THE CAUSE OF DEPRIVATION OF A PERSON'S LIBERTY. THE WAYS AND MEANS OF RECOVERING DEBTS SHALL BE REGULATED BY THE LAW.

ARTICLE FORTY FOUR:

IN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, THE INVIOABILITY OF RESIDENCE IS GUARANTEED. NO PERSON, INCLUDING A STATE REPRESENTATIVE CAN ENTER OR SEARCH A RESIDENCE WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE RESIDENT AND EXCEPT IN CIRCUMSTANCES AND UNDER PROCEDURES PRESCRIBED BY THE LAW.

ARTICLE FORTY FIVE:

IN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, CONFIDENTIALITY OF CORRESPONDENCE, TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS, TELEGRAMS AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS IS GUARANTEED. NO ONE, INCLUDING A STATE REPRESENTATIVE, SHALL INTERCEPT TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS, TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS EXCEPT UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW.

ARTICLE FORTY SIX:

CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN WHO SUFFER IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES UNLAWFUL DAMAGE BY STATE ORGANS, SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS AND RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS ARE ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION, CONDITIONS AND PROCEDURES OF WHICH SHALL BE REGULATED BY LAW.

ARTICLE FORTY SEVEN:

CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN ARE ENTITLED TO TAKE PART IN SOCIOPOLITICAL LIFE AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH THEIR REPRESENTATIVES.

ARTICLE FORTY EIGHT:

CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN HAVE THE RIGHT TO ELECT OR BE ELECTED. CONDITIONS AND PROCEDURES OF EXERCISING THIS RIGHT SHALL BE REGULATED BY LAW.

ARTICLE FORTY NINE:

CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN ENJOY THE RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION. CITIZENS CAN EXERCISE THIS RIGHT OPENLY, IN SPEECH AND IN WRITING, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW. PRE CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS IS NOT ALLOWED.

ARTICLE FIFTY:

CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN HAVE THE RIGHT TO ASSEMBLY, PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION AND STRIKE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW.

ARTICLE FIFTY ONE:

CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN ENJOY THE RIGHT TO PETITION, CRITICIZE AND MAKE SUGGESTIONS, EITHER INDIVIDUALLY OR COLLECTIVELY. STATE ORGANS, SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS AND RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS ARE BOUND TO CONSIDER THE PETITIONS, CRITICISMS AND PROPOSALS AND TAKE NECESSARY ACTIONS IN REGARD TO THEM WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED BY LAW. PROSECUTION FOR CRITICISM IS FORBIDDEN.

ARTICLE FIFTY TWO:

CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN HAVE THE RIGHT TO WORK AND ARE ENTITLED TO EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK. THE STATE, THROUGH ENACTMENT AND APPLICATION OF JUST AND PROGRESSIVE LABOR LAWS, SHALL PROVIDE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR THE CITIZENS TO ENJOY THIS RIGHT.

ARTICLE FIFTY THREE:

IMPOSITION OF FORCED LABOR IS FORBIDDEN. PERFORMANCE OF COMPULSORY LABOR IN WAR TIME, NATURAL CALAMITY AND OTHER STATES OF EMERGENCY WHICH THREATEN PUBLIC LIFE AND WELFARE SHALL BE EXCLUDED FROM THIS.

ARTICLE FIFTY FOUR:

CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, SUBJECT TO THE NEEDS OF THE SOCIETY AND ON THE BASIS OF THE FIELD OF EXPERTISE, HAVE THE RIGHT TO HOLD STATE POSTS AND CHOOSE THEIR OCCUPATION.

ARTICLE FIFTY FIVE:

CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN HAVE THE RIGHT TO REST. THE STATE DEFINES THE WORKING HOURS AND THE PERIODIC HOLIDAYS WITH SALARY AND THE SPECIFICATIONS OF WORK DURING HOLIDAYS, FESTIVALS, EIDS AND SHALL PROVIDE CONDITIONS FOR REST, GROWTH OF CULTURAL, ARTISTIC ESTABLISHMENTS, PHYSICAL TRAINING, SPORTS AND HEALTHY RECREATION.

ARTICLE FIFTY SIX:

CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN HAVE THE RIGHT TO FREE EDUCATION. THE STATE SHALL ADOPT NECESSARY MEASURES FOR ERADICATION OF ILLITERACY, GENERALIZATION OF BALANCED EDUCATION, IN MOTHER TONGUE, ENSURING COMPULSORY PRIMARY EDUCATION, GRADUAL EXPANSION OF GENERAL, INTERMEDIATE, TECHNICAL AND VOCATIONAL EDUCATION, AND GROWTH OF THE SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION FOR TRAINING NATIONAL CADRES. IN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN FOREIGN NATIONALS ARE ALLOWED TO ESTABLISH SCHOOLS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW. THESE SCHOOLS SHALL BE BASED OF THE FOREIGNERS ONLY.

ARTICLE FIFTY SEVEN:

CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN HAVE THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY. THE STATE SHALL ADOPT NECESSARY MEASURES FOR EXPANSION OF ALL-ROUND, BALANCED AND NATION WIDE MEDICAL SERVICES, EXPANSION OF HOSPITALS, HEALTH CENTERS, TRAINING OF DOCTORS AND PERSONNEL FOR MEDICAL SERVICES, UNIVERSAL PREVENTION OF DISEASES, EXPANSION OF FREE HEALTH SERVICES, ARRANGEMENT AND ENCOURAGEMENT OF PRIVATE MEDICAL SERVICES, IMPROVEMENT OF MATERIAL WELFARE OF THE ELDERLY, WAR AND WORK DISABLED AND DEPENDENTS OF MARTYRS.

ARTICLE FIFTY EIGHT:

CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN HAVE THE RIGHT TO SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL AND ARTISTIC ACTIVITIES. THE STATE ENSURES SYSTEMATIC PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND TRAINING OF SCIENTIFIC CADRES, PROTECTS THE RIGHTS OF AUTHORS AND INVENTORS, ENCOURAGES AND PROTECTS SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN ALL SPHERES AND GENERALIZES THE EFFECTIVE USE OF THE RESULTS OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH.

ARTICLE FIFTY NINE:

CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN HAVE THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND FREE CHOICE OF DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE IN THE COUNTRY. THE STATE IS AUTHORIZED TO BAN TEMPORARILY TRAVEL, SETTLEMENT AND RESIDENCE IN PARTICULAR AREAS OF THE COUNTRY FOR THE PURPOSES OF MAINTAINING SECURITY AND PUBLIC ORDER, PREVENTION OF EPIDEMIC DISEASES AND PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF INDIVIDUALS.

ARTICLE SIXTY:

CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN ENJOY ACCORDING TO LAW THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL ABROAD AND RETURN HOME.

ARTICLE SIXTY ONE:

EVERY CITIZEN OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN IS BOUND TO OBSERVE THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN. IGNORANCE OF PROVISIONS OF LAW IS NO EXCUSE.

ARTICLE SIXTY TWO:

CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN AND FOREIGNERS ARE BOUND TO PAY TAXES AND DUTIES TO THE STATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW.

ARTICLE SIXTY THREE:

THE DEFENSE OF HOMELAND, INDEPENDENCE, NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE COUNTRY IS THE PRIDEFUL DUTY OF THE CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN. CONDITIONS OF SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES SHALL BE REGULATED BY LAW.

ARTICLE SIXTY FOUR:

THE STATE SHALL PROVIDE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR THE CITIZENS TO EXERCISE THEIR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS AND DISCHARGE THEIR DUTIES. NO PERSON HAS THE RIGHT TO EXERCISE THE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS ENSHRINED IN THE LAW AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST AND TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF OTHER CITIZENS.

CHAPTER FOUR

LOYA JIRGA (GRAND ASSEMBLY)

ARTICLE SIXTY FIVE:

THE LOYA JIRGA IS THE HIGHEST MANIFESTATION OF THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH NATIONAL HISTORICAL TRADITIONS.

ARTICLE SIXTY SIX:

THE LOYA JIRGA CONSISTS OF:

- 1) TEN MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.
- 2) THE PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES FROM EACH PROVINCE AND ITS EQUIVALENT.
- 3) GOVERNORS OF PROVINCES AND MAJOR OF KABUL.
- 4) PRIME MINISTER, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS AND MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS,
- 5) CHIEF JUSTICE, DEPUTY CHIEF JUSTICES AND JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT.
- 6) ATTORNEY GENERAL AND HIS DEPUTIES.
- 7) CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL.
- 8) MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF THE NATIONAL FRONT.
- 9) A MAXIMUM OF FIFTY PERSONS FROM AMONG PROMINENT POLITICAL, SCIENTIFIC, SOCIAL AND SPIRITUAL FIGURES TO BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE BASIS OF THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE NATIONAL FRONT.

ARTICLE SIXTY SEVEN:

THE LOYA JIRGA ENJOYS THE FOLLOWING POWERS:

- 1) TO APPROVE AND AMEND THE CONSTITUTION.
- 2) TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT AND TO ACCEPT THE PRESIDENT'S RESIGNATION.
- 3) TO CONSENT TO THE DECLARATION OF WAR AND ARMISTICE.
- 4) TO ADOPT DECISIONS ON THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTIONS REGARDING THE DESTINY OF THE COUNTRY.

ARTICLE SIXTY EIGHT:

SAVE IN CASES OTHERWISE DEFINED IN THIS CONSTITUTION, THE LOYA JIRGA SHALL BE SUMMONED AND OPENED BY THE PRESIDENT AND ITS SESSIONS SHALL BE HELD UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE PRESIDENT OR ANY OTHER PERSON APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT AS HIS REGENT. THE QUORUM FOR THE LOYA JIRGA SHALL BE TWO THIRD OF ITS MEMBERS PRESENT. SAVE IN CASES OTHERWISE DEFINED IN THIS CONSTITUTION, THE DECISIONS OF THE LOYA JIRGA SHALL BE ADOPTED BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF ITS MEMBERS.

ARTICLE SIXTY NINE:

DURING THE TIME WHEN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REMAINS DISSOLVED, ITS MEMBERS SHALL RETAIN THEIR MEMBERSHIP OF THE LOYA JIRGA TILL A NEW HOUSE IS ELECTED.

ARTICLE SEVENTY:

ELECTIONS TO LOYA JIRGA SHALL BE REGULATED BY LAW AND ITS PROCEDURE LAID DOWN BY THE LOYA JIRGA ITSELF.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE PRESIDENT

ARTICLE SEVENTY ONE:

THE PRESIDENT IS THE HEAD OF THE STATE AND SHALL EXERCISE HIS POWERS IN LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL SPHERES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN.

ARTICLE SEVENTY TWO:

THE PRESIDENT SHALL BE ELECTED BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE LOYA JIRGA FOR A TERM OF SEVEN YEARS. NO PERSON CAN BE ELECTED AS PRESIDENT FOR MORE THAN TWO TERMS. THE PRESIDENT IS ACCOUNTABLE AND SHALL REPORT TO LOYA JIRGA. THE LOYA JIRGA SHALL BE CALLED TO ELECT A NEW PRESIDENT THIRTY DAYS BEFORE THE END OF THE TERM OF OFFICE OF THE OUTGOING PRESIDENT.

ARTICLE SEVENTY THREE:

ANY MUSLIM CITIZEN OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN WHO HAS COMPLETED THE AGE OF FORTY AND WHO AND WHOSE WIFE ARE BORN OF AFGHAN PARENTS AND ENJOYS CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHT CAN BE ELECTED PRESIDENT.

ARTICLE SEVENTY FOUR:

THE PRESIDENT, AFTER BEING ELECTED, SHALL TAKE THE FOLLOWING OATH: 'I SWEAR IN THE NAME OF ALLAH, THE ALMIGHTY, TO PROTECT THE PRINCIPLES OF SACRED RELIGION OF ISLAM, OBSERVE THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN AND SUPERVISE ITS IMPLEMENTATION, SAFEGUARD THE INDEPENDENCE, NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AFGHANISTAN, PRESERVE THE BASIC RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF THE CITIZENS AND EXERT ALL MY EFFORTS TO ENSURE SOCIAL JUSTICE, PEOPLE'S PROSPERITY, STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND PROGRESS IN THE COUNTRY'.

ARTICLE SEVENTY FIVE:

THE PRESIDENT SHALL ENJOY THE FOLLOWING POWERS IN ADDITION TO THOSE ENTRUSTED TO HIM BY OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION:

- 1) SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES.
- 2) TO SIGN LAWS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.
- 3) TO APPOINT THE PRIME MINISTER DESIGNATE TO FORM THE GOVERNMENT.
- 4) TO APPROVE THE HEAD AND MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT AFTER THEY HAVE RECEIVED THE VOTE OF CONFIDENCE OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND TO ACCEPT THEIR RESIGNATIONS.
- 5) TO CONVENE AND PRESIDE OVER THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WHEN NECESSARY.
- 6) TO APPROVE THE APPOINTMENT, PROMOTION AND PENSION OF JUDGES, HIGH RANKING OFFICIALS AND OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, ACCORDING TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW.
- 7) TAKE DECISIONS ON ASCERTAINING PUBLIC OPINION OR HOLDING REFERENDUM ON MAJOR POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES.
- 8) PARDON AND REMIT SENTENCES.
- 9) ACCREDIT THE HEADS OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS.
- 10) ACCEPT THE CREDENTIALS OF THE HEADS OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS OF FOREIGN STATES TO THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN. 11) PROCLAIM A STATE OF EMERGENCY, GENERAL AND PARTIAL MOBILIZATION AND THEIR TERMINATION. 12) DECLARE WAR AND ARMISTICE WITH THE CONSENT OF LOYA JIRGA. 13) AUTHORIZE THE ISSUE OF MONEY. 14) GRANT CITIZENSHIP AND ASYLUM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW. 15) GRANT HONOURARY ORDERS, MEDALS AND TITLES AS PER THE LAW. 16) EXERCISE OTHER POWERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW.

ARTICLE SEVENTY SIX:

THE PRESIDENT SHALL CONTINUE IN OFFICE TILL THE END OF HIS TERM EXCEPT IN THE EVENT OF PROTRACTED AND IRREVERSIBLE ILLNESS AND OR RESIGNATION. IN ALL CASES WHEN THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE HIS DUTIES, THE PRESIDENTIAL FUNCTIONS SHALL BE ENTRUSTED TO THE FIRST VICE PRESIDENT. IN CASE OF PERMANENT LOSS OF ABILITY TO WORK, DEATH OR RESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDENT, THE FIRST VICE PRESIDENT SHALL INVITE THE LOYA JIRGA WITHIN ONE MONTH TO ELECT A NEW PRESIDENT. IN THE EVENT OF RESIGNATION, THE PRESIDENT SHALL SUBMIT HIS RESIGNATION DIRECTLY TO THE LOYA JIRGA.

CHAPTER SIX

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

ARTICLE SEVENTY SEVEN:

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IS THE HIGHEST LEGISLATIVE ORGAN OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN.

ARTICLE SEVENTY EIGHT:

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CONSISTS OF TWO HOUSES: THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SENATE.

ARTICLE SEVENTY NINE:

THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE ELECTED FROM ELECTORAL CONSTITUENCIES HAVING EQUAL POPULATION, FOR A LEGISLATIVE TERM OF FIVE YEARS. MEMBERS OF THE SENATE (SENATORS) ARE ELECTED AND APPOINTED IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER:

- 1) TWO PERSONS FROM EACH PROVINCE AND EQUIVALENT UNITS FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS.**
- 2) TWO PERSONS FROM AMONG THE MEMBERS OF EACH PROVINCIAL COUNCIL AND ITS EQUIVALENT ELECTED BY THE COUNCIL FOR A TERM OF THREE YEARS.**
- 3) THE REMAINING ONE THIRD OF THE MEMBERS SHALL BE APPOINTED FOR A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS BY THE PRESIDENT FROM AMONGST WELL INFORMED, SCHOLARLY, PRESTIGIOUS AND NATIONAL FIGURES.**

ARTICLE EIGHTY:

THE NUMBER, CONDITIONS, PROCEDURE OF ELECTION AND APPOINTMENT OF THE MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BE REGULATED BY LAW.

ARTICLE EIGHTY ONE:

IN ADDITION TO OTHER POWERS PRESCRIBED IN THIS CONSTITUTION, THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL ENJOY THE FOLLOWING POWERS:

- 1) TO APPROVE, AMEND AND REPEAL LAWS AND LEGISLATION DECREES AND TO PRESENT THEM TO THE PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE.**
- 2) TO INTERPRET LAWS.**
- 3) TO RATIFY AN ANNUL INTERNATIONAL TREATIES.**
- 4) TO APPROVE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLANS AND ENDORSE THE GOVERNMENT'S REPORT ON THEIR EXECUTION.**
- 5) TO APPROVE THE STATE BUDGET AND EVALUATE THE REPORT ON ITS EXECUTION.**
- 6) TO ESTABLISH ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS AND MAKE CHANGES IN THEM.**
- 7) TO ESTABLISH AND ABOLISH MINISTRIES AND CENTRAL ORGANS EQUIVALENT TO THEM.**
- 8) TO DECIDE ON THE APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL OF VICE PRESIDENTS ON THE BASIS OF RECOMMENDATION AND REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT.**
- 9) TO AUTHORIZE THE STATE TO RECEIVE LOANS AND GRANT PRIVILEGES OF SUBSTANTIAL IMPORTANCE IN NATIONAL ECONOMY, INCLUDING MONOPOLY.**
- 10) TO INSTITUTE BY LAW HONOURARY ORDERS, MEDALS AND TITLES.**
- 11) TO ENDORSE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS.**
- 12) TO ELICIT REPLIES FROM THE PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER MEMBERS OF GOVERNMENT CONCERNING PERFORMANCE RELATING TO THEIR AUTHORITY DURING INTERPELLATIONS SESSION.**

ARTICLE EIGHTY TWO:

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL HAVE THE FOLLOWING EXCLUSIVE POWERS:

- 1) TO PASS A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE OR NO CONFIDENCE IN THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OR ONE OF ITS MEMBERS.**
- 2) TO TAKE FINAL DECISION ON THE DRAFT PLANS FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE STATE BUDGET IN THE EVENT OF DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SENATE.**

ARTICLE EIGHTY THREE:

EACH HOUSE OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL APPOINT AT ITS FIRST SESSION, A COMMISSION FROM AMONG ITS MEMBERS TO AUTHENTICATE THE CREDENTIALS. THE COMMISSION SHALL REPORT THE RESULTS OF ITS FINDINGS TO THE HOUSE CONCERNED. THE HOUSE SHALL CONFIRM THE CREDENTIALS OF THE DEPUTIES OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON THE BASIS OF THE REPORT AND IN CASE OF VIOLATION OF THE ELECTORAL LAW, THE HOUSE SHALL DECLARE THE CREDENTIALS OF THE MEMBER CONCERNED AS INVALID.

ARTICLE EIGHTY FOUR:

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTS AT ITS FIRST SESSION FROM AMONG ITS MEMBERS AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE COMPOSED OF A CHAIRMAN, TWO DEPUTY CHAIRMEN AND TWO SECRETARIES FOR THE WHOLE TERM OF THE LEGISLATURE. THE SENATE ELECTS FROM AMONG ITS MEMBERS AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE COMPOSED OF A CHAIRMAN FOR A TERM OF FIVE YEARS, TWO DEPUTY CHAIRMEN AND TWO SECRETARIES FOR A TERM OF ONE YEAR. THE CHAIRMAN OF EACH HOUSE OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL CONDUCT AND MAINTAIN ORDER IN THE RESPECTIVE SESSIONS OF THE HOUSES. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE CHAIRMAN ONE OF THE DEPUTY CHAIRMEN SHALL DISCHARGE HIS DUTIES.

ARTICLE EIGHTY FIVE:

THE ORDINARY SESSIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ARE HELD TWICE A YEAR, IN THE FIRST WEEK OF THE MONTH OF SUNBOLA AND THE FIRST WEEK OF THE MONTH OF HOOT. EACH REGULAR SESSION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, SHALL NOT EXTEND TO MORE THAN THREE MONTHS. IF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IS DISCUSSING THE ANNUAL BUDGET OR THE DEVELOPMENT PLAN, ITS SESSION SHALL NOT BE WOUND UP BEFORE THEIR ENDORSEMENT. IF THE BUDGET IS NOT ENDORSED BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE FISCAL YEAR, THE BUDGET OF THE PREVIOUS YEAR SHALL APPLY TILL THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE NEW ANNUAL BUDGET. AN EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CAN BE HELD ON THE DECISION OF THE PRESIDENT, REQUEST OF CHAIRMAN OF EITHER HOUSE OR OF ONE FIFTH OF MEMBERS OF EACH HOUSE.

ARTICLE EIGHTY SIX:

THE HOUSES OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL HOLD SEPARATE OR JOINT SESSIONS. THE JOINT SESSIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ARE CHAIRED ALTERNATELY BY THEIR CHAIRMEN. THE PRESIDENT INAUGURATES AND CONCLUDES THE SESSION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THE FIRST SESSION OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BE SUMMONED BY THE PRESIDENT, THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE ELECTIONS TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

ARTICLE EIGHTY SEVEN:

THE QUORUM FOR BOTH HOUSES OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BE COMPLETED WHEN TWO THIRD OF THE MEMBERS OF EACH HOUSE ARE PRESENT. THE DECISION OF EACH HOUSE IS PASSED BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF ITS TOTAL MEMBERSHIP.

ARTICLE EIGHTY EIGHT:

THE SEPARATE AND JOINT SESSIONS OF THE HOUSES OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BE OPEN, UNLESS THE HOUSES DECIDE TO MEET IN CLOSED SESSIONS. THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE DEBATES OF BOTH THE HOUSES SHALL BE RECORDED.

ARTICLE EIGHTYNINE: EACH HOUSE OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL ELECT FROM AMONG ITS MEMBERS STANDING COMMISSIONS FOR THE PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION AND ARRANGEMENT OF THE ISSUES WITHIN ITS COMPETENCE AND THE SUPERVISION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LAWS AND DECISIONS OF THE HOUSE.

ARTICLE NINETY:

EACH HOUSE OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IS EMPOWERED TO CONSTITUTE INVESTIGATION, AUDITING AND OTHER TEMPORARY COMMISSIONS AS MAY BE REQUIRED. THE TASKS AND PROCEDURES OF THE INVESTIGATION AND AUDITING COMMISSIONS SHALL BE REGULATED BY THE RESPECTIVE HOUSES OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

ARTICLE NINETY ONE:

MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HAVE THE RIGHT TO PUT QUESTIONS TO THE PRIME MINISTER OR ANY MEMBER OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE INTERPELLATIONS SESSION. ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS SHALL BE PRESENTED IN WRITING OR ORALLY. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CAN CONSIDER ON THE BASIS OF THE ANSWERS PRESENTED THE MOTION OF VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT. A GOVERNMENT WHICH FAILS TO RECEIVE THE VOTE OF CONFIDENCE SHALL CONTINUE IN OFFICE TILL A NEW GOVERNMENT IS FORMED.

ARTICLE NINETY TWO:

MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, HAVING CONSULTATIVE VOTE MAY ATTEND THE MEETINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

ARTICLE NINETY THREE:

MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAVE THE RIGHT TO VOTE AND EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS IN SEPARATE AND JOINT SESSIONS. NO MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BE SUBJECTED TO LEGAL PROSECUTION FOR A VOTE OR VIEWS EXPRESSED INSIDE OR OUTSIDE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. SAVE IN CASES OF PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF CRIMES, NO MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CAN BE ARRESTED, DETAINED OR SUBJECTED TO JUDICIAL SURVEILLANCE WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE HOUSE CONCERNED OR WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF ITS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE DURING THE INTERVAL BETWEEN TWO SESSIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. IF A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IS ARRESTED ON A PRIMA FACIE CASE, THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE CONCERNED SHALL BE INFORMED.

ARTICLE NINETY FOUR:

THE FOLLOWING AUTHORITIES HAVE THE RIGHT TO PROPOSE INTRODUCTION, AMENDMENT AND REPEAL OF LAW IN EACH HOUSE OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY:

- 1) THE PRESIDENT.
- 2) THE STANDING COMMISSIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.
- 3) AT LEAST ONE TENTH OF MEMBERSHIP OF EACH HOUSE.
- 4) THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.
- 5) THE SUPREME COURT.
- 6) THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.
- 7) THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF THE NATIONAL FRONT.
- 8) COUNCIL OF ULEMA AND CLERGYMEN.

ARTICLE NINETY FIVE:

SAVE IN CASES DEFINED OTHERWISE IN THIS CONSTITUTION, THE DECISIONS OF ONE OF THE HOUSES RELATING TO POWERS DESCRIBED UNDER ARTICLE EIGHTYONE SHALL BE DELIVERED TO THE OTHER HOUSE. IF THE DECISION OF ONE HOUSE IS REJECTED BY THE OTHER, A JOINT COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF AN EQUAL NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF BOTH HOUSES SHALL BE SET UP. THE DECISION OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE SHALL COME INTO FORCE AFTER IT IS SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT. IF THE JOINT COMMITTEE FAILS TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES, THE MATTER SHALL BE DISCUSSED IN THE JOINT SESSION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND DECISION TAKEN BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF THE JOINT SESSION.

ARTICLE NINETY SIX:

THE DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ARE ENFORCED AFTER SIGNATURE BY THE PRESIDENT. IN CASE THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT AGREE WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, HE CAN RETURN THEM TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF RECEIPT ALONG WITH HIS REASONS. AFTER THE ELAPSE OF THIS PERIOD, AND ALSO IF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ENDORSES THE DECISION IN ITS NEXT SESSION WITH TWO THIRDS VOTES OF ITS MEMBERS, THE DECISION SHALL BECOME EFFECTIVE AND THE PRESIDENT SHALL SIGN IT.

ARTICLE NINETY SEVEN:

IN CONSULTATION WITH THE CHAIRMEN OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SENATE, THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE CHIEF JUSTICE, THE PRESIDENT CAN DECLARE THE DISSOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STATING THE REASONS OF JUSTIFICATION. REELECTIONS SHALL BE HELD WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE DISSOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE. THE NEW HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CANNOT BE DISSOLVED TILL ONE YEAR AFTER REELECTIONS. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CANNOT BE DISSOLVED DURING THE LAST SIX MONTHS OF OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT.

ARTICLE NINETY EIGHT:

THE LAWS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BE PUBLISHED IN PASHTU AND DARI LANGUAGES AND CAN BE PUBLISHED IN THE LANGUAGES OF OTHER NATIONALITIES OF THE COUNTRY AS WELL.

ARTICLE NINETY NINE:

THE PROCEDURE OF FUNCTIONING OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND ITS STANDING COMMISSIONS SHALL BE REGULATED BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED:

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS (GOVERNMENT) IS THE HIGHEST EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGAN OF STATE POWER IN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS IS COMPOSED OF:

- PRIME MINISTER
- DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS
- MINISTERS, PRESIDENTS OF CENTRAL ORGANS EQUIVALENT TO MINISTRIES.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND ONE:

THE PRIME MINISTER DESIGNATE SHALL PRESENT TO THE FIRST SESSION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THE HOME AND FOREIGN POLICY LINE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE COMPOSITION OF HIS GOVERNMENT FOR SEEKING THE VOTE OF CONFIDENCE OF THE HOUSE. AFTER RECEIVING THE VOTE OF CONFIDENCE AND APPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRIME MINISTER SHALL PRESENT THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY LINE AND INTRODUCE MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE SENATE.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND TWO:

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS IS RESPONSIBLE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE PRESIDENT AND SHALL SUBMIT REPORTS TO THEM.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND THREE:

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAS THE FOLLOWING DUTIES AND POWERS:

- 1) FORMULATE AND IMPLEMENT THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES.
- 2) ENSURE THE EXECUTION OF MATTERS RELATING TO NATIONAL ECONOMY; FORMULATE THE SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLANS, PREPARE THE STATE BUDGET, IMPLEMENT PLANS AND BUDGET AND REPORT TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON THEIR EXECUTION
- 3) TAKE MEASURES FOR DEFENDING THE INTERESTS OF THE STATE, PROTECT ALL FORMS OF LEGAL PROPERTIES, ENSURE PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY AND SAFEGUARD THE RIGHTS, AND FREEDOMS OF THE CITIZENS.
- 4) OVERALL GUIDANCE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC TIES AND CONCLUSION OF AGREEMENTS WITH FOREIGN STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS ACCORDING TO LAW.
- 5) CREATE OFFICES AND ORGANS RELATED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.
- 6) OTHER POWERS ACCORDING TO PROVISIONS OF LAW. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN APPROVES REGULATIONS, RULES AND OTHER LEGAL DOCUMENTS IN THE JURISDICTION OF ITS POWERS.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND FOUR:

IN THE INTERVAL BETWEEN SESSIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AND IN THE EVENT OF DISSOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MAY, IF URGENTLY REQUIRED, ISSUE LEGISLATIVE ORDINANCES ON MATTERS WITHIN THE POWERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, EXCLUDING MATTERS RELATING TO BUDGET AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS. THESE LEGISLATIVE ORDINANCES SHALL COME INTO FORCE AFTER SIGNATURE BY THE PRESIDENT. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS SHALL SUBMIT TO THE FIRST PERIODIC SESSION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR APPROVAL THE LEGISLATIVE ORDINANCES WHICH ARE PROMULGATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ARTICLE. IF THE ORDINANCES ARE REJECTED BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, THEY BECOME VOID FROM THAT DATE. IN THE INTERVAL BETWEEN TWO SESSIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OR IN THE PERIOD OF DISSOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE PRESIDENT MAY, ON THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRIME MINISTER, APPOINT OR DISMISS ANY MEMBER OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE MATTER SHALL THEN BE SUBMITTED TO THE FIRST SESSION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO DECIDE UPON.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND FIVE:

THE TERM OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTER SHALL EXPIRE AT THE END OF THE LEGISLATIVE TERM OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS SHALL CARRY ON ITS ACTIVITIES TILL A NEW GOVERNMENT IS FORMED. ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND SIX: THE ORGANIZATION, COMPOSITION, AND ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS SHALL BE REGULATED BY LAW.

CHAPTER EIGHT

JUDICIARY

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVEN:

JUDICIARY IS AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT OF THE STATE.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHT:

JUDGMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN SHALL BE DELIVERED ONLY BY A COURT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF LAW. COURTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN INCLUDE: SUPREME COURT, PROVINCIAL COURTS, DIVISIONAL COURTS, DISTRICT COURTS, CITY COURTS, SUBDISTRICT COURTS, PRECINCT COURTS AND, MILITARY COURTS.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND NINE:

THE SUPREME COURT, AS THE HIGHEST JUDICIAL ORGAN, HEADS THE UNIFIED SYSTEM OF JUSTICE IN THE COUNTRY AND IS COMPOSED OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, DEPUTY CHIEF JUSTICES AND JUDGES. THE SUPREME COURT SHALL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF LAW, SUPERVISE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COURTS AND ENSURE THE UNIFORM APPLICATION OF LAW BY COURTS.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND TEN:

THE CHIEF JUSTICE, DEPUTY CHIEF JUSTICES AND JUDGES OF SUPREME COURT SHALL BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT FOR A TERM OF SIX YEARS. THE SUPREME COURT IS ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PRESIDENT AND SHALL REPORT TO HIM.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND ELEVEN:

THE COURT SHALL BE INDEPENDENT IN THEIR JUDGMENT AND SHALL SUBMIT ONLY TO THE LAW. TRIAL AND VERDICT BY COURTS SHALL BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY OF PARTIES BEFORE THE LAW AND THE COURT.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND TWELVE:

THE JUDGES SHALL APPLY THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN IN THE CASES UNDER THEIR CONSIDERATION. WHEN NO EXPLICIT PROVISION EXISTS IN THE LAW, THE COURT SHALL, FOLLOWING THE PROVISIONS OF THE SHARIAT OF ISLAM, RENDER A DECISION THAT SECURES JUSTICE IN THE BEST POSSIBLE WAY.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTEEN:

TRIAL IN THE COURTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN SHALL BE HELD OPENLY. THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH CASES ARE TO BE CONDUCTED IN CLOSED TRIALS SHALL BE DETERMINED BY LAW. THE VERDICT OF THE COURT SHALL BE PRONOUNCED OPENLY IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND FOURTEEN:

THE TRIAL AND JUDGMENT BY THE COURTS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN PASHTU AND DARI LANGUAGES OR IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE MAJORITY OF THE RESIDENTS OF THE PLACE. IF A PARTY TO THE CASE DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THE LANGUAGE IN WHICH THE TRIAL IS CONDUCTED, HE HAS THE RIGHT TO BECOME ACQUAINTED WITH THE MATERIALS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE CASE THROUGH AN INTERPRETER AND THE RIGHT TO ADDRESS THE COURT IN HIS MOTHER TONGUE.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTEEN:

THE VERDICT BY THE COURT SHALL CONTAIN THE STATEMENT OF REASONS AND EVIDENCE. THE FINAL VERDICT OF THE COURT IS BINDING, EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF A DEATH SENTENCE WHICH IS EXECUTED AFTER THE APPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENT.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTEEN:

THE ORGANIZATION, COMPOSITION, POWERS AND PROCEDURE OF WORK OF THE COURTS SHALL BE REGULATED BY LAW.

CHAPTER NINE

THE ATTORNEY OFFICE

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTEEN:

THE ATTORNEY OFFICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN IS A UNIFIED SYSTEM BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF CENTRALISM AND SHALL CONSIST OF: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, PROVINCIAL, DIVISIONAL, DISTRICT, SUBDISTRICT, CITY AND PRECINCT ATTORNEY OFFICES AND THE ATTORNEY OFFICE OF THE ARMED FORCES. THE STATE CAN SET UP A SPECIAL ATTORNEY OFFICE WITHIN THE UNIFIED ATTORNEY SYSTEM.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTEEN:

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SHALL LEAD THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ATTORNEY OFFICES OF THE COUNTRY. THE ATTORNEY OFFICES ARE INDEPENDENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES AND ARE SUBJECT ONLY TO THE LAW AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND NINETEEN:

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND HIS DEPUTIES ARE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT FOR A TERM OF SIX YEARS. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IS ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PRESIDENT AND SHALL REPORT TO HIM.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY:

HIGH SUPERVISION OVER THE IMPLEMENTATION AND UNIFORM OBSERVANCE OF LAWS BY THE MINISTRIES AND OTHER CENTRAL ORGANS OF STATE ADMINISTRATION, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES OF LOCAL COUNCILS, STATE, MIXED AND PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS, DEPARTMENTS, COOPERATIVES, POLITICAL PARTIES AND SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS, OFFICIALS IN CHARGE AND CITIZENS SHALL BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE ATTORNEYS SUBORDINATE TO HIM.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY ONE:

THE ORGANIZATION, COMPOSITION, POWERS AND PROCEDURE OF ACTIVITY OF THE ATTORNEY OFFICE SHALL BE REGULATED BY LAW.

CHAPTER TEN

THE CONSTITUTION COUNCIL

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY TWO:

THE CONSTITUTION COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN SHALL BE FORMED TO ENSURE THE CONFORMITY OF LAWS, OTHER LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL TREATIES WITH THE CONSTITUTION.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY THREE:

THE CONSTITUTION COUNCIL SHALL EXERCISE THE FOLLOWING POWERS:

- 1) EVALUATE THE UNIFORMITY OF LAWS, LEGISLATIVE DECREES AND INTERNATIONAL TREATIES WITH THE CONSTITUTION.
- 2) GIVE LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT ON CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY FOUR:

IN ORDER TO EXERCISE ITS POWERS THE CONSTITUTION COUNCIL HAS THE RIGHT TO:

- 1) SCRUTINIZE THE LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENTS PRESENTED FOR THE PRESIDENT'S SIGNATURE AND EXPRESS OPINION ON THEIR CONFORMITY WITH THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN.
- 2) SUBMIT CONCRETE PROPOSALS TO THE PRESIDENT ON MEASURES REGARDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AS REQUIRED BY THE CONSTITUTION.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY FIVE:

THE CONSTITUTION COUNCIL SHALL BE COMPOSED OF A CHAIRMAN AND EIGHT MEMBERS WHO ARE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT FOR A TERM OF SIX YEARS.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY SIX:

THE CONSTITUTION COUNCIL IS ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PRESIDENT AND SHALL REPORT TO HIM.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY SEVEN:

THE ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE OF ACTIVITY OF THE CONSTITUTION COUNCIL SHALL BE REGULATED BY LAW.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE LOCAL COUNCILS

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY EIGHT:

FOR THE PURPOSES OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN IS DIVIDED INTO PROVINCES, DIVISIONS, DISTRICTS, CITIES, SUBDISTRICTS, PRECINCTS AND VILLAGES. THE ORGANS OF STATE POWER IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS ARE THEIR LOCAL COUNCILS. THE EXECUTIVE ORGANS OF THE LOCAL COUNCILS ARE THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE SELECTED BY THE LOCAL COUNCILS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES. THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF LOCAL COUNCILS ARE LED BY GOVERNORS OF PROVINCES, DIVISIONS AND DISTRICTS RESPECTIVELY AS WELL AS SUBDISTRICT ADMINISTRATORS, VILLAGE CHIEFS, MAYORS AND HEADS OF PRECINCTS.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY NINE:

LOCAL ORGANS OF STATE POWER AND ADMINISTRATION SHALL DEAL WITH ALL PROBLEMS RELATING TO LOCAL ADMINISTRATION, KEEPING IN VIEW THE PUBLIC INTEREST. ALL LOCAL INSTITUTIONS, ORGANISATIONS AND OFFICES ARE DUTY BOUND TO IMPLEMENT THE DECISIONS OF THE LOCAL COUNCILS AND THEIR EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY:

THE TERM OF OFFICE OF LOCAL COUNCILS IS THREE YEARS.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY ONE:

THE ORGANIZATION, DUTIES, POWERS, ELECTION PROCEDURE AND ACTIVITIES OF LOCAL COUNCILS SHALL BE REGULATED BY LAW.

CHAPTER TWELVE

FOREIGN POLICY

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY TWO:

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN RESTS ON ENSURING THE NATIONAL INTERESTS, CONSOLIDATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE COUNTRY, PRESERVATION OF WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, EQUALITY OF RIGHTS AND ALL-ROUND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY THREE:

THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN RESPECTS AND OBSERVES THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND OTHER ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY FOUR:

THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN PURSUES THE POLICY OF NON ALIGNMENT AS A SIGNIFICANT PRINCIPLE OF THE STATE'S FOREIGN POLICY AND AS ONE OF THE FOUNDERS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT STRIVES FOR ACHIEVING ITS OBJECTIVES.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY FIVE:

THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN IS IN FAVOUR OF ESTABLISHING AND CONSOLIDATION OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY THE NEIGHBOURING AND ISLAMIC ONES IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR SOCIOPOLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS, BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY OF RIGHTS, MUTUAL RESPECT OF INDEPENDENCE, NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, NON INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, NON RESORT TO FORCE OR THREAT OF USE OF FORCE, DENUNCIATION OF ALL FORMS OF INTERFERENCE AND AGGRESSION AND SINCERE FULFILLMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY SIX:

THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN SUPPORTS THE STRUGGLE OF THE PEOPLES AND NATIONS FOR PEACE, NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE, DEMOCRACY, SOCIAL PROGRESS AND THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO SELF DETERMINATION AND FIGHTS AGAINST COLONIALISM, NEOCOLONIALISM, IMPERIALISM, ZIONISM, RACISM APARTHEID AND FASCISM.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY SEVEN:

THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN SUPPORTS THE STRUGGLE FOR TOTAL DISARMAMENT CESSATION OF ARMS RACE ON EARTH AND IN SPACE, NON PROLIFERATION AND ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND OTHER KINDS OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, DISMANTLING OF AGGRESSIVE MILITARY BASES, RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW AND JUST INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND INFORMATION ORDER.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY EIGHT:

WAR PROPAGANDA IS FORBIDDEN IN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY NINE:

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN HAS THE HIGHEST LEGAL CREDIBILITY. LAWS AND OTHER LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENTS SHALL BE FRAMED IN CONFORMITY WITH IT.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY:

THE STATE AND ALL ITS ORGANS SHALL FUNCTION ON THE BASIS OF THIS CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN AND ENSURE LEGAL ORDER, INTERESTS OF THE SOCIETY, RIGHTS AND LEGAL INTERESTS OF THE CITIZENS. STATE COOPERATIVE, MIXED AND PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL PARTIES, SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS, AND OFFICIALS IN CHARGE AND CITIZENS ARE OBLIGED TO OBSERVE THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY ONE:

AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION SHALL BE MADE BY THE LOYA JIRGA. DECISION ON INTRODUCING AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION SHALL BE ON THE PROPOSAL OF THE PRESIDENT OR PROPOSAL OF ONE THIRD AND APPROVAL OF TWO THIRD OF HE MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. IN THIS CASE, THE PRESIDENT CONVENES THE LOYA JIRGA. IF THE LOYA JIRGA FINDS THE PROPOSAL QUALIFIED, IT SHALL INTRODUCE THE AMENDMENTS IN THE CONSTITUTION, OTHERWISE, IT SHALL REJECT THE PROPOSAL. AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY IS NOT ALLOWED.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY TWO:

SALARIES OF THE PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENTS, MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, PRIME MINISTER, MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT, CHIEF JUSTICE, JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT, MEMBERS OF THE CONSTITUTION COUNCIL, ATTORNEY GENERAL AND HIS DEPUTIES SHALL BE FIXED BY LAW.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY THREE:

WHENEVER THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE, NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INTERNAL SECURITY BECOME IMPOSSIBLE THROUGH THE CHANNELS PROVIDED FOR IN THIS CONSTITUTION DUE TO WAR, DANGER OF WAR, DISTURBANCE OR SIMILAR CONDITIONS, A STATE OF EMERGENCY MAY BE PROCLAIMED BY THE PRESIDENT. A STATE OF EMERGENCY CAN BE EXTENDED BEYOND THREE MONTHS ONLY WITH THE CONSENT OF THE LOYA JIRGA.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY FOUR:

THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE THE FOLLOWING POWERS IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY.

- 1) EXTENSION OF THE TENURE OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.
- 2) DELEGATION OF POWERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN PART TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.
- 3) DELEGATION OF POWERS OF COURTS IN PART TO SPECIAL COURTS AND MILITARY COURTS.
- 4) SUSPENSION AND OR LIMITATION OF ARTICLES 30, 44, 45, 46, 49, 50 AND THE LAST ITEM OF ARTICLE 51 AND ARTICLES 53 AND 60 OF THE CONSTITUTION.
- 5) EXERCISE OF OTHER POWERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY FIVE

INTERNATIONAL TREATIES PREVIOUSLY ENTERED INTO BY THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN AND CONVENTIONS JOINED BY IT, IF FOUND REPUGNANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, SHALL HAVE ASCENDANCY.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY SIX:

ON THE ENACTMENT OF THIS CONSTITUTION AND THE ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL SHALL BE DISSOLVED. THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL SHALL CARRY ON ITS DUTIES TILL THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IS CONSTITUTED AND SHALL ENJOY THE POWERS ENSHRINED IS CHAPTER SIX OF THE CONSTITUTION. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BE CONSTITUTED WITHIN SIX MONTHS FOLLOWING THE ENACTMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ENJOYING THE POWERS DESCRIBED UNDER CHAPTER SEVEN OF THE CONSTITUTION SHALL CARRY ON ITS DUTIES TILL A NEW GOVERNMENT IS FORMED AND WINS THE VOTE OF CONFIDENCE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AS PER THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. FOLLOWING THE ENACTMENT OF THIS CONSTITUTION, THE PRESIDENT SHALL, WITHIN A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS, REORGANIZE THE JUDICIARY AND ATTORNEY ORGANS ON THE BASIS OF A UNIFIED SYSTEM IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND ESTABLISH THE CONSTITUTION COUNCIL.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY SEVEN:

THE FIRST PRESIDENT SHALL BE ELECTED BY THE LOYA JIRGA WHICH SHALL ENDORSE THIS CONSTITUTION.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY EIGHT:

ON THE ENACTMENT OF THIS CONSTITUTION, THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN SHALL BE ABROGATED. THE LAWS AND OTHER LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENTS ADOPTED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THIS CONSTITUTION SHALL REMAIN VALID, PROVIDED THEY ARE NOT REPUGNANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CONSTITUTION.

ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY NINE:

THIS CONSTITUTION SHALL COME INTO FORCE FROM THE DATE OF ITS ENDORSEMENT BY THE LOYA JIRGA AND SHALL BE SIGNED AND PROCLAIMED BY THE PRESIDENT.